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INDEX.

ABDUCTION.

In order to constitute the offence of abduction
within stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 20, it is not
necessary that the girl should be taken by
force, either actual or constructive, or be
taken out of the actual possession of the
parent or guardian. It is enough if she be
persuaded by the prisoner to leave her home,
and the control of the parent continues down
to the time of the taking.

Where, therefore, the prisoner persuaded
a girl under sixteen to meet him at a place
two miles from her father's house, where she
lived, for the purpose of going with him to
America; and she did so voluntarily, leaving
her home alone, then meeting the prisoner
at the place appointed, and afterwards tra
velling with him to London:

Held, that he was guilty of abduction.
Reg. v. Manktelow, 143

ADMINISTERING.

What is an attempt to administer poison, 14

ARREST.

Unlawful, by a constable, 371

ASSAULT.

A schoolmaster who places his hands inde-
cently on the person of a female pupil is
guilty of an indecent assault, although the
pupil is thirteen years of age, and does not
make any actual resistance.

Letters relating to the charge, written by
one of the scholars who is examined as a
witness for the prosecution, may, on her
denial of the handwriting, be proved and
given in evidence on the part of the defen-
dant for the purpose of affecting the wit-
ness's credit, and showing the capacity of
the scholars to conspire to make a false
charge against him, although the prosecutrix

VOL. VI.

is not proved to have received the letters, or
had any knowledge of their contents.

To enable the Court to order the costs of
such a prosecution to be allowed, it is neces-
sary, under the stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 55,
s. 3, to show that the case was originally
brought before the justices for summary
decision.

The production of the original summons
to the defendant, setting out the complaint,
and requiring him to appear before the jus-
tices to 66
answer the same information and
complaint, and to be further dealt with ac-
cording to law," is sufficient evidence of the
fact required, to enable the Court to order
payment of the costs of the prosecution.
Reg. v. M'Gavuran, 64

A. committed an assault upon a constable,
who, two hours afterwards, having obtained
assistance, and when there was no danger
of any renewal of the assault, attempted to
apprehend him, and was wounded in the
attempt:

Held, that his apprehension at that time
was unlawful: and that he was improperly
convicted of wounding the constable with
intent to prevent his lawful apprehension.
Reg. v. Walker, 371

AUTREFOIS ACQUIT.
Plea of, in murder, 178

BAIL IN ERROR.

A defendant in misdemeanor having obtained
a writ of error to the Exchequer Chamber,
entered into a recognizance with two sure-
ties approved by a judge, the condition of
which was to prosecute the writ of error
with effect; to surrender personally on the
hearing of the writ of error; and, in case the
judgment should be affirmed, to surrender
himself to the Court of Exchequer Chamber
to be further dealt with according to law:

2 a

Held, that this recognizance did not com-
ply with the stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 68, s. 1,
which requires that the recognizance shall
be conditioned to prosecute the writ with
effect; and in case the judgment should be
affirmed, forthwith to render the defendant
to prison, according to the judgment, where
imprisonment has been adjudged. Reg. v.
Dugdale, 161

BANKRUPTCY.

An indictment under the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106,
s. 254, contained the following allegation of
materiality: "And that at and upon the
said examination of the said J. Legge, it
then and there became and was material in
and to the matter of the said bankruptcy,
to inquire what was the nature and extent of
the said J. Legge's connection and dealings
with one Mr. Marshall, and how long he
had known the said Mr. Marshall, and whe-

ther the said Mr. Marshall was a relation of
the said J. Legge?"

The following was the evidence given by
the defendant before the Commissioners of
Bankruptcy: "Mr. Marshail is not in trade;
he is a speculator in anything and every-
thing. I have known Mr. Marshall about
two or three years (meaning that he the
said Joseph Legge had not known the said
Mr. Marshall more than two or three years.)
I imagine he was always a speculator, and
never in business."

CERTIORARI.

The defendant, having been convicted of mis-
demeanor upon an indictment which he had
removed into this court by certiorari, the
judgment was respited by consent, upon an
agreement by the defendant to pay the taxed
costs immediately. The costs were taxed at
2271.; the defendant became bankrupt, and
the prosecutor proved for that amount under
his bankruptcy. Judgment was afterwards
entered up, and the costs of the prosecution
again taxed under the 5 & 6 Will. & M.
c. 11, at 2437. Upon a rule for an attach-
ment against the defendant for nonpayment
of that sum pursuant to the Master's allo-
catur, and to estreat the recognizances into
which the bail had entered, the court es
treated the recognizances, but discharged
the rule for an attachment. Reg. v. Arthur
Hills, 174

The Lord Mayor of London having committed

the defendant for trial at the Central Crimi
nal Court upon a charge of misdemeanor,
directed the city solicitor to conduct the
prosecution, the expenses of which were
defrayed out of the city funds. The defen-
dant removed the indictment into this court
by certiorari, and was convicted.

Held, that the Lord Mayor, not being per
sonally liable for the expenses of the prose
cution, was not entitled, as prosecutor, to
recover the costs from the defendant under
the provision of stat 5 & 6 Will. & M.
c. 11, s. 3.

The assignment of perjury was in these
words: "Whereas in truth and in fact, the said
person so described as Mr. Marshall afore-
said, was one and the same person as one S.
Marshall Legge, and was and is the father of
the said Joseph Legge; and whereas in truth
and in fact, the said Joseph Legge had known
the said Samuel Marshall Legge, so de-
scribed as Mr. Marshall as aforesaid, for a
longer period than two or three years, to Privileged communication to, 219
wit, for twenty years and upwards :"

In order to bring the case within that
statute, there must be a prosecutor per-
sonally liable for the expenses.
Archibald Wilson, 176.
Practice as to, 345

Held, that there was no sufficient aver-
ment of materiality on the face of the indict-
Reg. v. Legge, 220

ment.

BIGAMY.

On an indictment for bigamy, where it is ne-
cessary to prove a Scotch marriage, some
witnesses conversant with the Scotch law
on the subject of marriage must be called.
Reg. v. Povey, 83

BURGLARY.

It is not sufficient that there was an entry
without a breaking of the outer door and a
breaking without an entry of an inner one.
Reg. v. Davis, 369

CLERGYMAN.

CONCEALMENT OF BIRTH.

Reg. v.

On an indictment against the mother for the
murder of her illegitimate child, it appeared
that the body of a child was found, a few
hours after its birth, on the floor of an attic
in a house where the prisoner lived as do-
mestic servant, the head severed from the
body, and both lying in sheets which had
been removed from the bed-room below,
which was occupied by the prisoner and her
mistress, and where there was evidence to
show that the birth had taken place, but it
was doubtful whether the severance of the
head from the body was effected there or in

the attic:

Held, that there was no evidence to war-

rant the jury in finding a verdict for the
statutable misdemeanor of endeavouring to
conceal the birth. Reg. v. Goode, 318

CONFESSION.

Upon the trial of an indictment for an un-
natural crime with a mare, one of the wit-
nesses, in the presence of T. the owner of
the mare, threatened to give the prisoner in
charge to the police if he did not tell what
business he had in T.'s stable, where the
inare was. At that moment the charge had
not been made known to the prisoner, but
it was immediately afterwards, and then he
confessed.

Held, that this confession was inadmis-
sible in evidence, having been made under
the influence of a threat held out to him in
the presence of one, who being the owner of
the mare, was likely to prosecute for the
offence. Reg. v. Luckhurst, 243
A maid-servant under a charge of setting fire
to a farm building belonging to her master,
was given into the temporary custody of a
married daughter of her master, who did
not live in the house, and had no control
over her as her mistress. Whilst they
were alone together, the daughter said to
the prisoner, "I am sorry for you, you ought
to have known better; tell the truth, whe-
ther you did it or no ;" and upon the pri-
soner replying, “I am innocent,'
" added,
"don't run your soul into more sin, but tell
the truth. She then confessed.

Held that the confession was admissible,
for that the words used did not amount to
a threat or inducement, nor were they used
by any person in authority. Reg. v. Jane
Sleeman, 246

CONSPIRACY.

Practice where prisoners have severed in their
challenges, 6.

1. An indictinent alleged that the defendants
I. W., C. W. and J. W., being persons in
indigent circumstances, and intending to
defraud tradesmen who should supply them
with goods upon credit, conspired to cause
J. W. to be reputed and believed to be a
person of considerable property, and in
opulent circumstances, for the purpose and
with the intent of cheating and defrauding
divers persons being tradesmen, who should
bargain with them for the sale to the said
I. W., of goods, &c. the property of such
last-mentioned persons, of great quantities
of such goods, without paying for the same,
with intent to obtain to themselves money
and other profits.

Held, that this indictment was not sup-
ported by proof that the defendants C. W.
and J. W. being the wife and daughter of
the other defendant I. W., represented that
they were in independent circumstances, their
income being interest of money received
monthly; at another time, when engaging
lodgings, that they were not in the habit of
living in lodgings, and that they obtained
various goods from tradesmen on credit,
under circumstances that showed an intent
to defraud, but no proof being adduced that
those goods were obtained by reason of any
of those general statements.

2. Another count alleged a similar con-
spiracy to represent I. W. to be a person of
considerable property and fit to be trusted,
and by means thereof to cheat and defraud
persons who should let to the said I. W.
lodgings for hire, of divers large sums of
money, being the sums agreed to be paid for
the hire of such lodgings.

Held, that this count was not supported by
proof of the representations above men-
tioned, and that the defendants went to
various houses taking lodgings, and quitting
them without notice or payment; for, if an
indictable offence at all, the object of the
defendants was to obtain possession of the
lodgings, and not to deprive him of the
price or profits of the rooms.

3. A count charging, the defendants with
conspiring, by divers subtle means and false
pretences, to obtain goods and chattels from
H. B., a tradesman, without paying for
them, with intent to defraud him thereof, is
supported by proof of overt acts, from which
a conspiracy may be inferred, without proof
of any such false pretence as is required in
an ordinary indictment for obtaining goods
by false pretences.

4. Quære, whether a count charging a con-
spiracy by divers subtle means and false
pretences, to obtain goods and chattels from
divers persons being tradesmen, without
paying for them, with intent to defraud them
of the same, is bad in arrest of judgment or
otherwise, for not setting out the names of
the parties defrauded or intended to be
defrauded, or making excuse for not doing

So.

Semble, that the ordinary form of indict-
ment for false pretences, which after stating
the false pretence, alleges that, by means of
which false pretence, the defendants ob-
tained the goods or money, is sufficient, and
that the substitution of the words "by
reason of" for "by means of " is equally
unobjectionable. Reg. v. Whitehouse, 38
Where an indictment for conspiracy charges
the offence in general terms, the defendant is
2 a 2

entitled to particulars of the charge, although
there has been a previous committal by a
magistrate.

Therefore, where an indictment contained
counts charging a conspiracy to cheat trades-
men of goods, without mentioning any
specific case, or name, time, or place:

Held, that the defendant was entitled to
such particulars. Reg. v. Rycroft and others,
76

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In support of an indictment charging the de-
fendants with a conspiracy to defraud and
deprive B. of certain leasehold messuages,
whereof the said B. was lawfully possessed,
and to cheat and defraud her of the rents
and profits of the said messuages; the
evidence as to B.'s title was, that F., before
her death, directed S. her next-of-kin, to
convey the messuages to B. on account of
a supposed quitable claim of B. to money
received by F. S., after the death of F.,
and before administration, executed an agree-
ment to assign to B., and went with her to
the houses, and pointed out the property,
and said B. was landlady, and he hoped the
tenants would not shuffle with her as they
had with F. B. atterwards received a small
sum as rent. There was no proof that F.
or S. were ever in possession, and no other
evidence of B.'s title.

Held, that there was some evidence of a
possession by B. to support the averment
in the indictment. Reg. v. Whitehouse and
another, 129

On an indictment against A., B., C., D., E.,
F., G., and H., for conspiracy to cheat M.
by selling a glandered horse as a sound
horse, the evidence was, that A. having
previously cheated M. by selling him a
kicking horse, the defendants B., C., D.,
and E., obtained that horse from M. in
exchange for a glandered horse, which he
subsequently sold. A., accompanied by G.,
afterwards sold M. another horse, in which
transaction the latter was again defrauded.
Some evidence was given to show that A.
was frequently in company with some of the
other defendants, and that he was aware of
a previous sale of the glandered horse by
them, but there was no other evidence to
connect him with its sale to M.

Held, that in the absence of any evidence
clearly leading to the conclusion that A. was
a party to that sale, there was no evidence
of a conspiracy to go to the jury against him.
Reg. v. Read, 134

An agreement with other persons by a witness
who has been bound over to prosecute and
give evidence on an indictable misdemeanor,
not to appear on the trial, is an indictable
offence, as being an agreement to obstruct

the due course of law and justice; and the
indictment may allege that to have been
the object of the defendants, although their
immediate intention had no reference to
the obstruction of justice; but was simply
to extricate themselves from a scrape, and
the defeat of justice was merely the effect of
the conspiracy. Therefore, where H., having
upon oath charged B. with fraud, and being
bound over to prosecute, was subsequently
induced to make an affidavit of B.'s inno-
cence, and H. and his friends, in order to
avoid the consequences of B.'s contradictory
statements on oath, agreed, upon receiving
a cheque from B.'s wife for a sum nearly
equal to the amount of H.'s recognizances,
to forfeit those recognizances by abstaining
from prosecuting, and also to return the
amount of the cheque if H. was not called
upon his recognizances:

Held, that the facts supported an indict-
ment charging H. and his friends with a
conspiracy to obstruct and defeat the due
course of law and justice; but

Held, that the facts did not support counts
in the indictment, charging the conspiracy
to be to obtain the money from the wife of
B., and to cheat and defraud him of the

same.

Notice to produce the cheque served at the
office of the London agents for the country
attorney of the defendants at three p.m. the
day before the commencement of the trial:

Held, sufficient to let in secondary evi-
dence of its contents:

Held, also, that such secondary evidence
was admissible, although it appeared that
the cheque had been seized by the sheriff
under a levy upon the effects of H. for the
amount of the estreated recognizance.

B., having been admitted to bail to answer
the charge of H., did not surrender to take
his trial, but absconded:

Held, that his wife, who was examined as
a witness on the indictment against H. and
others for conspiracy, might refuse to answer
a question whether she had not seen her
husband at a particular time or place, she
having assigned as a reason for not answer
ing it, that her husband had not appeared
upon his recognizance. Reg. v. Hamp, 167
The offence of conspiring may be committed
by conspiracy to use unlawful means for the
accomplishment of a lawful object; and
where A. and B., by false representations
made to C., respecting a horse which the
latter has sold to A., induced him to accept
a smaller sum in satisfaction of the agreed
price:

Held, that, although C. would not be
bound by his agreement to accept the smaller

sum, A. and B. were, nevertheless, properly
convicted of a conspiracy. Reg. v. Carlisle
and another, 366

CONSTABLES.

The right of searching persons in custody must
depend on the circumstances of each par-
ticular case; and the mere fact of a person
being drunk and disorderly will not justify a

rant the finding of the jury. In the Matter
of the Six-Mile-Bridge Inquisition, 122

COSTS.

Of certiorari, 174, 176

COUNSEL.

police officer searching his person, although Opening statement of, 116
the officer may have received general orders
to search all persons in custody; but any
person, whatever may be the nature of the
charge, may so conduct himself, by reason
of violence of language or conduct, that it
may be prudent and right to search him, as
well for his own protection as for those in-
trusted with the duty.

The same rule applies to handcuffing per-
sons in custody, and the right must depend
on the circumstances of each particular case,
as, for instance, the nature of the charge,
and the conduct and temper of the person in
custody. There cannot be any general rule
that will justify a constable in resorting to
the extreme measure of handcuffing a person
in custody for a misdemeanor to a felon, and
marching them through the public streets
from the police station to the magistrate's
office. Leigh v. Cole, 329

CONVICTION.

Although the entire period over which the
assizes extend in one place is, by the con-
templation of law, and for some purposes,
one legal day, the particular day on which a
prisoner's conviction took place may, when
necessary, be shown; and the record does
not operate as an estoppel so as to shut out
evidence of the actual day on which the
prisoner was convicted. Whitaker v. Wisbey,
109

CORONER'S INQUISITION.

Where, on a motion to quash the inquisition
of a coroner's jury finding certain persons
therein named guilty of wilful murder, the
court has, for the purpose of hearing counsel
on behalf of the next-of-kin of the deceased,
granted a conditional order, the party show-
ing cause is not entitled to begin, but the
counsel for the Crown will move to make
absolute the order as if moving an original
motion on notice.

Though this court may quash an inquisi-
tion where a verdict has been found against
a person confessedly innocent, yet it will not
interfere when there has been any evidence,
even though it may be insufficient to war-

DEPOSITIONS.

Taken abroad, admissibility of, 60

DYING DECLARATIONS.
Practice as to receipt of, 120, 357

EMBEZZLEMENT.

Upon an indictment for embezzlement, the
evidence of dishonest dealing with the money
of the prosecutor was, that the defendant,
who was in his service, had received a cheque
which he was to get cashed, and lay out the
proceeds in the market; that he did cash it,
but did not lay out the proceeds as he ought
to have done, and that in the prosecutor's
books he gave a wrong account of the
manner in which the money had been ex-
pended. The jury found the defendant
guilty of larceny, and acquitted him of the
embezzlement :

Held, that the prisoner had been impro-
perly convicted of larceny, and that a con-
viction for embezzlement might have been
sustained. Reg. v. Goodenough, 206
A contract had been entered into between W.
and the Great Northern Railway Company,
by which W. was to provide horses and
carmen (the company providing carts) for
the conveyance of the company's coals to
their several customers. By the contract,
W. stipulated that the carman should, in all
things connected with the carrying and
delivery of the coals and the receipt and
payment of moneys, obey the orders and
commands of the company's coal manager,
and should be subject to the same rules and
regulations as the servants of the company;
and, in case of disobedience of orders, should
be immediately discharged. It was also
provided that W. or the said carmen
should, day by day, pay and account for, to
the company's coal manager, all moneys,
cheques, &c., they should receive from the
customers of the company.

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