for the trial of small causes. The statute (Gen. St., p. 1638, 18) empowers any board of health to prescribe a penalty for the violation of any of its ordinances, not exceeding $100 or less than $10; and provides that every district court in any city, and every justice of the peace, police justice, or recorder is empowered upon complaint of the violation of any ordinance to issue process in the nature of summons or warrant; and on the return of process, or at any time to which the trial shall have been adjourned, the said court, justice of the peace, police justice, or recorder, shall proceed to hear the testimony and to determine and give judgment in the matter without filing any pleadings. The question respecting the character of the proceeding seems to be put at rest in this court by the case of White v. Neptune City, 27 N. J. Law 222, 28 Atl. Rep 378. That was a proceeding before a justice of the peace to recover a penalty for the violation of an ordinance passed under "An act respecting licenses in incorporated boroughs." P. L. 1892, p. 293. The proceeding prescribed by that act is almost a transcript of the section of the board of health act just set out. The only difference is that the board of health act provides for a summons or warrant, and the license act for a summons only. Both proceedings are summary. The proceeding before a justice under the license act was determined, in the case just mentioned, to be a civil suit in the court for the trial of small causes. It was therefore further held that the only ground for reversal of the judgment of the justice was absence of jurisdiction over the person or subject-matter. In the present case jurisdiction over the person is clear, and it seems equally clear that the justice had jurisdiction over the subject matter, over the matter of the violation of an ordinance of the board of health. Want of notice to connect prosecutrix's property with the sewer is not a jurisdictional defect, nor was failure to prove the ordinance jurisdictional. They were both (if such defects existed, which is not admitted) defects in proof of the merits of the case. Advantage could be taken of them only by an appeal to the court of common pleas. Judgment affirmed.

CONTROL OF REMOVAL OF REFUSE.

Certiorari by the State, on the prosecution of William M. Abbott, to review a conviction for the violation of an ordinance of Atlantic City. Affirmed. Argued November term, 1905, before Dixon, Garrison, and Swayze, JJ. Harry Wootton for Atlantic City. Bourgeois & Sooy for the prosecutor.

Swayze, J. The prosecutor was convicted of the violation of an ordinance of Atlantic City which prohibited anyone except the duly authorized contractor of Atlantic City from using the streets for the purpose of collecting or disposition of offal, garbage or refuse matter that might become dangerous to the public health. The ordinance contained regulations as to the time of removal of garbage, and its conveyance to the disposal plant of the contractor, or such other place within the city limits as might be designated by the sanitary committee. It prescribed the character of the conveyance to be used, and provided that no garbage should be spilled or left upon the ground, and that the conveyances should not be filled above a certain level, and should be kept covered, cleansed, and disinfected so that they might not become dangerous to the public health. The prosecutor was not the duly authorized contractor of the city, and the evidence justified his conviction of a violation of the ordinance. The city is authorized by section 14 of the act of 1902 (P. L. 1902, p. 284) to provide for the collection and disposal of offal, garbage, wastes, and all refuse matter which may become dangerous to the public health. The ordinance in question is clearly an attempt to exercise this power, and the question discussed

at the argument and in the briefs is whether it is a reasonable exercise of power in view of the provisions of our State and Federal Constitutions. It is said to be unreasonable because it limits the right of removal to the duly authorized contractor, and the place of disposition to the city limits, and to be in violation of the constitution because it deprives the owner of the garbage of his property without compensation. The disposition of garbage is a matter of prime importance to the public health, and justifies careful inspection and regulation on the part of the public authorities, in order to secure its prompt removal and disposition at seasonable hours, and under such conditions that the danger of scattering offensive matter in the streets may be reduced to a mimimum. These objects can be more readily secured if the matter is under the exclusive control of the city. The time and frequency of collection, the method of conveyance, and the method and place of final disposition of the refuse, are all important, and proper control can only be secured by close and careful inspection, which becomes more and more difficult as the number of places and persons to be watched increases. It is not sufficient that the method of collecting and carting should be harmless, and involve no menace to health by the use of the streets. It is necessary, also, that the refuse should be finally disposed of in such a way that the public authorities may be assured that it will be innocuous. To accomplish that purpose, they may adopt any reasonable plan of disposition, provided they act in good faith for the protection of the public health, and not in an arbitrary manner. We see no reason in the present case to doubt that the ordinance was passed in good faith, and, although it creates an exclusive right, we cannot say that this is not the result of an attempt to safeguard the public health by means which are reasonable and bear a real and substantial relation to the end to be accomplished-the final disposition of the refuse matter. In Nicoulin v. Lowery 49 N. J. Law 391, 8 Atl. Rep. 513, the charge was that the defendant in the nighttime carted, carried, and took into and within the limits of the township a load of night soil. It was said that the complaint, although it used the words of the ordinance, was defective in not charging facts to show an offense within the spirit and meaning of the law; but all that the case really decided was that the defendant ought to have taken an appeal to the court of common pleas, and that for his failure to do so the certiorari ought to be dismissed. The remark that the ordinance would be held unreasonable if its penalties were sought to be enforced against anyone making a use of the public streets which was harmless in fact was obiter, and was accompanied by the statement that it might be adjudged reasonable when applied to another state of facts; citing Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law 286. In the present case the defendant was in the employ of one Steelman, who resided at Bargaintown and raised hogs. The inference is, and it is so said in the prosecutor's brief, that he was collecting garbage and conveying it to Bargaintown to feed his hogs. In view of the importance to public health of a populous city like Atlantic City attending to the final disposition of garbage, we think this ordinance cannot be held unreasonable for limiting the final disposition to the territorial limits of the municipality, at least as applied to the state of facts presented by the case. It is argued, further, that the ordinance takes private property without compensation, because it deprives the owners of the garbage of the privilege of selling it and the purchasers of the privilege of using it. The defendant is neither owner nor purchaser, but only an employe of the purchaser. Whether he is in a position to raise this objection need not be considered, since we think the ordinance is not objectionable as taking private property without compensation. In City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 71 N. J. Law 75; 58 Atl. Rep. 343, Mr. Justice Van Syckle said:

"The true rule to be extracted from the cases, and the one abundantly supported by them, is that, when statutes are obviously intended to provide for the public safety and the ordinances prescribed under them are reasonable and in compliance with their purposes, both the statutes and the ordinances are lawful and must be given due effect." This statement of the law was approved by the Court of Errors and Appeals. 62 Atl. Rep. 268. We have already stated our reasons for holding the regulation now in question reasonably necessary. This view is supported by the authorities.

Weller

v. Snover, 42 N. J. Law 341; Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. Law 469. Newark and South Orange Horse Car Railway Co. v. Hunt, 50 N. J. Law 308, 12 Atl. Rep. 697, are cases in which the taking of private property was sustained as an exercise of the police power. More immediately in point are two cases decided since the argument in the present case by the Supreme Court of the United States. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works of San Francisco (November 27th, 1905), 199 U. S. 306, 26 Sup. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed- ; Gardner v. Michigan (November 27th, 1905), 199 U. S. 325, 26 Sup. Ct. 106, 50 L. Ed In the first case the city ordinances gave the contractor an exclusive right to cremate the garbage, and required that it should be delivered at the crematory at the expense of the person conveying it. In the second case the court considered the validity of an ordinance of Detroit very similar to the ordinance of Atlantic City now in question. In both cases, the ordinances were sustained as a valid exercise of the police power. The conviction should be affirmed with costs.

BARBER SHOPS MAY BE LICENSED BY LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH.

On certiorari, before Justices Van Syckel, Fort and Garretson. For the prosecutor, Leon Abbett. For the defendant, Edwin A. S. Lewis. The opinion of the court was delivered by Van Syckle, J.

This suit certifies unto the Supreme Court an ordinance of the board of health of Hoboken, providing rules to be observed in barber shops to prevent contagious diseases of the skin and fixing a license fee of two dollars in each case. The legislature has given ample authority to the board of health in the exercise of the police power to prevent the spreading of contagious skin diseases. Gen. Stat., p. 1644, % 49; Gen. Stat., p. 1642, 39. Powers conferred for the preservation of the public health should receive a liberal construction so that they may be rendered effective. Morford v. Board of Health, 32 Vroom 386; Gregory v. City of New York, 40 N. Y. 273. The license fee which may lawfully be imposed for regulation is reasonable in this case for that purpose. Benson v. Hoboken, 4 Vroom 280; Muhlenbrink v. Long Branch, 13 Id. 364; Blanke v. Board of Health, 35 Id. 42. In the agreed state of the case it is admitted that the license fees will not be sufficient to pay the additional expenses of printing, clerical work and of inspection required of the board of health by the ordinance. The only reason assigned for holding that the statutory requirements were not observed in passing the ordinance is that it was not published for two weeks before taking effect. Gen. Stat., p. 1638, % 16. It was adopted on the 23d of December, 1903, and by its terms was to take effect on the first day of January, 1904. Gen. Stat., p. 1638, 16, was amended by section 49 (Gen. Stat., p. 1644), which provides that the ordinance shall be published at least one week prior to the final passage. By the agreed state of the case it is admitted that the ordinance was adopted on December 23d, 1903, and that it was thereafter published for two weeks. The case fails to show whether it was published before its adoption. The objection now made as to publication is not assigned as a reason and not supported by proofs. The writ of certiorari should be dismissed, with costs.

New Jersey Sanitary Association.

The following program has been issued for the meeting of the New Jersey Sanitary Association which is to be held in the Laurel-in-thePines, Lakewood, November 16th and 17th, 1906:

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS,

Rudolph Hering, Chairman Executive Council. II. REPORTS OF THE CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES ONMEMBERSHIP AND REGISTRATION,

Edward Guion, M.D.

THE TRANSMISSION OF DISEASE BY FLIES; ITS CONTROL AND PRE-
Gordon K. Dickinson, M.D.

VENTION,

ORGANIZATION OF ANTI-TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETIES IN NEW JERSEY,

EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF HEALTH
MEDICAL INSPECTION OF SCHOOLS,

Thomas W. Harvey, M.D. OFFICERS, John L. Leal, M.D. Joseph Tomlinson, M.D.

III. SMOKE, NOISE AND STENCH NUISANCES.

1. HOW AND WHY THESE THINGS ARE BAD FOR THE PUBLIC,

Dr. B. D. Evans.

2. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN NEW YORK CITY, AND HOW,

Com'r Thomas Darlington, M.D. 3. THE METHOD TO BE PURSUED IN THE ABATEMENT OF THE NUI

SANCE,
DISCUSSION,

Mr. S. A. Patterson.
Dr. Henry Mitchell.

IV. FOREIGN MUNICIPAL OWNERSHIP OF ABATTOIRS AND THE NECESSITY OF

VIII. THE PRESENT STATUS OF SEWAGE DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED STATES AND

GREAT BRITAIN,

DISCUSSION,

Mr. Henry Hewat, Paterson, N. J. Geo. C. Whipple, C.E.; Rudolph Hering, C.E.

IX. SECRET NOSTRUMS AND PROPRIETARY MEDICINES.

X. FLOOD, CONTROL AND CONSERVATION OF WATER, APPLIED TO PASSAIC

RIVER,
DISCUSSION,

Morris R. Sherrerd, C.E.

James Owen, C.E.

XI. THE PROGRESS OF SEWAGE DISPOSAL IN NEW JERSEY,
Mr. Boyd McLean, Secretary of State Sewerage Commission.
Clyde Potts, C.E.

DISCUSSION,

XII. SCHOOL ARCHITECTURE FROM A SANITARY STANDPOINT,

DISCUSSION,

Mr. Nathan Myers, B.S.A., Newark, N. J.
Mr. Francis Bent.

XIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR OBTAINING A MORE COMPLETE RETURN OF BIRTHS,
Mr. David S. South, Registrar of Vital Statistics, N. J.

XIV. ELECTION OF OFFICERS.
XV. MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS.

XVI. ADJOURNMENT.

MEMBERSHIP AND OBJECTS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

The New Jersey Sanitary Association is composed of professors and teachers in our colleges and schools, municipal officers, health officers, lawyers, physicians, veterinarians, clergymen, civil engineers, sanitary engineers, architects, plumbers, and other citizens of our State interested in Sanitation as related to our homes, our schools and our municipalities. Any citizen may become a member of the State Association on application to the Secretary or any member of the Executive Council, on the day of meeting. The membership fee is two dollars per year, payable in ad

Honorary Members of Council-The ex-Presidents-Prof. C. F. Brackett, M.D., LL.D.; James M. Green, Ph.D.; William K. Newton, M.D.; Henry Mitchell, M. D.; Dowling Benjamin, M.D.; George P. Olcott, C.E.; C. Phillips Bassett, C.E.; Addison B. Poland, Ph.D.; David C. English, M.D.; Shippen Wallace, Ph.D.; James Owen, C.E.; Vernon L. Davey, Ph.D.; Daniel Strock, M.D.; Herbert B. Baldwin, Ph.D.; H. Brewster Willis, John L. Leal, M.D.; M. N. Baker, C.E.; Norton L. Wilson, M.D.