It should not operate to cover him against criminality in dealing with another. It is a sword against him-not a shield for him, when the avenger of the law is pursuing him. Take the case before the court and imagine that the transaction as to both parties was innocent as to federal law. What have we then? Defendant, who knows title cannot be acquired other than by actual bona fide residence, procures money from prosecuting witness by telling him it can. If the prosecuting witness was a defendant in a case making the payment of such money a crime, he could not set up he was ignorant of such a law. But can the procurer of the money by a pretense, which is a lie under the law, set up the knowledge of his victim. in his defense? Why should he be allowed to do this? The fiction exhausts itself in imputing knowledge of law to defendant. It has no need to go over to another and rebut what it has just imputed to defendant. It might be argued possibly, that there was no serious purpose to defraud, because the pretense was so opposed to law that it could not stand. This, however, would be a question of fact. Thus the court declining to say whether the fiction spoken of governs, says it is as easy for promisee to find out the truth of the matter as promissor. This surely cannot state a rule of absolute law. In many cases it is easy for a promisee to find out a statement as to a fact. That he does not attempt to find out, in no way lessens promissor's criminality. If there is the least mitigation from the theory of presumptive knowledge of law, you relegate the entire question to one of fact. The case of State v. Barrow, 36 Sup. Ct. 19, 82 Cent. L. J. 1, seems an authority opposed to the reasoning which is hereinabove criticised. The Barrow case was a prosecution for false personation of a federal officer. This personation was of an employe authorized to sell the "Messages and Papers of Presidents." The district court held that the prosecution must fail because there was no such employment un In this case there was employment of a teacher for a year, her offering herself for service, refusal to allow her to teach, a suit for two months' salary, judgment therefor, and a subsequent suit after the expiration of the term. To this latter suit defendant filed special plea setting up the judgment in the first suit. Judgment in plaintiff's favor was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeals by a majority of three to two. The prevailing opinion followed ruling in England, beginning in 1828, which rejected the theory of constructive service, and American cases were cited as following this ruling. This English ruling was in repudiation of former English authority upholding constructive service as declared by Lord Ellenborough in 1816 and the dissent shows a great number of American cases in which this theory has been accepted. As none of this English decision is binding on us under our common law, of course American courts may have their own views as to the correct theory. Justice Poffenbarger, author of the dissenting opinion, says the following: "A severable contract is not a separate or an independent one. To say a contract is severable necessarily implies a union of its parts, but not an indissoluble union. Any complete contract consisting of several parts is, in some cases, entire, but many such contracts are severable and they are severed or separated for remedial purposes. The severance is made to enable courts to do justice between the parties." He quotes as follows: The great weight of modern authority is to the effect, however, that a contract to do several things at several times, is divisible in its nature, because, although the agreement is in one sense entire, the performance is several, and an action will lie for the breach of any one of the stipulations, each of them being considered in respect to the remedy as a severable contract. 23 Cyc. 444.” It seems to us, that this view ought to be followed, not for "remedial purposes" in a technical sense, but because such is a fairer interpretation of such contracts. APPEAL AND ERROR-STATUTE INVADING JUDICIARY PRINCIPLE.-In Alabama there is a principle, supported by a long line of decisions, that when evidence is ore tenus appellate court will not disturb the conclusion of trial court trying a case without a jury, unless it is plainly and palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence. In construing a late statute regulating appeals, the Supreme Court of that state said: "The Legislature evidently intended to provide for trials without a jury in all courts unless it was demanded and to do away with the necessity of excepting to the finding or conclusion upon the facts in order to review the same in the appellate court, but did not mean to override a long line of decisions of this court as to what weight would or would not be accorded the conclusion of the trial court upon the facts. Moreover, if it was otherwise intended, it would be an invasion of the judiciary to require this court to disregard the findings of the trial court upon facts when said trial court had a better opportunity to pass upon and consider the evidence than the appellate court." Hackett v. Cash, 72 So. 52. We do not greatly favor the qualifying of a principle by a statement of a fact, the importance of which depends upon the view of another as to its application. If the principle that a trial court is in better position to judge of the value of testimony of witnesses testifying in its presence than is an appellate court reading that testimony from a printed record, is a good principle, it should be taken at its face value. Do we give it this value, when we say it must not be "plainly and palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence?" The adverbs, "plainly and palpably" are strong words, but after all they mean only as another court sees the evidence. A trial court, reversed for such a reason, did not look at the ore tenus testimony as making its conclusion contrary at all to the weight of evidence. RECENT DECISIONS BY THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETH ICS. QUESTION No. 100. Divorce-Arrangement to sue in distant state upon existing cause not recognized in present domicile—if carefully conditioned, not disapproved by majority, but wholly disapproved by minority. Husband and wife, residents of this state, are not living together; the husband having actually and by express declaration deserted the wife. There is no ground known to the wife on which she could obtain a divorce in New York. Let it be assumed that facts existing at the time of the desertion will give ample grounds for divorce at the instance of the wife in several other states. There has been absolutely no collusion in bringing such facts into existence. The husband, who actively desires a divorce, and his attorney, have requested that the wife accept a substantial money payment for herself in settlement of all claims for future maintenance and also a substantial fee for her attorney; and in return for these payments, that she go to another state, where existing facts would be grounds for a divorce, and there procure a divorce decree, it being the husband's plan to go to such state and accept service of papers. Will you kindly give me the opinion of your committee on the propriety of such an arrangement? ANSWER No. 100. In the opinion of a minority of the committee, it would be unprofessional for a member of our bar to advise, or assist in, the arrangement suggested, the object of which is to escape the operation of the laws of this state; but a majority is of the opinion that the arrangement is not inherently improper, provided there is no imposition on the wife, and the arrangement is fully disclosed to the foreign court, and the change of residence is actual and in good faith. SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 100. The inquirer has remonstrated with the committee for its answer to Question No. 100, insisting that the committee should have an swered the question as presented, without suggesting conditions not included therein. The committee, in consequence, supplements its former answer as follows: A majority of the committee was unable to agree with the minority that the mere fact that the statutes of New York do not provide for the relief desired in the case suggested is sufficient ground to condemn the arrangement or the participation of a New York lawyer in aid elsewhere according to the law there in force. In the opinion of the majority, the vice of such arrangements does not arise from the state of the law in New York, but from possible imposition upon the injured party owing to the importunities of the wrongdoer and the conditions imposed by him, possible imposition upon the foreign court by concealment of the actual facts, and a fraudulent resort to the foreign state by one only colorably a resident of such state. As the question did not negative these possibilities (though it did not, it is true, explicitly suggest them), the majority concluded that it should point out specifically the only conditions upon which, in its opinion, the arrangement would not be open to condemnation. It is unwilling to indicate that it would consider as reprehensible, participation by a lawyer in such arrangement, if carefully conditioned as it has suggested. It does consider, however, that the careful observance of such conditions would tend to minify the number of such arrangements and to rob them of the character which has led to what it deems the most serious criticism. QUESTION No. 104. Judge-Solicitation for a Charity by a Judge as such-disapproved. The attention of the committee has been directed by an inquirer to a case in which the occupant of judicial position, on the official letter-head of his court, on which he is designated as a judge thereof, has addressed a circular letter to members of the bar commending to their favorable attention a very worthy charity, of which the judge is president, and enclosing to the member of the bar a number of tickets for an entertainment of such charity. The charity is in every way commendable. The ticket refers to the judge by his official title as president. The communication sent by him requests the member of the bar to contribute to the charity in one of several ways, one of which is by accepting the enclosed tickets and making checks payable to the charitable institution. The letter is one which might properly be sent as a letter of solicitation to any member of the bar by the president of any charitable institution. The inquirer asks whether, in the opinion of the committee, it is improper for the president of the institution, while occupying judicial position, to address circular letters to members of the bar upon the letter-head of his court, and enclosing tickets urging assistance to the charity. ANSWER No. 104. In the opinion of the committee, solicitation of subscriptions to a charity from members of the bar by a judge, in the manner indicated in the question, should be disapproved as of questionable propriety. EFFICIENCY IN THE LEGAL PRO- The cause of legal reform has several aspects that are more or less familiar. The average lawyer, like the average layman, thinks of that movement in connection with the interminable delays and the obscure technicalities of court procedure, or in connection with the antiquated, inefficient organization of the judicial system in its trial and appellate divisions. It is highly creditable to the Chicago bar that it should have called national attention to another source of the law's delays, costs, confusions and vexations, and that it should have taken the initiative in a movement that cannot fail to enlist not only the progressive lawyers' organizations of important legal centers, but the progressive law schools as well. Twenty-two months ago there was organized in Chicago the first "Society of Advocates." Very brief references were published at the time in the Central Law Journal to the objects, aims and methods of this new society, but it wished to find itself gradually, to be judged by its fruits, rather than by glittering general statements, and to make sure of its province and function. The fact that the Chicago Society of Advocates, with the hearty and enthusiastic support of the respective deans of the Law Schools of the University of Illinois, the University of Chicago and other law schools, including those of sister cities, is to inaugurate a special course of six lectures at the University of Chicago Law School, makes it fitting that its work and purpose should be made better known to those interested in the modernization of the administration of justice or in the proper training of the young men and women who will be called upon to discharge the high duties of Bar and Bench. In a nutshell, the object of the Society of Advocates is to improve and raise the standards of "advocacy" in the trial and appellate courts, or, to put it in other words, to introduce more scientific efficiency, more method, more honest skill and art into the actual trial of civil and criminal cases in our courts. True efficiency is impossible without a certain amount of specialization and division of function. This is now fully recognized in every profession and business, except the legal profession. And even in that profession it is recognized-to their great advantage by the trust companies, the banks, the insurance companies, the great corporations. Only the general public, or the great majority of ordinary litigants, have, to their serious disadvantage, failed to realize it and to act upon the principle. The ordinary business man, as well as the ordinary person accused of crime, assumes that every lawyer of repute and fair training and experience is equal to any kind of a case, and equal to any question that may arise in the case, whether of pleading -that is, the drawing and preparation of the papers-or of substantive law, including the study of the issues and points involved, the writing of briefs, the arguing of the case before judge, jury and appellate courts, the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, etc. Nothing is further from the truth. A man may be an excellent "pleader" and a poor or indifferent advocate. A man may be a fine counsellor and legal scholar, and a very inferior pleader. A man may be an effective jury lawyer and a wholly unsuccessful counsellor or solicitor. The lack of legal specialization and of efficiency is responsible for many of the evils complained of by the lay and business community. Many a client with a good case finds himself out of court, after much delay and anxiety, solely because his lawyer failed to draw the original paper properly. Many a client fails to obtain justice because his lawyer attempted a task unsuited, in part, to his powers and talents. Many a man is serving time in the penitentiary because he was poorly defended and his legal rights were insufficiently protected, or overlooked. Thus there is an economic as well as a moral or social basis for the specialization contemplated and urged by the Society of Advocates. Without specialization, a good bar, a bar worthy of the problems and complex conditions of our time, is impossible. The able men will be drawn more and more to the service of the big corporations and encouraged to become specialists. The general public will have to take the leavings. In the words of Justice Farmer, of the Illinois Supreme Court, "Better men. are urgently needed at the bar; better judges and better laws will follow," since, as the same eminent jurist further said, "the work of the court is the collaboration of judges and lawyers, and the better the lawyer the better the court." How are better lawyers to be developed? There is plenty of native mental power in the profession, the law schools are steadily improving, and the alert, bright young men and women who choose law as their career leave nothing to be desired as a class. It is the unprogressive methods of the profession that leave a great deal to be desired, and it is the methods that the Society of Advocates proposes to improve and render more modern and more scientific. It addresses itself chiefly to the students of the university and other law schools. It hopes, by suitable lectures and object lessons, to impress upon the students the need of distinguishing between office work and trial work, of determining as early as possible the line of legal work for which their abilities and temperamental traits fit them. By following and developing natural faculties it is possible for the law schools to create classes of legal specialists who should be able to serve the general public far better, and at much less expense, than the ordinary nondescript, jack-of-all-cases lawyer can possibly expect to serve the average client. But the society does not wholly confine its activities to the undergraduates. To some extent, at any rate, it hopes to influence and improve the methods of those who are already in active practice. The membership has been kept small and can only be acquired by invitation and election by the board of governors. It is confined to "advocates," or to lawyers who devote most of their time to the trial of cases. These members are too busy and too well-established to need the help of other lawyers in attracting new clients, but they are willing to try cases for other lawyers, on fixed terms, and to apply to whatever extent it may be feasible, the principle of rational specialization. They bind themselves, on pain of expulsion from the society, to respect scrupulously the clientele of counsellors and solicitors who may employ them. While the Society of Advocates is the first of its kind in the United States, and the average lawyer may look upon its ideas and aims as revolutionary and undemocratic-just as spoilsmen still look on civil service and merit laws as undemocraticthe fact is that in Great Britain, in Canada, in Germany and elsewhere the doctrines of the society have been adopted and applied as a matter of necessity or of economy of The utory prohibitions and restrictions. appeal is to enlightened self-interest of lawycars and clients, to sane idealism, to the spirit of scientific efficiency. Misunderstanding and opposition may be expected from certain reactionary or timid elements in the profession, but the essential merits of the scheme are bound to commend it more and more widely. The Chicago Society of Advocates was organized in the latter part of 1914, and the roll of charter members includes many of the most distinguished judges, lawyers and law teachers in the city. The president of the society is Eugene E. Prussing and the vice-president Albert M. Kales. There are ten "governors," and the society's constitution has been carefully worked out. A. H. ROBBINS. ABANDONMENT, FORFEITURE AND RESUMPTION OF WATER USED FOR IRRIGATION PURPOSES IN THE ARID AND SEMIARID STATES. Definitions and Distinctions.-Abandonment is, "The relinquishment or surrender of rights or property." "Abandonment includes both the intention and the external act by which the intention is carried into effect." "To constitute an abandonment there must be the concurrence of the intention to abandon and the actual relinquishment of the property." Abandonment Distinguished from Gift, Sale, or Barter.-It has been said that abandonment must be made voluntarily, without any design that any other person shall acquire the property; for if it were made for a consideration it would be a |