use what have been termed "decoy" letters. A series of thefts may be reported at a certain office, and by a process of elimination the Inspectors conclude that the thefts occur during a certain watch. There may be more than one man upon this watch, and it is entirely unjust to suspect all of them. Decoys are, therefore, used. These decoy letters are sometimes called "test" letters. The question arose as to whether or not such letters could be the subject of the offense described and punished by 5467, and the other articles akin thereto. It is now settled, beyond dispute, that such letters may be the subject of the offenses defined. In Hall vs. United States, 168 U. S., 631; 42 Law Ed., 607, the point was raised as follows, which is taken from that case:

"The evidence showed that the Government detectives prepared a special delivery letter designed as a test or decoy letter, containing marked bills, and delivered it, bearing a special delivery stamp, to the night-clerk in charge of Branch Station 'F' of the post-office. The defendant was not a letter carrier, but a clerk employed at that office, whose duty it was to take charge of special delivery letters, enter them in a book for that purpose, and then place them in course of transmission. The letter in question was addressed to Mrs. Susan Metcalf, a fictitious person, 346 East Twenty-fourth Street, New York City, a fictitious number. The letter was placed by the night clerk with other letters upon the table, where such letters were usually placed, and the defendant, entering the office not long after, took this letter, along with the others on the same table, removed them to his desk, and properly entered the other letters, but did not enter this letter. On leaving the office, not long after, the omission to enter the letter having been observed, he was arrested, and the money contents of the letter, marked and identified by the officers, were found upon his person. The officers testified upon cross examination that the address was a fictitious one; that the letter was designed as a test letter, and that they did not intend that the letter should be delivered to Mrs. Susan Metcalf, or that address, and that it could not be delivered to that person at that address."

Upon this state of facts, the Supreme Court held that the facts stated an offense, and the evidence was entirely sufficient to sustain the conviction upon the latter part of Section 5467, which did not include the words "intended to be conveyed by mail." The Court cites Good vs. United States, 159 U. S., 663; 40 Law Ed., 297; Montgomery vs. United States, 162 U. S., 410; 40 Law Ed., 1020.

I have spoken in a preceding paragraph of the use of decoy letters by government inspectors and the approval of such use by the Courts as expressed in Hall vs. U. S. Judge Bourquin draws a distinction in United States vs. Healy, 202 Federal, 349, between the proper and the improper use of the decoy. Such distinction is most pleasing since everyone dislikes to approve any course on the part of the official which appears to be overreaching or which suggests to the weak an easy way to get money or something of value. In the Healy case it was said that decoys are permissible to entrap criminals or to present opportunity to those having intent to or who are willing to commit crime, but not to create criminals, or to ensnare the law abiding into committing an offense without an intent to do so. Where a statute makes an act a crime regardless of the actor's intent or knowledge, ignorance of fact is no excuse if the act is done voluntarily; but if done on solicitation by the government's instrument to that end, ignorance of fact shows the act to have been involuntary and estops the government from claiming a conviction.

The observations in that case were based upon facts which showed that the government's decoy claimed that he was not an Indian when as a matter of fact he was, and upon his representation that he was not an Indian the defendant acted and sold him spirituous liquors. The court, of its own motion, set aside the conviction.

It will be observed that the new statute uses the word "such," which means, beyond any question of a doubt, a letter, postal-card, package, bag, or mail, which was intended to be conveyed by mail, or carried or delivered by a carrier, messenger, agent, or other person employed in a Department of the Postal Service, or forwarded through, or delivered from, any post-office or station. If, therefore, the testimony of the Government Inspector should disclose that he did not intend that the decoy or test should be carried or delivered or conveyed by mail, or forwarded through, or delivered from, any post-office, then and in that event, the new section would not be sufficiently broad to prosecute an employee who stole a decoy or test letter. Hall vs. U. S., 168 U. S., 631. The last portion of the old statute 5467 made it an offense for any such person, to wit, employee, to take any of the things mentioned therein out of any letter,

packet, bag, or mail which had come into his possession as such employee; which is vastly different in its broadness from the present statute.

The case of Ennis vs. United States, 154 Federal, 842, decides that a piece of mail matter which had been set aside by a dishonest employee to be later taken, and which was discovered by an inspector, and taken to the addressee, from whom the inspector secured permission to open the packet, and thereupon marked certain bills, and placed them in the said packet, and then returned the packet, where the employee had left it, such employee afterwards taking the packet: held, that the packet, at the time it was returned by the Inspector, had not ceased to be mail matter, and that the defendant was, therefore, properly convicted of embezzling the same, in support of which the Court cites Scott vs. United States, 172 U. S., 343; 43 Law Ed., 471, and also argues that a letter delivered to the wrong address, and remailed with the canceled stamp thereon, if stolen after being re-mailed, would appear to be an offense under the section. In the case of Bromberger vs. United States, 128 Federal, 346, the Court held that a letter properly stamped, with the receiving stamp of the office thereon, and placed in a carrier's pigeon hole at a postal station, with other letters addressed to a real person on his route is "intended to be conveyed by mail," and its abstraction by the carrier, and the taking of the money therefrom constitutes an offense under 5467, although it was placed there by postal inspector for the purpose of testing the carrier's honesty.

The difference between the Bromberger case and the Hall case is, that the test or decoy in the Bromberger case was addressed to an actual person, and was intended for delivery to such person, while in the Hall case, it was a fictitious address, and no such delivery could be made. Under the new statute, therefore, the indictment must allege, and the proof must show, that the matter was intended to be conveyed by mail, or carried or delivered by a carrier, messenger, agent, or other person employed in a Department of the Postal Service, or forwarded through or delivered from any post-office or station thereof, established by authority of the Postmaster General, and if the decoy or test be to a fictitious person, at an address where the delivery cannot be made, it would not, under the new statute, be an offense.

Under the authority of Shaw vs. United States, in 165 Federal, page 174, the indictment must allege lawful possession, but under the authorities of United States vs. Trasp, 127 Federal, 471, and Bowers vs. United States, 148 Federal, 379, and United States vs. Falkenhainer, 21 Federal, 624, it is not necessary to allege the ownership of the packet. The employee, under the present section, whether he be postmaster or other person, can offend against the new law only when he is such employee, has mail entrusted to him, or has mail in his possession when the same was to be conveyed and delivered as hereinbefore shown. So, too, it will be noticed that the new section makes it an offense to secrete, embezzle, or destroy any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, and also makes it an offense to steal, abstract, or remove from any such package, bag, or mail, any article or thing therein, and does not make use of the word "value." In other words, any article, whether of value or not, and any letter or packet, whether it has any article in it or not, under this new section, is protected by its provisions, and it is thought that this broadness comes by reason of its comprehending the elements of 3890 and 3891, as well as those of 5467. Other cases bearing upon these three sections are Alexis vs. United States, 129 Federal, 60; Chitwood vs. United States, 153 Federal, 551; United States vs. Kerr, 159 Federal, 185; United States vs. Wilson, 44 Federal, 593; United States vs. Lacher, 134 U. S., 624; United States vs. Delany, 55 Federal, 475; United States vs. Gruver, 35 Federal, 59; United States vs. Byrne, 44 Federal, 188; Walster vs. United States, 42 Federal, 891; United States vs. Matthews, 35 Federal, 890; Rosencrans vs. United States, 165 U. S., 257; in re Wight, 134 U. S., 136; U. S. vs. Taylor, 37 Federal, 200; Jones vs. United States, 27 Federal, 447; U. S. vs. Hamilton, 9 Federal, 442; Scott vs. United States, 172 U. S., 343.

§ 51a. For a fact case under Section 195, see Welsing vs. United States, 218 Federal, 369.

An indictment under this Section need not describe the article contained in the mail package with the same particularization as in a prosecution for forgery or larceny, but the article must be stated and sufficiently described so as to apprise the defendant of the charge against him and so as to protect him against a second prosecution for the same offense.

An indictment which charged that a letter contained "articles of value" to wit, "$12 in money of the U. S." was sufficient under this statute to charge an offense. Shaw vs. U. S., 180 Federal, 348. An offense under this Section may be prosecuted in either the district where article "removed" or the one into which the article is taken with the evil intent. Perara vs. U. S., 221 Federal, 213.

§ 52. Stealing, Secreting, Embezzling, Etc., Mail Matter or Contents.-Section 194 of the new Code is in substitution of Sections 3892 and 5469 and 5470 of the Code of 1878, and by the wideness or latitude of punishment and generality of its phraseology, includes all of the offenses enumerated in the old sections. 3892 was limited originally to the taking of mail for the purpose of prying into the business or secrets of another, and 5469 originally was for the taking of mail matter by theft or other unlawful method by any person not employed in the postal service. It is only by being familiar with Section 5467 and 3891 and 3890, as heretofore treated, that we conclude that 5469 related to persons other than postal employees. Under the terms of Section 194, as it now reads, one who, by misrepresentation or pretense, secures from a post-office mail directed and intended for another, is liable to the penalties of that section. For instance, one who calls for the mail of another, representing that he has authority to receive the same, and thereafter commits unlawful act with the mail, is subject to the penalty. The authorities cited supra in the construction of Section 195 are applicable to decoy and test letters under 5469 of the old statute or 194 of the new statute. The authority of the United States vs. Meyers, 142 Federal, 907, with reference to 5469, seems to be applicable to the needs of an indictment and proof under new Section 194. The indictment must allege that the stealing, taking, or obtaining by fraud of any letter or other mail matter and the embezzlement of the same or its contents must be either fraudulent or unlawful, and an indictment which leaves this open to inference is defective. Thus, an indictment which by inference may allow the letter charged to have been taken to have been delivered to and received by the defendant through a mutual mistake, is insufficient. Mail matter that has been delivered by the Postal Department to its address thereby passes