REG. v. WHITEHOUSE AND OTHERS. 1852. and defraud them of their moneys," was too general. In Reg. v. Gill, 2 B. & Ald. 204, (e) a similar count to the present was held sufficient in arrest of judgment, but that did not affect the question as to the necessity of proof in support of it. With respect to the 7th count, there was an objection that the false pretence was not set out with the proper certainty. It departed Conspiracy— from the usual form in alleging after the false pretence, that by False pretences reason of the said false pretence, the defendants obtained the bread. —IndictmentThe usual form was, that by means of which false pretence, &c. By "reason of" is not same as by means of. But even that is not sufficient. It is objectionable as not containing any direct and positive averment by the jurors, but merely a sort of historical narrative that the goods were obtained. Hodgson, for the prosecution, contended that the 3rd count was perfectly good.-In the case of King v. The Queen, already cited, the case of Reg. v. Peck, 9 A. & E. 686, was referred to. It was there held that it was no objection that the count on a similar charge to the present, did not name the parties who were to have been defrauded. (f) He also referred to the case of Reg. v. Rowlands (5 Cox's Crim. Cas. 437), where similar counts were employed. (e) The indictment alleged, that the defendants unlawfully did conspire and combine together, by divers false pretences, and subtle means and devices, to obtain and acquire to themselves, of and from P. D. and G. D. divers large sums of money of the relative moneys of the said P. D. and G. D., and to cheat and defraud them respectively thereof, and it was heid sufficient. Abbott, C. J., "The gist of the offence is the conspiracy; and although the nature of every offence must be laid with reasonable certainty, so as to apprise the defendant of the charge, yet I think that it is sufficiently done by the present indictment. It is objected that the particular means and devices are not stated. It is, however, possible to conceive that persons might meet together, and might determine and resolve that they would, by some trick and device, cheat and defraud another, without having at that time fixed and settled what the particular means and devices should be. Such a meeting and resolution would nevertheless constitute an offence. If, therefore, a case may be reasonably suggested in which the matters here charged would, if there was nothing more, be an offence against the law, it is impossible as it seems to me, to conclude that the law should require the particular means to be set forth. The offence of conspiracy may be complete, although the particular means are not settled and resolved on at the time of the conspiracy ;" and, per Holroyd, J., "The present case differs materially from the case of obtaining money under false pretences. There the false pretences constitute the offence; but here the conspiracy is the offence; and it is quite sufficient to state only the act of conspiring and the object of the conspiracy in the indictment. Here it is stated that the parties did conspire, and that the object was to obtain, by false pretences, money from a particular person. Now a conspiracy to do that would be indictable, even when the parties had not settled the means to be employed." Greaves, Q. C. observes, that “in this case the statements were of the most general kind that have ever been held sufficient," and refers to Reg. v. Parker, 11 L. J. (N.S.) 102, M. C., where Williams, J. said "It has been always thought that in Rex. v. Gill, the extreme of laxity was allowed." (2 Russell on Crimes, by Greaves, p. 692, note (e).) (f) The first count of the indictment in Reg. v. Peck, stated that the defendants, T. P., J. P., and S. P., falsely, unlawfully and wickedly did conspire, confederate and agree amongst themselves to deceive and defraud, and to cause and procure to be deceived and defrauded, divers of Her Majesty's liege subjects, who should bargain with the said T. P. and J. P. for the sale of goods and merchandize, of great quantities of such goods and merchandize of the sad subjects, of great value, to wit, 2000l. without making payment or other remuneration or satisfaction for the same, with intent to obtain and acquire to the said T. P., J. P., and S. P., divers sums of money and other profit and emolument, to the evil example, &c. The 2nd count alleged, that the said T. P., J. P., and S. P., on &c. at &c. (they the said T. P. and J. P. having theretofore been, and then and there being, in partnership trade together, and being then and there indebted to divers persons in divers large sums of money, to wit, 10,000l.) falsely, unlawfully, and wickedly did conspire, combine, confederate and agree amongst themselves, to deceive and defraud the said creditors of them the said T. P. and J. P., of payment Evidence. REG. v. WHITEHOUSE AND OTHERS. Huddleston, in reply said, in the case Reg. v. Rowlands, a rule had been granted since the trial, to arrest the judgment on the very counts referred to. (g) Mr. BARON PLATT, after intimating an opinion that there was 1852. nothing in the objection to the 7th count, said he would put a Conspiracy further question to the jury with reference to the 4th count, False pretences which might save trouble. He then asked the jury, whether they -Indictment-thought the false pretences were made in pursuance of a previous conspiracy by all the defendants? The jury said "Yes, we are of that opinion." Evidence. Thereupon the defendants were sentenced on the 4th count, the husband and wife each to twelve months' imprisonment, with hard labour, and the daughter Jane to three months' imprisonment, with hard labour. of their said debts; and the jurors, &c. present that the said T. P., J. P., and S. P., afterwards, to wit, on &c. at &c., in pursuance of and according to the said conspiracy, combination, confederacy, and agreement amongst themselves, had falsely, and unlawfully, and wickedly did make and execute, and cause and procure to be made and executed, a certain false and frandulent deed of bargain and sale, and assignment of certain fixtures, stock in trade, and good-will of great value, of and belonging to the said T. P. and J. P., by and from the said T. P. and J. P. to the said S. P., for divers false and fraudulent considerations, with intent thereby to obtain and procure to the said T. P., J. P. and S. P., divers sums of money and other emolument, to the great damage of the said creditors, to the evil example, &c. On error from the Borough Court of Quarter Sessions, it was held, that both counts were bad for uncertainty; the first count for not defining with sufficient particularity what the defendants conspired to do, -obtaining goods without paying not being necessarily a fraud, and the words of the count might apply to the obtaining goods to sell on commission; and the 2nd count, for not stating in what respect the deed was false and fraudulent. It was held, however, that there was nothing in the objection to the 1st count, that it did not state what particular creditors the defendants meant to defraud, because, if the offence in fact went no further than the general conspiracy, it could not well be known what particular person would fall into the snare. (g) See ante, vol. v., p. 467. A nolle prosequi was entered as to those counts, so that the question was not decided.-[J. E. D.] OXFORD CIRCUIT. MONMOUTHSHIRE SPRING ASSIZES, 1852. Monmouth, March 26. (Before Mr. BARON PLATT.) REG. v. EVAN WILLIAMS. (a) Larceny-Security for money-Statute 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 5. A mortgage deed, and title deeds accompanying it, constitute a security for money within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 5, which makes it felony to steal any debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, warrant, order or other security whatsoever for money or for payment of money." An indictment charging in one count the larceny of "three deeds being a security for money, to wit, for 201., of and belonging to H. W. :" and in another count the larceny of "three deeds, being a security for the payment of money, to wit, for 201., of and belonging to H. W." Held, to be supported by proof of the larceny of deeds of lease and release from A. to B. of real estate, and of a mortgage by demise of the same property from B. to C., and held by the prosecutor as executor of C. IN the first count of the indictment, the prisoner, Evan Williams, was indicted for that he, on the 18th of December, 1851, three deeds, being a security for money, to wit, for 20., of and belonging to Hannah Williams, then and there feloniously did steal, take and carry away, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. In a second count they were described as "three deeds, being a security for the payment of money, to wit, for 20., of and belonging to Hannah Williams." In a third count, the deeds were described as "three skins of parchment." From the evidence on the part of the prosecution, it appeared that the prosecutrix, Mrs. Hannah Williams, was the executrix of John Waters, and, in that character, became possessed of the three deeds mentioned in the indictment. Two of them were a conveyance in fee by lease and release, from William Price to James Bailey, of certain freehold land and premises in the county of Monmouth. The third deed was a mortgage, by demise, of the same property, from James Bailey and his trustee, to John Walters for the term of five hundred years, for securing the sum of twenty pounds. REG. v. EVAN WILLIAMS. 1852. LarcenySecurity for money. The prisoner claimed some small interest in a part of the property included in the conveyance and mortgage; and, having gone to the prosecutor's house and obtained a sight of the deeds, watched his opportunity and, suddenly snatching up the deeds, ran away with them. It was for this act that he was now indicted. The money was still due on the mortgage. At the close of the case for the prosecution, W. H. Cooke, on the part of the prisoner, submitted that the indictment was not proved. The deeds formed part of the evidence of the title to real estate, and were not the subject of larceny at common law. The 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 23, (b) made it a misdemeanor to steal any instrument being evidence of the title to any real estate. Here the taking was charged as a felony. The 5th section of the same statute, it is true, makes it felony to steal "any debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, warrant, order, or other security whatsoever, for money or for payment of money;" (c) but the deeds here did not constitute a security for money within that section. It was not a security to Hannah Williams, the prosecutrix, even if the demise could be considered as a security for money to Walters within the statute. It is not within the act unless on the face of it it is a security for money. As to the third count, that cannot be supported. The difficulty cannot be got rid of by describing the deeds as skins of parchment. If in these cases the objection could be avoided by describing the skins as bits of parchment, where was the necessity for statutable enactments respecting choses in action? A thing must be described by its true character, and what it really is. Powell, for the prosecution, submitted that all the counts were sufficient. The words of the 5th section under which the prisoner is indicted, are very comprehensive :-"Any debenture, deed, &c., or other security whatsoever for money or for payment of money." Surely a mortgage is a security for money, if anything is. (b) The section enacts that, "if any person shall steal any paper or parchment, written or printed, or partly written and partly printed, being evidence of the title, or of any part of the title, to any real estate, every such offender shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable to any of the punishmeuts which the court may award, as hereinbefore last-mentioned; and in any indictment for such offence, it shall be sufficient to allege the thing stolen to be evidence of the title, or of part of the title, of the person, or of some one of the persons having a present interest, whether legal or equitable, in the real estate to which the same relates, and to mention such real estate, or some part thereof, and it shall not be necessary to allege the thing stolen to be of any value." (c) If any person shall steal any tally, order, or other security whatsoever, entitling or evidencing the title of any person or body corporate to any share or interest in any public stock or fund, whether of this kingdom, or of Great Britain, or of Ireland, or of any foreign state, or in any fund of any body corporate, company, or society, or to any deposit in any savings bank, or shall steal any debenture, deed, bond, bill, note, warrant, order, or other security whatsoever, for money or for payment of money, whether of this kingdom, or of any foreign state, or shall steal any warrant or order for the delivery or transfer of any goods or valuable thing, every such offender shall be deemed guilty of felony, of the same nature and in the same degree, and punishable in the same manner, as if he had stolen any chattel of like value with the share, interest, or deposit to which the security so stolen may relate, or with the value of the goods or other valuable thing mentioned in the warrant or order; aud each of the several documents hereinbefore enumerated, shall throughout this act be deemed for every purpose to be included under and denoted by the words' valuable security."" PLATT, B.-Must it not, under this indictment, be a security to REG. v. EVAN WILLIAMS. In 1852. Larceny money. PLATT, B., intimated his doubts whether the indictment was supported by the evidence, but said he would consult Mr. Justice Security for Wightman, sitting in the other court; and withdrew for that purpose. On his return, he said:-" I have discussed the matter with my brother Wightman, and he has induced me to think that the words 'other security for money,' in the 5th section of the statute, are quite sufficient to include this case. On talking the matter over he has quite satisfied me on that point." Cooke applied to his lordship to give the prisoner the opportunity of having the matter reconsidered by reserving the point. PLATT, B.-No; I do not think I ought to do that. It is a course which ought not to be adopted lightly. There being no doubt as to the facts of the case, Cooke did not address the jury, and the prisoner was convicted. (d) See 4 Cox's Crim. Cas. 336. In that case, however, no objection was taken on the ground that the cheque could not be described as a bit of paper. The question was, whether the facts constituted larceny.--[J. E. D.] |