every person from participation in your Legislature who took an official oath to support the Government of the United States, and afterwards gave aid or comfort to its enemies, until such person shall have been relieved by Congress of the disability thus incurred-bearing in mind that the only relief from such disability is found in the action of two thirds of each House of Congress, and cannot be accomplished by the individual opinion of the person affected, that the aid or comfort was not voluntarily afforded."

The adoption and execution of this course by ourselves, will, I am quite confident, secure for us full and complete recognition as a State in the Union.

RUFUS B. BULLOCK, Governor.

LETTER OF HON. W. B. FLEMING.

A. R. Wright, Esq:

SAVANNAH, June 23d, 1869.

MY DEAR SIR-Yours of the 21st instant, requesting me to give for publication in the Chronicle and Sentinel, my opinion upon the effect of the decision lately made by the Supreme Court of Georgia, upon the status of the expelled negro members of the present Legislature, is received.

I have no idea that my opinion will have, or indeed ought to have, any weight in "moulding public opinion," but as you desire it, and only because you desire it, I will give it. can see no reason why this decision should have an effect different from other decisions. The decision of a Court, decides the case in which the decision is made, and of course becomes a precedent for the decision of other cases in which the same question arises. But who ever heard that the decision of any one case, decided every case involving the same question. There must be a separate decision in every case as it comes up. The case decided by the Supreme Court settles the question that White, although a negro, may hold the office of Clerk. It can have no other effect beyond the retaining of White in office, except as authority to control the decision of other cases as they arise involving the same

question. But the decision will have to be made in every case. It cannot possibly have the effect to put in or out of office others who are strangers to the judgment. Is it not a well settled principle that a judgment binds only the parties to it? There are some cases in this county (Chatham), where white persons have been installed into office by the Ordinary, who, I think, very properly felt his duty to do so, under the decision of Judge Schley. Can it be that the effect of the decision in the case of White is to put them out and put the negroes in? Could a judgment of ouster be entered up against them on the judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of White? Can these negroes be put into office except by proceedings regularly instituted for the purpose? I think not.

The same, I suppose, is true of the negroes who were elected to the Legislature. The decision in the case of White cannot put them in, or the white men out, and for the simple reason they were not parties to that act.

And now comes the question, can the negroes elected to the Legislature make a case before the judicial tribunals of the State? I have no difficulty in saying they cannot. There is but one tribunal with jurisdiction to decide this question, and from the decision of that tribunal there is no appeal; it is final and conclusive, there being no other tribunal before which the decision can be reviewed or reversed. That tribunal is the Legislature itself. "Each House shall be the judge of the election returns and qualifications of its members, &c." Constitution Article 3, Section 4.

DEAR SIR Yours of the 21st instant, in which you ask my opinion upon the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court touching the eligibility of negroes to office, has been

received. In reply, I have to say, that to the extent of their jurisdiction over the question, their decision will be biuding and obligatory upon the people of the State. The trial and correction of errors from the Superior Courts of the State is the limit by the Constitution to that jurisdiction.

The effect, then, will be, in all cases where that tribunal has the legal authority to enforce their decision, to require that it be observed, and that negroes be installed into such offices as they may be elected to fill. But so far as the status of the negroes elected to the Legislature is concerned, that is not in the slightest degree altered or changed, becauseby the Constitution-the qualification of members is exclusively given to the two Houses respectively, and from their judgment there is no appeal. No power is lodged anywhere by the organic law to review errors if they be committed in this respect by either of the Houses composing the General Assembly.

Their action in the premises, threefore, is final unless they should consent to reopen the question of the eligibility of the negro to their respective Houses, and upon argument had reversed their own decisions and adjudge him competent and qualified. To the extent that the members have respect for the judgment pronounced by the concurring Judges, they would give it consideration, and if sufficient to change their views, they would no doubt act in conformity therewith. But the whole matter rests necessarily in foro conscience, and must be decided according to the individual opinion of members themselves. No man can, therefore, speak for another in such a matter, and whilst a majority of the present Legislature may be of opinion that the negro is ineligible, the very next may think and decide otherwise. The whole power over this subject is vested by the Constitution permanently in each House. It was not a provision made for a day or a case, but for all time, and therefore written in the organic law.

It has been thus in all Constitutions of all the States as well as in the Constitution of the United States from the beginning, and must of necessity be there so long as the present form of government stands.

But whilst I suppose this will be admitted, still the important question remains, what is the proper course to be pursued by the Legislature and the people? In my judgment, it is to render obedience to the law and the officers thereof, giving to the Legislature, the Executive and Judicial, each in its own sphere, all the rights, powers and privileges thereunto belonging, and in no case contravening

them. By so doing the harmony of our governmental system will be preserved and the will of the people, where they are permitted, carried out. This necessarily throws upon the members of the Legislature the duty of disposing of this question of negro eligibility, and were I a member of either branch thereof, with my views upon the subject, I should vote unhesitatingly against it, and let consequences take care of themselves. This I should do conscientiously and in conformity to my opinion of the law, at all times, and in every form in which the subject might be presented.

But another and very important form in which this question may arise, is, in cases made before the Judges who are under the supervisory power of the Supreme Court, and whose decisions must conform under the law to those made by the higher tribunal. Over this class of officers the decision operates, and will be executed as the law until the same shall be changed by a reversal in the Supreme Court itself, or by the people in the manner prescribed by law.

I look upon the opinion of Judge Brown, even admitting his premises, as the clearest case of non sequiter that ever was written; in fact, illustrations, if such were ever collected, none could be found so apt as that pronounced by the Chief Justice in this case.

As to Judge McCay's, before he can make up his judgment he has to put us outside of all constitutions and laws, and take his start from that point. And with his theory he makes the negro a consistent element in the formation of the present State government, and, therefore, he has all the rights and privileges appertaining to any citizen of the Commonwealth. I confess that the negro constituted about ninety per cent. of the elements which made up the present Constitution of this State, the Federal soldiers with the bayonet about seven, and the remaining three per cent. was composed of native and imported whites.

The white element was, however, increased in the ratification of the Constitution, but this was due in a great degree to the clear and convincing argument of Judge Brown against the constitutional right of the negro to hold office.

But, taking Judge McCay's view, that we were outside, leaves me great difficulties to overcome. I cannot see how one from his standpoint can come to the conclusion that the Constitution of the United States had even become void or inoperative in these States, when the whole war was waged by the Federal Government upon the ground that it was impossible for us to get from under its authority, and that it extended throughout the States and Territories of the whole

Union. We were conquered into obedience thereto, and then for the first time it was discovered that it was not of force in these States; in its name we were denied its rights and privileges, and in its name the sword and not the judge declares the law. The inconsistency of coercing a State into subjection to the Constitution is only equalled by the enormity of the proposition that when she is coerced that the Constitution does not extend over it at all.

But to conclude our hastily written letter, we say that our duty is to obey the law as it is made and decided by each department of the government, according to its power and authority to decide, and make no effort to "disrupt the ties" &c., because the President prefers a "colored" to a "plain" Republican. With me a spade's a spade, and the "plain" will be for disrupting the-party unless the thing is stopped. Respectfully yours, &c.,

MARTIN J. CRAWFORD.

LETTER OF HON. JUNIUS HILLYER.

General A. R. Wright:

ATHENS, June 24th, 1869.

MY DEAR SIR-I received by yesterday's mail your letter referring to "the recent decision of the Supreme Court of this State, in relation to the eligibility of negroes to hold office, and asking my opinion upon the effect of this decision upon the status of the expelled negro members of the present Legislature.

At your request, General, I willingly give you my opinion upon the question stated. In doing so, I think it best not to crowd the columns of your paper by an elaborate argument, but to content myself with a simple statement of my opinion, with such reasons and remarks as may be necessary to make it clear and intelligible.

I have all my life been a law-abiding man, and have made the principle of obedience to the laws of my country a part of my religion and a matter of conscience; and while I regard the Supreme Court of the State as the proper final ar