English charters of running northern and southern boundaries from sea to sea. If it be objected by Lord A. (as it was) that lines of latitude were arbitrary and might be very unnatural and inconvenient boundaries, I told him that this circumstance was as likely to be in their favor as ours; that lines of latitude had the advantage that they could always be ascertained by men of science; and that, in point of fact, the fortyninth degree had proved a very convenient line for 1,000 miles. In fact the part of the boundary running on the parallel is the only part in reference to which no controversy has arisen or is to be feared. Another natural and obvious principle, I observed, connected with this, but not identical, was the extension of contiguous territory. Lord Aberdeen be much difficulty dary. * This train of remark produced an obvious effect upon Lord Aberdeen, and after making some inquiry as to the course which things would probably take in Congress during the approaching session, in reference to this subject, and expressing a strong hope that no step would be taken by either House to embarrass the two governments in the negotiation, he said, if this can be avoided, "I do not think we thinks there will not shall have much difficulty ;" and this remark he repeated. in settling the boun- As not a syllable fell from me authorizing the expectation that the United States would be induced to run the line below the forty-ninth degree, I considered that remark, twice made, coupled with the tenor of my own observation on the reasonableness of that boundary, as authorizing the inference that Mr. Pakenham would be instructed to assent to it. The main difficulty in the way of this will be that the forty-ninth degree has twice been offered by the United [19] States, or rather thrice, and declined by England. Lord *Aberdeen on former occasions has admitted as much. To meet this difficulty, it may deserve the President's consideration tion from 49% would whether he would not agree to give up the southern exwhole of tremity of Quadra and Vancouver's Island (which the fortyninth degree would leave within our boundary) on condition that the entrance of the straits of Juan de Fuca should at all times be left open and free to the United States, with a free navigation between that island and the main land, and a free outlet to the north. If there is any reliance in appearance and professions, Mr. Pakenham will go to America with the best feelings for an honorable adjustment of the matter in discussion. Mr. Everett suggests that a deflec leave to Great tain the Vancover Island. * * No. 19. EDWARD EVERETT. Mr. Everett and Mr. Everett to Mr. Upshur. [Confidential.] LONDON, December 2, 1843. SIR: I had a long and important conversation with Lord Aberdeen on the 29th ultimo, which I now beg leave to report to you Lord Aberdeen dis- confidentially for the information of the President. cuss the boundary. I have observed to you in a former communication that, though the negotiation relative to the Oregon boundary had, in consequence of the recall of Mr. Fox and the appointment of Mr. Pakenham, been transferred to Washington, I should use my best efforts to produce such an impression on Lord Aberdeen's mind, as to the prominent points of the question, as might have a favorable influence in the preparation of the instructions to be given to Mr. Pakenham. With this end in view I had, in a former interview, as I have already informed you, gone over the ground generally in support of our claim, particularly urging, and as I thought with some effect, the reasonableness of the terms on which the United States have uniformly offered to adjust the boundary. In my interview with Lord Aberdeen on the 29th I pursued the same line of argument. * I first made some remarks on the claim of the United States, as [20] the representatives of Spain, to an extension on the north western coast of America, originally indefinite, and limited only by the compacts with Russia, to which Spain and the United States are parties. * Passing from this topic I urged with all the force in my power the extreme reasonableness of the proposal of the United States to run the line on the forty-ninth parallel to the sea, on the grounds of extension of contiguous territory; of giving to each power the tract due west of its acknowledged territory; and on the ground that in a final appropriation of a region at present unappropriated (assuming for the sake of argument that Oregon territory is in that condition) that the United States certainly were entitled, besides their own share, to two other shares, in the right of France and Spain, whose title they had combined with their own. * * * After considerable discussion of these points, Lord Aberdeen finally said that these were grounds which, in the main result, had been long ago taken by the United States, and rejected by England; that the question was quite different from what it would have been if now presented for the first time; and that it was impossible for the present ministry to accept what had been rejected in 1824 and 1826; that they did not suppose that we, any more than themselves, could now agree to terms which we had declined then; and that, consequently, there must be concession on both sides; that they were willing to act on this principle, and that we must do the same. I regarded this observation, now made to me for the first time, although the Oregon boundary since my residence in England has been the subject of very frequent conversation between Lord Aberdeen and myself, as very important. I told Lord Aberdeen that I thought it would be very difficult for the United States to make any modification of their former proposal, except in one point, which I did certainly regard as very important to England, if she entertained any views to the future settlement of the country. I thought the President might be induced so far to depart from the forty-ninth parallel as to leave the whole of Quadra and Vancouver's Island to England, whereas that line of latitude would give us the southern extremity of that island, and consequently, the command of the straits of Fuca on both sides. If the country is to be occupied by a dense population, as there is no reason to doubt would one day be the case, this would be a valuable concession to England, without implying a great sacrifice on our part. I observed, I was not authorized to say this would be agreed to; I could only *say I thought and wished it might be. I then pointed out on a map the extent of this concession, and Lord Aberdeen said he would take it into consideration. [21] Mr. Everett points out on a map the de flection from 49 that would leave Vancou ver to Great Britain. He then asked me if I was confident of the accuracy of the statement which I had made relative to the offer in 1826, on the part of Great Britain, to give us a port within the straits of Fuca, with an adjacent territory. * * I accordingly considered his inquiry to proceed from some anxiety lest I should be mistaken, and a wish to have the fact established that they had then offered us a territory north of Columbia, in order now to facilitate the way for an abandonment of the Columbia as the boundary. I may be in an error in this view of the subject; but it is the result of the closest consideration I have been able to give it, that the present government, though of course determined not to make any discreditable sacrifice of what they consider their rights, are really willing to agree to reasonable terms of settlement. * ** I spoke with considerable earnestness in reprobation of the conduct of the Hudson's Bay Company in multiplying and pushing their posts far to the south of the Columbia, and said I trusted that the government would not allow itself to be embarrassed by this circumstance. Fair warning had been given to the company in 1818, that no settlements after that date should prejudice the rights of either party. He said he did not consider the existence of those settlements as a very serious matter, but the navigation of the Columbia was a serious one. EDWARD EVERETT. A. P. UPSHUR, Esq., Secretary of State. * Mr. Everett pre to Lord writing. [Inclosure B to the above.] Mr. Everett to Lord Aberdeen. [Private.] 46 GROSVENOR PLACE, November 30, 1843. MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN: The proposition relative to sents bis proposition a port within the straits of Fuca and an adjacent tract of country was made by Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Addington to [22] Mr. Gallatin, on the 1st December, 1826, and will be found recorded in the protocol of the third conference, which was held on that day. It appears from Mr. Gallatin's correspondence that at a former conference Mr. Huskisson had especially objected to the extension of the forty-ninth degree to the Pacific, on the ground that it would cut off the southern extremity of Quadra and Vancouver's Island. My suggestion yesterday would obviate this objection. I ought, however, to repeat, in thus alluding to that suggestion in writing, that though it would have been within my competence to propose it, (subject to the approbation of my Government,) had the negotiation remained in my hands, it would have been so only under the general authority to propose and receive terms of compromise. The suggestion itself is not specifically alluded to in my instructions. A glance at the map shows its importance as a modification of the forty-ninth degree, and I should be truly rejoiced if, in regarding it in that light, your lordship would permit it to become the basis of a final settlement of this serious difficulty. The EARL OF ABERDEEN, &c., &c. EDWARD EVERETT. No. 20. Mr. Everett to Mr. Nelson. LONDON, April 1, 1844. SIR: * The principle of running the forty-ninth degree of latitude Mr. Everett and to the sea and leaving to each party west of the Rocky Lord Aberdeen conMountains the continuation of its territory east was in all other respects the most natural and equitable basis of settlement. tinue the discussion. I had on previous occasions pursued substantially this line of argument with Lord Aberdeen, and I received from him now the same answer to it as formerly, viz, that Great Britain could not now accept terms which she had distinctly refused before; that he felt that we were under the same necessity; that he did not expect the United States to agree to what they had already rejected; and that consequently it must, he thought, be assumed as the basis of negotiation that something [23] must be yielded on each side. To *this I replied, that though as a general principle of negotiation under such circumstances this might be admitted, it was impossible to leave out of view the substantial character of the former propositions on either side; and that in proportion as he (Lord Aberdeen) should, on reconsidering the subject, be inclined to think that the offer formerly made by the United States to continue the forty-ninth parallel to the sea was an equitable offer, and one founded on natural and reasonable principles of adjustment, he ought to be satisfied with but a moderate departure from that proposal; particularly if such a modification, without involving a great sacrifice to us, were eminently advantageous to them. In fact such a modification was the only one which the United States could, in my opinion, be brought to agree to. The modification which I had formerly suggested, viz, that the United States would waive their claim to the southern extremity of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, which would be cut off by the forty-ninth degree of latitude, was precisely of this kind. It could be of no great importance to us to hold the southern extremity of an island of which the main portion belonged to England' while the entire possession of the island, and consequently the free entrance of the Straits of Fuca, would be a very important object to Great Britain. I repeated what I had often observed before, that I had no authority to say that this modification would be agreed to by the United States, but that I thought it might. Lord Aberdeen did not commit himself on the point, whether or not this proposal, if made by the Government of the United States, would be accepted. He however stated (as I understood him) that he had caused a map to be colored as I suggested; that he was desirous to go as far as possible for the sake of settling the controversy; that Mr. Pakenham's original instructions were drawn up in this spirit; and that since he left home, he (Lord Aberdeen) had enlarged his discretionary powers. I confess from these facts, viz, that Lord Aberdeen does not expect us to agree to the Columbia as the boundary, not even with the addition of Port Discovery and an adjacent tract of country within the Straits of Fuca (which we refused in 1826,) that he has never negatived the idea of the forty-ninth degree with the suggested modification; that he has uniformly said that he did not think there would be great [24] difficulty in settling the question, and this although I have as uniformly assured him that, in my opinion, the United States Mr. thinks Britain will accept Everett the proposed deflection. would not stop short of the 49th degree except in the point that Great above stated; I draw the inference that this proposal would the line of 49° with in the last resort be accepted. I am satisfied that the ministry sincerely wish to settle the controversy, and are willing to go as far as their views of consistency and the national honor will permit to effect that object. They do not, therefore, I imagine, much regret the agitation of the subject in the United States, and are willing we should advance a claim to the 54° 40'; such a course on our part will make it easier for them to agree to stop at 49°. JOHN NELSON, Esq., * Secretary of State ad interim. * * EDWARD EVERETT. No. 21. Extract of a lecture delivered by Mr. William Sturgis before the Mercantile Library Association of Boston, January 22, 1845. Views of Mr. Stur I deem it very desirable that the question of boundary should be speedily adjusted, and that the limits and the rights of each party be so clearly established and defined as to prevent all danger of collision hereafter. In this opinion I doubt not that the distinguished statesmen, Messrs. Pakenham and Calhoun, who now have charge of the negotiation, will cordially concur; and it seems to me that each party will attain their object, and justice be done to both, by adopting as the boundary a continuation of the parallel of 49° across the Rocky Mountains, to tidewater, say to the middle of the Gulf of Georgia; thence by the northernmost navigable passage (not north of 49°) to the Straits of Juan de Fuca, and down the middle of those straits to the Pacific Ocean; the navigation of the Gulf of Georgia and the Straits of Juan de Fuca to be forever free to both parties-all the islands and other territory lying south and east of this line to belong to the United States, and all north and west to Great Britain. By this arrangement we should yield to Great [25] *Britain the portion of Quadra and Vancouver's Island that lies south of latitude 49°, which, in a territorial point of view, is of too little importance to deserve a moment's consideration; and both parties would secure, for a considerable extent, a well-defined natural boundary, about which there could hereafter be no doubt or dispute. Will Great Britain accede to this? I think she will. Up to the close of the last negotiation, in 1827, the free navigation of the Columbia was declared to be indispensable to Great Britain, by the British commissioners; but subsequent developments will probably render the British less pertinacious upon this point. The "summary" presented by the commissioners in 1827 shows that the Columbia was then supposed to be the most convenient, in fact the only, navigable channel of communication between the ocean and most of the numerous establishments of the Hudson Bay Company, west of the Rocky Mountains. Within a few years past, however, several rivers of considerable magnitude have been explored from the interior to the seas into which they empty, north of latitude 49°. These are "Frazer's River," which disembogues about that parallel; the river called by Harmon the "Nach |