SECT. I. OF the true State of the Question SECT. III. Of the Argument for Neceffity SECT. IV. Of the cause of Volition, and SECT. V. Of the fuppofed consciousness of Liberty, and the use of the term Agent, 54 SECT. VI. Whether Liberty be essential to Practical Virtue; and of Moral and Phy- SECT. VII. Of the Propriety of Rewards and Punishments, and the Foundation of Praife and Blame, on the Scheme of Ne- SECT. VIII. How far Mens' general Con- SECT. SECT. IX. Of the moral Influence of the Doctrine of Neceffity, 115 SECT. X. In what Senfe God may be confidered as the Author of Sin, and of the Objection to the Doctrine of Neceffity, on that Account, 127 142 SECT. XI. Of the Nature of Remorse of Confcience, and of praying for the Pardon of Sin, on the Doctrine of Neceffity, SECT. XII. How far the Scriptures are favourable to the Doctrine of Neceffity, 164 SECT. XIII. The Calvinistic Doctrine of Predeftination compared with the Philofophical Doctrine of Neceffity, 184 A LETTER to the Author of Letters on Materialism, and on Hartley's Theory of the Mind, To Dr. Kenrick, To Mr. Whitehead, To Dr. Horseley, 203 243 259 275 APPENDIX, containing a farther Confideration of the Objection to the Doctrine of Neceffity, as favouring Indolence and Vice. 291 THE THE DOCTRINE O F PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY ILLUSTRATED. SECTION I. Of the true STATE OF THE QUESTION reSpecting Liberty and Neceffity. Ο NE of the chief fources of the difference of opinion respecting the fubject of liberty and neceffity, and likewife of much of the difficulty that has attended the difcuffion of it, feems to have been a want of attention to the proper ftating of the question. Hence it has come to pass, that the generality of those who have ftood forth in defence of what they have called liberty, do, in fact, admit every thing VOL. II. B that that is requifite to establish the doctrine of neceffity; but they have misled themselves, and others, by the use of words; and also, wanting fufficient ftrength of mind, they have been staggered at the confequences of their own principles. Ifhall, therefore, begin with fome obfervations, which, I hope, may tend to throw light upon the nature of the subject in debate, and help the reader to understand what it is that, as a neceffarian, I contend for. In the first place, I would observe, that I allow to man all the liberty, or power, that is poffible in itself, and to which the ideas of mankind in general ever go, which is the power of doing whatever they will, or please, both with respect to the operations of their minds, and the motions of their bodies, uncontrolled by any foreign principle, or cause. Thus, every man is at liberty to turn his thoughts to whatever subject he pleases, to confider the reafons for or against any scheme or propofition, and to reflect upon them as long as he thall think proper; as well as to walk wherever he pleases, and to do do whatever his hands and other limbs are capable of doing. 66 Mr. Hobbes has given the following clear and happy illuftration of this subject. “Liberty," fays he, "is the absence of all impediments to action, that are not con"tained in the nature and intrinfic quality "of the agent. As for example, water is "faid to defcend freely, or to have liberty "to defcend, by the channel of the river, "because there is no impediment that way, "but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water can"not afcend, yet men never fay it wants liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power ; "because the impediment is in the nature of "the water, and intrinfically. So alfo we fay, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, * See his Works, p. 483. |