the board register as hereinafter provided, and also receive a certificate, said certificate to be signed by the president and secretary of said board ." Laws 1901, p. 315.

The dental board is authorized by this act to examine all applicants for certificates. To be eligible to this examination, the applicant must possess a good moral character, and present a diploma from some dental college in good standing, and give evidence of the lawful possession of such diploma. No power of legislation is conferred by the act upon the dental board, unless it may be said that the rules which the board have adopted, or may adopt, are arbitrary and unauthorized. There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the dental board have adopted any rules, arbitrary or otherwise, but assuming that the board have adopted some rulesas they certainly must, in order to properly determine the good character of the applicant and the good standing of the college issuing his diploma, and to conduct the examinations upon subjects reasonably required in that profession-we must assume in this proceeding that such rules are reasonable and within the scope and purview of the act. That the board may adopt unreasonable, unwarranted, or purely arbitrary rules for the examination of applicants cannot be presumed to defeat the act. Unless the act itself is void, arbitrary or void rules, made without authority of the act, cannot render it so. The remedy of petitioner for an abuse of the powers of the dental board is not an attack upon the act creating the board, but must be found in some appropriate proceeding to review the conduct of the board.

In the case of Ex parte Whitley, decided by the supreme court of California in July of this year, and reported in 77 Pac. 879, that court, in speaking to this point, said:

Opinion Per MOUNT, J.

[36 Wash. "Upon the other point, that the power conferred on the board is of such a character as, if exercised arbitrarily, it will be beyond the power of the court to control it, it may be said that petitioner does not seem to have applied to the court on any complaint that the board has taken. such arbitrary action. He has not complained to any court that the board has unjustly and arbitrarily dealt with him, but he is here contending that the law is unconstitutional, and that, under it, his right to practice is not subject to action or determination by the board at all. If he has been unjustly and arbitrarily dealt with, and should apply to the courts for redress, it will be doubtless found, as is stated in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 124, 9 Sup. Ct. 234, 32 L. Ed. 623, where the same objection was raised as to power conferred on the board of medical examiners of West Virginia, that ‘if, in the proceedings under the statute, there should be any unfair or unjust action upon the part of the board in refusing him a certificate, we doubt not that a remedy would be found in the courts of the state.' Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, 47 L. Ed. 563; Wisconsin v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 558."

The case of Ex parte Whitley, supra, is directly in point in this case, and discusses and decides every point presented here by petitioner adversely to his contention.

(3) If we are correct in our conclusion that the legislature, in the exercise of its police power, has authority, under the state and federal constitutions, to regulate the practice of dentistry within the state by reasonable rules, it follows that the legislature may provide that an applicant must be possessed of a diploma from some dental college in good standing. There is nothing unreasonable in this requirement, nor in the other requirements named in the act. Such diploma is evidence of the ability of the applicant to practice dentistry. It is not conclusive of such ability, and the dental board may, therefore, provide reasonable rules for determining the actual ability

of the applicant. Ex parte Whiteley, supra, and cases there cited.

We therefore conclude that the act is not violative of any constitutional provision suggested. The writ is therefore denied.

FULLERTON, C. J., and HADLEY, DUNBAR, and ANDERS, JJ., concur.

(No. 5109. Decided December 28, 1904.)

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of the Attorney General, Plaintiff, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOR CHELAN COUNTY et al., Defendants.1

EMINENT DOMAIN-STATE LANDS-CONDEMNATION OF SCHOOL LANDS BY WATER COMPANY. There is no authority in this state for the condemnation of state school lands by a water company for the purpose of procuring water for domestic purposes, since the statutes do not expressly so provide, and they must be strictly construed.

Certiorari, issued upon the application of the Attorney General, to review a judgment of the superior court for Chelan county, Martin, J., entered March 17, 1904, appropriating certain state school lands, after overruling a demurrer to the petition and a motion to dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. Reversed.

The Attorney General and Vaughn Tanner, for plaintiff.

Fred Reeves, for defendants.

HADLEY, J.-Application was made here for a writ of review for the purpose of reviewing the action of the lower court in a condemnation proceeding. Upon issu1Report in 78 Pac. 1011.

Opinion Per HADLEY, J.

[36 Wash. ance of the writ the record was certified to this court, and a hearing was had. The application was made by the state on the relation of the attorney general. The trial court entered an order adjudging that the petitioner below, the Home Water Company, a corporation, is entitled to condemn certain lands in Chelan county, the same being common school lands and belonging to the state. The alleged purpose of the condemnation is that of "procuring water for household and domestic purposes, and also for a reservoir site."

The first contention urged by the attorney general is that there is no law authorizing the condemnation of common school lands for such a purpose as stated above. Our attention is directed to the history of legislation in this state upon the subject of the power of corporations to condemn. In 1873 the legislature of the territory passed an act entitled, "An act to provide for the formation of corporations." Laws 1873, p. 398. The act repealed all former laws upon the subject. It was subdivided into four chapters. The third chapter is prefaced by the following words: "Corporations when authorized to appropriate land for corporate purposes." We fail to find in said chapter any expression that directly, or by implication, confers power upon corporations to condemn lands belonging to the state. It is true, the first section states that corporations organized for certain purposes "shall have a right to enter upon any land between the termini thereof, etc." The following remark made by this court in Seattle & Montana R. Co. v. State, 7 Wash. 150, 34 Pac. 551, 38 Am. St. 866, 22 L. R. A. 217, is pertinent:

"As well might it be contended that because a railroad is authorized to enter upon and condemn 'any' land for its tracks, depots, shops, round houses, etc., it could, by

serving notice upon the auditor of Thurston county, take the entire ten acres upon which the state capitol stands for a depot and shops."

The entire context of the chapter shows that the legislature was considering lands of private ownership, and also the right to appropriate portions of public highways or public grounds. The term "public grounds" cannot be said to comprehend common school lands, but rather tracts that are used and occupied for some public purpose. The act of 1873 conferred no authority to condemn any lands except upon corporations organized for the construction of "any railroad, macadamized road, plank road, clay road, canal, or bridge." It will thus be seen that the purposes of the condemnation, in the case at bar, as stated above, are not comprehended in the act of 1873, even as relates to private property. The legislature of 1879, however, passed an act amendatory of that of 1873. See, Laws 1879, p. 134. The first section of the act is as follows:

"That all corporations, authorized to do business in the territory, and who have been or may hereafter be organized for the purpose of erecting and maintaining flumes or aqueducts to convey water for consumption or for mining, irrigation, milling or other industrial purposes, shall have the same right to appropriate lands for necessary corporate purposes, and under the same regulations and instructions as are provided for other corporations in the act to which this is amendatory, and such corporations organized for such purposes, in order to carry out the object of their incorporation, are authorized to take and use any water not otherwise legally appropriated or legally claimed."

That section appears to confer power to appropriate lands for such corporate purposes as are sought to be accomplished here. It will be noticed, however, that the new statute does not enlarge upon that of 1873 as to what