French budget support under the guise of these two types of aid. The budgetary support is open and direct in the case of funds for the Indochina war.

Pakistan

Total United States aid to Pakistan, for technical assistance and special economic assistance during the period fiscal year 1951-55, amounted to $150.08 million. These had the nature of defense support, although the aid was not so identified until Pakistan became eligible for military aid. Once the program was identified as defense support, all balances remaining from the previous development assistance (or special economic assistance) programs were also identified as defense support.

Since the military and defense efforts of Pakistan are an important factor in the defense of the free world, it necessarily follows that they are of basic importance in the total United States aid program to Pakistan.

Increased military and defense requirements of Pakistan cannot be obtained without a disastrous drain on the country's economy unless bolstered by outside assistance. This means that the United States must support these additional costs which we are doing under the guise of "defense support," which embraces almost anything in the form of economic aid which directly or indirectly contributes to the strength of Pakistan.

This points up the difficulty of distinguishing between the various aid categories; i. e., technical cooperation, economic, development, and defense support.

The benefits to be derived from this conglomerate of aid are in consonance with the quality of the planning and programing. To date there has been a lack of such adequate planning and programing, with a consequent inadequacy in results.

Unless careful restraint and perceptive judgment is exercised, our objectives of increasing the military and defense capabilities of Pakistan will not be obtained and our defense support aid will be wasted.

Philippines

Up to and including fiscal year 1955 there has been no aid by the United States in the direct-forces-support category.

The interrelationship and heterogeneity of the technical cooperation and defense support aid is evident in the Philippines as it is elsewhere. This is illustrated by the avoiding of the commodity limitations inherent in the technical cooperation title by supplying the commodi

ties for a number of agriculture and natural resources Technical Cooperation projects from the defense-support component. Again we must draw the conclusion that both are part and parcel of economic aid despite the individual titles which separate them only for the purpose of funding. In addition, technical services for evaluation, planning, and design of many defense-support projects will be funded under technical cooperation.

Defense Support

Prior to fiscal year 1955, the Philippine program was developed and presented on an integrated basis, which combined defense support, economic assistance, and technical assistance. In accordance with the requirements of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the proposed program was broken down into two components-technical cooperation and defense support-all grants.

It should be noted that the funds made available to the Philippines have been utilized largely for projects designed to increase investment in productive public projects and to improve or expand public service. Their value as defense support is debatable.

The fiscal year 1955 program, all grant, shows a total of $22.8 million, of which all but $7.3 million is for defense support ($15.5 million). A review of the fiscal year 1955 program indicates that while there is no doubt it is economic aid, there is some doubt concerning the classification of defense support applied to better than two-thirds of these programs.

The following table (fiscal year 1955) is illustrative of this as well as being indicative of unsettled thinking (comparison of illustrative and operational programs):

Illustrative and Operational Programs, Fiscal Year 1955

In the illustrative program neither technical support nor regional and interregional costs were shown separate from the categories.

United Kingdom

The cumulative aid program to the United Kingdom, from April 3, 1948, to June 30, 1954, shows $85 million allocated for direct forces support. An item for industrial commodities in the amount of approximately $1,968 million undoubtedly contained elements which could properly be classified as defense support. One of these, in 1951, was for $112 million in machine tools for the manufacture of aircraft, tanks, guns, and naval vessels.

The fiscal year 1954 military program of $316.3 million contained $206.3 million which might be characterized as defense support.

Again this factor shows when counterpart expenditures after the Korean outbreak were devoted in great part to military uses. Military production ($611.8 million) and promotion of production for military use ($18.3 million) appear to fall in a defense-support category.

In addition to the above, $84 million in counterpart funds were spent for defense budget support during fiscal year 1953 and fiscal year 1954.

It would appear that, while economic benefits to the United Kingdom from defense aid and special programs are substantial, the reverse also appears to be true as in the following cases:

(a) Steel Company of Wales, Ltd.-The United States contributed $2.7 million for construction and expansion of sheet and plate capacity, with resulting economic and defense support benefits.

(b) National Oil Refineries, Ltd.-A contribution of $2.9 million for expansion.

(c) Sheel Haven Refineries.-A contribution of $2.6 million for expansion.

Both (b) and (c) above, while basically economic aid, were aimed at increased production for defense use, i. e., Defense Support.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

Generally speaking, both direct forces support and defense support aid have constituted budget support in a varying degree from country to country, and have involved activities, in most respects, which are indistinguishable from economic aid or technical assistance.

The term “defense support," it seems obvious, was originally introduced as part of an effort to win continued public and congressional support for an economic aid program in Europe at a time when there was considerable opposition to additional economic aid grants. This, however, is not a commentary on the importance or necessity for such aid in developing the defensive strength of the free world.

The introduction of new terms to describe phases of the foreign aid program has not resulted in greater public understanding of the program, especially when some of the terms used convey no real understanding of the programs they encompass and no real meaning in themselves.

Public understanding of the aid program, and undoubtedly its administration, would be simplified if the various terms were redefined and the program realigned, to bring identical or similar activities under the same heading and to abolish the distinctions without differences which now exist. This can, and should, be done without introducing new terms which add to the confusion, or changing the terms again in another year.