The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that a stipulation maturing a whole series of notes upon default in the payment of one does not impair negotiability. The Wisconsin statute, however, is slightly different from the Tennessee statute. The former statute has an additional subsection among those defining instruments payable at a determinable future time, as follows:

"4. At a fixed period after date or sight, though payable before then on a contingency." St. Wis. 1915, § 1675-4.

This subsection seems to have been added to the statute to meet former decisions of the Wisconsin court, and the holding of the court referred to above is rested on the statute. Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N. W. 417, 68 L. R. A. 146, 107 Am. St. Rep. 1003.

The case of Iowa National Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa 715, 123 N. W. 237, is cited in opposition to the views we have indicated. The notes there held to be non-negotiable, in addition to the stipulation for the maturity of all upon default in respect to one, provided:

"If the said party of the first part shall sell, assign, dispose of, or attempt to sell, assign, dispose of, or remove from said county of Iowa without the consent of said Port Huron Machine Co., Ltd., the whole or any part of said goods or chattels, or if at any time the said party of the second part shall deem themselves insecure,"

-the whole of the notes should become due.

The Iowa court might obviously have based its conclusion, as to the character of the notes, upon that portion of their contents just quoted, without consideration of the acceleration clause.

Roblee v. Union Stockyards National Bank, 69 Neb. 180, 95 N. W. 61, is not in point. In that case, by a collateral agreement, the maker undertook to make payments on the notes by the delivery of milk to a certain creamery, by which deliveries his notes were to be credited. The court said the transaction involved the payment of uncertain sums at uncertain times, that it would be impossible to tell how much would be due on these notes at maturity, and that such notes were not negotiable.

Inasmuch, therefore, as we find no direct construction of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the contrary, and, believing the act, in this particular, made no change in the rules of the law merchant, we prefer to follow the interpretation of the latter rules adopted by the Supreme Court in Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' National Bank, supra, and adjudge that the negotiability of a series of

notes is not affected by a provision that upon the failure of the maker to pay any one of the notes, the whole of the series shall become due.

Such a result is undoubtedly desirable in furtherance of trade and industry. A conditional vendor, selling implements, equipment, and machinery with lieu of title retained, is thus protected against depreciation of his security, incident to its use. Purchase-money notes, so secured, may be more readily marketed. The security being better, credit will be easier, and small enterprises may be organized and outfitted with less difficulty. It is said that these notes might find their ways into different hands, and that the holder of the later notes would not know it if default was made upon an earlier note; that such default would mature the whole series, and the holder of the later notes would thus unwittingly and perhaps unwillingly have the notes in his possession rendered past due.

Chi

(2) The answer to this is that the provision that the series of notes shall become due upon the failure of the maker to pay any one of them means that such other notes shall become due at the option of the holder. cago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' National Bank, supra. Unless the holder of the other notes so elects, said notes will not become due until their fixed maturities.

The holder of earlier notes, upon one of which default is made, can only declare due and payable the notes in his possession. His act cannot affect the notes in the possession of another.

Upon the whole case we think the correct result was reached by the Court of Civil Appeals, and the decree of that court is affirmed.

NOTE. Right of Holder to Declare Maturity of Note for Failure to Furnish Additional Collateral-Negotiable Instruments Law provides that a note is not rendered non-negotiable by the fact that it is payable by stated installments or that on failure to pay an installment all the notes remaining unpaid shall become due. In Finley v. Smith. 165 Kv. 145, 177 S. W. 262, L. R. A. 1915 F. 777, it was held that a provision for accelerating maturity by demanding additional security and refusal to comply did not render a note non-negotiable. The Negotiable Instruments Act is cited as supporting this construction, because it leans to the view that independent promises by way of securing the payment of the note itself were not intended to affect a promise in itself to pay. It was said: "The promise to strengthen the collateral under penalty of the note maturing at once did not change the date of its maturity any more than would the provision in a note payable in installments that upon

default in the payment of the installment the whole should become due. We think that the promise to do an act in addition to the payment of money that will render the note not negotiable must be a promise that conflicts with some one of the essential characteristics of a negotiable note."

Further on this case argues that: "It is quite usual to pledge collateral as security for the payment of a negotiable note, and we do not think that any narrow construction of the law should be adopted that would impair the value of this kind of security. *** This condition in the note is merely supplementary to the fixed and controlling promises, and is really nothing more than additional security for the payment of the instrument."

In Kennedy v. Broderick, 132 C. C. A. 381, 216 Fed. 137, L. R. A. 1915 B, 472, there was a note payable by installments, and provision that if collateral depreciates, failure to furnish additional collateral should mature all installments. This was held not to affect negotiability. It was said: "It is clear that the stipulation for additional collateral and the sale of collateral are pertinent only to the pledge part of the transaction, and that the only condition which could, in any event, be carried into the promise to pay part, is the one by which the maturity might be anticipated. That provision, however, could only affect the time provision of the note to the extent of causing the maker to promise to pay ninety days after date or sooner on demand of the holder after the maker's default in putting up additional securities."

In Hunter v. Clarke, 184 Ill. 158, 56 N. E. 297, 75 Am. St. Rep. 160, it was said: "There can be no difference, in principle, between the exercise of an option by the maker to pay before a certain day or a provision that the note shall be due upon the happening of some event prior to the date fixed and an option of the holder to declare it due upon the occurrence of some event."

But a provision in a note giving the right to a holder to call for additional collateral when the holder deems the security insufficient does make maturity so doubtful as to take away negotiability. Holladay State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 390, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, I. A distinction was drawn in this case from a note where mere default in payment by the maker matured the note. It was said, however, that: "Here maturity of the note is to be accelerated by the failure of the maker to do something in addition to the payment of money, and both contingencies are made to depend upon something over which he has not the absolute control. It is within the power of the holder, by refusing assent to what the maker has done, arbitrarily to make the note due at any time between the date of its execution and six months thereafter. If the holder is not satisfied with the additional security, the note matures at once, and thus the time at which it may mature would depend upon the time at which the holder declared himself dissatisfied with the security delivered by the maker."

In line with the Holladay case is Lincoln Nat. Bank, 14 C. C. A. 273, 66 Fed. 887, and also Commercial Nat. Bank v. Consumers' Brewing Co., 16 App. D. C. 186.

This kind of ruling appears to have prevailed more greatly before Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted, and there is nothing except implication which overrules it. On the other hand it might be claimed, that there arises implied refusal to overrule it in the principle expressio unius, exclusio alterius. This law expressly provides that a provision in a note payable by installments that default maturing the whole note does not destroy negotiability, leaves it to be inferred that failure to provide additional security maturing a note does destroy it, especially, if it is left to holder to say how much additional security is required and its character. C.

BOOK REVIEWS.

RICHARDS' ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE LAWYER-STATESMAN.

This discussion of one side of Mr. Lincoln's character by John T. Richards, of Chicago, will be of peculiar interest to lawyers. It is not a biography of Lincoln, but presents the results of "an investigation into the record of Abraham Lincoln, as a lawyer." It presents his views upon the subjects of universal suffrage and the reconstruction of the Confederate State governments at the close of the Civil War, and his attitude toward the judiciary, upon which there has been considerable misunderstanding in recent years.

There is appended a full list of Mr. Lincoln's cases before the Supreme Court of Illinois. One hundred and seventy-five appeals were argued by Mr. Lincoln before that court and reported in the Illinois Reports. These cases involve every conceivable point of law, criminal, equitable and common law. Mr. Richards pertinently remarks that "there were in those days no specialists among the members of the bar of Illinois." The lawyer followed the court in its circuit and handled all the business which his friends and clients confided to him.

Mr. Lincoln was a successful lawyer, not flashy, brilliant, egotistical, but quiet, careful and convincing. He was a fluent talker and made a pleasing impression on his hearers, due probably to his transparent frankness and honesty in dealing with any question at issue. He was considered the greatest jury lawyer at his bar and this title to pre-eminence was attested by the testimonials of his opponents at the bar, including Leonard Swett, himself a great advocate, and Stephen A. Douglas.

A full account is given of President Lincoln's Mr. handling of legal affairs as President. Lincoln had such a great regard for the rights of property (in his mind only second to the

rights of man) that he spent much time in working out a method of emancipation that would have compensated every slave owner for the losses suffered. His attitude toward the matter of reconstruction is well known, even in the Southland, where he is now regarded as one of the best friends the South ever had. His untimely death threw the American nation back a whole generation in solving the problems of healing the wounds of fratricidal strife.

Printed in one volume, containing 259 pages, bound in blue cloth and published by Houghton Mifflin Company, New York.

CORPUS JURIS. VOLUMES 4, 6 AND 7.

Volume 4 of this serial came to us after we had reviewed Volume 5 and in due course of time Volumes 6 and 7 reached our table. The alphabet has now come in titles of subjects down to "Bills," with which Volume 7 ends, so far a remarkable achievement in treatment.

Volume 4 begins with "Appeal and Error," and ends with "Arbitrary;" Volume 6 begins with "Attachment" and concludes with "Bank Paper;" and Volume 7 starts with "Bankruptcy" and ends with "Bills;" Volume 5 having been reviewed in 82 Cent. L. J. at page 252.

This work is brought out by the same publishers as was Cyc, a short term for a work of mammoth proportions, that has become as familiar to lawyers as is the term Code to the local practitioner. Indeed, it may be thought, that a Code without the Cyc for its interpretater may be a puzzle without a key. Corpus Juris is the fuller assurance that the key for the Code is found and at the same time it unlocks the treasures of common law and equity jurisprudence. When this great work is viewed from the latter angle we cease to wonder at its bulk, but our wonder rather is that the law has been so greatly condensed, yet not to the degree that its serviceability is in any way impaired. The wilderness of instances is brought within practical control, so that marshy exhalations may be distinguished for what they are-products of a boggy intellectuality which disappear in the sunlight of correct precedent.

We gave an extended review of this great work in 82 Cent. L. J., at page 36, and refer our readers to that review. The work emanates from the eminent publishing house, American Law Book Company, of New York. Subscribers for the Cyc need it and those who have not subscribed to that work need it still more.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

Captain-"What's he charged with, Casey?" Officer-"I don't know the regular name fer it, captain; but I caught him a-flirtin' in the park."

Captain-"Ah, that's impersonatin' an officer."-Judge.

It is recorded that when Lord Halsbury was a barrister he was arguing a case on behalf of a Welshman, and showed a great knowledge of the principality and its people.

"Come, come," said the judge at length, “you know you cannot. make yourself out to be a Welshman!"

"Perhaps not," replied the barrister, "but I have made a great deal of money out of a Welshman in my time."

"Well, then," replied the judge, suppose we call you a Welshman by extraction?"-St. Louis Star.

case.

A correspondent writes us about his first We believe his letter is worth passing on. He states: "My client, who ran a cheese factory in Knox County, Illinois, was urged by the neighbors to prosecute a patron who, they claimed, had been skimming his milk for some years before taking it to the factory; but he, not being litigous, was reluctant to move in the matter. Finally he concluded to submit the matter to arbitration. The submission and the bond were drawn up; evidence was heard before the arbitrators, two of whom were justices of the peace, one of the latter being a member of the church mentioned in the award -if it could be one. I left the cheese factory after the evidence had been introduced and some remarks made by counsel for the respective parties, and returned to Galesburg. The local item from Township in

the newspaper that week contained the information that the arbitrators had found that the defendant had skimmed the milk before delivering it at the factory for several years, "to the advantage of the defendant and to the detriment of the plaintiff, but in as much as the said (defendant) is a member in good standing of the Baptist Church of Township, we adjudge that he pay the costs of this proceeding." My client informed me that, as a condition to bringing in this adjudication, the submission and the bond had been burned by the arbitrators.

"I have always tried to persuade myself that I did not lose this, my first, case; but some time before I die I would like to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that I really won it."

One

1. Adverse Possession Restrictions. can claim adverse possession by tenant to only cleared part of land in dispute, where tenant's lease restricts his use of premises to farming purposes only, with prohibition against cutting or destroying any timber.-Village Mills Co. v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, Tex., 186 S. W. 785.

2. Assault and Battery-Damages.-Where a stronger man, without sufficient provocation, assaults a weaker one, the latter, though not seriously injured, may recover for injury to his feelings.-Trahan v. Benoit, La., 71 So. 893.

3. Attorney and Client-Criminal Conduct.Attorney who acted as notary after expiration and before renewal of his commission, charging fees in a few instances, so doing through negligence instead of willfulness, was not guilty of criminal conduct by falsely pretending to be an officer.-People v. Harris, Ill., 112 N. E. 978.

4.

distinguished from lack of candor, untruthfulness, and perjury.—In re Blitz, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 276.

6.- -Fraternal Association.-An incorporated fraternal benefit association is not an insurance corporation, within the provision of the Bankruptcy Act excepting such corporations from the benefits thereof.-In re Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 199.

7.

-Jurisdiction.-A

court of

bankruptcy can entertain a petition in the bankruptcy proceedings by a judgment creditor of the corporation of which the bankrupt was an officer to have assets of the corporation transferred to the bankrupt applied to the payment of the judgment.-In re Goldberg & Sagman, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 194.

8. Jurisdiction.-A judgment rendered by a state court directing the sale of notes of a bankrupt which had been attached is void, where neither the bankrupt nor his trustee were before the court when it was rendered, and the bankrupt was insolvent when the attachment suit was begun, so that the attachment was void under Bankr. Act, § 67f.-De Friece V. Bryant, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 233.

9.- Pledge. Where a bankrupt has pledged his own and customers' securities, his securities are to be applied first to the payment, then those of his customers rightfully pledged, and lastly those of his customers wrongfully pledged. In re H. B. Hollins & Co., U. S. C. C. A., 232 Fed. 124.

10. Practice.-Intervening creditors are not entitled to notice of a continued hearing before the master on the question whether the claims of the original petitioners were sufficient in amount.-In re Smith, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 284.

11. Practice.-The withdrawal of part of the petitioning creditors does not prevent the court from proceeding with the adjudication at the request of other petitioners, though less in number and amount of claims than required to institute proceedings. In re San Jose Baking Co., U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 200.

14. Preference.-A sale in attachment proceedings in another state of notes given to a bankrupt is not a preference, where there was no transfer by the bankrupt, and he did not procure or suffer the judgment to be rendered. -De Friece v. Bryant, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 233. 15. Priority.-A court, which approved trustee's report and authorized him to sell

a

bonds and a vendor's lien, did not thereby warrant the priority of such claims over other claims, so that it was judicial bad faith for the same court to thereafter hold other claims prior to the claims sold.-Taylor v. Kimmerle, U. S. C. C. A., 232 Fed. 134.

16.- -Pro Rata Distribution.-Shares represented by stock in a corporation found in possession of bankrupt firm of stockbrokers, though insufficient to satisfy its customers, should be allotted to them pro rata.-Duel v. Hollins, U. S. S. C., 36 S. Ct. 615.

17. Selection of Trustee. Where there was a struggle over the selection of a trustee, held, that it was not improper for the referee to refuse to allow the wife of the bankrupt to vote, though her claim, which was disallowed, might be amended, where her vote would determine the choice of trustee.-In re Ballantine, U. S. D. C., 232 Fed. 271.

18. Banks and Banking-Cashier.-A bank and its receiver in insolvency, are bound by drafts issued by its cashier and by the admission of value received contained in such drafts, in the absence of proof that the payee had knowledge of the fraud of the cashier or the falsity of such admission.-Pemiscot County Bank v. Wilson-Ward Co., Tenn., 186 S. W. 59S. 19.

Beneficial Associations-Waiver.-Where a labor union did not enforce strict compliance with letter of constitution as to time of payments of per capita tax, held, local union was entitled to rely on waiver until notice, and defendant is estopped from claiming suspension of the local lodge.-Crogan v. Persion, N. Y., 159 N. Y. Supp. 500.

20. Bills and Notes-Acceptance.-Where drafts by deputy marshal on United States marshal on claim for services and expenses assigned to plaintiff are not accepted, no right of action accrues against administrator of deputy marshal till money is collected from the government.-Moore v. Harkins, N. C., 89 S. E. 43.

21. Attorney Fees.-Even if suit on note containing stipulation for attorney's fees was in default, it was error, in absence of proof that defendant was notified of claims for attorney's fees, to render judgment therefor. O'Kelly v. Welch, Ga., 89 S. E. 76.

22.- -Negotiability.-Instrument promising to pay money "negotiable and payable at" named bank is negotiable without words, "or order, or bearer."-Essig v. Porter, Ind., 112 N. E. 1005. 23. Notice of Infirmity.-Where plaintiff cashed check given for salary within reasonable time after delivery, without knowledge of infirmity in its transfer by payee to party who cashed it in payment of gambling debt, the inception of the check having been valid, plaintiff could recover of drawers as bona fide holder for value before maturity.Poshkoff v. Bernstein, N. Y., 159 N. Y. Supp. 206.

24. Part Payment.-Where borrower makes payment of part of debt to lender's attorney in fact, he owes only balance, regardless of whether payment is indorsed on back of note.-King v. Boles, Ark., 186 S. W. 607.

25. Surety.-Under agreement whereby indorsers renewed a note without the maker's signature, and whereby one indorsed such note without agreement fixing his liability and afterwards renewed the note, they would not be sureties, but principals.-Wilson v. Thompson, Tex., 186 S. W. 773.

26.

plain

Boundaries-Description.-Where tiff's deed described his land as bounded on west by a road, he took title to center of the highway there being no words in the conveyance expressly or necessarily limiting boundary to side. Cronin v. Janesville Traction Co., Wis., 158 N. W. 254.

27. Brokers-Agency.-One who had taken applications for loans and to whom lender directed borrower to deliver papers was agent of lender and not of borrower.-Brinton V. Maxey, Okla., 157 Pac. 1048.

28.--Commissions.-Where broker, on effecting a sale, payments on which were to be by installments, agreed in writing that commis

sions should be paid pro rata from each installment as received, he was not entitled to commissions, except on installments paid.-Colvin v. Post Mortgage & Land Co., N. Y., 159 N. Y. Supp. 361.

29. -Commission.-A broker employed to renew negotiations and make a sale of a business to parties already discovered is entitled to his commission if the sale is consummated, despite the fact that he did not discover the purchasers. -Minter v. Rothschild, Mo., 186 S. W. 753.

30. Carriers of Goods-Bill of Lading.Where seller consigning goods sent bill of lading to bank with directions to deliver goods on cash payment and execution of notes, and bank delivered goods without collecting the cash or requiring notes, its liability is not lessened by sum offered by buyer less than amount due.-St. Louis Carbonating & Mfg. Co. Lookeba State Bank, Okla., 157 Pac. 1046.

V.

31. Bill of Lading.-Though the Carmack Amendment expressly requires that a common carrier issue a bill of lading for goods accepted for interstate shipment, issuance of same is not a prerequisite to the shipper's right to recover for loss or damage to the shipment.— Barrett v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Idaho, 157 Pac. 1016.

32. -Connecting Carrier. Under the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act of June 29, 1906, a carrier which receives an interstate shipment routed by it over another carrier's line is liable for any damage from negligence in transportation, whether the damage occurs on its line or that of the connecting carrier.--Barrett v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., Idaho, 157 Pac. 1016.

33. Insurer. Common-law liability of carrier as insurer was not changed as to a loss on its own line by Carmack Amendment.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Rankin, U. S. S. C., 36 S. Ct. 555.

34. Carriers of Live Stock-Joint Owners.-A joint owner of a shipment of live stock was properly joined as plaintiff in a suit for damages to the shipment; nothing in the Carmack amendment depriving him of his right to join in the suit and recover.-Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Corn, Tex., 186 S. W. 807.

35.- -Negligence.-Railroad companies are liable for damages caused by failure to furnish reasonably a fit and suitable place in which to put stock received for shipment.McSpadden v. Lusk, Mo., 186 S. W. 731.

36. Carriers of Passengers-Alighting.-A carrier of passengers is not liable for injury to alighting into passenger, stepping 7% inch space between car step and station platform, in the absence of special circumstances.-Gibson v. New York Consol. R. Co., N. Y., 159 N. Y. Supp. 514.

37. Charities-Condition.-A provision in a charitable subscription that a corporation is to be formed to carry the purpose of the gift into effect is usually deemed not a condition, but an expression of donors as to matters affecting the administration of the trust.-Richards v. Wilson, Ind., 112 N. E. 780.

38. Commerce Employes.-Under federal Employers' Liability Act April 22, 1908, the right of recovery arises only where the injury is suffered while the carrier is engaged in interstate commerce, and the servant is employed the carrier in by such commerce.-Long Lusk, Ark., 186 S. W. 601.

V.