control over its products. Another was the system of special contracts, directly in restraint of trade, employed by the Standard Oil Trust, and by the Beef Trust.

"These," he said, "are some of the cases which I think fall within the operation of the bill." The meaning of "monopoly," according to Webster, was "To engross, to obtain by any means, exclusive right of trade to any place or within any country or district, as to monopolize the trade." The attempt to do this, he continued, was forbidden by the bill.

At this point, Mr. Butterworth asked several specific questions. Suppose, he queried, the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, in selling to Texas agents, fixed the selling price for those agents, without authorizing them to drive out competitors? This Mr. Culberson considered legal, if they sold to everybody in that way. Again, asked Mr. Butterworth, suppose a combination at Chicago should purchase beef consigned from other states, and should by arrangements with its agents throughout those states, keep the price below a certain figure? This Mr. Culberson considered, would be prohibited by the bill. And lastly Mr. Butterworth asked: "Suppose a Chicago firm should consign its beef to a butcher in my town, and should afterwards, upon his insisting upon selling the meat at a lower price than they directed, establish another butcher by his side, refusing to sell any more to the first, and authorizing the second to sell at a lower price until the first was driven out of the business; would that be reached by this bill?" Which Mr. Culberson again answered in the affirmative. Thereupon, Mr. Culberson explained section 4, pointing out that it gave the Attorney-General power to in

stitute suit. Mr. Henderson of Iowa, thought each district attorney should have this power, but Mr. Culberson insisted that suits would be of such great importance, that they should be directed from a central head. Then, Mr. Culberson took up section 6, showing the importance of forfeiture to the government of any goods which are the subject of a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, under the same conditions as goods wrongfully imported into the country. He next called attention to section 7, saying that it allowed people to sue for damages in a circuit court, whether or not the sum exceeded in quantum $2000. He also emphasized the fact, that as jurisdiction in state courts was not specifically denied, it was permitted. He ended his explanation, with the remark that Congress could completely crush the trusts, by removing the tariff from those articles which were manufactured by trusts, but stated that this would be inadvisable, because since nearly all products were handled by combinations, it would strip all the revenue from the government, and force them to resort to direct taxation.

I

The next speaker was Mr. Wilson, of West Virginia. He criticised the bill severely, as being quite inadequate: "I, for one, Mr. Speaker, do not believe that this bill will accomplish the purpose for which it purports to be enacted," And he considered that the only way to strike the trusts was through the corporations, adding that this could most effectively be accomplished by the states. And then he turned to the relation between the tariff and the trusts, pointing to the existence of trusts in Germany and their failure in England.

His thought is summed up in this sentence: "If there

1 Congr. Rec., 1890, vol. 21, p. 4092.

is a remunerative demand for products, there is little temptation and no necessity for forming trusts. It is only when the power of production has outstripped the power of consumption that this temptation and almost necessity exist." In this country, he insisted, our supply has outstripped our demand. For this condition there were but two remedies, either to open markets to commerce and let out the surplus, or to create trusts and throttle commerce. On being asked what law prevented exports, he replied it was the tariff which prevented imports. And he further criticised the Republicans: "You hold out to a man great prizes, you dangle before his eyes the opportunity of making great wealth, and then you say, 'If you sieze upon these prizes we are going to punish you.'" Finally, he submitted extracts from many articles to bring out his views. These explained that the present tariff was protective in nature, that this stimulated production excessively and that this excess, being closed to commerce by the tariff, brought about the formation of combinations against commerce.

"2

Mr. Sayers, of Texas, now offered an amendment permitting the President to suspend the tariff on articles made by a trust, but he was called out of order by the Chair.

Mr. Ezra B. Taylor replied to Mr. Wilson's arguments, denying all relation between the tariff and trusts, pointing to the existence of trusts in England, and averring that many of our most highly protected articles were not involved in trusts. Thereafter, he declared himself opposed to trusts, describing them as the "monster who robs the farmer on one hand, and the consumer on the other."3 And he favored this bill which proposed to destroy them.

1 Congr. Rec., 1890, vol. 21, p. 4093.

Ibid., p. 4098.

Ibid., p. 4095.

Mr. Cannon, of Illinois, also criticised Mr. Wilson for confusing the trust and the tariff questions, and declared himself strongly in favor of the proposed bill. And then he informed Mr. Wilson that the tariff bill at that time under consideration

repealed the juggling sugar schedule under which the Sugar Trust was formed, and put sugar upon the free list. It will relieve each inhabitant of the country, great and small, rich and poor, from the exaction of at least $1 a year, upon sugar alone, and at the same time, destroy the sugar trust.

This curious admission of the connection between the tariff and the Sugar Trust does not appear to have been followed up, however, and the subject was allowed to drop.

Mr. Bland now offered an amendment to come in after section 8, providing that contracts for the prevention of competition in transported commodities, or in the transportation of persons or property, between different states, be prohibited.'

Pending the vote, Mr. Heard of Missouri and Mr. Rogers of Arkansas, pointed to the ability of those Senators who had passed on the measure, and then Mr. Fithian stated his econotnic views of trusts.

It is sufficient for me to know [he said] that they exist, that they are an evil, that they are destroying the legitimate commerce of the country, that they enhance the price of commodities to the people beyond an honest profit and that they are a crime against the government and against the people. These causes are sufficient to call for the intervention of the power of the government for their suppression.

'Congr. Rec., 1890, vol. 21, p. 4099.

Thereupon Mr. Bland offered his amendment;' which was passed without debate; and immediately after, with this amendment, the bill was passed.

Congress now entered upon a series of conferences between committees of the two houses, during which a number of amendments were proposed and rejected.

The bill, with the Bland amendment, was received back by the Senate on May 2nd, and immediately referred to the judiciary committee. This body reported the bill on May 12th; Senator Hoar offering an amendment to section 2 in place of that suggested by the House. In presenting this amendment, he stated that the first part of Mr. Bland's proposal exceeded the authority of Congress, in attempting to "treat forever after" articles which have once been the subjects of interstate commerce. But the second part of the proposal, that "contracts or agreements entered into for the purpose of preventing competition in the transportation of persons or property from one state or territory into another shall be deemed unlawful," he concurred in, although he explained that he had considered such cases already covered by the bill.3

1" Every contract or agreement entered into for the purpose of preventing competition in the sale or purchase of a commodity transported from one state or territory to be sold in another, or so contracted to be sold, or to prevent competition in transportation of persons or property from one state or territory into another shall be deemed unlawful within the meaning of this act; provided that the contracts here enumerated shall not be construed to exclude any other contract or agreement declared unlawful in this act."

'Ibid., p. 4559. "Every contract or agreement entered into for the purpose of preventing competition in transportation of persons or property from one state or territory to another shall be deemed unlawful within the meaning of this act.'

'Ibid., p. 4560. "We suppose that it is already covered by the bill as it stands-that is, that transportation is as much trade or commerce