The defendant, being one of the carmen
so engaged by W. and employed by the
company, received from a customer the price
of a load of coals he had delivered, and,
instead of paying it over to the coal manager,
he converted it to his own use.

Held, on an indictment charging him with
embezzling certain moneys of W. his master,
that he could not be convicted, since the
money was received not for and on account
of W., but for and on account of the railway
company. Reg. v. Beaumont, 269
H. was the miller of a mill in a county gaol.
It was his duty to direct any person bringing
grain to be ground at the mill, to obtain at
the porter's lodge a ticket specifying the
quantity brought. The ticket was his order
for receiving the grain, and his duty was to
receive the grain with the ticket, grind it,
receive the money for the grinding, and
account to the governor for the money so
received. It was a breach of his duty to
receive or grind grain without such ticket;
but he had no right to grind any grain at
the mill for his private benefit.

Having misappropriated money received
by him from persons who brought grain to
be ground without a ticket, he was indicted
for embezzlement:

Held, that a conviction could not be sus-
tained, as the reasonable conclusion from
the facts was, that he did not receive the
money by virtue of his employment, but
made an improper use of the mill for his
private benefit.

Quære, whether he was a servant of the
inhabitants of the county within the mean-
ing of the statutes relating to embezzle-
ment? Reg. v. Thomas Harris, 363.
S. & Co. were in the habit of entering in a
book the names of creditors, by whom goods
were supplied by them. Such names were
in the first column, and in the third column
was the amount of the goods so supplied.
The second, or intervening one, was reserved
for the signatures of the persons to whom
the money was paid, and who were required
to sign, at the time of payment, no other
receipt or voucher being ever asked for.
The prisoner being clerk to a creditor of
S. & Co., called for the amount of their
debt, which in due course was paid him, and
he signed his name in the second column of
the book before mentioned, between the
entry of his employers' names and the sum
due to them.

Held, on an indictment against him for
embezzling that sum of money, that the
entry was a receipt within the stamp laws,
and, being unstamped, the whole of the
entry ought not to have been read to the

jury, although it was tendered and admitted
in evidence solely with the view of identify
ing the prisoner as the person to whom the
money was paid—the payment having been
proved aliunde.

Semble, that the signature alone might
have been used, one witness proving that it
was written by the person who received the
money, and another proving that the
handwriting was that of the prisoner. Reg.
v. Overton, 277

A. marked money, and delivered it to a third
person, that he might therewith buy goods at
and
A.'s shop, of his shopman B. He did so,
B. having received the marked money,
instead of putting it in the till, as his duty
was, secreted it.

Held, that B. was properly convicted of
embezzlement. Reg. v. Samuel Gill, 295
Evidence of, 277, 295, 296

EVIDENCE.

Under the stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 17,
which, after providing for the taking of de-
positions before justices, enacts that, upon
proof at the trial of the death, &c., of the
deponent, "it shall be lawful to read such
depositions as evidence in such prosecu
tion;"

Quære, whether the deposition of a deceased
person on a charge against the prisoner of
stabbing him, can be read on a trial for the
murder or manslaughter of the deceased.
Reg. v. Dilmore, 52

Before a deposition of a person who is dead,
or so ill as not to be able to travel, can be
read on the trial, under the stat. 11 & 1
Vict. c. 42, s. 17, it must be proved affirms-
tively on the part of the prosecution that the
deposition was taken in the presence of the
accused person, and that he or his counsel
or attorney had a full opportunity of cross-
examining the witness.

To give the accused a full opportunity
within the meaning of the statute, the ex-
amination must be taken, question by ques-
tion, in his presence, and in the presence of
the magistrate, and it is not sufficient to
read over the statement of the witness,
previously taken and committed to writing,
in the absence of the magistrate.

The accused must also be asked whether
he has any question to put with reference to
the statement of the individual witness.

To render the deposition of an absent
person admissible, it is not necessary that be
should be absolutely unable to travel; it is suf-
ficient if his attendance would place his life in
jeopardy. Reg. v. Day, 55

Semble, depositions taken by a consul abroad

under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, ss. 58, 59, and
returned to this country, and certified under
the consular seal to have been duly taken,
are admissible in evidence under the Mer-
cantile Marine Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict.
c. 93, s. 115) without further proof, although
it appears from extrinsic evidence that the
witnesses gave their evidence in a foreign
language, which was translated into English
to the prisoner, and inserted in the deposi-
tions by the counsel.

Quare, as to the effect of 8 & 9 Vict.
c. 113, s. 1 (to facilitate the admission in
evidence of certain official and other docu-
ments), on such a case.

Quare, whether such depositions are ad-
missible where a consul, after the examina-
tion of such witness, asked the prisoner
whether he had anything to say, and on the
prisoner saying he knew nothing about the
witnesses, proceeded to examine the next
witness, without expressly telling the pri-
soner that he might put questions to the
witness.

Quare, whether depositions to witnesses
containing a great portion of hearsay evi-
dence are admissible.

Quære, has the judge power to strike out
the portion that consists of such hearsay
evidence, and admit the residue. Reg. v.
Russell, 60

A map or plan prepared for the purpose of a
trial ought not to contain any reference to
transactions and occurrences which are the
subject-matter of the investigation before the
court, and not existing when the survey was
made; and if it does, and the objection is
taken, the court will not allow the jury to
look at it. Reg. v. Mitchell, 82.
On a trial for murder it was proved that the
deceased, who lived a few hours after the
wound was inflicted, made a statement, at
the conclusion of which he exclaimed, “Oh,
God! I am going fast; I am too far gone to
say any more;" but he did not appear to
have previously said anything about his
condition, and there was no evidence, one
way or other, to show that he was aware
of it:

Held, that the statement was inadmissible
as a dying declaration.

The objection to the statement having been
subsequently withdrawn by the prisoner's

counsel:

Held, that it might be read in evidence,
although not evidence if objected to. Reg.
v. Nicolas, 120

Upon the trial of an indictment for arson, with
intent to defraud an insurance company, the
policy was not produced, but parol evidence
of it given, a notice to produce having been

served upon the prisoner about mid-day the
day before trial:

Held, that the parol evidence was im-
properly received and the conviction wrong.
Reg. v. Jabez Kitson, 159

On a trial for forgery of a bill of exchange, an
expert cannot be asked whether, on com-
paring the signatures of the drawer, the
acceptor and the indorser of the bill, he is of
opinion that they are all written by the same
person. Reg. v. Coleman and others, 163
A witness may be called to prove that, on a
former trial, the prosecutrix made statements
inconsistent with those made by her on the
second trial of the case, and the admission
of such evidence may be distinguished from
allowing witnesses to be examined to disprove
statements not relevant to the issue. Reg.
v. Daniel Rorke, 196

A

chaplain to a workhouse had, in his spiritual
capacity, frequent conversations there with
the prisoner, who was charged with the
murder of her child, but who was too ill to
be removed from the workhouse:

Semble, per Alderson, B., these conversa-
tions ought not to be adduced in evidence
at the trial. Reg. v. Griffin, 219
Where a witness for a prosecution gives a
different answer on examination-in-chief to
that which was expected, his deposition be-
fore the coroner or justices, as the case may
be, may be put in his hands for the purpose
of refreshing his memory, and the question
then put to him.

If the witness persists in giving the same
answer after his memory has been so re-
freshed, the question may be repeated to him
from the depositions, in a leading form.
Reg. v. Williams and others, 343.

In order to render dying declarations admis-
sible in evidence, the facts to show that the
deceased was conscious of his state must
point to the time of the statement, and
therefore declarations some days prior to an
expression that the deceased "had given
up all in this world," were held inadmissible.

Where the deceased said he was "a mur-
dered man, and it would have been better if
they had killed him on the spot than left
him to linger, and that he thought he should
never get over it," but he lived several weeks
afterwards:

Held, that there was a primâ facie case
for the admissibility of declarations made at
the time of those statements.

Held, that the case was taken out of the
principle on which such declarations are
receivable in evidence. Reg. v. Qualter, 357
1. Statements made by a prisoner with the
knowledge of a reward and pardon to any
but the actual perpetrator of the offence,
and under circumstances which lead to the
belief that such statements were made with
the hope of receiving the reward, and being
allowed to give evidence as a witness on the
part of the Crown are inadmissible.

2. A printed copy of a reward offered
for such private information and evidence as
would lead to the detection and conviction
of a murderer or murderers, and a statement
that the Secretary of State would recommend
the grant of a pardon to any accomplice, not
having been the actual perpetrator of the
murder, who should give such evidence, was
hung up in the magistrate's room in the
county gaol. A prisoner, who could read,
made a statement to the governor of the
gaol in this room, and before that statement
inquired whether he could give evidence,
but did not say that he made the statement
in that expectation, or in the hope of getting
the reward, and before making the state-
ment, he was told it would be used against
him:

Held, that such statement was inad-
missible.

3. But statements made, and anony-
mous letters written by a prisoner before his
apprehension, are not inadmissible merely
on the ground of the prisoner's knowledge
of the offer of the reward and pardon, or
by reason of his having been employed by
the police authorities and paid money for
his support, under the belief that he was an
important witness for the Crown.

4. A statement by a prisoner that A. had
proposed to him to murder B. on the follow-
ing night, and that he (the prisoner) agreed
to go, but did not do so, is not of itself
evidence that the prisoner was accessary be-
fore the fact to the murder of B. by A. on
that night.

5. A woman, having been called as a wit-
ness against A., was examined on the voir
dire, and said she was married to A.:

Quære, whether it was competent to the
counsel for the prosecution to call witnesses
to show that she had, after the period of her
alleged marriage, and with reference to the
present charge, stated and sworn that she
was not A.'s wife;

Quære, also, whether the question of cover-
ture is one to be decided by the judge or by
a jury.

6. A witness, called to prove that he had
seen a prisoner at a particular spot at a

certain time, added that he had since seen a
number of men in gaol, and had pointed out

one:

Held, that the following was a proper
form of question to put to the witness-
"Who did you point him out as being?"

7. Where several prisoners are jointly in-
dicted, the judge will not allow a separate
trial on the ground that the depositions dis-
close statements and confessions made by
one prisoner implicating another, which are
calculated to prejudice the jury, and that
there is no legal evidence disclosed against
the other prisoner.

8. Where one of several prisoners calls
witnesses on his behalf, the Crown is en-
titled to reply generally on the whole case.
Reg. v. Blackburn, 333

Forgery and uttering, 1, 18, 312, 320
Perjury, 21, 58, 69, 105, 107, 150, 360
Rape, 23

Malicious damages to machines, 25
False pretences, 38, 182, 257, 260, 314, 366
Conspiracy, 38, 129, 134, 167, 366
Larceny of deeds, 46, 304
Comparison of handwriting, 58
Assault, indecent, 64
Returning from transportation, 79
Of period of conviction, 109
Neglecting to support child, 140
Abduction, 143

Conspiracy to abstain from prosecuting, 167
Of wife against her husband, 167
Giving false, before Commissioners in Bank-
ruptcy, 220
Cross-examination of prisoner's witnesses by
another prisoner, 224
Of intent to commit felony, 241
Confession, 243, 245, 333
Embezzlement, 269, 277, 295, 363
Larceny by servant, 284, 296
Larceny, 293, 310

Of a deed of assignment, 373
EXPENSES.

Of apprehending prisoner, 78

FALSE PRETENCES.
In an indictment for obtaining money by false
pretences, the pretence alleged was, that the
defendant had been to B. on behalf of the
prosecutrix, and had served a certain order
of affiliation on one J. B. and that he was
entitled to receive for serving the said order
the sum of five shillings :

Held, that this averment was not sup-
ported by proof that the defendant said that
he had been with the order to B. to serve

J. B. and left it with the landlady where
J. B. lodged, he being out, &c.

Held, also, that this was not an amendable
variance within the meaning of the statute
14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1. Reg. v. Bailey, 29
Two statements made at different times, even
at the interval of a month, may be so con-
nected together as to constitute one indict-
able false pretence; and it is entirely a ques-
tion for the jury whether they ought to be
so connected.

Where, therefore, the prisoner falsely
stated on one day that a certain club had
70001. in the bank, in order to persuade the
prosecutrix to become a member, and to
hand money over to him, but she refused to
do so; and a month afterwards the prisoner
again recommended the club to her as
strong and respectable," and then obtained
the money:

Held, that the jury were properly directed,
that they might take into account what
passed at the first interview as well as what
passed at the time when the money was
paid; but that before they could convict the
defendant they must be satisfied that the
representations were knowingly false and
fraudulent, and that the prosecutrix was
induced to part with her money by those
representations. Reg. v. Welman, 153
The London and Brighton Railway Company
were in the habit of advancing small sums
of money to persons sending goods to be
carried by their railway on the faith of re-
ceiving such sums from the consignee on the
delivery of the goods to him. The defen-
dant went to the principal railway station,
and gave to the clerk there a card, on which
was written Case to Brighton, 11s. 9d. to
pay;" at the same time requesting that the
case might be sent for to a certain tavern,
and forwarded to its destination. The card
was, in the ordinary course of business, sent
to the goods station of the company with
the message left by the defendant, and the
manager there directed a carman to fetch the
case from the tavern and to pay the 11s. 9d.
This was done. The case was
sent to
Brighton, but the address written upon it
was found to be a fictitious one, and, on
opening the case, it was found to contain
nothing but brickbats and other rubbish.

Held, that these facts did not support an
allegation of a false pretence that the box
contained certain valuable articles. Reg. v.
Partridge, 182

An order by the president of a burial society
upon the treasurer for the payment of a sum
of money to bearer on account of the society,
is a valuable security within the meaning of
stat. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, ss. 5 and 53; and

a member who obtained such an order by
false pretences was held properly convicted
of that offence, though the rules had neither
been certified or enrolled. Reg. v. Green-
halgh and another, 257

The defendant had obtained from a banking
firm in New York, a circular letter of credit
for 2107., authorizing him to receive that
sum, or any portion of it, from certain
named correspondents in foreign countries,
and then to draw for that amount upon the
Union Bank in London, in favour of the
persons from whom he had received it. He
went to St. Petersburg, and having fraudu-
lently altered the sum mentioned in the letter
from 210l. to 5,210l., he presented it in its
altered form to W. and Co. of that city, one
of the firms named in the letter, and obtained
from them 1,2001. He drew a bill for that
amount on the Union Bank in favour of
W. and Co. in London, the correspondents
of W. and Co. in St. Petersburg. The bill
was sent by the latter firm to London, to
W. and Co. there, who duly presented it at
the Union Bank, but payment was refused.

On an indictment charging the defendant
with an attempt to obtain the sum of 1,2007.
from the Union Bank by false pretences, it
was held, that he could not be convicted.
The presentment of the bill by W. and Co.
of London could not be taken to be a pre-
sentment by the defendant, with intent to
obtain money, since, had the money been
obtained, it would have been obtained to the
use and benefit of W. and Co. and not of
the defendant. Reg v. Sans Garrett, 260
On an indictment for obtaining money by
falsely pretending that the promissory note
of a bank that has stopped payment by
reason of bankruptcy, was a good and
valuable security for the payment of the
amount' mentioned in it, and was of that
value, it is not necessary to prove the pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy. It is sufficient to
prove the time when the bank stopped pay-
ment, and that cash could not be obtained
for the note on its being presented for pay-
ment at the place where it was made
payable.

Quare, whether the fact that a banker's
note was more than six years old at the time
goods or money was obtained by means
of it, is of itself sufficient evidence that it
was worthless. Reg. v. Smith, 315

An indictment for false pretences will be sus-
tained by evidence that the prisoner had sold
to the prosecutor blacking which he had
asserted to be "Everett's Premier," and
which bore a label nearly, but not precisely,
imitating Everett's labels, the said blacking
not being Everett's Premier, but a spurious

manufacture of his own. Reg. v. Dundas,

380

FORGERY.

A. applied to B. to lend him money, and gave
him the name of the defendant as a surety.
B. went to the defendant, and, to satisfy
himself of his respectability, asked to see
his receipts for rent and taxes. The defen-
dant placed in the hands of B., for his in-
spection, three documents purporting to be
receipts for poor rates, with the intent to
induce B. to advance money to A. One of
these receipts was forged. B. inspected the
documents, and then returned them to the
defendant:

Held, that the defendant might be con-
victed within the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4,
c. 66, s. 10, of uttering a forged receipt, and
that, for the purpose of rendering him liable,
it was not necessary that the receipt should be
used to get credit upon it by its operating as
a receipt, but that it was sufficient if he used
it fraudulently to obtain money by means of
it:

Held, also, that it was immaterial whether
the money to be obtained by means of it was
for himself or for any other person. Reg. v.
Ion, 1

On a charge for uttering an order or request

for the delivery of goods, proof of the re
ceipt of the goods by the prisoner is no
evidence of the utterance.

Where, therefore, the prisoner was indicted
in one count for forging, and in another
count for uttering, an order for goods to be
forwarded by train, and the evidence failed
to show that the order was written by the
prisoner, and no direct proof was offered of
the utterance:

Held, that the uttering could not be in-
ferred from proof that the prisoner attended
at the station to which the goods were for-
warded, and inquired for parcels addressed
as mentioned in the order, and represented
to the porter that they were required for a
funeral, for which the goods ordered were
appropriate and, consequently, that there
was no evidence to go to the jury against the
prisoner. Reg. v. Johnson, 18

On an indictment for forging and uttering an
accountable receipt for goods, the following
document was held to be an accountable
receipt within the statute:

"By order of R. F. Pries, we have this
day transferred into the name of Messrs.
Collman and Stolterfoht, 759 quarters and
4 bushels of wheat, ex August Ferdinand,
Captain Richards, à Neustadt.

"Entered by R. F. Pries, and now lying

66

The uttering of a forged testimonial of quali
fication as schoolmaster of parish school,
knowing such testimonial to be forged, with
intent to obtain the emoluments of the place
of schoolmaster, and to deceive, is an offence
at common law, although no fraud was ac-
tually perpetrated. Reg. v. Sharman, 312
Putting off a bill of exchange of A., an existing
person, as the bill of exchange of A., a ficti
tious person, is a felonious uttering of the
bill of a fictitious drawer.

Where N. uttered a bill of exchange pur-
porting to be drawn by M., and at the time
of the uttering represented M. to be a clerk
at a railway station, and there was evidence
to show that M. had authorized the use of
his name as drawer of the bill, but that the
prisoner knew that M. was not then,
although he formerly had been, a clerk at a
railway station:

Held, that there was evidence from which
the jury might find that the prisoner ut-
tered the name of M. as the name of a
fictitious person, so as to support a charge
of feloniously uttering the bill, knowing it
to be forged:

Held, also, that statements made by the
prisoner with reference to M. on a previous
occasion, when he applied to get a bill dis-
counted, were admissible in evidence. Reg.
v. Nisbett, 320

FRAUD.

Conspiracy to defraud of houses, 129
Conspiracy to defraud by sale of unsound
horses, 134, see FALSE PRETENCES

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
For any offence within 13 Eliz. c. 5, s. 3, the
offender may be proceeded against by indict

ment.

In such an indictment it is not necessary
to set out the specific facts which consti-
tute the fraud. Reg. v. Smith, 31.