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the point was one as to which controversy then existed, and had given occasion to strife. In 1580, Chaderton, Bishop of Chester, acting as Commissioner in Lancashire, under the Crown, applied to the Privy Council for instructions as to "two special points "worthy of reformation"; one of which was "for the Lord's "Supper, with wafers, or with common bread ?" The Lords of the Council replied (26th July, 1580) that they thought both points ought to be referred to the consideration of Parliament; adding
"In the meantime, for the appeasing of such division and "bitterness as doth and may arise of the use of both these kinds "of bread, we think it meet, that in such parishes as do use the 66 common bread, and in others that embrace the wafer, they be severally continued as they are at this present. Until which time, also, your lordship is to be careful, according to your "good discretion, to persuade and procure a quietness amongst "such as shall strive for the public maintaining either of the one or the other." (Peck's 'Desiderata Curiosa,' p. 91.)
In a later letter the Bishop recurred to the same question, and was thus answered (21st August, 1580) by Lord Burghley and Sir Francis Walsingham:
"Concerning the last point of your letter, contained in a post"script, whereby appeareth that some are troubled about the "substance of the Communion bread, it were good to teach them "that are weak in conscience, in esteeming of the wafer bread, 66 not to make difference. But, if their weakness continue, it 66 were not amiss, in our opinions, charitably to tolerate them, as "children with milk. Which we refer to your lordship's better "consideration.”—(Ibid. p. 94.)
In 1584 Bishop Overton, of Lichfield, issued an injunction to the clergy of his diocese :
"That the ordinance of the Book of Common Prayer be from "henceforth observed in this, that the bread delivered to the communicants be such as is usual to be eaten at the table with "other meats, yet of the purest and finest wheat; and no other "bread to be used by the minister, nor to be provided for by the "churchwardens and parishioners, than such finest common "bread." (Appendix to Second Report of Rit. Com.,' p. 430.)
The 20th Canon of 1603-4, already mentioned, seems to have proceeded on the same view of the law; and, after the passing of that canon, the usual form of inquiry in the Visitation Articles of Bishops and Archdeacons (e.g., Archbishop Bancroft in 1605; Bishop Babington, of Worcester, in 1607; and Bishop Andrewes in 1619) was whether the churchwardens always supplied, for the Holy Communion, "fine wheat bread."
The same form of inquiry continued to be generally used after the rubric had been altered, upon the revision of 1662, so as to express its purpose to be, to take away all occasion of
"dissension," as well as of "superstition " (which alone had been previously mentioned). The same motive had been expressed in the rubric of King Edward's first Prayer Book, "for avoiding all matters and occasion of dissension " (" superstition "not being then added): when the opposite course was taken, of requiring unleavened bread, of a certain form and fashion, to be everywhere and always used. The practice of using fine wheat bread such as is usual to be eaten, and not cake or wafer, appears to have been universal throughout the Church of England from the alteration of the rubric in 1662, till 1840, or later.
Their Lordships think that if it had been averred and proved that the wafer, properly so called, had been used by the appellant, it would have been illegal; but, as the averment and proof is insufficient, they will advise an alteration of the decree in this respect.
IV. THE CRUCIFIX ON THE SCREEN.
There remains to be considered the charge as to the crucifix. As to this the allegation is that the appellant unlawfully set up and placed upon the top of the screen separating the chancel from the body or nave of the church a crucifix and twenty-four metal candlesticks, with candles which were lighted on either side of the crucifix.
This charge was accompanied by two other charges, in respect of which the appellant has been admonished to abstain from the acts complained of, and to this part of the monition he has submitted. One of these charges was for having formed and accompanied a procession from the chancel, down the north aisle and up the nave back to the chancel again, on the occasion of public service, those taking part in the procession at one time falling upon their knees, and remaining kneeling for some time. other charge was the setting up, attached to the walls of the church, representations of figures, in coloured relief of plastic material, purporting to represent scenes of our Lord's Passion, and forming what are commonly called Stations of the Cross and Passion, such as are often used in Roman Catholic churches. The learned Judge [Lord Penzance] whose decision is under appeal, thus describes the screen and crucifix :
"There is a screen of open ironwork some 9ft. high stretching "6 across the church at the entrance to the chancel; the middle portion of this screen rises to a peak, and is surmounted by a "crucifix or figure of our Saviour on the Cross in full relief "and about 18 inches long-this is the crucifix complained "of. The screen of course, from its position, directly faces the congregation, and the sculptured or moulded figure of our "Lord is turned towards them. There is, further, a row of "candles at distances of nearly a foot apart all along the "top of the screen, which is continued up the central and
'rising portion of it, the last candles coming close up to the "crucifix on either side, so that when the candles are lighted for "the evening service, I should presume that the crucifix would "stand in a full light."
For the erection of this screen at the entrance of the chancel, in the form in which it is now found there, and surmounted by the crucifix in question, their Lordships think it clear that no faculty has been obtained. There is, indeed, a faculty, dated the 23rd of August, 1870, authorising the building of "a dwarf wall "with screen thereon of light ironwork between the chancel and "the nave "" ; and this faculty appears to have been granted with reference to a ground plan annexed to the petition for the faculty; which ground plan specifies the place where this screen of light ironwork was to be erected. But no further information was given to the Ordinary of the character of the structure, much less of the crucifix by which it was to be surmounted.
Technically, therefore, it must be held that, in the absence of a proper faculty, the crucifix was unlawfully set up and retained. If, however, their Lordships were of opinion that the case was one in which, under all the circumstances, the Ordinary, on the application for a faculty, ought to grant, or might properly grant, a faculty, they might probably have thought it right, before pronouncing any judgment, to have given an opportunity to the appellant to apply for a faculty.
Their Lordships, however, are of opinion that, under the circumstances of this case, the Ordinary ought not to grant a faculty for the crucifix.
The learned Judge refers to two cases, decided by this tribunal, which have a material bearing upon the present question.
The first of these was the case of Liddell v. Westerton.* In this case, as the learned Judge states, the Court had to pronounce upon the legality of a cross set up in the appellant's church. And it was decided that, although before the Reformation the symbol of the cross had no doubt been put to superstitious uses, "yet that crosses, when used as mere emblems of "the Christian faith, and not as objects of superstitious rever❝ence, may still lawfully be erected as architectural decorations," and that the wooden cross erected in that particular case 66 "to be considered a mere architectural ornament."
The Court determined nothing directly as to the legality of a crucifix, but was at great pains throughout the judgment to point out that crosses were to be distinguished from crucifixes, saying that “there was a wide difference between the cross and images “of saints, and even, though in a less degree, between a cross " and a crucifix," the former of which, they said, had been “used as a symbol of Christianity two or three centuries before either "crucifixes or images were introduced."
* Moore's Special Report.
The other case is that of Phillpotts v. Boyd.* As to this case, the learned Judge states that this tribunal, in justifying the erection of the Exeter reredos, adhered entirely and very distinctly to the position taken up in the previous case, and pronounced that erection lawful, though it included many sculptured images, on the express ground "that it had been set up for the purpose of decoration only," declaring that it was not in danger of being abused,” and that “it was not suggested that any superstitious reverence has been, or is likely to be, paid to any of the figures upon it.”
The learned Judge then proceeds to consider whether it would be right to conclude that the crucifix in the present case was set up for the purposes of decoration only; whether it is in danger of being abused; and whether it could be suggested that superstitious reverence had been, or was likely to be, paid to it.
The learned Judge states that the crucifix, as formerly set up in our churches, had a special history of its own.
He refers to the rood ordinarily found before the Reformation in the parish churches of this country, which was, in fact, a crucifix with images at the base, erected on a structure called the rood loft, traversing the church at the entrance to the chancel, and occupying a position not otherwise than analogous to that which the iron screen does in the present case.
He refers to the evidence as to the preservation of the crucifixes or roods during the reign of Queen Mary, and of their destruction, as monuments of idolatry and superstition, in the reign of Elizabeth.
He takes notice of a letter of Bishop Sandys in 1561 in the 'Zurich Letters,' first series, p. 73, in which he states :
"We had not long since a controversy respecting images. "The Queen's Majesty considered it not contrary to the Word "of God-nay rather for the advantage of the Church, that the image of Christ crucified, together with Mary and John, should "be placed, as heretofore, in some conspicuous part of the church, "where they might more readily be seen by the people. Some "of us thought far otherwise, and more especially as all images "of every kind were at our last Visitation not only taken down, "but also burnt, and that, too, by public authority, and because "the ignorant and superstitious multitude are in the habit of paying adoration to this idol above all others."
The learned Judge arrives at the conclusion that the crucifix so placed formed an ordinary feature in the parish churches before the Reformation, and that it cannot be doubted that it did so not as a mere architectural ornament, but as an object of reverence and adoration.
He further points out that the worship of it was enjoined in the Sarum Missal, in which the order of service for Palm Sunday
* L. R. 6 P. C. 435.
ends with the adoration of the rood by the celebrant and choir before passing into the chancel. And to this reference might be added one to the Order for the Communion according to the Hereford use, in which there is a prayer with this introduction : "Postea sacerdos adorans crucifixum dicat."
Proceeding, then, on these considerations, and dealing with a church in which was found not merely an illuminated crucifix, but also those Stations of the Cross and other acts in the conduct of the services, the illegality of which the appellant does not challenge in his appeal, the Judge continues thus :
"It is no doubt easy to say, what proof is there of danger of idolatry now? What facts are there to point to a probability "of abuse'?
"But when the Court is dealing with a well-known sacred object—an object enjoined and put up by authority in all the "churches of England before the Reformation, in a particular part of the church and for the particular purpose of 'adoration' "-when the Court finds that the same object, both in the Church "and out of it, is still worshipped by those who adhere to the "unreformed Romish faith, and when it is told that, now, after a lapse of 300 years, it is suddenly proposed to set up again "this same object in the same part of the church as an architec"tural ornament only, it is hard not to distrust the uses to "which it may come to be put, or escape the apprehension that "what begins in 'decoration' may end in 'idolatry.'
"If this apprehension is a just and reasonable one, then there "exists that likelihood and danger of 'superstitious reverence' "which the Privy Council in Phillpotts v. Boyd* pronounced "to be fatal to the lawfulness of all images and figures set up in a church."
In these observations of the learned Judge their Lordships concur; and they select them as the grounds of his decision which commend themselves to their judgment. They are prepared, under the circumstances of this case, to affirm the decision directing the removal of the crucifix, while at the same time they desire to say that they think it important to maintain, as to representations of sacred persons and objects in a church, the liberty established in Phillpotts v. Boyd, subject to the power and duty of the Ordinary so to exercise his judicial discretion, in granting or refusing faculties, as to guard against things likely to be abused for purposes of superstition.
GENERAL RESULT OF THE JUDGMENT.
On the whole, therefore, their Lordships will humbly recommend Her Majesty to affirm the decree of the Court of Arches, * L. R. 6 P. C. 435.