ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

February 7, 1964

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the Submerged Lands Act releases any former title of the United States to the lands naturallymade as islands which formerly were lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 2(a) of the Submerged Lands Act. The Wallis ruling, so far as inconsistent with this conclusion, should be disapproved.

[blocks in formation]

Oil and Gas Leases: Acquired Lands Leases-Oil and Gas Leases: Description of Land

An acquired lands lease offer for a tract of land consisting of portions of several irregularly shaped surveyed tracts of land no part of the boundaries of which coincide with any part of the boundary of the tract applied for need not, in addition to giving a complete metes and bounds description of the tract tied to a corner of the public land surveys, give the section numbers of the surveyed tracts portions of which are included in the tract applied for. APPEAL FROM THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Carolyn C. Stockmeyer, Executrix for the Succession of Edwin W. Stockmeyer, deceased, has appealed to the Secretary of the Interior from a decision dated July 13, 1962, by the Division of Appeals of the Bureau of Land Management which affirmed a decision of the Eastern States land office dismissing the protest of Edwin W. Stockmeyer against the award of a lease in response to S. R. Cain, Jr.'s, oil and gas lease offer, BLM-A 055740, which was filed simultaneously with Stockmeyer's offer, BLM-A 055744, and was awarded first priority in a public drawing of all the simultaneously filed offers.

The protest alleged that Cain's description of the land sought for leasing does not comply with the requirements of departmental regulation 43 CFR 200.5(a), which provides in pertinent part that—

* If the lands have been surveyed under the rectangular system of public land surveys, and the description can be conformed to such survey system, the lands must be described by legal subdivision, section, township, and range. Where the description cannot be conformed to the public land survey, any boundaries which do not so conform must be described by metes and bounds, giving courses and distances between successive angle points with appropriate ties to established survey corners.

Cain's offer describes by metes and bounds a long, narrow, irregularly shaped tract of acquired land comprising 505.24 acres which extends northeasterly through the northern part of one township (T. 8 N., R. 1 W., Wash. Mer.) and northward into the adjoining township (T. 9 N., R. 1 W., Wash. Mer.). The land is in the Natchez Trace Parkway in Mississippi. The metes and bounds description is tied to the township corner common to the two townships in which the land sought is located and the two adjoining townships on the east. It designates the townships in which the tract applied for is situated but does not give any section numbers or other reference to other subdivisions of the townships.

The appellant does not challenge the description on the grounds that it is not a proper metes and bounds description because it fails to include the proper courses and distances between the successive angle points or that it is not tied to an established survey corner or that it fails to close. She contends only that the description is inadequate because it fails to designate the sections of land in which the tract sought for leasing is located and thus does not comply with the plain requirement of the applicable regulation.

An examination of the official plats of the townships in which the land sought for leasing is located discloses that, although the townships are bounded by 4 lines, each 6 miles in length, which meet at right angles and enclose 36 square miles, there are no sections 1 square mile in area within these townships arranged in the regular manner and numbered continuously from 1 to 36 in the ordinary east-west, west-east progression of the public land surveys. The township boundaries are merely superimposed upon surveys of private land holdings of various shapes and sizes with few, if any, boundary lines which run in cardinal directions. The private holdings, referred to as sections, are designated by the names of the owners and also by numbers, probably assigned in the order in which the surveys were made, so that the number assigned to any tract affords no clue as to its location within the township. Furthermore, in some instances, a township boundary bisects a section. Thus, it is obvious that the interiors of the two townships in question were not surveyed in the manner of normal, rectangular township surveys. See 43 U.S.C., 1958 ed., secs 751, 752.

In view of the manner in which the interiors of the two townships in question were surveyed, a question is presented whether the quoted portion of 43 CFR 200.5 (a) is applicable to this case. That portion of the regulation applies only to situations where the lands applied

February 7, 1964

for have been surveyed "under the rectangular system of public land surveys." It may be questioned whether the lands applied for by Cain were so surveyed.

It is not necessary, however, to determine that question,' for, assuming the quoted portion of the regulation to be applicable, Cain's description literally complied with the requirements set forth. A plotting of the tract, as Cain described it in his offer, in the proper location upon the township plats discloses that, while it includes portions of two sections in one township and seven in the other, the boundaries of the tract do not, in a single instance, coincide with the boundaries of the sections shown on the plats. The boundary lines merely cut across section boundaries two, three, or four times in each section and, except for these crossings, run entirely within the sections. Since no part of Cain's boundary conforms to any surveyed lines, the first sentence of the regulation quoted above is not applicable and only the second sentence applies. Cain's description clearly complies with the second sentence.

Appellant argues that nonetheless the description must also comply with the first sentence and give the numbers of the sections in which the tract applied for lies. This interpretation is sanctioned neither by the express language of the regulation nor by necessary implication. Appellant seems to be confusing the situation here with a situation. where parts of the boundaries of a tract applied for coincide and are coextensive with the boundaries of a surveyed subdivision or section and part does not coincide and is not coextensive. In the case here no portion of the boundary of Cain's tract coincides with any boundary of the surveyed sections within the two townships in question.

Accordingly, the protest against Cain's offer was properly dismissed. Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Solicitor by the Secretary of the Interior (sec. 210.2.2A (4) (a), Departmental Manual; 24 F.R. 1348), the decision appealed from is affirmed.

ERNEST F. HOM,

Assistant Solicitor.

If it were determined that the portion of the regulation quoted is not applicable, the sufficiency of Cain's description would have to be measured against the following portion of the regulation:

"If [the lands applied for are] not so surveyed [under the rectangular system] the lands must be described by metes and bounds, giving courses and distances between the successive angle points on the boundary of the tract and connected with an official corner of those surveys by courses and distances." 43 CFR 200.5 (a). Cain's description clearly complies with this provision of the regulation.

T-1176 (Supp.)

CLAIM OF MICHAEL J. DOLAN, JR.

Decided February 10, 1964

Torts: Amount of Damages

Upon the presentation of proper proof, an award of damages to one injured through the negligence of another may include an allowance for loss of wages and for pain and suffering.

Torts: Amount of Damages

As a general rule, any payment to an injured party from a collateral source is not deductible from an award made to the injured party against one who negligently caused the injury.

SUPPLEMENTAL ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

Our original administrative determination concerning the claim of Michael J. Dolan, Jr.1 stated the details which gave rise to this claim. We found that the operator of the Government vehicle, an employee of the Geological Survey, was negligent, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Mr. Dolan had presented a claim in the amount of $392.20 for personal injury and for damage to his automobile. An award was made to the claimant in the amount of $186.50 ($139.50 for property damage; $47 for personal injury). An item of $135.20 for loss of wages was not allowed because, "no verification of loss of wages has been submitted."

Mr. Dolan, by and through his attorney, Mr. John H. O'Neil, of Fall River, Massachusetts, has submitted a statement from Dolan's employer, Plymouth Rubber Company, Inc., and asked that the item be considered. The statement from the employer verifies that Mr. Dolan was absent from work for two weeks due to the accident, and that his salary amounted to $67.60 per week. This statement, when read together with the statement of Dr. Donald S. Winter, M.D., that Mr. Dolan was disabled during the period of "12-3-62 to 12-18-62," forms sufficient basis for allowing $135.20 for loss of wages.

The two statements also establish that the claimant underwent some pain and suffering as a result of the accident. Mr. Dolan is entitled to compensation for this pain and suffering. An award of $50 for pain and suffering is hereby made.

1 T-1176 (June 3, 1963), 70 I.D. 208.

2 During that period, Mr. Dolan received $35 per week insurance payments. These payments from a collateral source are not deductible from any award made to Mr. Dolan. 15 Am. Jur. Damages sec. 198.

3 Rodgers v. Boynton, 315 Mass. 279, 52 N.E. 2d 576 (1943).

February 13, 1964

Therefore, the award to Mr. Michael J. Dolan, Jr. is increased from $186.50 to $371.70.

EDWARD WEINBERG,

Acting Solicitor.

STATE OF ARIZONA

A-28752

Decided February 13, 1964

School Lands: Indemnity Selections-School Lands: Mineral Lands

Since sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, permit a State to select mineral lands as indemnity for numbered school sections if the land for which indemnity is being sought was mineral in character, Arizona may select school indemnity land which is mineral in character if such land is selected as indemnity for mineral sections lost to the State prior to survey.

School Lands: Indemnity Selections-School Lands: Mineral Lands

Where the Geological Survey classifies both selected and base lands in an indemnity selection as mineral, the State is entitled to the indemnity land without a reservation in the United States under the act of July 17, 1914, of minerals designated in the act.

Mineral Lands: Determination of Character of-Mineral Lands: Mineral Reservation-Mineral Lands: Nonmineral Entries

Lands which are reported by the Geological Survey to be prospectively valuable for minerals subject to leasing under the Mineral Leasing Act are not subject to entry or selection under the nonmineral land laws without a mineral reservation to the United States in accordance with the act of July 17, 1914. Mineral Lands: Mineral Reservation-Mineral Lands: Nonmineral Entries School Lands: Indemnity Selections-School Lands: Mineral Lands-Regulations: Applicability

Where a State has appealed to the Secretary from a requirement that it file a mineral waiver for selected school indemnity land reported to be prospectively valuable for oil and gas and the regulation requiring such waiver is amended to eliminate the requirement, the case will be remanded for further processing under the amended regulation.

APPEAL FROM THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

The State of Arizona has appealed to the Secretary of the Interior from decisions of November 22, 1960, by the Director of the Bureau of Land Management affirming decisions by the manager and the acting manager of the Phoenix land office conditionally rejecting 18

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »