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There is another source from whence much of our present distress, and past difficulties have flowed, and that is the hope and expectation which seizes the States, and Congress toward the close of every year, that Peace must take place in the WinterThis never fails to produce an apathy which lulls them into ease and security, and involves the most distressing consequences at the opening of every campaign. We may rely upon it that we shall never have Peace till the enemy are convinced that we are in a condition to carry on the war. It is no new maxim in politics that for a nation to obtain Peace, or insure it, it must be prepared for

war.

But it is time for me to recollect myself and quit a subject which would require a folio volume to illucidate, and expose the folly of our measures. To rectify past blunders is impossible, but we might profit by the experience of them, tho' even here I doubt, as I am furnished with many instances to the contrary.

DEAR SIR,

TO MAJOR-GENERAL HEATH

ROBINSON'S HOUSE, 26 September, 1780.

* I cannot conclude, without informing

United States, are considering themselves as dependent on their respective States. In a word, I see the powers of Congress declining too fast for the consideration and respect, which are due to them as the great representative body of America, and I am fearful of the consequences."-Washington to Joseph Jones, in Congress, 31 May, 1780.

you of an event, which has happened here, and which will strike you with astonishment and indignation. Major-General Arnold has gone to the enemy. He had had an interview with Major André, adjutant-general of the British army, and had put into his possession a state of our army, of the garrison at this post, of the number of men considered as necessary for the defence of it, a return of the ordnance, and the disposition of the artillery corps, in case of an alarm. By a most providential interposition, Major André was taken in returning to New York, with all those papers in General Arnold's handwriting, who, hearing of the matter, kept it secret, and left his quarters immediately, under pretence of going over to West Point on Monday forenoon, about an hour before my arrival; then pushed down the river in the barge, which was not discovered till I had returned from West Point in the afternoon; and, when I received the first information of Major André's captivity, measures were instantly taken to apprehend him; but, before the officers, sent for the purpose, could reach Verplanck's Point, he had passed it with a flag, and got on board the Vulture ship of war, which lay a few miles below. He knew of my approach, and that I was visiting, with the Marquis, the north and middle redoubts, and from this circumstance was so straitened in point of time, that I believe he carried with him but very few if any material papers, though he has a very precise knowledge of the affairs of the post. The gentlemen of General Arnold's family, I have

the greatest reason to believe, were not privy in the least degree to the measures he was carrying on, or to his escape. I am, dear Sir, with very great esteem and regard, yours, &c.

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN CADWALADER

DEAR SIR,

HEAD-QRS., TAPPAN, 5 October, 1780.

I have to acknowledge and thank you for your obliging and friendly letter of the 20th ulto.-It came to this place in my absence from the army and during my necessary detention at West Point on a very interesting but disgraceful incident in our military occurrences.

Altho I have but little leizure for the gratification of private correspondencies, I beg you to be assured, that, from a warmth of friendship, any letters of yours will be gratefully accepted; and it is with much pleasure I receive fresh assurances of your regard and attachment to me. We are now drawing an inactive campaign to a close; the beginning of which appeared pregnant with events of a favorable complexn. I hoped, but I hoped in vain, that a prospect was displaying, which wd. enable me to fix a period to my military pursuits, and restore me to domestic life. The favorable disposition of Spain, the promised succor from France, the combined force in the West Indies, the declaration of Russia (acceded to by other powers of Europe, and humiliating to the naval pride and

power of Great Britain),1 the superiority of France and Spain by sea in Europe, the Irish claims and English disturbances, formed in the aggregate an opinion in my breast, (which is not very susceptible of peaceful dreams,) that the hour of deliverance was not far distant; for that, however unwilling Great B. might be to yield the point, it would not be in her power to continue the contest. But alas! these prospects, flattering as they were, have prov'd delusory, and I see nothing before us but accumulating distress.

We have been half of our time without provision, and are likely to continue so. We have no magazines, nor money to form them; and in a little time we shall have no men, if we had money to pay them. We have lived upon expedients till we can live no longer. In a word, the history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary devices, instead of system and œconomy. It is in vain, however, to look back, nor is it our business to do

SO.

Our case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is wisdom among our rulers.

1 In this war, which was waged between France, Spain, and the United States on the one side and Great Britain on the other, the latter power showed little disposition to regard the rights of neutrals. In consequence, the Empress of Russia, on February 28, 1780, issued a declaration setting forth a series of principles or rules for the guidance of her naval officers in the protection of the neutral rights of her subjects. Other nations were invited to join in her declaration, and Denmark, Sweden, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Portugal and the Two Sicilies did so. The league thus formed is known as the Armed Neutrality of 1780. See Moore, Digest of International Law, vii., 558.

But to suppose that this great revolution can be accomplished by a temporary army, that this army will be subsisted by State supplies, and that taxation alone is adequate to our wants, is in my opinion absurd, and as unreasonable as to expect an Inversion in the order of nature to accommodate itself to our views. If it was necessary, it could easily be proved to any person of a moderate share of understanding, that an annual army or an army raised on the spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is, in various ways which could be enumerated, ten times more expensive than a permanent body of men, under good organization and military discipline, which never was nor never will be the case of new Troops. A thousand arguments, resulting from experience and the nature of things, might also be adduced to prove, that the army, if it is to depend upon State supplies, must disband or starve; and that taxation alone, (especially at this late hour,) cannot furnish the means to carry on the War. Is it not time then to retract from error, and benefit by experience? Or do we want further proof of the ruinous system we have pertinaciously adhered to?

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JOHN LAURENS

MY DEAR LAURENS,

HD-QRS., PASSAIC FALLS, 13 October, 1780.

* In no instance since the commencement of the war, has the interposition of Providence ap

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