date, presentation for payment within ten months was held to be sufficient to hold the indorser. Under s. 133, a note payable at a bank is properly presented for payment at the bank, although the bank is in the hands of a receiver. It need not be presented to the receiver personally. First National Bank of City of Brooklyn vs. Gridley, 98 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Supreme Court, April 20, 1906). Where one of the payees of a note, made payable to the payees jointly, indorsed it and mailed it to the maker, who then altered the note by placing his own name in the place of one of the payees and by erasing the word "jointly." Held: That under Laws 1897, c. 612, § 33, the maker had not authority to complete the note by filling the blanks, that under §71 an indorsement of all the payees was necessary to give good title to the transferee, and that under §§ 204, 205, there was no implied warranty, on the part of the payee indorser, extending to the changed condition of the note after it parted from her possession. "It is necessary in commercial transactions that the rules. of liability of parties to negotiable paper should be fixed and certain. It is better that such rules be arbitrary than that they lack precision and certainty." The defendant, who was one of the payees and accommodation indorsers on a note, indorsed another note "for renewal " and mailed it to the maker before maturity of the first note. The maker inserted his own name in the place of the name of one of the payees, and after maturity of the first note, took it up by discounting the second note. The discounting bank had no notice, until the time of the discount, that the defendant had indorsed the second note. Held: That the indorsement by the defendant before the maturity of the first note did not amount to a waiver of notice of dishonor of the first note, under Laws 1897, c. 612, § 180. National Bank of Newport vs. Snyder Manufacturing Company, 107 App. Div. 95, New York (July, 1905). A note purporting to be of the defendant corporation, signed by its president and treasurer, known by the plaintiff to be accommodation paper, without proof of execution by the president and treasurer, under authority from their corporation, does not bind the corporation. (The N. I. L. is not mentioned. See § 39.) Kerby vs. Ruegamer, 107 App. Div. 491, New York (September 29, 1905). Under § 39 of the N. I. L., the makers of a negotiable promissory note signing as "trustees," without further disclosing their principal, the payee knowing who it was, are held not to be individually liable. Salen vs. Bank of the State of New York, 97 N. Y. Supp. 361 (Supreme Court, January 19, 1906). An agent was authorized to indorse checks received from customers payable to the principal, and to deposit them in a designated bank for collection for the principal's account. He indorsed some such checks in his principal's name and deposited them with a broker as margins on a personal speculative stock account. The broker deposited the checks in a bank, which received them, and paid the proceeds thereof to him, in good faith. Held: The indorsements made by the agent were not forgeries under Laws 1897, c. 612, § 42, and therefore the bank receiving these indorsed checks and paying the proceeds to the broker in good faith is not liable to the principal as for a conversion of the checks. Oriental Bank vs. Gallo, 98 N. Y. Supp. 561 (Supreme Court, April 27, 1906). A holder of a check under a forged indorsement indorsed it to a bank and received the amount thereof, which amount was paid to the bank by the drawee, the plaintiff, which, on discovering the forgery, sued to recover the amount paid. Held: That by his indorsement of the check, the indorser warranted the genuineness of the prior forged indorsement, and on discovery of the forgery is liable to make good the amount he has received on the check. (The N. I. L. of 1897, c. 612, was not cited. See § 42, and Tolman vs. Am. National Bank, 48 At. 480 or 22 R. I. 462.) Jamieson vs. Heim, 86 Pac. 165 (July 20, 1906). A draft was made payable to A. B., which came into the possession of another man of the same name as the defendant. He procured an introduction to a bank which then cashed the draft for him. He deposited part of it in this bank and a draft or check upon it came to the plaintiff in due course. It was held that the purchaser took it free of equities, under § 52 of the Washington N. I. L. (Crawf. Ann. N. I. L., § 42). People's National Bank vs. Schepflin, 62 Atl. 333, New Jersey (November 13, 1905). A note executed by a married. woman for her husband's accommodation, unenforceable in New Jersey because of Gen. St., p. 2017, § 5, prohibiting liability of a married woman as surety, or upon the default or liability of another, is not made valid by the N. I. L. (P. L. 1902, p. 583, Crawf. § 50). Hover vs. Magley, 96 N. Y. Supp. 925 (Supreme Court, November, 1905). In an action on a note of a married woman and her husband, an answer stating that the note was without consideration as to the wife, being given for a pre-existing debt of the husband, was held to be a good defense, following Sutherland vs. Mead, 80 N. Y. Supp. 507, and Roseman vs. Mahony, 83 N. Y. Supp. 749, notwithstanding the N. I. L. of 1897, c. 612, §§ 51, 52 and 55. See contra, Brewster vs. Schrader, 26 Misc. Rep. 480, (1899). This question will have to be carried to the Court of Appeals in New York before the uniformity which is the object of the N. I. L. can be secured, by reversal of this case. See the case of Sutherland vs. Mead, previously commented upon adversely in my address as President in 1904. Rogers vs. Morton, 95 N. Y. Supp. 49 (March, 1905). In an action by the indorsee of a negotiable promissory note, against the maker, who was also the payee and indorser, a plea, demurred to, alleged that the note was never duly negotiated or discounted for value. Held: That this is the statement of an ultimate fact, and not of a conclusion of law, and was therefore admitted to be true by the demurrer. An allegation in another plea that the plaintiff is not a bona fide holder in due course, also demurred to, was held to be a conclusion of law, and therefore not admitted to be true by the demurrer. See §§ 52, 54, 60, 90, 91, ch. 612, Laws 1897. Westheimer vs. Helmbold, 109 App. Div. 854, New York (December, 1905). Under the N. I. L., § 55, when the defendants, who were accommodation indorsers on a negotiable promissory note for $300 on which $100 was advanced, returned it to the maker to procure a more satisfactory indorser, and it was then destroyed by the indorsers and the maker, the defendants are still liable as accommodation indorsers for the $100 advanced. Welch vs. Kukuk, 107 N. W. 301, Wisconsin (May 8, 1906). Where one of two defendants, makers of a note, voluntarily paid the interest thereon before maturity, although by its terms the interest was not due until maturity and the payee voluntarily consented to extension of the time of payment of the note, without regard to the time when the interest was paid, which payment of interest in advance and agreement for renewal was made without the knowledge or consent of another maker, the other defendant who signed the note without consideration, for the accommodation of the first defendant, this accommodation maker was not released from liability by reason of such extension. The N. I. L. is not cited in the opinion, although in force in Wisconsin. See Laws, Wis., 1899, c. 356, §§ 1675-55 and 1678. Crawf. Ann. N. I. L., §§ 55, 130 (but a portion of § 130 is omitted in the Wisconsin law, § 1678). Viets vs. Silver, 106 N. W. 35, Supreme Court, North Dakota (December 22, 1905). A negotiable promissory note has no validity between the parties unless delivered. The N. I. L. is not cited, although in force in this state. See Laws 1899, § 30 (Crawf. Ann. N. I. L., § 60.) Chemical National Bank vs. Kellogg, 75 N. E. 1103, New York (November 21, 1905). Where a note is dated and made payable in the State of New York, an indorsement in blank thereon is presumed, under the common law and under Laws 1897, p. 731, ch. 612, § 76, to have been made in New York, and one discounting the note in good faith can rely on such indorsement. Meuer vs. Phenix Nat. Bk., 88 N. Y. Supp. 83 (May 13, 1904). Under Laws 1897, ch. 612, §§ 79, 112, 323, 324, 325, the title to a check payable to a specified person passes by delivery without indorsement. The transfer of a check by the payee, by delivery without indorsement, destroys its negotiability, and the tranferee takes merely his transferors' title, subject to any equity between him and the drawer. The payee of a check, given to discharge an indebtedness due to her, transferred it without indorsement for consideration, and the transferee presented it at the bank upon which it was drawn, which certified it. Held: The bank was liable, although it did not know who was the owner of the check when the certification was made. See also 86 N. Y. Supp. 701 (January, 1904). Schlesinger vs. Lehmaier, 99 N. Y. Supp. 389 (June 13, 1906). Under § 91 N. I. L., a bank discounting a note with knowledge that it is usurious, is not a holder in due course. Elias vs. Whitney, 98 N. Y. Supp. 667, Supreme Ct. (April 27, 1906). Where a mere inspection of a check showed that it had been altered, a purchaser thereof took with notice of the infirmity, and was not a holder in due course, under Laws 1897, c. 612, § 91. Quimby vs. Varnum, 76 N. E. 671, Massachusetts (January 6, 1906). Upon failure of the maker, the defendant, to pay his note at maturity, an irregular or anomalous indorser paid it to the indorsee, who struck out his own indorsement and delivered the note to the irregular indorser. Five years afterwards he sold the paper to the plaintiff. note, the irregular indorser had maker, but not upon the note. c. 73, §§ 80, 81, 67, 31 (Crawf. 80, 202). Held: That, having paid the |