페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

e humanitarian and so forth; but I do say that with all ild-they can be strong, they can be unified; they can be d the evidence is that they do have serious economic you have documented that and I am inclined to appreciate , and I think that Senator Mansfield had to admit that s seemed to be sound.

ess, they do have a discipline and an authority over their I think is very, very hard not to recognize. Yes, sir? Coercion, I think, is the word that might be used. nk the Chinese people are no more and no less intelligent eoples. Now, if we were told one day that Lin Piao is the mrade we have, the next day we were told he is the worst he world there is, I cannot help think that the Chinese some doubt about the political system that rules the

ARTZ. May I say something?

PROXMIRE. Yes, sir.

ARTZ. I think that that side of the picture must be Sa strange historic phenomenon here. I do think China quite drastically in the next few years, particularly after It is very difficult to tell in exactly which direction it wet I don't think that this picture that visitors get of a ermination to hold together is wholly a case of Potemkin's aply a case of coercion. It is something that probably goes ical structures. There is a desire to hold together. I is a deep desire to maintain China as a strong nation. ever, that behind your question was another questiona does remain unified will it be a menace to the world? PROXMIRE. That is the question that I was basically

ARTZ. Yes. Let us assume for the moment-putting aside that it will remain unified. Here I would point to the placed on China by the world environment in which it think it is always wrong to say that any society is ineternally "aggressive" or "nonaggressive." Any society in turn in history may be aggressive at times and nonothers. Thus I wouldn't want to make any blanket ncerning the distant future.

st submit that China is in a world where it confronts other uclear powers, where it has all kinds of external constraints one assumes a leadership that is wildly irrational—and, at may happen-I would doubt that even a China of 800 800 million people are as much a problem as an asset) and a that is strongly united can easily conquer the world. hal leadership I would think that they would realize they ld where formidable power continues to reside elsewhere. PROXMIRE. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I don't think any regime can really unify

without

48

Chairman PROXMIRE. Let me think of that a little bit, because I think it is a fascinating observation. You say only a humanistic government can unify the Chinese people. I wonder if a humanistic government can ever really unify any people; humanism being the kind of thing which seems to me allows difference and dissent and for a considerable degree of divergence, and so forth.

Mr. Liu. Well, there have been many changes in the Chinese history, of course, many dynasties. The most successful one was the Tank dynasty. Of course, in the first few years it had to fight but after that it followed very humanistic sort of policies and it was still the best, one of the very best dynasties we had so that is a concrete example.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Best in terms of its kindness and decency and so forth?

Mr. LIU. Yes.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Was it effective in unifying that vast and divergent land?

Mr. Liu. Well, because it is humanistic and because it is kind, it therefore succeeded in unifying the country. The famous emperior is Tank Tai Tsung whose policies were really quite benevolent.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I would add after Tank Tai Tsung had come to power in a sea of blood. I think that this is not a simple question. We talk of a "Communist system" and assume that we are discussing a clear and unchanging entity. I would certainly be prepared to call the present system in China a Communist system; China is still totalitarian but, as I mentioned before, China is in flux. What we now call communism in China is already different in many of its aspects (although the differences may not be attractive to many of us) from the Soviet Union. When we used the term a "Communist system" in the 1940's, what we meant was Stalinist Russia with its specific political organization and its specific economic organization.

As I have tried to indicate in my statement, in the economics sphere the Chinese leadership has departed most drastically from the Soviet way of doing things. Their political structure remains in flux.

I think there is even hope of their moving in the direction of a somewhat greater relaxation and flexibility in the cultural and educational spheres.

In other words, the "system" may have within it the potentialities for change over time.

Chairman PROXMIRE. Thank you very, very much for your exchanges and responses. They have been very helpful.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when we will have as our witnesses Owen Lattimore, director, department of Chinese studies, Leeds University; Prof. Joyce Kallgren, deputy director, center for Chinese studies, University of California at Berkeley; and Prof. Yuan-li Wu, University of San Francisco and Hoover Institute.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 14, 1972.)

OMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN MAINLAND CHINA

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 1972

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Washington, D.C. mittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room Capitol Building, Hon. William Proxmire (chairman nittee) presiding.

Senators Proxmire, Fulbright, and Javits; and Repre

-oggs.

esent: John R. Stark, executive director; Loughlin F. enior economist; John R. Karlik and Courtenay M. Slater, ; Lucy A. Falcone, research economist; George D. Krumand Walter B. Laessig, minority counsels; and Leslie J. nority economist.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE

n PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order.
day of hearings on China was a most productive one. Led
tor Mansfield, the majority leader, and Senator Scott, the
ader, there were a number of points of agreement and some
in judgment.

I agreement were: (1) Although China may continue to
y defense burden, it will use its capabilities primarily on
ders. Thus, if we withdraw from Indochina, we may expect
r of military threat from the People's Republic of China;
jor shortrun problem is Vietnam; Taiwan is a longrun
3) trade and exchanges may be modest but are of value;
major external concern is with the Soviet Union.

disagreement are: (1) Is China strong, unified, and dyIs the present Chinese regime stable? Will the stability f not, why not? (3) Can we assess China's economic perAre they doing better outside the defense area? (4) How led-by coercion or consent?

hat not only are United States-Chinese relations changis long overdue-but China itself is changing.

he course of our study, and increasingly as the hearings e are struck by the need for a thoroughgoing reassessment

[ocr errors]

Today we turn first to Prof. Owen Lattimore. We are especially honored to hear from Prof. Owen Lattimore, one of the world's leading specialists on Chinese, Mongolian, and Asian affairs in general. Mr. Lattimore has flown over here from England where he has been instrumental in developing a fine program of Chinese studies at his center in Leeds College.

Once we could call Professor Lattimore our own. Because of the terrible attacks of my predecessor, Senator Joseph McCarthy, in hounding Professor Lattimore unmercifully for views which today are recognized as facts of life, he decided to emigrate to another land. Professor Lattimore, as Senator from Wisconsin, I want to take this occasion to apologize to you for the indignities you suffered in the ordeal of the early 1950's. I hope it will never again happen to any man. I think it is time, certainly, that we should recognize that whether we agree or disagree on foreign policy matters, we should not question the patriotism and devotion to the fundamental principles of our country of a man who just happens to disagree with us. If there is one fundamental tenet in our democracy, it is the notion that people can express themselves according to their own conscience, not matter how that may disagree with somebody who happens to hold office and to hold power, whether it is senatorial power or executive power.

Despite your protestations of lack of familiarity with the current China scene, we know you are one of the most knowledgeable experts in this field, and we shall gain lasting insights from your testimony today. Go right ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF OWEN LATTIMORE, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF CHINESE STUDIES, LEEDS UNIVERSITY, UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. LATTIMORE. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I should say and I want to apologize again; this is most embarrassing to me with these distinguished witnesseswe did this to the majority and minority leaders yesterday. We have a timer here, and we try to limit your testimony to 10 minutes and then after that go into questions so we can have more time for questions. Mr. LATTIMORE. Thank you, Senator. Before the timer goes on, may I make just one correction. I was not hounded out of this country. I was engaged in teaching very successfully at Johns Hopkins University and suddenly, quite unexpectedly, from a university which I had never even visited, I received an invitation to go there and found a new department, which toward the end of a man's career is a wonderful opportunity to start something new based on a lifetime of experience and to be allowed to do it your own way. It is a very, very great compliment.

Chairman PROXMIRE. I appreciate that correction. Thank you, sir. Mr. LATTIMORE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is an honor to be asked to testify before this committee, but I should point out, before somebody else does, that my qualifications for the honor are limited. Although I spent some 25 years in China, my last visit was 27 years ago and lasted for only about 10 days, including Christmas 1945

[ocr errors]

then

called Ameni

years of the civil war which ended in the liberation of the Communists in 1949.

been asked to address myself in the first instance to the Republic of China: An Economic Assessment" prepared by aff of this committee, but here again I must be careful not an authority.

ics is a branch of mythology which I have never studied. ay is that I spent about 6 years as an employee of a business na, rising to be manager of their Peking office. This was the hich we kept a supply of grease for the palms of Governals. In those years, which were years of chronic civil war, I ed frequently in the interior trying to negotiate passage for h had been held up either by corrupt officials or by warring herefore know something about the economics of corrupI can also say that I was a participant in the economics of n in the years when it was breaking down.

doubt whether economics exists as a science, the world is onomic facts and in my opinion the contributors to this Republic of China: An Economic Assessment" have prowith an admirable collection of facts, useful for a better understanding of China. They have achieved a higher standhost American academic studies of China; but then one must that the standard of academic studies of China is distinctly merica than it is in countries like England, or France, or Japan.

rits of this study speak for themselves and will doubtless ven more clear by questions asked by members of this comshall, therefore, proceed directly to a few points on which, rong, I have strong opinions.

n with, I think an historical introduction is desirable. China may be called a prerevolution lasting much longer than that From 1911 there was always civil war in some part of the 'rom 1931 there was a foreign invasion which occupied the ts of China. From 1945 there was renewed civil war, made avish American aid to the losing side. The mere cessation of 1949, therefore, and the installation of a government that d the whole of China for the first time in nearly 40 years, uine liberation and equivalent to the most massive relief China's history.

uld next proceed directly to what may be called the American Chinese politics.

resident Truman and the beginning of the cold war, it has ashington shibboleth that you can't, you mustn't negotiate munists except from a position of strength. Yet the stark, ked truth is that today, under President Nixon, America is t time trying to deal with both China and Russia from a posiakness. Only the agile histrionics of the President and Mr. distract attention from the fact that the emperor has no

erica's growing weakness, and especially defeat in Vietnam, s the difference between the great cultural revolution period

« 이전계속 »