visional organ of consultation for the purposes of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Its council takes action to further cooperation in the economic and other fields or through its technical economic organ, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

As the central organ of OAS, the Pan American Union acts as advisor to its council and organs in the preparation of programs. It offers technical assistance and necessary personnel to the governments of member countries.

3. Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

Section 405 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorizes the appropriation of $11,189,190 to be contributed to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) for the purpose of assisting in the movement of migrants, as well as a continuation of other unexpended funds previously made available. ICEM was established in 1951, with 24 member nations, to facilitate and increase the movement of migrants and refugees out of the overpopulated countries of Europe-Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Greece-to overseas countries in a position to receive immigrants-Australia, Canada, the United States, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. Approximately 250,000 emigrants leave Europe annually on their own resources or assisted by their governments.

4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Section 415 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorizes the President to use funds available under sections 131 (Defense Support) and 403 (Special Assistance in Joint Control Areas) in order to furnish assistance, by transfer of funds and by other means, directly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for a strategic stock pile of foodstuffs and other supplies, or for other purposes. While NATO is now considered primarily as an organization for the defense of the member nations, the North Atlantic Treaty embodies political and economic clauses, and the defense functions themselves call for economic measures.

NATO reviews annually the economic potential of the member states to ascertain the capabilities of these countries to support force goals, defense production, and other security commitments.

5. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

The agreement establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. The

treaty, which came into effect on February 19, 1955, is designed to promote security and peace in southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific. It calls for economic cooperation to enable the free countries of that area to gain strength and vigor, not only militarily, but also socially and economically.

Artcle III of the treaty recognizes the importance of free institutions and sound economies in achieving the objectives of peace and security. It is based on the assertion that the opportunities of communism will diminish if the free nations are able to develop their internal stability through economic cooperation. The member nations agree to cooperate in promoting economic progress and social well-being.

Member nations include Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.

6. OEEC and EPA

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and its subsidiary agency, the European Productivity Agency (EPA), are in a sense the offspring of our mutual aid program. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 made assistance contingent upon continuous effort of the participating countries to accomplish a joint recovery program through multilateral undertakings and the establishment of a continuing organization for this purpose. Work in the Committee of European Economic Cooperation led to a convention in April of 1948, establishing the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. OEEC's immediate task was to draw up and carry out a joint recovery program to end as soon as possible the dependence of member countries on extraordinary outside help. The participants agreed to use self-help and mutual assistance to the maximum; they pledged themselves to develop production, to modernize their industrial equipment, and to develop the maximum possible interchange of goods and services. They agreed to take a number of steps toward free trade and the free movement of people. While regional in membership, the OEEC recognized the need to balance trade not only among the membership, but on a worldwide basis as well. OEEC machinery at the outset consisted of a council, an executive committee, and an international secretariat with a secretary general. Decisions were to be unanimous. Thus OEEC was limited to action involving no sacrifice of sovereignty, which could be carried out by mutual cooperation. At best, it could be said that OEEC has strengthened the habits of mutual consultation in Europe on economic problems.

The European Productivity Agency (EPA) was set up in 1953 as a unit of the OEEC, to put into effect on a self-help basis the programs fostered by the Benton and Moody amendments looking toward an

increase in productivity in European industry and agriculture. EPA was financed by counterpart contributed by the participating countries (11 signed Moody agreements) and by a direct contribution of $2.5 million to the OEEC from the United States to support EPA.

Although the United States is not a member of the OEEC, because of its regional nature, it participates in the work of the organization, and of the EPA as well. This work has been supported by the personnel of the United States Regional Office (USRO) in Europe, and this in turn has been supported by the Foreign Operations Administration in Washington.

Both OEEC and EPA were created to take over and carry forward on a regional basis, such elements of a program of regional mutual assistance and self-help as were valuable and appropriate, and which would permit the United States to withdraw from this field except for extraordinary measures.

7. EPU

The European Payments Union (EPU), like OEEC, was set up at the instance of the ECA. European efforts to relax trade barriers and otherwise to move in directions desired by United States policy had led to serious difficulties in clearing European balances of payments, which had not been solved by the two payments agreements made in 1948 and 1949. At the end of 1949, ECA submitted a plan for a payments union to the OEEC, which was adopted in September 1950. This plan embodied a fundamental contradiction in objectives— should EPU be developed as a permanent instrument for the integration of Europe, or should it be simply a transitional step toward full world-wide convertibility? EPU's main objective was to help in trade liberalization, but moves in this direction led to further difficulties. Member nations were under pressure to "correct" their internal economic position if they were recurrently debtors or creditors in the payments union. And the ECA soon found itself in the position of intervening in the economic affairs of OEEC. In the case of Belgium, that country, having an overall dollar deficit but an intra-European dollar surplus, was asked to solve the problem of its overall deficit by raising discriminatory barriers against American trade and increased government intervention in the Belgium economy-action hardly compatible with the objectives of American economic policy."

EPU needed money to operate. The United States made available initially a capital fund of $350 million and an "administrative" fund of $150 million to take care of the position of "structural debtors" (States which were in continuing difficulties in settling their EPU accounts). As contributor of these capital funds, the United States

Brown and Opie, p. 210.

retains a continuing voice in EPU deliberations, and has a say in the ultimate distribution of the capital funds, if EPU is disbanded. These rights and responsibilities have required continuing United States representation, which has come to date from USRO.

8. Discussion

The existence of these various international agencies with functions in the fields of economic assistance, and the participation of the United States in them, raise a host of questions. Many of these points have been raised and examined in the special papers dealing with technical assistance and the disposition of FOA functions.

The general question of whether the United States should alter the balance between its bilateral and its multilateral efforts cannot be given a general answer. The requirements of our policy, and the opportunities and weaknesses of each program must be taken into account. One broad observation is of general application, however; wherever it appears that the United States can meet its policy objectives by supporting the work of an existing agency rather than organizing or operating its own agency, it should do so. It is probably cheaper in the long run, and technical functions will be discharged by better qualified people if the United States takes full advantage of the specialized technical skills already assembled by going international organizations.

Most international organizations depend on unanimity, since the participating governments are sovereign States. Hence their programs are restricted to a common denominator on which all parties agree; many of them deal only with the gathering and exchange of technical information and personnel, and the furnishing of forums for conference and discussion. As such, their programs are not susceptible of great expansion, or of bending to the exclusive interest of any one sovereign power. Into this class fall such organizations as FAO, ILO, WHO, and UNESCO.

The action agencies, which depend on the voluntary contributions of the participating states, are more flexible, and their programs are sized more according to the operating needs and the forthcoming funds. These include UNICEF, UNKRWA, UNRWA, ICEM, and UNREF. They are often set up for limited time periods, and tend to disappear with the emergencies which have called them into being. The Bretton Woods agencies-IBRD and the International Monetary Fund-have fallen far short of the hopes which their sponsors held for them at birth. We are in process of expanding the role of the bank by the addition of an International Finance Corporation which will add certain functions and funds to the total available from international sources for economic development purposes.

Congress has the word on this at the moment, so far as the United States is concerned. But there appears to be no movement or desire to expand the powers and functions of the Monetary Fund. The bank's role and its relations to our Export-Import Bank are discussed further in the paper on public lending agencies.

The work of the Organization of American States might be expanded, but there seems to be little pressure or need for it. The United States already carries 66 percent of the budget of that organization, and for that very reason should not press for an expanded program unless the other American States are willing to increase their contributions more than proportionately.

The problems posed by the civilian functions of NATO and the as yet unexplored economic role of SEATO are manifold, but they do not extend to the simple one of more of NATO/SEATO and less of FOA. On the contrary, the more active are these regional politicomilitary-economic organizations, the greater is the requirement for proper United States Government participation; they will pose continuing problems of organization, staffing, and procedure both in Washington and in the field. The meshing of economic with politico-military aspects creates problems at the level of the National Security Council, where it does not now appear that we are fully equipped to deal with all three elements of national security matters. Our joint military planning requires economic estimates of the capacities of participating countries, to determine what they can contribute and what we must contribute, to achieve determined force goals and other defense requirements.

The problems posed by OEEC, EPA, and EPU are more important for policy than for administration. These agencies were launched in an effort to shift the burden of economic reconstruction and future progress to other shoulders. We have commenced to shift that burden; if we continue to do so we can look forward to a lessening of the administrative requirement for supporting these organizations, down to the point where a small amount of diplomatic contact and organizational liaison will be enough to keep our hand in and make a proper degree of influence felt, without risking the resentments which are bound to arise from daily intervention.