jury should be informed, in some part of the instructions, that before they can convict, the fact that the oath was false must be shown to their satisfaction in such way; and it is thought in this connection that the instructions must also somewhere inform the jury what is meant by "corroborated." State vs. Hunter, 181 Missouri, 316; 80 S. W., 915; People vs. Wells, 103 Calif., 631; U. S. vs. Hall, 44 Federal, 864. § 105a. Proof, Continued. As stated in the foregoing paragraph proof must be by two witnesses or by one witness with corroborating circumstances. Kahn vs. U. S., 214 Federal, 54; Allen vs. U. S., 194 Federal, 664. § 105b. Other Cases.-Perjury committed during the trial of oneself. In Allen vs. U. S., 194 Federal, 664, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said that one may be convicted of perjury for testifying falsely in his own behalf wherein he was acquitted, but the government should not institute a prosecution for perjury on substantially the same evidence presented on the first trial. In that opinion the Court mentions authorities supporting the position that one may be indicted for swearing falsely on his own trial, and also cites authorities against the correctness of that doctrine. In the latter list of cases, however, it fails to notice or mention the case of Coffey vs. U. S., 116 U. S., 436. In the Coffey case the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Judge Blatchford, said, "Where an issue raised as to the existence of the Act or fact denounced has been tried in a criminal proceeding instituted by the United States, and a judgment of acquittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that judgment is conclusive in favor of such person on the subsequent trial of a suit in rem by the United States where, as against him the existence of the same Act or fact is the matter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in rem." See also the case of Chelson vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat., 245, 4 L. Ed., 381; U. S. vs. McDee, 4 Dill., 128; Murff vs. State, 68 Tex. Crim. App. There should be no attempt by the Government and its prosecuting officers to disregard the verdicts and judgments of its own Courts by seeking one jury to find that another gave a wrong verdict upon what is in all material respects the same testimony. § 106. Subornation of Perjury.-Section 126 of the new Code reads as follows: "Whoever shall procure another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and punishable as in the preceding section prescribed,' which are the substantial words of old Section 5393. An indictment is sufficient which alleges that the witness knew the testimony to be false and that the defendant, knowing it was perjury, procured her to commit it. Babcock vs. United States, 34 Federal, 873; United States vs. Thompson, 31 Federal, 331. In United States vs. Dennee, 3 Woods, (U. S.) 39, the Court held that an indictment must allege that the defendant knew that the testimony which he instigated the witness to give was false, and the defendant knew that the witness knew that the testimony she was instigated to give was false. The same particularity and accurateness is required in an indictment under this section, and the same general law relates thereto, as under that for perjury. The following cases may be interesting: U. S. vs. Evans, 19 Federal, 912. U. S. vs. Howard, 132 Federal, 325. U. S. vs. Boren, 144 Federal, 801; 30 Cyc., at page 1440, gives the following elements of an indictment for subornation, with supporting authorities, which it is thought is the law: "An indictment for subornation of perjury must state all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury, as well as of subornation of perjury. It must set forth the nature of the proceeding in which the alleged perjury was committed; the court or officer in which, or before whom, the false oath was taken; that the witness was duly sworn; that the testimony was material, and false; that defendant knowingly and wilfully procured another to swear falsely; that the party did knowingly swear falsely; that defendant knew that the testimony of the witness would be false; and that he knew that the witness knew said testimony was false." A charge of subornation of perjury may be joined with a charge of perjury in the same indictment, and the perjurer and the suborner may both be included in it. Commonwealth vs. Devine, 155 Mass., 224; 29 N. E., 515. § 106a. Attorney Suborning.-An attorney who advises a witness to testify falsely before a United States Commissioner in order that she might assist to obtain the discharge of her husband, is guilty of subornation, even though the indictment charging such uses the word "trial" and the word "issue," in presenting the case, and even though a trial and an issue within the technical meaning of those words cannot be held before a United States Commissioner. Cohen vs. U. S., 214 Federal, 23. Subornation may be successfully laid against one who induces two entrywomen to make false affidavits to the settlement, residence and cultivation of the lands as required by Section 2291 of the Revised Statutes. Hallock vs. U. S., 185 Federal, 424. A witness § 106b. Elements of Subornation.-1. must have testified falsely knowing or believing the testimony to be false. (2) The accused must have known or believed that the testimony would be false. (3) The accused must have known or believed the witness would give the false testimony with like knowledge or belief. (4) The accused must have induced or procured the witness to do so. Hallock vs. U. S., 185 Federal, 417; 2nd Vol. Bishop's New Criminal Law, Section 1197. Inciting to false swearings which are not perjuries is not subornation of perjury. Bishop New Criminal Law, Vol. 2, page 689. 107. Stealing or Altering Process; Procuring False Bail, Etc.-Old Section 5394 is practically re-enacted in Section 127 of the new Code, except that under the old statute the Court was not authorized to impose both penalties of fine and imprisonment. The new section reads as follows: "Whoever shall feloniously steal, take away, alter, falsify, or otherwise avoid any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, by means whereof any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or whoever shall acknowledge, or procure to be acknowledged, in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both; but this provision shall not extend to the acknowledgment of any judgment by an attorney, duly admitted, for any person against whom such judgment is had or given." Most of the annotators cite United States vs. Crecilius, 34 Federal, page 30; Barber vs. United States, 35 Federal, 886, and 5 Attorney General's Opinion, 523. The two first cases contain practically no assistance, by decision or argument, for the construction of the statute. In one of them the word "alter" is treated at some inconsiderate length. Anderson's Dictionary of Law defines the word alter to mean "to make a thing different from what it was." The definition in the Century Dictionary is practically the same, and is in the following words: "to become different in some respect; to vary; to change." The statute, of course, does not make an innocent, thoughtless, or mistaken alteration or falsification an offense. The charge must include an unlawful and felonious alteration or falsification. The statute also includes the acknowledgment of any recognizance or bail or judgment by one in the name of another without authority. § 108. Obstructing Process, or Assaulting an Officer, Etc. In the new Code Section 140 takes the place of Section 5398 in the 1878 statutes. The new section, which reads as follows: "Whoever shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist, or oppose any officer of the United States, or other person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting to serve or execute, any mesne process or warrant, or any rule or order, or any other legal or judicial writ or process of any court of the United States, or United States Commissioner, or shall assault, beat or wound any officer or other person duly authorized, knowing him to be such officer, or other person so duly authorized, in serving or executing any such writ, rule, order, processs warrant, or other legal or judicail writ or process, shall be fined not more than three hundred dollars, and imprisoned not more than one year," contains some interpolated phrases that seem to strengthen and broaden the old statute. In other words, under the new statute, the words, "or other person duly authorized" would protect any person who happened to be a messenger conveying any Court process, though such person would not be an officer of the United States, within the meaning of the decisions, which requires a person to have been nominated and commissioned by the Executive Department. So also, the words, "or any other legal or judicial writ or process" are placed in the new statute; and to meet that line of decisions which has held in contempt proceedings that a United States Commissioner does not hold any United States Court, and is, therefore, not a Court, or Judge, the statute specially includes the words, "or United States Commissioner." The new statute also includes the words "knowing him to be such officer or other person so duly authorized," which is but an enactment of what the best authorities had already determined was necessary before one could be convicted for an alleged violation of the Section. Necessarily, one who, by mistake or without knowledge, obstructed process or an officer should not be prosecuted. In United States vs. Terry, 41 Federal, 771, Judge Ross held that the Section related to an oral order of a Court, to remove from a Court room a prisoner who was disturbing the proceedings of a Court. In that case, it was conceded in argument, and is recognized by the Court in his opinion, that at the time the defendant resisted the marshal who attempted to eject her from the court room under the order of the Judge, that such order was oral, and had not been entered of record. The distinction is drawn in the following words: "Undoubtedly, in judicial proceedings, an 'order' as distinguished from a 'judgment' is often defined as one reduced to writing and entered in the records of the Court, and such is the purport of many of the cases referred to by counsel for the defendant, but this is by no means saying that such only is an order. There must, in the nature of things, be an order of a Court made before it is, or can be, written out in the records of the Court by the Clerk. When written out, the writing becomes a record of the order, and is evidence of it. Orders are almost daily given to the Marshal concerning matters to be performed in the presence of the Court, and they are as constantly executed before being written out. Indeed, many of them are never reduced to writing at all. Yet, there can be no doubt of their validity. The language of the statute in question is broad enough to include all valid oral orders. The natural ordinary meaning of the word includes written, as well as unwritten orders, and there is no reason in the policy of the law or in the nature of things, for excluding unwritten orders. Indeed, the contrary is true. There is just as much reason and necessity for making it an offense to resist the execution of a lawful unwritten order, brought distinctly and authoritatively to the notice of the offending party, as for making it an offense to resist the |