James C. Nicholson, of Columbus, for Horace S. Kerr, of Coplaintiff in error. lumbus, for defendants in error.

dition to the amount of chattel property
otherwise by law exempt. That section con-
"No personal
tains, also, this provision:
property shall be exempt from execution on
a judgment rendered for the purchase price
or any part thereof."

of Columbus (the successor of the justices' court) to set off to the relator as exempt from execution a certain photographic camera taken in execution on a judgment in favor of the W. C. Dunn Photo Supply Com- NEWMAN, J. It is provided in section pany. The case was submitted to the com- 11738, General Code, that a husband and mon pleas court on an agreed statement of wife living together, resident of this state, facts. That court stated its conclusions of and not the owner of a homestead, may hold fact, in substance, as follows: The relator exempt from levy and sale property to be purchased from the W. C. Dunn Photo Sup-selected, not exceeding $500 in value, in adply Company a No. 10 Cerket camera at an agreed price of $290. He paid $100 cash, and gave ten notes of $19 each to cover the balance, secured by chattel mortgage on the camera in question. Two of these notes were paid. The relator, after the purchase of the camera, purchased from time to time from the W. C. Dunn Photo Supply Company certain items of merchandise, which were charged against him on an open book account. On the 10th day of September, 1914, the W. C. Dunn Photo Supply Company commenced an action before a justice of the peace of Montgomery township, Franklin county, Ohio, against the relator as upon an open account in the sum of $265.20. This included the amount remaining unpaid upon the camera and the balance due on the open account for merchandise. On October 16, 1914, a default judgment was rendered against the relator in the sum of $255.81, the relator having paid $10 after the proceeding was begun in the justices' court. The amount of the balance due on the camera and the amount due on the open book account were merged in one judgment. An execution was issued and levied by the defendants in error on the camera in question. The relator is a married man, the head and support of a family, with whom he is living, and whom he is supporting, and is a citizen and resident of the city of Columbus, Ohio, and was such at the time of the issue and levy of the execution. Neither he nor his wife was or is the owner of a homestead or any real estate whatever, and the personal property owned by them, including the camera, does not exceed in value the sum of $500.

The relator made demand that the camera be set off to him as exempt under the laws of Ohio, which demand was refused, and thereupon he instituted the proceeding in mandamus. The court found as its conclusion of law that the relator was not entitled to exemptions as against part of the judgment, amounting to $152 and interest, but that as against the balance of the judgment he was entitled to his exemptions. The petition of the relator was dismissed at his costs, and a motion for a new trial was overruled. Error was prosecuted to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the common pleas court was affirmed. Upon application of the relator the Court of Appeals was directed to certify its record to this court.

The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that under this provision so much of the judgment as was represented by the unpaid purchase money was superior to the homestead exemption. The common pleas court had reached the same conclusion, and in support thereof cited Green v. Bass, 83 Ohio St. 378, 94 N. E. 742, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 828, where Frost v. Shaw, 3 Ohio St. 271, was approved and followed. In Green v. Bass, supra, the holding was that the owner of the senior chattel mortgage did not, by recovering a judgment on the note which was secured and causing execution to be levied on the chattels mortgaged, waive the priority of his lien. In Frost v. Shaw, supra, it was held that in the case of the chattel mortgage the owner waives the benefit of the exemption, so far as the incumbrance extended or was operative, and that, where a mortgagee at the maturity of his debt, having the right to the possession of the property mortgaged, saw proper to reduce his debt to judgment and have the property sold under the authority of an execution for the payment of his debt, the debtor sustained no injury in the right of possession of the property, which would support an action of trespass, even though the chattels mortgaged and sold belonged to the enumerated articles exempted by law from execution.

The relator in the instant case had executed a chattel mortgage to secure the payment of the notes given in part payment of the purchase price of the camera, If, in the action brought by the W. C. Dunn Photo Supply Company against him in the justices' court, the claim had been confined to one based on these notes, the judgment debtor could not, under the holding in the Bass Case, supra, have complained had the camera been levied on and sold on execution; but, in view of the fact that in the instant case judgment was not rendered exclusively on the notes given for the purchase price of the camera, we do not think the two cases to which we have referred are in point.

[2] That part of section 11738, General Code, which is quoted above, is a compara

tively recent enactment, and by force of its sion above quoted. If the creditor did not provision the vendor of personal property see fit to bring a suit in foreclosure on the who is not secured by a chattel mortgage chattel mortgage, he could have brought an stands on an equal footing, so far as the action on the notes for the purchase price right of the judgment debtor to claim exemp- and reduced these notes to judgment, and the tions is concerned, with the vendor who has provision of the statute would have fully such security. But the question for our protected his rights. But when he combined determination is whether it has application in one action the balance due on the purchase in the instant case. price of the camera and his account for merchandise he waived his right to proceed under the provision we have quoted.

The creditor had two classes of claims against his debtor. Certain personal property was not exempt from execution on a judgment rendered upon one class of these claims. As to a judgment rendered upon the other class the same property was exempt. The creditor saw fit to combine his claims in one action, and they were merged in one judgment rendered by default. The provision of the statute upon which counsel relies and upon which the Court of Appeals based its conclusion is a statutory provision in the nature of an exception to the general exemption law.

[1] It is the policy of this state, as it is elsewhere, to construe laws exempting property of a debtor upon execution liberally in his favor, and it is the duty of courts to see that the beneficial object of the law is accomplished. It would follow, then, that a provision in the nature of an exception to the general law on the subject of exemptions should be strictly construed. The provision of the statute in question is that no personal property shall be exempt from execution on a judgment rendered for the purchase price or any part thereof. The judgment in the instant case is not a judgment for the purchase price or a part of the purchase price of the camera. It is for a part of the purchase price and in addition thereto for an amount due on a book account for merchan

dise. No exception as to exemptions is made by this statute in the case of a judgment a part of which only is for the purchase price or a part of the same. The judgment must be exclusively for the purchase money or a part

thereof.

For the reasons we have given the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and, upon the undisputed facts in the case, judgment is rendered for plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed and judgment for plaintiff in error.

NICHOLS, C. J., and JONES, MATTHIAS, JOHNSON, and DONAHUE, JJ., concur.

CHICAGO

&

(283 111. 99)

VICINITY HUNGARIAN
BENEV. SOC. v. CHICAGO & SUBURB
HUNGARIAN AID SOC. et al. (No. 11712.)
(Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 20, 1918.
Rehearing Denied April 4, 1918.)

1. EQUITY 443- BILL OF REVIEW-DE-
OREES REVIEWABLE-"CONSENT DECREE."
A decree in an injunction suit, approved
before entry by the O. K. and signatures of
counsel for both parties and the master in chan-
cery, was a "consent decrce," and not subject
to be set aside upon a bill of review for er-
rors of law apparent upon the face of the rec-
ord.

and Phrases, First and Second Series, Consent
[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words
Decree.]

2. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT 85-ACTS OF

ATTORNEY-LIABILITY OF CLIENT.

The counsel of a party, by his agreement to the entry of a consent decree, bound his client and, if any of his acts were without sufficient authority, the client's remedy was against him.

3. CONTEMPT 20 WHAT CONSTITUTESFAILURE TO PAY MONEYS.

[3] This is not a case where the judgment In injunction suit involving funds of two rendered in the justices' court was being societies, where money was found to belong in reviewed on error. It was a proceeding in part to defendant and in part to plaintiff, and mandamus, and the judgment before the an attorney was found to have rendered servlower courts was an entirety and indivisible. from the clerk the judgment in plaintiff's faices to plaintiff worth $500, and he collected The claim for the balance of the purchase vor for $616, and plaintiff filed a bill of review, money for the camera and the claim on the upon which no decree was entered, and which book account had become united and merged. could not be sustained, because the decree sought But we do not see upon what theory a courtney was not in contempt for failing to pay to to be reviewed was a consent decree, the attorin a mandamus proceeding, or an officer in the clerk, as required by court order, the entire whose hands an execution is placed, can ana-amount collected, where he offered the difference lyze a judgment for the purpose of ascertain-between the value of his services and the amount collected. ing the several items which might be included in it. We think the lower courts were without power to apportion the judgment.

It is said that to permit the relator to exempt the property in question from execution would work a hardship to the creditor and would destroy the efficacy of the provi

Error to Second Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Denis E. Sullivan, Judge.

Bill by the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Society against the Chicago &

For other cases see came topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Suburb Hungarian Aid Society. To review | master in chancery, to whom the cause was

the decree rendered, the plaintiff filed a bill of review in the superior court, making Alphonse Lefkow a defendant. Defendant Lefkow was adjudged to be in contempt of court, and he appealed to the Appellate Court, where such judgment was reversed. To review the judgment of the Appellate Court, the plaintiff brings certiorari. Affirmed.

Charles R. Whitman, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. Frank H. Culver and Irene M. Lefkow, both of Chicago, for defendant in er

ror.

referred, reported, recommending that a decree be entered dividing the funds claimed by the complainant between it and the defendant society in certain proportions mentioned, the share of the defendant society being $667.31. The master further recommended that the complainant society pay 75 per cent. of the costs and the defendant society 25 per cent. The master further found and reported that the defendant society was indebted to defendant in error, Lefkow, in the sum of $200 for legal services rendered in the suit of the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Society against the Chicago & Suburb

FARMER, J. Defendant in error, Alphonse | Hungarian Aid Society; that he also repreLefkow, was by the superior court of Cook county adjudged guilty of contempt of court for failure, to pay and restore to the custody of the court $616.33 obtained by him from the clerk of said court, and which the court had previously ordered him to pay to said clerk.

sented the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Society in the suit then pending, and had rendered services therein, and that the entire services rendered by defendant in error for the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Society were reasonably worth $500; and the master recommenued that upon If we correctly understand the situation, the payment of said sum to defendant in erwhich is imperfectly stated in the briefs, ror he should cause to be satisfied his judgsome time prior to 1913 the Chicago & Vicin- ment in the municipal court for $200 and disity Hungarian Benevolent Society filed a bill miss the garnishment proceedings. The masin chancery to dissolve the Chicago & Suburb ter also reported that the usual and reasonHungarian Aid Society, which last-named able fee for the services of the complainant's society, had been doing business since 1894, solicitor in the suit was $600, and that said claiming to be a corporation organized not sum should be paid to said solicitor out of for pecuniary profit. That bill was dismissed the amount found due the complainant sofor want of equity, and Alphonse Lefkow, de- ciety. The banks had previously paid to the fendant in error here, who had acted as at- clerk of the court, pursuant to an interlocutorney for complainant in that suit, sued his tory decree, the amounts they had on deposit client in the municipal court of Chicago for to the credit of the complainant society. Deservices rendered, and secured a judgment ducting the defendant society's share of the against it by default for $200, which judg- cost of that litigation left in the hands of the ment he assigned to Emma Lord, and garnish- clerk $616.33, which the master found belongment proceedings were begun against the Illi-ed to the defendant society. Defendant in ernois Trust & Savings Bank and the Continen- ror, Lefkow, as its attorney, collected and retal & Commercial Trust and Savings Bank, in each of which the Chicago & Suburb Hungarian Aid Society had funds on deposit to its credit, for the purpose of collecting said judgment. Apparently the garnishment proceeding was instituted on the theory that the Chicago & Suburb Hungarian Aid Society | ity Hungarian Benevolent Society filed a bill had no corporate existence, and that the of review in the superior court of Cook counmoney on deposit to its credit belonged to the ty to review the decree of June 9, 1914, for members of said society, a part of whom were errors of law apparent on the face of the recalso members of the Chicago & Vicinity Hun- ord. We deem it unnecessary to refer to all garian Benevolent Society. The Chicago & the pleadings in that case. Defendant in erSuburb Hungarian Aid Society thereupon, in ror was made a party to that suit. Among May, 1913, filed its bill in the superior court other things, the bill prayed that he be reof Cook county against the Chicago & Vicinity quired to return to the clerk the sum of $616.Hungarian Benevolent Society, the defendant 33. Defendant in error demurred to the bill, in error, Emma Lord, and numerous other which demurrer was overruled, and he filed individuals, and the two banks mentioned. an answer setting forth facts relied on by The bill prayed that defendant in error him in justification of the charges made and Emma Lord be enjoined from prose- against him in the bill of review. This ancuting the garnishment suit; that the for-swer was, on motion of complainant in that mer members of the complainant society suit, stricken from the files, and on motion of be enjoined from using the Hungarian and complainant the defendant in error was orAmerican names, and that the charter of dered to pay the sum of $616.33 to the clerk the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benev- of the court within five days from that date. olent Society be declared void. Such pro- No decree had been entered on the bill of re

ceived from the clerk the whole of said sum of $616.33. The decree is identical with the master's report, and was rendered June 9, 1914. No appeal was prosecuted from it, or writ of error sued out to review it.

On February 13, 1915, the Chicago & Vicin

[1] It is contended by defendant in error that the decree entered in the suit brought by the Chicago & Suburb Hungarian Aid Society against the Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Society, defendant in error, and others, was a consent decree, and is therefore not a proper subject for a bill of review. Defendant in error's justification for receiving and retaining $500 of the $616.33 is based on the decree in that case. The master in chancery found, determined, and reported the rights of the parties in that proceeding, Testator's will provided that his trustees and it does not appear that either party made should keep his estate for five years from the any objection to the master's report, either date of his death, and then, after providing for certain payments to his wife, etc., should divide before the master or the chancellor, and that the residue into six equal portions, and pay and the decree was prepared finding and decree-deliver one-half of each portion to persons nam

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

ed, making further provisions in case of death of any legatee, and further provided that the balance of the estate, after such payments, should be kept together and managed by the trustees until ten years from his death, when the residue of the estate, after deductions, should be divided into six equal parts, and paid to persons named, providing further that if, at the expiration of the 10 years, any of the legatees were dead, or should die without having received his part of the estate, the trustee should pay the share to his or her heirs at law. Held, that each legacy was contingent and does not vest until the respective five and ten year periods of distribution.

6. WILLS 506(1) "HEIR" "HEIR AT LAW."

The word "heir," or the phrase "heir at law," meant at common law that person who succeeds to the real estate in case of intestacy. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Heirs; Heirs at Law.]

7. WILLS 506 (1)-CONSTRUCTION—HEIRS HEIRS AT LAW.

By the general rule in the disposition of realty, in the absence of contrary intention expressed in the will, the term "heirs at law," "heirs," or the like, must be construed in its strict and primal meaning, signifying those entitled by law to inherit by descent the realty of a decedent.

be divided equally between them, and provided that at the end of ten years they should deliver to such three children $7,500 share and share alike, and further provided that if, at the expiration of such ten years, any of the grandchildren should be dead, or have died without having received his share, the trustees should pay it to his or her heirs at law according to the statute of descent in the state of Illinois. One of such three grandchildren of testator was insane, and died intestate, before testator's death, without issue. Held, that the legacy to the grandchild who predeceased testator did not lapse.

Error to Second Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Thomas G. Windes, Judge.

Suit by George S. Walker against Elizabeth Frances Walker and others. From the decree, writ of error was sued out to the Appellate Court for the First District, which affirmed in part and reversed in part, and Walker and others petition for certiorari. to review the judgment Elizabeth Frances Judgment reversed.

Scott, Bancroft, Martin & Stephens and Lester L. Falk, all of Chicago (John E. MacLeish and Leland K. Neeves, both of Chicago, 8. WILLS 506(1)—CONSTRUCTION-INTEN- of counsel), for plaintiff in error Whiting.

TION OF TESTATOR.

The intention of testator must be the controlling factor as to the meaning to be given the word "heir," or the phrase "heir at law," used in the will; the true intention and meaning of testator, as expressed by the language used in the will, to be ascertained from its consideration in all of its parts, is controlling.

George C. Otto, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error Chicago Title & Trust Co. Gerald Turnbull, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error Foley. George H. Kriete, of Chicago, for defendant in error Walker. Ruby Koenig Ellis, of Two Rivers, Wis., for Irene Du Ver9. WILLS 506(4)—CONSTRUCTION-SURVIV- net Rabell. Felsenthal & Wilson, of ChicaING HUSBAND AS "HEIR AT LAW ACCORDING TO STATUTE OF DESCENT."

The surviving husband of testator's daughter was included as the daughter's "heir at law according to the statute of descent in the state of Illinois," within testator's will, though the daughter left a child surviving.

10. WILLS 447–PRESUMPTION OF TESTATOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF LAW.

The testator is presumed to know the law, and to make his will in view of existing stat

utes.

EFFECT TO ALL WORds. Where one construction of a will renders a portion of it meaningless, and another gives effect to all the words used, the latter should be adopted.

12. WILLS 449 CONSTRUCTION - AVOIDANCE OF INTESTACY.

go, for Clara May McDonald and Mary E. Walker. William H. Gruver, of Chicago, for Edwin Walker, Jr.

CARTER, C. J. Edwin Walker died testate April 27, 1910. His will was duly admitted to probate and thereafter a bill was filed by the testamentary trustees in the circuit court of Cook county for its construction. - GIVING A decree was entered in said court construing the will, and from that decree a writ of error was sued out to the Appellate Court for the First District, and counsel in that court insisted that the decree was wrong on three points: First, in holding that certain interests under the will were contingent and not vested; second, in holding that Frederick Whiting was an "heir" under the provisions of the will; and, third, in holding that took the share of a son of said Hettie Foley the children and husband of Hettie Foley who died before the testator. The Appellate Court affirmed the decree in holding that the interests in question were contingent and not vested, but reversed the decree on the other two points. A judgment was entered accordingly in the Appellate Court, and the case has been brought here on petition for certiorari.

It is a universal presumption that one who makes a will intends to dispose of his entire estate, and any reasonable construction of the will that will avoid the conclusion of intestacy as to part of the property should be adopted. 13. WILLS 775-LAPSE OF LEGACY OR DE

VISE-DEATH BEFORE Testator.

At common law, a devise or legacy always lapses where the devisee or legatee dies before the death of the testator. 14. WILLS 775

LAPSING OF LEGACY BY

PREVIOUS DEATH-INTENTION OF TESTATOR.

The intention of testator must control on the question whether a legacy to a grandchild lapsed by his death before testator. 15. WILLS 775

LAPSING OF LEGACY

DEATH OF LEGATEE. The estate disposed of by said will is all Testator's will directed his trustees at the end of five years to pay $7,500 to three surviv-personal property, amounting to over $250,ing children of testator's deceased daughter, to 000. After making certain specific bequests