STAY.
Pending appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 6.
STOCK.
Corporate stock, see "Corporations," § 1.
See "Banks and Banking," § 1.
SUBSTITUTION.
Of administrator in action brought by intestate, see "Abatement and Re-
vival," § 1.
SUICIDE.
Condition in policy against suicide, see "Insurance," § 4.
SUPERSEDEAS.
On appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 6.
SURVIVAL.
Of cause of action, see "Abatement and Revival," § 1.
TARIFF.
See "Customs Duties."
1. Levy and assessment.
Rev. St. Ohio, §§ 2808, 2809, which require the state board of equaliza-
tion for incorporated banks to meet annually on a fixed date, to examine
the returns of said banks to the county auditors, and the value of their
shares as fixed by the auditors, and to hear complaints and equalize the
value of said shares "according to the rules prescribed in title 13 for
valuing and equalizing the values of real and personal property," when
read in connection with the provisions of said title 13, confer no power on
the board to change the valuation of bank shares without reasonable no-
tice to the parties interested and an opportunity for a full hearing; and
an increase in the valuation of the shares of a national bank made by
such board at a subsequent meeting, to which no adjournment was shown
by its records, and without notice to the bank or its shareholders, is not
merely irregular, but is void for want of jurisdiction.
--Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 105 Fed. 809......45 C. C. A. 66
Laws Fla. c. 4115, §§ 21-23, require the owner of real property or his
agent to return the same for taxation, and the property to be assessed
against the owner, or to the unknown owner if no return is made and
the owner is unknown. Rev. St. Fla. § 1982, provides that a mortgage
creates a specific lien on real estate, and does not convey the legal title.
The mortgagee of real estate, who was not in possession, made a return
to the assessor showing that it was the mortgagee of the lands, and they
were appraised to it. Held, that the purchaser at a tax sale thereunder
acquired no title to the property as against a foreclosure purchaser, since
the assessment was invalid.
-Flanagan v. Dunne, 105 Fed. 828.....
......45 C. C. A. 81
§ 2. Collection and enforcement against persons or personal property.
A national bank may maintain a suit in a federal court to enforce the
right given by Rev. St. Ohio, § 5848, to enjoin the collection of taxes
levied on an illegal assessment.
-Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 105 Fed. 809......45 C. C. A. 66
3. Tax titles.
Where the property was sold at a mortgage foreclosure to the mort-
gagee, but before the confirmation of the sale the bid was assigned to
plaintiff, the latter is not estopped by the return of the mortgagee from
denying the validity of the assessment and the sale thereunder, since he
does not hold under the mortgagee, and is not bound by his acts.
-Flanagan v. Dunne, 105 Fed. 828...
..45 C. C. A. 81
TORTS.
Maritime torts, see "Collision"; "Shipping," § 1; "Towage."
TOWAGE.
The Carbonero, a powerful ocean tug, went to sea from Vineyard Haven,
in heavy southwest weather, with three barges in tow; two of the
barges being the St. Nicholas and the Excelsior. Although, after sailing,
the weather became heavier, the tug did not put back, and finally was
compelled to proceed with its tow to an intermediate anchorage. The
St. Nicholas and Excelsior dragged their anchors and were finally lost.
Held, in a suit by the owners of the barges against the tug, that the evi-
dence as to the state of the weather was insufficient to sustain the charge
that the tug was in fault either for going to sea, for not returning to
port, or for anchoring where she did; also, that as to the St. Nicholas the
tug rendered all the assistance which was possible, and was not in fault.
-The Carbonero, 106 Fed. 329..
.....45 C. C. A. 314
Unless under extraordinary circumstances, it is the duty of a tug which
has been compelled by stress of weather to anchor with her tow to
promptly render all practicable assistance to a tow which is in peril; and
where a barge, constituting a part of a tow anchored under such circum-
stances, dragged her anchor and began to drift, and the tug, on attempting
to weigh anchor, found that her donkey engine would not work, a delay of
21⁄2 hours, and until after the barge had drifted out of sight, before slip-
ping her cable to go to the assistance of the tow, was a breach of the
contract of towage, and also gross negligence; but, such negligence not
being a statutory fault, the burden does not rest upon the tug of proving
that she could not have rescued the barge by diligent action, and to charge
her with liability for the loss of the barge it must be shown by libelant,
in accordance with the usual course in admiralty, that such loss was in
fact due to her fault.
-The Carbonero, 106 Fed. 329....
.45 C. C. A. 314
See "Municipal Corporations."
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES.
§ 1. Infringement and unfair competition.
It is irregular to ask or grant à construction of a decree previously
entered in respect to matters outside the issues, as by construing a decree
enjoining unfair competition in trade as applied to new labels or advertise-
ments proposed by defendant; but the party who invokes such action can-
not question the result merely because of the irregularity of practice.
-Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168; Mitchell v. Williams, Id......
45 C. C. A. 265
Where an article has become known by a name adopted by the manu-
facturer as a trade-mark, such name cannot be used by another in such
manner as to deceive the public, and to palm off his goods as those of
the first user, although by reason of its descriptive character it cannot
constitute a technical trade-mark.
-Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168; Mitchell v. Williams, Id.....
45 C. C. A. 265
Where a decree finds that defendants have been guilty of unfair compe-
tition, and by the imitation of complainant's advertisements have deceived
purchasers and the public into believing that articles of their manufacture
were made by complainant, the complainant, on proper proof, is entitled
to recover compensation to the extent of the invasion of his rights.
-Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168; Mitchell v. Williams, Id.....
45 C. C. A. 265
The circuit court, in determining, after having entered a decree enjoin-
ing infringement of a trade-mark for unfair competition, that defendant
may rightfully use certain proposed new labels or advertising matter,
acted irregularly; such question being outside of the issues in the case.
and one which can only be authoritatively determined in a new action
upon issues properly framed, and evidence taken thereunder.
-Williams v. Mitchell, 106 Fed. 168; Mitchell v. Williams, Id.................
45 C. C. A. 265
TRANSCRIPTS.
Of record for purpose of review, see "Appeal and Error," § 7.
TRIAL.
See "Witnesses."
Criminal prosecutions, see "Criminal Law," § 2.
§ 1. Reception of evidence.
The fact that an altered instrument has been admitted in evidence pro-
visionally does not deprive the court of the power to exclude it later.
thereby withdrawing from the jury the question whether the alteration
was made before or after execution
-Brady v. Berwind-White Coal-Min. Co., 106 Fed. 824..45 C. C. A. 662
§ 2. Taking case or question from jury.
At the close of the evidence there is always a preliminary question for
the judge before the case can be properly submitted to the jury, and that
is whether or not there is any substantial evidence upon which the jury
can properly return a verdict in favor of the party who produces it, and,
if there is no such evidence, it is the duty of the court to direct the jury
to return a verdict against him.
-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Marcan, 106 Fed. 645......45 C. C. A. 515
§ 3. Trial by court.
An opinion of the trial court, being obviously not intended as a special
finding of facts, will not be treated as such on appeal, though it may state
facts developed at the trial.
-Consolidated Coal Co. v. Polar Wave Ice Co., 106 Fed. 798.....
45 C. C. A. 638.
TROVER AND CONVERSION.
Conversion of mortgaged personalty, see "Chattel Mortgages," § 2.
TRUSTEE.
Trust deeds, see "Chattel Mortgages"; "Mortgages."
§ 1. Management and disposal of trust property.
A corporate record and certificate of ownership of stock by A. B., trustee,
is notice to the corporation that he holds it, without the power of disposi-
tion, for some cestui que trust.
-Geyser-Marion Gold-Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558..45 C. C. A. 467
The legal presumption is that a trustee has no power to sell or transfer
the subject of his trust.
-Geyser-Marion Gold-Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558..45 C. C. A. 467
See "Customs Duties."
Courts, see "Courts," $ 1, 7,
Indians, see "Indians."
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
See "Copyrights," § 1; "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 1.
UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS.
A commissioner of a circuit court was an officer of such court, and sub-
ject to its rules prescribing his administrative duties, the manner of keep-
ing his records, etc., and he is entitled to his statutory fees for making
the entries in his docket in criminal cases required by such rules.
--United States v. McGourin, 106 Fed. 288....... ..45 C. C. A. 291
Under the provision of Act March 3, 1893 (27 Stat. 609), requiring the
officer or magistrate issuing a warrant to attach thereto a certified copy
of the complaint, and providing that upon the arrest of the accused the
return of the warrant, with the copy of the complaint attached, shall con-
fer jurisdiction upon the officer before whom it is returned, the warrant
and the copy, together with the return thereon, constitute a single paper,.
to be filed as such by a commissioner before whom the return is made,
and he has no authority to detach the copy, and charge a separate fee
for filing the same.
-United States v. McGourin, 106 Fed. 288..........45 C. C. A. 291
UNITED STATES MARSHALS.
The provision of the sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1893
(27 Stat. 609), that "and hereafter no part of any money appropriated to
pay any fees to the United States commissioners, marshals or clerks
shall be used" in the payment of fees in internal revenue prosecutions,
except in certain cases, and the following clause, requiring persons ar-
rested to be taken before the nearest officer for hearing, and providing
that "no mileage shall be allowed any officer violating the provisions
hereof," was not merely a proviso restricting payments from the appro-
priation therein made, but was general legislation, furnishing rules for the
government of the officers therein named until repealed; and a marshal
who fails to take a prisoner before the nearest judicial officer for hearing
violates its provisions, and is not entitled to mileage, notwithstanding the
commissioner issuing the warrant has failed to comply with the require-
ment of the act by attaching thereto a certified copy of the complaint.
The provision of the statute is absolute, and the courts are not authorized
to ingraft exceptions upon it.
-United States v. Puleston, 106 Fed. 294.
....45 C. C. A. 297
See "Customs and Usages."
Of judgment, see "Judgment," § 1.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
See "Sales."
Purchasers at tax sale, see "Taxation," § 3.
Requirements of statute of frauds, see "Frauds, Statute of," § 1.
§ 1. Performance of contract.
Where G. sold land to S., to be paid for by application of half the crop
each year till full payment of the price, and after S. had mortgaged it to
C., and C. had gone into possession under the mortgage and put in a
crop, G. was paid all the purchase price and gave a deed, he is not enti-
tled to half the crop, though reserving such interest as S. had therein;
S. being entitled only to have the value of the crop applied on his debt
to C.
-Clark v. Anheier, 106 Fed. 754....
.45 C. C. A. 599
WAIVER.
See "Estoppel."
Error waived in appellate court, see "Appeal and Error," § 10.
Of right to appeal, see "Appeal and Error," § 2.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.
1. Appropriation and prescription.
Abandonment is either express or implied. It may be effected by a
plain declaration of an intention to abandon. It may be inferred from
|