The defendant, being one of the carmen so engaged by W. and employed by the company, received from a customer the price of a load of coals he had delivered, and, instead of paying it over to the coal manager, he converted it to his own use.
Held, on an indictment charging him with embezzling certain moneys of W. his master, that he could not be convicted, since the money was received not for and on account of W., but for and on account of the railway company. Reg. v. Beaumont, 269 H. was the miller of a mill in a county gaol. It was his duty to direct any person bringing grain to be ground at the mill, to obtain at the porter's lodge a ticket specifying the quantity brought. The ticket was his order for receiving the grain, and his duty was to receive the grain with the ticket, grind it, receive the money for the grinding, and account to the governor for the money so received. It was a breach of his duty to receive or grind grain without such ticket; but he had no right to grind any grain at the mill for his private benefit.
Having misappropriated money received by him from persons who brought grain to be ground without a ticket, he was indicted for embezzlement:
Held, that a conviction could not be sus- tained, as the reasonable conclusion from the facts was, that he did not receive the money by virtue of his employment, but made an improper use of the mill for his private benefit.
Quære, whether he was a servant of the inhabitants of the county within the mean- ing of the statutes relating to embezzle- ment? Reg. v. Thomas Harris, 363. S. & Co. were in the habit of entering in a book the names of creditors, by whom goods were supplied by them. Such names were in the first column, and in the third column was the amount of the goods so supplied. The second, or intervening one, was reserved for the signatures of the persons to whom the money was paid, and who were required to sign, at the time of payment, no other receipt or voucher being ever asked for. The prisoner being clerk to a creditor of S. & Co., called for the amount of their debt, which in due course was paid him, and he signed his name in the second column of the book before mentioned, between the entry of his employers' names and the sum due to them.
Held, on an indictment against him for embezzling that sum of money, that the entry was a receipt within the stamp laws, and, being unstamped, the whole of the entry ought not to have been read to the
jury, although it was tendered and admitted in evidence solely with the view of identify ing the prisoner as the person to whom the money was paid—the payment having been proved aliunde.
Semble, that the signature alone might have been used, one witness proving that it was written by the person who received the money, and another proving that the handwriting was that of the prisoner. Reg. v. Overton, 277
A. marked money, and delivered it to a third person, that he might therewith buy goods at and A.'s shop, of his shopman B. He did so, B. having received the marked money, instead of putting it in the till, as his duty was, secreted it.
Held, that B. was properly convicted of embezzlement. Reg. v. Samuel Gill, 295 Evidence of, 277, 295, 296
Under the stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17, which, after providing for the taking of de- positions before justices, enacts that, upon proof at the trial of the death, &c., of the deponent, "it shall be lawful to read such depositions as evidence in such prosecu tion;"
Quære, whether the deposition of a deceased person on a charge against the prisoner of stabbing him, can be read on a trial for the murder or manslaughter of the deceased. Reg. v. Dilmore, 52
Before a deposition of a person who is dead, or so ill as not to be able to travel, can be read on the trial, under the stat. 11 & 1 Vict. c. 42, s. 17, it must be proved affirms- tively on the part of the prosecution that the deposition was taken in the presence of the accused person, and that he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity of cross- examining the witness.
To give the accused a full opportunity within the meaning of the statute, the ex- amination must be taken, question by ques- tion, in his presence, and in the presence of the magistrate, and it is not sufficient to read over the statement of the witness, previously taken and committed to writing, in the absence of the magistrate.
The accused must also be asked whether he has any question to put with reference to the statement of the individual witness.
To render the deposition of an absent person admissible, it is not necessary that be should be absolutely unable to travel; it is suf- ficient if his attendance would place his life in jeopardy. Reg. v. Day, 55
Semble, depositions taken by a consul abroad
under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, ss. 58, 59, and returned to this country, and certified under the consular seal to have been duly taken, are admissible in evidence under the Mer- cantile Marine Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 93, s. 115) without further proof, although it appears from extrinsic evidence that the witnesses gave their evidence in a foreign language, which was translated into English to the prisoner, and inserted in the deposi- tions by the counsel.
Quare, as to the effect of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, s. 1 (to facilitate the admission in evidence of certain official and other docu- ments), on such a case.
Quare, whether such depositions are ad- missible where a consul, after the examina- tion of such witness, asked the prisoner whether he had anything to say, and on the prisoner saying he knew nothing about the witnesses, proceeded to examine the next witness, without expressly telling the pri- soner that he might put questions to the witness.
Quare, whether depositions to witnesses containing a great portion of hearsay evi- dence are admissible.
Quære, has the judge power to strike out the portion that consists of such hearsay evidence, and admit the residue. Reg. v. Russell, 60
A map or plan prepared for the purpose of a trial ought not to contain any reference to transactions and occurrences which are the subject-matter of the investigation before the court, and not existing when the survey was made; and if it does, and the objection is taken, the court will not allow the jury to look at it. Reg. v. Mitchell, 82. On a trial for murder it was proved that the deceased, who lived a few hours after the wound was inflicted, made a statement, at the conclusion of which he exclaimed, “Oh, God! I am going fast; I am too far gone to say any more;" but he did not appear to have previously said anything about his condition, and there was no evidence, one way or other, to show that he was aware of it:
Held, that the statement was inadmissible as a dying declaration.
The objection to the statement having been subsequently withdrawn by the prisoner's
Held, that it might be read in evidence, although not evidence if objected to. Reg. v. Nicolas, 120
Upon the trial of an indictment for arson, with intent to defraud an insurance company, the policy was not produced, but parol evidence of it given, a notice to produce having been
served upon the prisoner about mid-day the day before trial:
Held, that the parol evidence was im- properly received and the conviction wrong. Reg. v. Jabez Kitson, 159
On a trial for forgery of a bill of exchange, an expert cannot be asked whether, on com- paring the signatures of the drawer, the acceptor and the indorser of the bill, he is of opinion that they are all written by the same person. Reg. v. Coleman and others, 163 A witness may be called to prove that, on a former trial, the prosecutrix made statements inconsistent with those made by her on the second trial of the case, and the admission of such evidence may be distinguished from allowing witnesses to be examined to disprove statements not relevant to the issue. Reg. v. Daniel Rorke, 196
chaplain to a workhouse had, in his spiritual capacity, frequent conversations there with the prisoner, who was charged with the murder of her child, but who was too ill to be removed from the workhouse:
Semble, per Alderson, B., these conversa- tions ought not to be adduced in evidence at the trial. Reg. v. Griffin, 219 Where a witness for a prosecution gives a different answer on examination-in-chief to that which was expected, his deposition be- fore the coroner or justices, as the case may be, may be put in his hands for the purpose of refreshing his memory, and the question then put to him.
If the witness persists in giving the same answer after his memory has been so re- freshed, the question may be repeated to him from the depositions, in a leading form. Reg. v. Williams and others, 343.
In order to render dying declarations admis- sible in evidence, the facts to show that the deceased was conscious of his state must point to the time of the statement, and therefore declarations some days prior to an expression that the deceased "had given up all in this world," were held inadmissible.
Where the deceased said he was "a mur- dered man, and it would have been better if they had killed him on the spot than left him to linger, and that he thought he should never get over it," but he lived several weeks afterwards:
Held, that there was a primâ facie case for the admissibility of declarations made at the time of those statements.
Held, that the case was taken out of the principle on which such declarations are receivable in evidence. Reg. v. Qualter, 357 1. Statements made by a prisoner with the knowledge of a reward and pardon to any but the actual perpetrator of the offence, and under circumstances which lead to the belief that such statements were made with the hope of receiving the reward, and being allowed to give evidence as a witness on the part of the Crown are inadmissible.
2. A printed copy of a reward offered for such private information and evidence as would lead to the detection and conviction of a murderer or murderers, and a statement that the Secretary of State would recommend the grant of a pardon to any accomplice, not having been the actual perpetrator of the murder, who should give such evidence, was hung up in the magistrate's room in the county gaol. A prisoner, who could read, made a statement to the governor of the gaol in this room, and before that statement inquired whether he could give evidence, but did not say that he made the statement in that expectation, or in the hope of getting the reward, and before making the state- ment, he was told it would be used against him:
Held, that such statement was inad- missible.
3. But statements made, and anony- mous letters written by a prisoner before his apprehension, are not inadmissible merely on the ground of the prisoner's knowledge of the offer of the reward and pardon, or by reason of his having been employed by the police authorities and paid money for his support, under the belief that he was an important witness for the Crown.
4. A statement by a prisoner that A. had proposed to him to murder B. on the follow- ing night, and that he (the prisoner) agreed to go, but did not do so, is not of itself evidence that the prisoner was accessary be- fore the fact to the murder of B. by A. on that night.
5. A woman, having been called as a wit- ness against A., was examined on the voir dire, and said she was married to A.:
Quære, whether it was competent to the counsel for the prosecution to call witnesses to show that she had, after the period of her alleged marriage, and with reference to the present charge, stated and sworn that she was not A.'s wife;
Quære, also, whether the question of cover- ture is one to be decided by the judge or by a jury.
6. A witness, called to prove that he had seen a prisoner at a particular spot at a
certain time, added that he had since seen a number of men in gaol, and had pointed out
Held, that the following was a proper form of question to put to the witness- "Who did you point him out as being?"
7. Where several prisoners are jointly in- dicted, the judge will not allow a separate trial on the ground that the depositions dis- close statements and confessions made by one prisoner implicating another, which are calculated to prejudice the jury, and that there is no legal evidence disclosed against the other prisoner.
8. Where one of several prisoners calls witnesses on his behalf, the Crown is en- titled to reply generally on the whole case. Reg. v. Blackburn, 333
Forgery and uttering, 1, 18, 312, 320 Perjury, 21, 58, 69, 105, 107, 150, 360 Rape, 23
Malicious damages to machines, 25 False pretences, 38, 182, 257, 260, 314, 366 Conspiracy, 38, 129, 134, 167, 366 Larceny of deeds, 46, 304 Comparison of handwriting, 58 Assault, indecent, 64 Returning from transportation, 79 Of period of conviction, 109 Neglecting to support child, 140 Abduction, 143
Conspiracy to abstain from prosecuting, 167 Of wife against her husband, 167 Giving false, before Commissioners in Bank- ruptcy, 220 Cross-examination of prisoner's witnesses by another prisoner, 224 Of intent to commit felony, 241 Confession, 243, 245, 333 Embezzlement, 269, 277, 295, 363 Larceny by servant, 284, 296 Larceny, 293, 310
Of a deed of assignment, 373 EXPENSES.
Of apprehending prisoner, 78
FALSE PRETENCES. In an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences, the pretence alleged was, that the defendant had been to B. on behalf of the prosecutrix, and had served a certain order of affiliation on one J. B. and that he was entitled to receive for serving the said order the sum of five shillings :
Held, that this averment was not sup- ported by proof that the defendant said that he had been with the order to B. to serve
J. B. and left it with the landlady where J. B. lodged, he being out, &c.
Held, also, that this was not an amendable variance within the meaning of the statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1. Reg. v. Bailey, 29 Two statements made at different times, even at the interval of a month, may be so con- nected together as to constitute one indict- able false pretence; and it is entirely a ques- tion for the jury whether they ought to be so connected.
Where, therefore, the prisoner falsely stated on one day that a certain club had 70001. in the bank, in order to persuade the prosecutrix to become a member, and to hand money over to him, but she refused to do so; and a month afterwards the prisoner again recommended the club to her as strong and respectable," and then obtained the money:
Held, that the jury were properly directed, that they might take into account what passed at the first interview as well as what passed at the time when the money was paid; but that before they could convict the defendant they must be satisfied that the representations were knowingly false and fraudulent, and that the prosecutrix was induced to part with her money by those representations. Reg. v. Welman, 153 The London and Brighton Railway Company were in the habit of advancing small sums of money to persons sending goods to be carried by their railway on the faith of re- ceiving such sums from the consignee on the delivery of the goods to him. The defen- dant went to the principal railway station, and gave to the clerk there a card, on which was written Case to Brighton, 11s. 9d. to pay;" at the same time requesting that the case might be sent for to a certain tavern, and forwarded to its destination. The card was, in the ordinary course of business, sent to the goods station of the company with the message left by the defendant, and the manager there directed a carman to fetch the case from the tavern and to pay the 11s. 9d. This was done. The case was sent to Brighton, but the address written upon it was found to be a fictitious one, and, on opening the case, it was found to contain nothing but brickbats and other rubbish.
Held, that these facts did not support an allegation of a false pretence that the box contained certain valuable articles. Reg. v. Partridge, 182
An order by the president of a burial society upon the treasurer for the payment of a sum of money to bearer on account of the society, is a valuable security within the meaning of stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, ss. 5 and 53; and
a member who obtained such an order by false pretences was held properly convicted of that offence, though the rules had neither been certified or enrolled. Reg. v. Green- halgh and another, 257
The defendant had obtained from a banking firm in New York, a circular letter of credit for 2107., authorizing him to receive that sum, or any portion of it, from certain named correspondents in foreign countries, and then to draw for that amount upon the Union Bank in London, in favour of the persons from whom he had received it. He went to St. Petersburg, and having fraudu- lently altered the sum mentioned in the letter from 210l. to 5,210l., he presented it in its altered form to W. and Co. of that city, one of the firms named in the letter, and obtained from them 1,2001. He drew a bill for that amount on the Union Bank in favour of W. and Co. in London, the correspondents of W. and Co. in St. Petersburg. The bill was sent by the latter firm to London, to W. and Co. there, who duly presented it at the Union Bank, but payment was refused.
On an indictment charging the defendant with an attempt to obtain the sum of 1,2007. from the Union Bank by false pretences, it was held, that he could not be convicted. The presentment of the bill by W. and Co. of London could not be taken to be a pre- sentment by the defendant, with intent to obtain money, since, had the money been obtained, it would have been obtained to the use and benefit of W. and Co. and not of the defendant. Reg v. Sans Garrett, 260 On an indictment for obtaining money by falsely pretending that the promissory note of a bank that has stopped payment by reason of bankruptcy, was a good and valuable security for the payment of the amount' mentioned in it, and was of that value, it is not necessary to prove the pro- ceedings in bankruptcy. It is sufficient to prove the time when the bank stopped pay- ment, and that cash could not be obtained for the note on its being presented for pay- ment at the place where it was made payable.
Quare, whether the fact that a banker's note was more than six years old at the time goods or money was obtained by means of it, is of itself sufficient evidence that it was worthless. Reg. v. Smith, 315
An indictment for false pretences will be sus- tained by evidence that the prisoner had sold to the prosecutor blacking which he had asserted to be "Everett's Premier," and which bore a label nearly, but not precisely, imitating Everett's labels, the said blacking not being Everett's Premier, but a spurious
manufacture of his own. Reg. v. Dundas,
A. applied to B. to lend him money, and gave him the name of the defendant as a surety. B. went to the defendant, and, to satisfy himself of his respectability, asked to see his receipts for rent and taxes. The defen- dant placed in the hands of B., for his in- spection, three documents purporting to be receipts for poor rates, with the intent to induce B. to advance money to A. One of these receipts was forged. B. inspected the documents, and then returned them to the defendant:
Held, that the defendant might be con- victed within the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 10, of uttering a forged receipt, and that, for the purpose of rendering him liable, it was not necessary that the receipt should be used to get credit upon it by its operating as a receipt, but that it was sufficient if he used it fraudulently to obtain money by means of it:
Held, also, that it was immaterial whether the money to be obtained by means of it was for himself or for any other person. Reg. v. Ion, 1
On a charge for uttering an order or request
for the delivery of goods, proof of the re ceipt of the goods by the prisoner is no evidence of the utterance.
Where, therefore, the prisoner was indicted in one count for forging, and in another count for uttering, an order for goods to be forwarded by train, and the evidence failed to show that the order was written by the prisoner, and no direct proof was offered of the utterance:
Held, that the uttering could not be in- ferred from proof that the prisoner attended at the station to which the goods were for- warded, and inquired for parcels addressed as mentioned in the order, and represented to the porter that they were required for a funeral, for which the goods ordered were appropriate and, consequently, that there was no evidence to go to the jury against the prisoner. Reg. v. Johnson, 18
On an indictment for forging and uttering an accountable receipt for goods, the following document was held to be an accountable receipt within the statute:
"By order of R. F. Pries, we have this day transferred into the name of Messrs. Collman and Stolterfoht, 759 quarters and 4 bushels of wheat, ex August Ferdinand, Captain Richards, à Neustadt.
"Entered by R. F. Pries, and now lying
at our granaries, Bermondsey-Wall. The wheat is insured against risk of fire by us.— BROWN and YOUNG. Corn Exchange, October 23, 1852." Reg. v. Pries, 165 An indictment for forging an order for the payment of money, is supported by proof of a forged document, containing the words Sirs, please to pay," &c., which, though not addressed to any one, was proved to have been presented to the bankers of the party whose signature was forged, with a representation that it was intended for them. Reg. v. Snelling, 280
The uttering of a forged testimonial of quali fication as schoolmaster of parish school, knowing such testimonial to be forged, with intent to obtain the emoluments of the place of schoolmaster, and to deceive, is an offence at common law, although no fraud was ac- tually perpetrated. Reg. v. Sharman, 312 Putting off a bill of exchange of A., an existing person, as the bill of exchange of A., a ficti tious person, is a felonious uttering of the bill of a fictitious drawer.
Where N. uttered a bill of exchange pur- porting to be drawn by M., and at the time of the uttering represented M. to be a clerk at a railway station, and there was evidence to show that M. had authorized the use of his name as drawer of the bill, but that the prisoner knew that M. was not then, although he formerly had been, a clerk at a railway station:
Held, that there was evidence from which the jury might find that the prisoner ut- tered the name of M. as the name of a fictitious person, so as to support a charge of feloniously uttering the bill, knowing it to be forged:
Held, also, that statements made by the prisoner with reference to M. on a previous occasion, when he applied to get a bill dis- counted, were admissible in evidence. Reg. v. Nisbett, 320
Conspiracy to defraud of houses, 129 Conspiracy to defraud by sale of unsound horses, 134, see FALSE PRETENCES
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. For any offence within 13 Eliz. c. 5, s. 3, the offender may be proceeded against by indict
In such an indictment it is not necessary to set out the specific facts which consti- tute the fraud. Reg. v. Smith, 31.
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