much it is offensive in itself, yet it is to be doubted as having the effect of bringing the supposed sender into contempt and to deprive him of public confidence and esteem. A stranger seeing it and knowing nothing of the circumstances would draw no inference against him at all. It would have to be explained to him what the circumstances were. If another does that, why should defendant be responsible for the making of the necessary explanation? But as the books appear to make no difference in an open publication about one and what is written to him under seal, where the words impute crime or scandalous conduct, it hardly may be open to argue that words. needing explanation are less to be considered than those which do not. It is, at least, a subject for congratulation that the law of libel can take in tow the indirection that was conceived by low malice such as in the case referred to.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW-VALIDITY OF INDORSEMENT BY MINOR.The construction of a section of the Negotiable Instruments Law reading that: "The indorsement or assignment of the instrument (note or bill of exchange) by a corporation or by an infant, passes the property therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity the corporation or infant may incur no liability thereon," lately came before the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the court saying that "the question to be ruled seems never to have been passed on by any court of last resort." Murray v. Thompson, 188 S. W. 578.

It was further said: "One of the questions on which judicial decisions were in conflict was, whether an infant's indorsement of a negotiable instrument was void or only voidable." There is then quoted from a former Tennessee case that: "Mr. Story in his work on promissory notes, §§8 77-80, puts upon the same ground the minor's incapacity to indorse and make a promissory note, and shows that there is a conflict of opinion as to whether such act is void or voidable. *** Mr. Story thought the weight of authority preponderated in favor of

holding promissory notes given or indorsed by an infant voidable only." Then the court goes on to say: "It was to make certain and uniform the law on this point that § 22 was embodied in the Negotiable Instruments Act. In stipulating that the indorsement of the instru ment by an infant 'passes property therein,' it was meant to provide that the contract of indorsement is not void and that his indorsee has the right to enforce payment from all parties prior to the infant indorser. The incapacity of the minor cannot be availed of by prior par ties. It was not intended to provide that the indorsee should become the owner of the instrument by title indefeasible as against the infant or to make the act of indorsement an irrevocable one."

Construed in this way, the section merely creates a rule of evidence in favor of subsequent indorsees in promissory note cases, and it is conceivable that it might be thought within competency so to declare. An infant by this is given the right, if he were joined as defendant in a suit, to set up a defense in the way of a cross-action and obtain judgment against all prior parties to him on the note and that plaintiff subsequent indorsee to him had no property in the note. If he were not joined in the suit, he also might recover against such subsequent indorsee for all he had collected on the note. This would serve a useful purpose in securing currency to paper negotiable in form and acquit prior parties to the infant from being further harassed by him. There is no property right in the infant destroyed, and only in exceptional instances would he be really damaged.

This view corresponds to construction of English Bills of Exchange Act, which provides that: "When a bill is drawn or indorsed by an infant, minor or corporation having no capacity or power to incur liability on a bill, the drawing or indorsement entitles the holder to receive payment of the bill and enforce it against any other party thereto."

LIBEL AND SLANDER-KNOWINGLY ACCEPTING SHIPMENTS OF LIQUOR BY CARRIER ADDRESSED TO UNAUTHORIZED CONSIGNEE.-Georgia Court of Appeal, holding that a carrier must accept intoxicating liquors for shipment, further holds that the fact that it knows or has good reason to know, that a shipment of liquor to one has not been authorized by him and would not be received by him, does not justify refusal to receive such liquor, though it knew it would not be received and that a course of addressing shipments this

way was working injury to a pretended consignee. Knight v. Ga., S. W. & G. Ry. Co., 90 S. E. 81, one judge dissenting.

A lengthy syllabus seems something in the argumentative form, in that it relies upon an absolute rule of a public service commission requiring a carrier to do certain things, under a penalty, where a shipment is addressed to a consignee. These rules are made for the government of carriers and they are not intended to foreclose anyone else of any rights he may have against the carrier.

Plaintiff averred that his name was used for the purpose of concealing the identity of the real consignee receiving liquor and that the carrier knew this absolutely. The use of plaintiff's name was therefore not essential to the regularity of the shipment nor to its being delivered to whomsoever the shipment was intended for. It was more a matter of bookkeeping arranged between consignor and carrier in which the supposed consignee had no lot or part whatever. If his objections had been listened to no right between consignor and carrier would have been more than incidentally affected. The switching to another name as a pretended consignee would be as easy as to the original selection. Why, as to a mere detail not in any way important, should consignor be allowed to use the carrier to another's injury? If the carrier could object, and yielding to his objection affected the consignor's right to ship in no substantial way, was it not its duty to object and even refuse to accept goods injuriously consigned to a party without any interest therein?

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH FOR NONDELIVERY OF INTERSTATE MESSAGE.-In Western U. Tel. Co. v. Smith, 188 S. W. 702, decided by one of Texas Courts of Civil Appeals, two questions are passed on regarding damages arising out of non-delivery of an interstate message.

One of these questions was whether the law of the state where the message originates controls as to damages for negligent non-delivery or that of the state where such negligence occurs. A review of Texas controlling author

Tel. Co., 35 R. I. 498, 87 Atl. 319, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 180.

Contra: W. U. Tel. Co. v. Flannagan, Ark., 167 S. W. 701; Honthal v. Tel. Co., 166 N. C. 602, 82 S. E. 851; Schmitt v. Tel. Co., Iowa, 146 N. W. 467.

It seems to us that, as matter of general law, the instant case was ruled correctly, for whether you say the negligence was for a mere delict or for breach of contract, at bottom the right to recover is based on a contract relation.

The second question involves the effect of act of Congress giving to Interstate Commerce Commission control of interstate messages upon the rule of recovery for delay in delivery of messages. This is a federal question and two state cases are cited as to this, one holding that by the act of Congress the purpose was clear, that the whole subject was taken over by Congress along with right to regulate, and the other, the contrary. This purpose hardly stands out as clearly as, say in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and under the Carmack Amendment. The instant case held that under either view, there could be no recovery under Texas law for mental anguish, New Mexico law where the telegram originated not recognizing any such rule, and federal courts likewise so holding. See as to whether the federal act takes over whole subject, W. U. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955, and construction thereof in Bailey v. Tel. Co., Texas, 171 S. W. 263; Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 115 Ark. 564, 171 S. W. 859; Tel. Co. v. Compton, 114 Ark. 193, 169 S. W. 946; Tel. Co. v. Stewart (Ark.), 179 S. W. 815; Tel. Co. v. Bilisoly, 116 Va. 562, 82 S. E. 91.

AMERICAN DECISIONS IN

CANADA.

To give an adequate treatment of the effect of American decisions upon the case law of Canada would require far more space than the limits of the present article would permit, as on account of the

adding only this, that the process of reasoning upon which the judges in these cases proceeded, is, in my humble judgment, incontrovertible."

The same point arose in the Province of New Brunswick in the case of Ex parte Owen, in 1881, and the New Brunswick Supreme Court decided, following the Ontario case, that federal officials residing in the province could not be taxed for provincial or municipal purposes.

Judge Weldon, who delivered the leading judgment, after referring to the American and Ontario decisions, said:

"He (referring to the counsel who argued in favor of the province) was obliged, therefore, not only to deny the authority of the decision of the highest court in Ontario, but also to dispute those principles of constitutional law propounded by the Supreme Court of the United States, even at a time when that court was presided over by so eminent a constitutional lawyer as Chief Justice Marshall. No doubt it was quite competent for Dr. Tuck to do this;

because neither of these courts exercises appellate jurisdiction over us, and therefore we are not constrained to follow their decisions unless we approve of them. But I think that it was his duty to show us satisfactory grounds for disapproving of them. He should have been prepared to furnish us with cogent and convincing reasons for refusing our assent to the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Ontario; and for repudiating the principles of constitutional law laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States. For I think, with Chief Justice Hagarty, that there is no practical difference between the principles which should be applied in discussing the relative powers and jurisdictions of the Dominion and local legislatures, under our Confederation Act, and those which have been declared to regulate the respective powers of the United States, and the several States of the Union. And that, barren of au

(3) 20 N. B. Rep. 487.

thorities upon the subject, as our own books are, 'it is to the Marshalls and Storys of the neighboring republic, and to their successors in that court, which is still true to the traditions of the best age of American jurisprudence that we have to look for guidance and assistance on a subject most familiar to them-most unfamiliar to us.'"

The Owen case was followed by the Supreme Court of New Brunswick in Ackman v. Moncton, in 1884, and in Coates v. Moncton, in 1886.

These cases were regarded as settling the law in Canada, and while Mr. C. N. Skinner, K. C., who had been engaged on the losing side in the Owen case, strongly recommended carrying the case to the Privy Council; but this was not done and for a number of years federal officials enjoyed their salaries free from provincial or municipal taxation.

In the meantime the Australian confederation had been formed, and the same point arose there. The Australian courts accepted the principle laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Australian decisions were treated fully by an Australian lawyer at the time in an article in one of the American Law Journals."

The Australian case, however, was carried to the Privy Council, which in the case of Webb v. Outrim squarely decided that the salaries of the federal officials were not exempt, and entirely repudiated the American doctrine.

The question was then brought before the New Brunswick Supreme Court for the fourth time, and in the case of King v. Abbott, in 1908, the court held that they were bound by the Privy Council decision. in the Webb case and overruled all the previous decisions.

Generally. The coming of the automobile brought no new principles of law, but its use does raise new questions for the consideration of the courts. Collisions between automobiles and railroad trains have formed a fruitful source of litigation, and the question of the care required of automobile operators when approaching and crossing railroad tracks has been raised in numerous cases. The general rule applicable to all classes of persons when approaching railroad crossings is applicable to motorists. He is required to exercise ordinary care and

prudence to ascertain whether or not a train is approaching, and if he knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence could know, of the near approach of a train, it is his duty to stop and allow it to pass before attempting to cross.1

This degree of care, while only ordinary or reasonable, is required in view of all the surrounding circumstances. The presence of the railroad is notice of the danger that arises from passing locomotives and trains, and the degree of care must be com

mensurate with the danger, whatever that may be.

The required degree of care is established upon a consideration of the automobile and its characteristics, as well as upon a consideration of the dangers peculiar to the railroad crossing. The fact that there are no horses to become frightened, and that the automobile may be driven within a few feet of the track and quickly and easily stopped, when operated at a reasonable rate of speed, are to be considered in determining whether the motorist used due care.3

In the case of New York Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Maidment, the court quite well and fully stated the general law on this subject as follows: "With the coming into use of the automobile, new questions as to reciprocal rights and duties of the public and that vehicle have and will continue to arise. At no place are those relations more important than at the grade crossings of railroads. The main consideration hitherto with reference to such crossings has been the danger to those crossing. A ponderous, swiftly moving locomotive, followed by a heavy train, is subjected to slight danger by a crossing foot passenger, or a span of horses and a vehicle; but, when the passing vehicle is a ponderous steel structure, it threatens, not only the safety of its own occupants, but also those on the colliding train. And when to the perfect control of such a machine is added the factor of high speed, the temptation to dash over a track at terrific speed makes the automobile, unless carefully controlled, a new and grave element of crossing danger. On the other

(3) Walters v. Chicago, M. & P. S. R. Co., 47 Mont. 501, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 501. Owing to the peculiar character of his vehicle, to the noise which it produces, and the fact that it may be stopped close to a railroad track in safety, there may be instances where the exercise of ordinary care would demand that the driver of an automobile stop before crossing, while the exercise of the same care would not