The final category is the one that would produce effective parity with the superpowers and would involve new families of aircraft, heavier ships, and complete modernization of ground elements to include tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons would of course have to be present in numbers and types that would afford all the options and weight of explosives available to Moscow and Washington.

Costing Chinese Programs

It is not rewarding to try to price Chinese military programs. Personnel costs, as compared to the United States are negligible. It has been asserted by one economist that military production in China is most efficient when compared to other functions. On the other hand the problems of getting into series production on newer and more complex items can create difficulties. The determination of how much is enough for support of the present posture-the problem of further additions at the margin-leads to the problem of deciding where and how the threshold into a new posture is to be crossed. What is the utility of small numbers of modern offensive systems in the face of the holdings of the United States and U.S.S.R.? A respectable entry into this area of military capability would require massive increases in the budget and preemption of some vital types of plant. Even though it cannot be precisely costed, such a move would involve critical reductions in other production sectors. In the United States there is now talk about capital ships whose cost nears $1 billion and fighter aircraft. that run from $10 to $15 million each. The physical and budgetary implications for the PRC should she undertake to try for some position of credible and useful global power, would require major surgery in the programs now directed to broad front progress toward the goal announced by Chou En-lai; a national economy advancing in the front ranks of the world.

The Current Condition

There is obviously a lack of symmetry among China's view of her place in the world, her economic power, her political weight, and her military capability. Physical safety, while present, is tenuous and uncertain. If the PRC were to concentrate on closing the military gap, she would face the problem presented in Zeno's sixth paradox: Achilles, the swift runner, can never catch the tortoise because the tortoise started first. The basic concept, false in its original application, would apply here because the tortoise started far enough ahead. In her present circumstances, the PRC must pay close attention to both the political and military components of her strategy. Political changes can come more quickly. The PLA of say, 10 years ago, is discernible in the PLA today. having undergone incremental improvement within functional constraints. On the other hand, who, 10 years ago, could confidently have predicted the detailed course of China's relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States? The relaxation in U.S. relations and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam have effectively reduced the immediacy of the military threat from that quarter. It may also have introduced a new element in Soviet thinking about the way to deal with Peking. The present condition, probably not completely satisfactory to Peking, may neverthe

less represent the best position achievable in the real and objective circumstances. Most of all, China needs time.

How will China spend her time? Present indications are for concentration on improving the industrial base and general economic power of the nation, with only that level of attention to the desires of individuals necessary for stability. Although some may see a growing pragmatism in the policymaking of the leadership, it should not completely be forgotten that political or ideological stimuli can produce phenomena that were not anticipated by outsiders, particularly in the case of Mao Tse-tung. With this reservation, it is still possible to say that PRC is directing her energies to broad front economic growth while preserving the driving Maoist concepts of social and political order.

Within this framework the PLA will provide a defensive wall, behind which other programs may operate. To spend too much on the shield would cripple the operations it is supposed to protect. The linchpin of the concept is the reality of deterrence-the belief by others that the PRC can make the cost of attack on her too high for whatever benefits might result.

China may be seen as a nation in process, while her major rivals are not; rather, they have arrived at strategic positions from which Peking cannot eject them. The long-range goal may be an approach to parity that gives China access as an equal in the international dealings of world powers. The exact method for doing this involves some risktaking. There is one view in the United States that the most rational course is the most dangerous for others. By foregoing massive military programs now, and addressing directly the tasks of building a solid modern industrial base, the Chinese will develop the ability to pro duce in future much larger and more modern military systems.

This would indeed be likely, and there is little that others can do about it. The emergence of such a position would add greatly to the complicated competition for military security that now characterizes the Soviet-U.S. relation. China has reached an intermediate plateau of security. It would appear that her future military plans are directed to some continuous growth, at rates that do not cripple the movement toward total goals.

China's Choices

The PRC's ambitious and impatient struggle for simultaneous progress on many fronts induces intense competition for chronically short resources. Military demands have sponsors and opponents within the armed forces as well as in the entire government system. More is known about the product or result of the struggle, represented by the realities of the PLA, than is known of the process of debate and compromise that produced it. The concern of this study has been directed to what the forces in being and planned say about the play of stimulus and response between military tasks and their performance. Forces mirror their foes.

If security and integrity of the national territory are the primary and irreplaceable goals then the utility of the PLA today is very high. Pragmatically, the forces have performed their mission. This has been done after the trauma of separation from the major source of supply

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represented by Moscow. The continuing costs of maintenance and improvement are bearable.

Some equipment of native design has encountered problems of design and technology, but efforts to meet the problems continue behind the shield of older systems still in service. Most importantly, the security of the homeland has rested upon tactics and strategies attributed to Chairman Mao, regardless of the zigs and zags introduced by lesser men. In this effort all the people have an honorable part. Physically, this situation embodies the second category of action described earlier in this section.

It is not implied that the PRC would not seek a better stance. R. & D. efforts and increasing ability to produce such modern weapons systems as the Luta class destroyer, Romeo class submarines and-in spite of difficulties-efforts to improve air defense, all indicate movement toward the third category. With the improved performance capabilities residing in the achievement of a more modern defensive force, the doubts that must now arise from the inadequacies of "what_is" could largely be erased. This move is particularly important in nuclear weapons. There is some reassurance in the deterrent capacity now in hand, but the existence of an assured second strike capability would inspire much more confidence.

It is therefore concluded that the present strategic posture of the PRC provides the minimum necessary utility for the moment. Budget constraints and technological problems will shape but not halt armament programs. Conventional weapons of improved design will replace older models as the addition of older models at the margin becomes increasingly less desirable. In the nuclear field the immediate goal will be the continued production of weapons able to inflict higher levels of damage on the Soviet Union, India. and perhaps Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. The ability to strike the United States appears less urgent. The risk of war on more than one front will not alter production of weapons but will have strong influence on the way they figure in strategic plans.

THE CHINESE DEFENSE BURDEN, 1965-74

By SYDNEY H. JAMMES

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 10 years the leadership of the People's Republic of China has maintained an ambitious array of military programs which have used a substantial portion of China's economic resources. The purpose of this paper is to examine the magnitude and types of resources allocated to the defense effort and to assess the burden on the Chinese economy.

MILITARY PROGRAMS

China's military policy has called for large conventional forces and small but growing nuclear deterrent forces. The 3-million-man ground forces the world's largest-have been equipped and trained mainly for the military environment of the 1940's and 1950's, although an increasing proportion is being armed with more modern weapons. The air force consists largely of obsolescent short-range fighters, while naval forces have been configured primarly for coastal defense. In short, China has deployed the type of conventional forces one would expect from a developing country with a large population and a largely agricultural economy. The conventional forces stress manpower and easily manufactured weaponry in lieu of more sophisticated armaments.

China has also developed nuclear weapons for delivery by bombers and by medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching most parts of Asia. Longer range land-based missiles as well as a submarine-launched ballistic missile are probably under development, while work continues on what is apparently China's first nuclearpowered attack submarine (probably armed with conventional torpedos). The development and manufacture of these weapons, while limited in number, testifies to the mastery by the People's Republic of much of the technology of a modern industrial nation.

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE

An appraisal of the impact of China's military effort on the economy over the past 10 years is best made by dividing the discussion into two parts-military personnel-related costs, and weapons-related costs.

Military Personnel-Related Costs

Military personnel-related costs consist primarily of outlays for pay, food, and clothing for the armed forces and the pay of civilian employees of the armed forces. Examination of alternative civilian uses

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of military manpower suggests that the impact of military personnelrelated costs on the Chinese economy is slight. Only a fraction of each military age group-perhaps 1 youth in 10-is selected for the armed forces. The great majority are assigned to the ground forces (2- to 4-year term of service), with a small fraction going to the air force (3- to 5-year term) and the naval forces (4- to 6-year term).

The normal recruit is physically strong and loyal to the regime— the two main criteria for selection. He has had primary and, increasingly common, middle-school education and in the majority of cases has been toughened by life in a largely unmechanized countryside. Once in the military forces, he is subject to rigorous physical training and to training in a number of skills often of later use in the civilian economy-for example, truck driving, construction skills, and communication skills.

The soldier contributes to production while on active service. The armed forces produce perhaps as much as half of their own food supply, assist civilians in planting and harvesting, and participate in the building of public works such as roads, railroads, canals, and water conservation projects. Finally, the personal living standards of the military are frugal and involve a minimum of support from the nonmilitary sectors of the economy.

The "opportunity cost" of the use of manpower in the armed forces that is, the output forgone as measured by the output of these men in their best alternative use thus is seen to be quite small.1 China has a plentitude of people in relation to land and capital plant and indeed finds it difficult to usefully employ the nine-tenths of the military-age males who are not inducted. Similarly, the employment of civilians by the armed forces is little burden, i.e., costs only a small amount in output given up elsewhere in the economy.

Weapons-Related Costs

Weapons-related costs impinge more directly and heavily on the economy. Resources consumed by the armed services for (a) investment in defense industries, (b) weapons R.D.T. & E. (research, development, test, and evaluation) (c) weapons procurement and operation, and (d) construction of military facilities are the same types of resources needed for growth in the civilian sector. While limitations of data prevent a precise weighing of this burden, estimates of direct costs for procurement and operation of military equipment, as shown in figure 1, provide an appreciation of how weapons-related costs have grown over the past decade.

1 A further exposition of this thesis can be found in J. G. Godaire, "Communist China's Defense Establishment: Some Economic Implications," An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Washington, Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, 1967.