ployers to use and on account of the efforts made by the sick funds reduce the sick rate among members. The general knowledge in gard to matters pertaining to health which the sick funds have seminated by means of circulars, lectures, etc., has acted in a preative manner, while the immediate and often elaborate medical vice of the funds has been such as the means of the workingmen ald but seldom have secured.

In the field of housing of the working people the invalidity organitions have rendered assistance by investing part of their funds in proved dwellings.

The effect of the insurance on the employer has been, first of all, to d to his financial burdens. During the period 1885 to 1900 it is timated that the employers have paid not less than 1,500,000,000 irks ($357,000,000) in contributions, etc. The demands on the ployers, however, have not been too heavy, nor have they injured ermany's ability to compete in foreign markets.

As to the actual amount of this burden, one authority estimates that e amount paid by the employer for accident insurance is 3 per cent the wages, for sick insurance 14 per cent of the wages, and for validity insurance 1 per cent of the wages, making a total of 51⁄2 per nt of the wages added to the cost of production. The author conudes that this burden has not been shifted to wages, nor has it esulted in higher prices to the consumer, but has been made up by provements in methods of production.

The following tables reproduce the greater part of the data conined in the statistical summary given at the end of the volume:

INCOME, EXPENDITURES, AND INVESTED FUNDS OF THE INSURANCE SYSTEM

EXPENDITURES FOR OLD-AGE AND INVALIDITY INSURANCE RELIEF.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

BLACKLISTING CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE PROCURING DISCHARGE-COMMON LAW LIABILITY-LIBEL- Wabash Railroad Company v. Young, Supreme Court of Indiana, 69 Northeastern Reporter, page 1003.-In this case John W. Young obtained a judgment in the circuit court of Miami County against the Wabash Railroad Company on the ground that it had prevented him from obtaining employment and had procured his dismissal from positions secured by him.

Young had been employed by the railway company, but had voluntarily left its service and sought employment elsewhere. Recovery for the alleged injuries was claimed under an act of March 9, 1889 (section 7077, Burns' A. S. 1901), quoted in part below, and also on commonlaw grounds, sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court.

The case was before the supreme court on an appeal from a ruling made by the judge of the circuit court as to the sufficiency of the pleading of the plaintiff as a whole and as to the two points referred to.

The contentions of the company were sustained and the judgment of the lower court reversed, as appears from the following extracts from the remarks of Judge Dowling, who delivered the opinion of the court:

The title of the act of March 9, 1889, in force at the time the supposed grievances occurred, was "An act for the protection of discharged employees and to prevent blacklisting." The section of the act relied upon by appellee is as follows: "Sec. 2. If any railway company, or any other company, or partnership, or corporation, in this State, shall authorize or allow any of its, or their, agents, to blacklist any discharged employees, or attempt by word or writing, or any other means whatever to prevent such discharged employee, or any employee who may have voluntarily left said company's service, from obtaining employment with any other person or company, except as provided in section one of this act, such company or copartnership shall be liable in treble damages to such employee so prevented from obtaining employment, to be recovered by him in a civil action."

An act of the legislature can embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject must be expressed in the title. If any subject is embraced in an act which is not expressed in its title, such act is void as to so much thereof as is not expressed in its title. (Section 19, art. 4, Const.) The subject of the act of March 9, 1889, supra, is the protection of discharged employees. The prevention of blacklisting of discharged employees was a matter properly connected with this subject. But the subject of the protection of discharged employees does not include the protection of employees who have not been discharged, or who voluntarily quit the service of their employer. Nor is the protection of employees who voluntarily quit their employment matter properly connected with the subject of the protection of discharged employees. Every section of the act refers to employees who have been discharged, and only in the second section is any provision found which relates to employees who have voluntarily left the service of an employer. This single provision is the prohibition of any attempt, by word, writing, or other means, to prevent a discharged employee, or any employee who may have voluntarily left such service, from obtaining employment with any other person, except as authorized in the first section of the act. So far as the provision just referred to applies to any employee who may have voluntarily left the service of an employer, it is not embraced in the subject of the act as expressed in its title, nor is it properly connected therewith. The protection of discharged employees was a proper and complete subject for an act of the legislature. But, under that title, provisions for the protection of employees who had not been discharged could not be included without a violation of section 19, art. 4, of the constitution. The blacklisting prohibited by section 2 of the act is expressly confined to discharged employees. The complaint does not allege that the appellee was a discharged employee of the appellant, but, on the contrary, it avers that he voluntarily left the service of the company. Therefore, he does not come within the purview and protection of the statute, and his action can not be maintained under its provisions. (Indianapolis, etc., Co. v. Foreman (No. 20,253, at present term) 69 N. E. 669.) The question remains whether the complaint is good under the rule of the common law in such cases, either as charging the appellant with libel or with a wrongful interference with appellee's occupation. The material facts alleged against the appellant in the first paragraph of the complaint are that, shortly after the appellee voluntarily left its employment, the railroad company, by its agents, falsely accused him of being a "labor agitator," and that by letters, words, and influence the appellant caused the discharge of the appellee after he had obtained employment, and by the same means prevented him from obtaining employment. A further and more specific charge is made that the appellant prevented the appellee from being employed by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad Company, at Denver, Colo., in November, 1894, by representing and stating to that company that the appellee was a "labor agitator," and unfit for said company to have in its employment, and that he was connected with the Order of Railroad Telegraphers of North America. The second paragraph of the complaint in the original action states substantially the same facts as the first, although with a little more particularity. It alleges that the appellee was a member of the Order of Railroad Telegraphers of North America, and that he assisted in the further organization of that asso