of the law, and the county issued and sold these bonds. It may be that if the state or the county, or any taxpayer of this precinct, had challenged its existence, or the right of the county or its officers to issue these bonds, by a writ of quo warranto, or by an application for an injunction, before public interests were affected or private rights had vested under them, the issue of the bonds might have been stayed. The assessor, the justices of the peace, and the constables might have been restrained from exercising their functions, and the board of county commissioners might have been compelled to change. the boundaries of the precinct. But no such action was taken. The proposition to issue the bonds was presented to the board of county commissioners on October 6, 1886. On that day a special election in the precinct was called for November 16, 1886, and the bonds were not issued until December in that year. Here was ample time for an objector to present the question which seems to have been first raised after this precinct and its officers had been discharging their respective duties without question for more than seven years. It is too late now for public officers or private parties, in private litigation, to question the legality of the existence of this precinct, or of the contracts made on its behalf, in reliance upon which money has been advanced and rights have vested. When these bonds were issued and sold, every citizen of the territory comprised within the order of October 4, 1886, and called "Nebraska City Precinct," and every piece of property therein, was represented by the board of county commissioners of Otoe county in all the proceedings which culminated in the issue of these bonds. That board was the agent of these citizens and this property, under the statutes, to borrow the money which they voted to obtain upon the bonds. Under the color of law, it constituted the precinct, called the election, issued the bonds, and no man objected. Under these circumstances, Nebraska City precinct was a precinct de facto, and the board of county commissioners were its governing officers de facto, and the silence and general acquiescence of the private citizens within it and the officers of the state and county, until after the rights of the bondholders had vested, estop them from questioning the existence of the precinct, or the validity of the acts of these officers, as against the purchasers of the bonds. The acts of these officers have all the force of the acts of officers de jure for a precinct legally constituted, and the owners of the property within the boundaries of the order of the board of county commissioners of October 4, 1886, are estopped, by their silence and acquiescence, from denying that the property within those limits is liable to taxation to raise the necessary amount to pay these bonds. Another contention of counsel for the defendant in error is that the bonds are void because the proposition submitted to the voters of the precinct contained these words: "The said bonds, when signed as required by law, to be delivered to Wm. E. Hill, Robert Payne, and F. W. Rottman, as trustees for the persons who shall have paid for the right of way and depot grounds aforesaid;" and because the bonds were delivered to them, and the proceeds of them were applied to the purpose there indicated. But these facts do not appear upon the face of the bonds, and they contain not only the recital which we have heretofore quoted, to the effect that all the requirements of law necessary to authorize the issue and delivery of the bonds had been fully complied with, but also this statement: "This bond is one of forty of like date, issued to aid in the construction of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company's Railroad through said Nebraska City precinct, by purchase of right of way and grounds for depot therein." These recitals import that the bonds were issued in pursuance of a lawful and proper proposition, of a legal vote of the electors of the precinct, and of honest and just action on the part of the board of county commissioners under the statute. They relieve the innocent purchaser of all inquiry, notice, and knowledge of the actual proposition submitted, and of the action of the board thereon, and estop the county and the inhabitants of the precinct from denying that a legal proposition was submitted and sustained by a vote of the electors, and that the bonds are based upon such action. Board of Co. Com'rs v. National Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 228, 231, 32 C. C. A. 591, 594, 61 U. S. App. 53, 58; City of Evansville v. Dennett, 161 U. S. 434, 439, 443, 16 Sup. Ct. 613, 40 L. Ed. 760; Wesson v. Saline Co., 73 Fed. 917, 919, 20 C. C. A. 227, 229, 34 U. S. App. 680, 684; Rathbone v. Board, 83 Fed. 125, 131, 27 C. C. A. 477, 483, 49 U. S. App. 577, 589; City of South St. Paul v. Lamprecht Bros. Co., 88 Fed. 449, 31 C. C. A. 585, 60 U. S. App. 78; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683, 696, 26 L. Ed. 526; City of Huron v. Second Ward Sav. Bank, 86 Fed. 272, 279, 30 C. C. A. 38, 45, 57 U. S. App. 593, 606; National Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Education, 62 Fed. 788, 792, 10 C. C. A. 637, 651, 27 U. S. App. 244, 266; Board v. Heed, 41 C. C. A. 668, 101 Fed. 768. Nor is it any defense to the action of this innocent purchaser that the board of county commissioners of Otoe county certified upon the face of the bonds that they were issued for a lawful purpose, but actually issued them and applied their proceeds to an unlawful purpose. City of Huron v. Second Ward Sav. Bank, 86 Fed. 272, 275, 277, 30 C. C. A. 38, 41, 43, 57 U. S. App. 593, 600, 603; Board of Com'rs of Seward Co. v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. 222, 32 C. C. A. 585, 61 U. S. App. 41; West Plains Tp. v. Sage, 69 Fed. 943, 946, 16 C. C. A. 553, 557, 32 U. S. App. 725, 733; Board of Com'rs of Barber Co. v. Society for Savings, 41 C. C. A. 667, 101 Fed. 767. The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the amount claimed in the complaint. NOTE. Enjoining Proceedings in Federal Courts. 1. In General. [a] An injunction issued by a state court is inoperative in any manner to affect process or proceedings in the federal courts. (Cal. Sup. 1857) -(U. S. Sup. Ill. 1867) Weber v. Lee Co., 73 U. S. 210, 18 L. Ed. 781; U. S. v. Council of Keokuk, 73 U. S. 514, 18 L. Ed. 933; (Iowa) Riggs v. Johnson Co., 73 U. S. 166, 18 L. Ed. 768; (1869) Supervisors v. Durant, 76 U. S. 415, 19 L. Ed. 732; (Pa. 1843) Duncan v. Darst, 42 U. S. 301, 11 L. Ed. 139; Phelan v. Smith, 8 Cal. 520; Shimer v. Hammond, 51 Iowa, 401, 1 N. W. 656. [b] A state court will not enjoin a party from proceeding with a pending action in a federal court. -(Ga. Sup. 1869) Bryan v. Hickson, 40 Ga. 405; (N. Y. Ch. 1838) Schuyler v. Pelissier, 3 Edw. Ch. 191; (Sup. 1864) Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. Prac. 448. [c] Courts of chancery will not sustain an injunction bill to restrain a suit or proceeding previously commenced in a court of a sister state, or in any of the federal courts. -(Mich. Sup. 1842) Carroll v. Bank, Har. 197; [d] (Ala. Sup. 1877) One should file a bill in equity in a federal court to obtain the benefit of an equitable defense to an action in a federal court, as no state tribunal can enjoin the prosecution of such action.-City of Opelika v. Daniel, 59 Ala. 211. [e] (N. Y. Sup. 1877) A state court will enjoin a trustee under a railroad mortgage who voluntarily removes to a foreign country and becomes a resi dent thereof, thereby incapacitating himself from discharging the duties of the trust, from bringing an action as trustee in the federal courts.-Trust Co. v. Hughes, 11 Hun, 130. [f] (N. Y. Ch. 1844) A court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain actions in the United States court, but will leave the party to apply there for a stay of proceedings until the equitable relief is finally heard in the state court.-Coster v. Griswold, 4 Edw. Ch. 364. [g] (R. I. Sup. 1860) A state court has no power to enjoin proceedings in a court of the United States, especially in a suit at law for damages for the infringement of a patent, so expressly, if not exclusively, confided by law to the federal courts.-Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453. [h] (R. I. Sup. 1874) As between state courts and United States courts, neither can enjoin the process of the other.-Chapin v. James, 11 R. I. 86, 23 Am. Rep. 412. 2. Priority of Jurisdiction. [a] (U. S. Sup., Iowa, 1869) An injunction of a state court cannot in any manner affect the action, the process, or the proceeding of a circuit court, whether such injunction be granted before or after the action of the cir cuit court.-Supervisors v. Durant, 76 U. S. 415, 19 L. Ed. 732. [b] (U. S. C. C., Mo., 1896) Mandamus to compel the euforcement of a judgment rendered by a federal court was not defeated by the issuance out of a state court of an injunction to restrain enforcement thereof, in an action commenced therein subsequent to the bringing of the action in the federal court.-U. S. v. King. 74 Fed. 493. [e] (U. S. C. C., N. Y., 1892) A state court has no authority to enjoin the proceedings of a federal court, or of the parties thereto, in a suit in which the federal court has first acquired jurisdiction of the controversy and the res.-Bank v. Hazard, 49 Fed. 293. [d] (Ga. Sup. 1869) Where a state court has enjoined a party to proceedings before it from reducing his claim to judgment, and such party com mences an action on his claim in a federal court, the state court, though it cannot restrain or in any manner interfere with the proceedings in the federal court, may punish such party for contempt.-Hines v. Rawson, 40 Ga. 356. [e] (Neb. Sup. 1896) A state court, having no prior jurisdiction of the subject-matter, will not restrain a plaintiff in whose favor judgment has been rendered in a federal court from proceeding to the execution of such judg ment.- Prugh v. Bank, 48 Neb. 414, 67 N. W. 309. [f] (N. J. Ch. 1873) The court of chancery, having first obtained possession of a controversy over which a federal court in another state has concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction, will retain the same in its discretion, until it has finally disposed thereof, although the subject-matter of the controversy be situated there; and to this end this court may avail itself of the ordinary process of injunction and attachment for contempt, to compel the party to desist from bringing or further prosecuting a suit at law.-Insurance Co. v. Howell, 24 N. J. Eq. 238. [g] (Wis. Sup. 1862) Where an action was brought in a state court to foreclose a mortgage, to which the defense of partial failure of consideration was interposed, such court could enjoin proceedings thereon subsequently commenced in a federal court, where such defense would be unavailable.-Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 401. 3. To Prevent Decision Adverse to That of State Court. [a] (N. Y. App. 1875) It is not the province of a state court to interfere, for the purpose of preventing a resort to the federal courts for the enforcement of an obligation of a class decided to be invalid by the state courts, on the ground that it may be held valid in the federal courts.-Town of Venice v. Woodruff, 62 N. Y. 462, 20 Am. Rep. 495. [b] (N. Y. Sup. 1882) Though the courts of a state have decided a point of law one way, a state court will not enjoin prosecution in a federal court of an action in which said point is involved, on the ground that the federal court will probably decide the point the other way; said court having full jurisdiction.-Town of Thompson v. Norris, 63 How. Prac. 418, 11 Abb. N. C. 163. 4. Enforcement of Judgment. [a] (U. S. Sup., Ky., 1812) A state court has no jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the United States.-McKim v. Voorhies, 11 U. S. 279, 3 L. Ed. 342. [b] (U. S. Sup., N. Y., 1898) A state court has no power to impeach and nullify a decree of the circuit court of the United States, rendered in a case in which it had jurisdiction, by enjoining its enforcement, though the injunction is directed in personam against the parties entitled to the benefit of such decree, over whom it has jurisdiction.-Bank v. Stevens, 18 Sup. Ct. 403, 169 U. S. 432. 42 L. Ed. 807; Id., 18 Sup. Ct. 837. [c] State courts have no right to interfere with the process of the federal courts to enforce their judgments on county bonds.--(U. S. C. C., Ark., 1878) U. S. v. Hewett, Fed. Cas. No. 16,288 [4 Dill. 224]; (Ill. 1869) U. S. v. Lee Co., Fed. Cas. No. 15,589 [2 Biss. 77]; (Tenn. 1876) Brooks v. Memphis, Fed. Cas. No. 1,954. [d] (Ga. Sup. 1860) A state court cannot enjoin the issuing of an execution from the United States circuit court.-Strozier v. Howes, 30 Ga. 578. [e] (La. Sup. 1879) A parish court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of a judgment of a United States court.-Shields v. Pipes, 31 La. Ann. 765. [f] (R. I. Sup. 1860) A state court will not enjoin execution under a judgment rendered by a federal court on the ground that parties who were not, at the time of the trial, examinable as witnesses, had since been made so in the state courts by statute.-Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453. [g] (R. I. Sup. 1874) The supreme court of the state has no power to enjoin the United States marshal from proceeding to a sale on execution, although the property levied on is that of a stockholder in a corporation against which judgment and process of execution issued; the execution being levied, by direction of attorneys thereon indorsed, to enforce the stockholder's liability under the Rhode Island statute regulating manufacturing corporations. Chapin v. James, 11 R. I. 86, 23 Am. Rep. 412. [h] (S. C. Ch. 1846) A court of equity of South Carolina cannot enjoin the collection of an execution issuing from a federal court.-English v. Miller, 2 Rich. Eq. 320. [i] (Va. Sup. 1886) A state court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of a decree of a federal court.-Dorr v. Rohr, 82 Va. 359. 5. Foreclosure Proceedings. [a] (U. S. Sup., Ill., 1900) An injunction against proceeding to foreclose a mortgage in a federal court which has first acquired jurisdiction over the property cannot be granted by a state court in which suit is brought for removal of the trustee.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Lake St. El. R. Co., 20 Sup. Ct. 564, 177 U. S. 51, 44 L. Ed. 667, reversing (1898) 51 N. E. 55, 173 Ill. 449. [b] (U. S. C. C., Ind., 1890) Where a purchaser, after foreclosure sale of a railroad, never waived its right to abandon and disclaim a lease made by 45 C.C.A.-38 the mortgagor, the federal court in which the mortgage was foreclosed, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, will issue a writ of assistance in favor of such purchaser, notwithstanding the issuance of a temporary injunction by a state court, in which the purchaser appeared, restraining it from interfering with the lessee's possession.-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 44 Fed. 653. [e] (N. Y. Sup. 1889) A state court is without jurisdiction or power to interfere with a decree of foreclosure made by the circuit court of the United States against a railroad company, where the railroad was within the jurisdiction of the court making the decree, and all the parties in interest were before it.-Gernsheim v. Olcott, 7 N. Y. Supp. 872. 6. Proceedings in Admiralty. [a] (N. Y. Super. 1855) In an action to enforce a mortgage on a steamboat on a motion for the appointment of a receiver, the superior court will not interfere to prevent any of the parties from enforcing their claims in the district court of the United States or interpose any obstructions to any exercise of jurisdiction therein in admiralty proceedings.-Thompson v. Van Vechten, 12 N. Y. Super. Ct. 618. [b] (Wis. Sup. 1897) Where a vessel has a lien on the cargo in its possession, enforceable in admiralty, a state court cannot preclude the vessel from enforcing such lien in admiralty, or deprive it of such possession while the lien continues.-Supply Co. v. Galvin, 71 N. W. 804, 96 Wis. 523. 7. Sales under Federal Decrees. [a] (N. Y. App. 1894) Some of the bondholders secured by a railroad mortgage sued in a state court for the appointment of a receiver and a foreclosure of the mortgage, and the property was sold subject to the payment of receiver's certificates issued in the suit. Afterwards the holders of the certificates sued the purchasers under the former sale in the federal court for a foreclosure of their lien, and a sale of the property was therein decreed. Held, in an action in a state court by the bondholders who were not parties to the first bondholders' suit, that on the setting aside of the proceedings in such suit as fraudulent, and the ordering of a resale of the property, the sale under the federal decree could be enjoined.-Stevens v. Bank, 144 N. Y. 50, 39 N. E. 68. [b] (N. Y. Sup. 1893) In 1872 a railroad mortgage was foreclosed, and sale made to II. and L. In 1880 one S. sued in behalf of himself and other bondholders, alleging that H. and L. purchased the road and mortgaged it for the benefit of the original bondholders. A receiver was appointed, and certificates were issued, a number of them to defendant, and judgment was entered directing a sale of the road, subject to the certificates, and it was accordingly sold to H. and F. In 1886 appellant, the interest on the certificates not having been paid, sued H., F., and others, which suit was removed to the circuit court of the United States, and resulted in a decree directing the sale of the road and the payment of defendant. Held, in an action begun in 1887 by bondholders who were not made parties to the action brought in 1880 by S., that the judgment in that action being vacated, on the ground that the action was not a representatiye one, and was fraudulently conducted, and it being adjudged that the decree in the action brought in 1872 be enforced, it was proper to enjoin the sale under the decree of the United States circuit court.-Stevens v. Bank, 69 Hun, 460, 24 N. Y. Supp. 219. 8. Collection of Taxes. [a] A state court cannot enjoin collection of a tax ordered by a federal court to pay a judgment of that court. -(U. S. C. C., Ark., 1878) U. S. v. Hewett, Fed. Cas. No. 16.288 [4 Dill. 224]; (Or. 1879) U. S. v. Hamilton, Fed. Cas. No. 15,289; (Tenn. 1879) Apperson v. City of Memphis, Fed. Cas. No. 497 [2 Flip. 363]; (Ark. Sup. 1885) Gaines v. Springer, 46 Ark. 502; Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 88; (Iowa Sup. 1869) (Tenn. Sup. 1876) Merchants v. City of Memphis, 68 Tenn. 76. [b] (U. S. Sup.) Where the circuit court of the United States has issued a peremptory mandamus to the supervisors of a county, commanding them to |