of the claim was in fact given. It is true that in the statement made by the Court of Appeals it is said that so far as appears from the record "no claim was filed by the shipper." We must assume, however, that this was in effect a construction of the provision as requiring a more formal notice than that which was actually sent. For the court had already set forth the uncontroverted facts in detail showing that the shipper (having made an investigation in response to the communication of the traffic manager of the Railway Company) had telegraphed to the latter, on June 7, 1910, only five days after the arrival of the goods at destination, as follows: “We will make claim against railroad for entire contents of car at invoice price. Must refuse shipment as we can not handle." In the preceding telegrams, which passed between the parties and are detailed by the state court in stating the facts, the shipment had been adequately identified, so that this final telegram taken with the others established beyond question the particular shipment to which the claim referred and was in substance the making of a claim within the meaning of the stipulation, the object of which was to secure reasonable notice. We think that it sufficiently apprised the carrier of the character of the claim, for while it stated that the claim was for the entire contents of the car 'at invoice price' this did not constitute such a variance from the claim for the value of the flour as to be misleading; and it is plain that no prejudice resulted. Granting that the stipulation is applicable and valid, it does not require documents in a particular form. It is addressed to a practical exigency and it is to be construed in a practical way. The stipulation required that the claim should be made in writing, but a telegram which in itself or taken with other telegrams contained an adequate statement must be deemed to satisfy this requirement. See Ryan v. United States, 136 U. S. 68, 83; Kleinhans v. Jones,

68 Fed. Rep. 742, 745; Godwin v. Francis, L. R. 5 C. P. 295; Queen v. Riley [1896], 1 Q. B. 309, 314, 321; Howley v. Whipple, 48 N. H. 487, 488; State v. Holmes, 56 Iowa, 588, 590.

Judgment affirmed.

STOWE, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF HARVEY, v. HARVEY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 329. Argued April 27, 28, 1916.-Decided May 8, 1916.

In this case the substantial controversy was whether a transfer made by the bankrupt to his wife of certain valuable certificates of stock was made before or after insolvency; and, notwithstanding doubts engendered by conflicting statements and questionable circumstances and the different conclusion reached by the trial court, this court agrees with the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals that the gift was made during the period of solvency.

In California, where the bankrupt resided, title to stock may be transferred by delivery of certificates and the corporate books are not for public information.

219 Fed. Rep. 17, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the legality of a transfer of assets made by the bankrupt more than four months prior to the filing of the petition, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. E. Shaw, with whom Mr. Bert Schlesinger, Mr. Edwin H. Williams and Mr. Edward M. Cleary were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Charles S. Wheeler, with whom Mr. John F. Bowie was on the brief, for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

J. Downey Harvey of San Francisco was adjudged a bankrupt November 17, 1911. Appellant having become trustee of the estate instituted this proceeding to set aside a transfer by the bankrupt to his wife defendant in error of certain stock in Shore Line Investment Company because made without consideration and with intent to delay and defraud his creditors. The complaint alleges that the gift was made and stock transferred in November, 1909, when it is admitted Harvey was insolvent. Mrs. Harvey maintains that her husband gave the stock and actually delivered the properly endorsed certificate to her in 1905, during all of which year his solvency is conceded. The substantial controversy throughout has been upon the question of fact thus raised.

Having heard witnesses, the trial court held the transfer was made in 1909 and rendered a decree in favor of the trustee. The Circuit Court of Appeals after a careful review of the evidence, reached a contrary conclusion. 219 Fed. Rep. 17. We are now asked to reverse its decree and sustain the trial court.

Notwithstanding doubts necessarily engendered by some conflicting statements and questionable circumstances, upon consideration of the whole record we think the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is correct.

Appellant also suggests (a) that the gift is void because Mrs. Harvey permitted her husband for more than four years to retain apparent title to the stock and hold himself out as its real owner; and (b) that there was no actual and continuous change of possession as required by the state statute against fraudulent conveyances. In reply to these suggestions it seems only necessary to cite National Bank v. Western Pacific Ry., 157 California, 573, 581, which announces as settled doctrine in California

that title to stock may be transferred by delivery of certificates and corporate books are not for public information.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

LANE, SECRETARY OF THE

INTERIOR,

v.

UNITED STATES EX REL. MICKADIET AND

TIEBAULT.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 449. Argued April 10, 1916.-Decided May 22, 1916.

The general rule that courts have no power to interfere with the performance by the Land Department of the administrative duties devolving upon it, although they may, when the functions of the Department are at end, correct, as between proper parties, errors of law committed by the Department in such administration, held to be applicable in this case, as no exception exists to take it out of the rule.

Under the acts of May 8, 1906 and June 25, 1910, the Secretary of the Interior has exclusive authority and jurisdiction to determine the heirs of an allottee Indian who are entitled to succeed to the allotment made to him under the act of February 8, 1887, in case of his death during the restricted period; and this authority includes the right to reopen and review a previous administrative order on proper charges of newly discovered evidence or fraud while the property is still under administrative control.

A court has no power to issue a writ of mandamus to control the conduct of the Secretary of the Interior concerning a matter within his administrative authority.

43 App. D. C. 414, reversed.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

241 U. S.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the act of February 8, 1887, and the jurisdiction of the courts to control by mandamus the action of the Secretary of the Interior concerning an allotment thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The Solicitor General, with whom Mr. Robert Szold was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Since the United States, the real party defendant, has not consented to be sued in this cause, it should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The United States is the real party defendant. Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60.

The immunity of the United States from suit is not waived by failure to present the point in the lower court. Carr v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 270.

Prior to conveyance of legal title to the heirs of the Indian allottee the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction to reconsider a determination of heirship.

The statutory direction that the Secretary's decision shall be "final and conclusive" is addressed to the courts. Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506; Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281.

The decided cases settle the general rule. Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473; Knight v. Lane, 228 U. S. 6.

In this case the legal title beyond all doubt remains in the United States. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432.

The judgment of the Secretary cannot be controlled by mandamus. The petition was premature.

The order for rehearing was not arbitrary, but within the exercise of reasonable discretion. Jaster v. Currie, 69 Nebraska, 4; Tucker v. Fisk, 154 Massachusetts, 574.