XV. Conclusion Whether or not future aid to Israel other than technical assistance should be continued depends on United States foreign policy objectives with respect to the future of that country. Immediate objectives have been reached. Immigration has stopped, temporarily at least. The country is not in acute financial distress or in danger of becoming so in the immediate foreseeable future. There is no serious internal weakness in Israel that would invite Arab attack; and no important pressures within Israel to attack the Arab States. There is no immediate apparent danger that the armistice agreement obligation of the United States (along with that of Britain and France) to maintain the present boundaries between Israel and the Arab States will lead to the involvement of this country. On the other hand, the United Staes may have some moral obligation to Israel since it exerted a strong influence in the decision to set up an independent nation and a national home for the Jewish people there. The country has made rapid progress, but it still has some years to go (possibly 7 or 8) before it becomes economically self-sufficient, even at the level of the present low standard of living. In the meanwhile it must depend on reparations, loans, and gifts from its friends abroad. Until it achieves viability it will be a potential danger spot. Present United States policy is to relieve reasons for tension between Israel and the Arab States as rapidly as possible. Economic assistance to both sides will increase United Staes influence and make its task of preventing war in that strategic area that much easier. The extent and form of future United States assistance to Israel, if any, should be based on a United States foreign policy decision, developed in part from recommendations of the National Security Council. From its inception to the present, United States economic aid to Israel has influenced events there and has played an important part in bringing about the present fairly satisfactory situation. It has been administered in as satisfactory a manner as could be expected. Much more, however, could have been accomplished with better administration of the technical assistance program. Since technical assistance will probably continue for some time to come, and since it can accomplish results substantially greater than the amount of funds expended, this type of United States aid in Israel should be given greater emphasis. There is some indication that the present United States mission chief recognizes this, and will devote greater attention to this phase of activity in the future. The cost of the Israel program, $186 million for economic aid, $1.2 million for technical assistance, and $1 million for administration, does not seem too great a price to have paid for preventing that country from going bankrupt with the concomitant risk of Arab attack and war in this strategic area of the Middle East. Undoubtedly some mistakes have been made, but in relation to the amount of money expended and the results achieved, they do not loom too large. Finally, it is repeated that to appraise a foreign aid program, even with all the facts available and an on the spot examination, is a hazardous task at best. So far as this report is concerned, it was neither possible to get all the facts nor to make the on the scene inspections. It should be read with this in mind. 1 Figures for 1953 are not available on a basis comparable to the definition of administrative expenses utilized in 1954 and 1955. 2. Employment for MSP Activities as of June 30, 1954 |