contingency, it may have the effect to deceive and defraud, it is sufficient to found a conviction of such an offense upon. This decision arose in a case where the defendant had forwarded to the officers of the Land Department affidavits that were forged and false, which were erroneously received by the Land Office, but which, if acted upon, would have caused the issuance by the United States of a patent to the land, which purchase could not have been successfully attacked collaterally if the land had passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser, and the United States would thereby have been defrauded.

§ 172a. Covers Civil Service Examination.-This statute is broad enough to make unlawful a fraudulent civil service examination or the forging of a voucher in a bid. Hass vs. Henkle, 216 U. S., 462; Curley vs. U. S., 130 Federal, 1; U. S. vs. Bunting, 82 Federal, 883; U. S. vs. Plyler, 222 U. S., 15. It is not necessary that there should be a pecuniary loss to the Government. Hass vs. Henkle, 216 U. S. 462.

§ 173. Forging Deeds, Powers of Attorney, Etc.Section 29 of the new Code, in the following words:

"Whoever shall falsely make, alter, forge, or counterfeit, or cause or procure to be falsely made, altered, forged, or counterfeited, or willingly aid or assist in the false making, altering, forging, or counterfeiting, any deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, for the purpose of obtaining or receiving, or of enabling any other person, either directly or indirectly, to obtain or receive from the United States, or any of their officers or agents, any sum of money, or whoever shall utter or publish as true, or cause to be uttered or published as true, any such false, forged, altered, or counterfeited deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited; or whoever shall transmit to, or present at, or cause or procure to be transmitted to, or presented at, any office or officer of the Government of the United States, any deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, in support of, or in relation to, any account or claim, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years."

takes the place of old Section 5421, and contains all of the elements of the old Section, and adds thereto the word "contract," and changes the punishment, fixing a maximum fine and imprisonment.

Considered abstractly, the Section comprises three offenses: first, the making of any forged or counterfeited deed or other writing as therein enumerated for the purpose of obtaining any sum of money from the United States or any of its officers; second, the uttering of any such forged or counterfeited paper, with the intent to defraud the United States, knowing it to have been so forged; third, the transmitting or presenting to any office or officer of the Government any such writing, with knowledge that it is false, or forged, with the intent to defraud the United States. An indictment, therefore, under either of the three parts, must contain the elements as above set out, and must specially plead the intent and knowledge where requisite. So, likewise, a bill that includes in one count allegations that set up acts covering the entire statute, would be bad for duplicity.

In the case of United States vs. Fout, 123 Federal, 625, District Judge Adams divided the statute as above indicated. In the case of United States vs. Swan, 131 Federal, page 140, the same judge, in passing upon this statute, held that the forgery of an affidavit by a pensioner, to be used in contesting his deserted wife's claims for one-half of his pension, as authorized by the Act of March 3, 1899, was not a offense within old Section 5421, which provided that any person who falsely forges any writing for the purpose of obtaining or receiving, or enabling any other person, directly or indirectly, to receive from the United States, any sum of money, shall be imprisoned, etc., was not an offense thereunder. The decision is based upon the ground that the purpose of Swan seemed to be to make use of the forged writing to prevent his wife from obtaining half of the pension, which had already been allowed to him. He was, therefore, making no claim against the United States for himself. His right to a pension had already been established, and he, therefore, did not have the necessary intent under the statute to obtain or receive from the United States, etc., any sum of money.

Carrying out this distinction, the cases of United States vs. Barney, 5 Blatchf., 294, and United States vs. Myler, 27 Federal Case No. 15849, can be read with profit, since

they hold that the first and second parts of the old section, and, therefore, of course, of the new statute, are confined to instruments designed to obtain money from the United States, and a count alleging the forgery and uttering of a certain false and fraudulent bond on the exportation of distilled liquors charges no offense under the section. To the same effect is the case of United States vs. Reese, 4 Sawyer, 629, which held in substance that an indictment for uttering and presenting as true to the Board of Land Commissioners, a false writing purporting to be a grant of certain described lands from the Mexican Government, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, was subject to demurrer on the ground that the section applied only to instruments altered or forged for the purpose of obtaining moneys from the United States or their officers or agents. To the same effect is Staton vs. United States, 88 Federal, 253, where it was held that an indictment which alleged the signing of the name of a Justice of the Peace to an affidavit, with the intent to defraud the United States, charged no offense under the section.

In United States vs. Wilson, 28 Federal Case No. 16732, it was held that the words "other writing" did not embrace a forged endorsement of a genuine instrument, as the forgery to a bank check drawn by a Pension Agent upon a depository of the United States.

In the case of the United States vs. Rohmstormm, 5 Blatchf., 222, it was held that a claim against the Government under this section need not be in favor of the party presenting the false writing or instrument or paper in support thereof.

In United States vs. Glasener, 81 Federal, 566, the Court held that false statements in the certificate of a notary public did not come within the provisions of the section; to the direct contrary of which holding is the case of the United States vs. Hartman, 65 Federal, 490, the courts being of equal dignity. In that case, the Court held that the statement in a certificate of something that was not true, if taken with the intent and knowledge required by the statute, would authorize prosecution thereunder, and subject the offender to punishment. To the same effect, is the decision in the case of United States vs. Moore, 60 Federal, 738.

In the cases of United States vs. Wilcox, 4 Blatchf., 385, and United States vs. Bickford, 4 Blatchf., 337, it was held that where a writing did not state all the facts, if made with the intent to defraud denounced by the statute, it would constitute an offense under this section.

It must be remembered, as a general proposition, that the false statements so made must be material, just as materiality is meant in a prosecution for perjury. Every false oath is not perjury. United States vs. Corbin, 11 Federal, 238.

In the case of United States vs. Moore, 60 Federal, 738, District Judge Cox in passing upon a demurrer to an indictment under this section, says that,

"the authorities are unanimous in holding that the first paragraph of this Section 5421 is a forgery, and not a perjury, statute. It punishes one who falsely makes an affidavit, and not one who makes a false affidavit. The words of the statute are ejusdem generis, and are the words usually adopted to describe the crime of forgery. False making may almost be said to be synonymous with forging. United States vs. Statts, 8 Howard, 41; U. S. vs. Barney, 5 Blatchf., 294; U. S. vs. Wentworth, 11 Federal, 52; U. S. vs. Reese, 4 Sawyer, 629; U. S. vs. Cameron, 4 Dakota, 141, 13 N. W., 561; State vs. Wilson, 28 Minnesota, 52, 9 N. W., 28; Mann vs. People, 15 Hun., 155; State vs. Young, 46 N. H., 266; Commonwealth vs. Baldwin, 11 Gray, 197; Barb. Criminal Law, 97; Wharton Criminal Law, 653. It is clear, then, if the indictment merely charges the defendants with making an affidavit which contains a false statement of fact, that the offense cannot be punished under the paragraph quoted. For reasons stated hereafter, it is thought that the indictment is defective under any construction of the statute; but assuming now that it contains a full and clear statement of the acts of omission and commission attending the fabrication of the affidavit and jurat, it amounts only to an averment that the notarial certificate is false. The names signed to the affidavit and jurat are all geniune. No part of the affidavit has been altered, forged, or counterfeited. In short, the certificate contains a number of false statements. It is a false certificate, but not a forged certificate. No authority has been cited or found by the Court, holding that a notary who signs a certificate containing untruthful statements, is guilty under a forgery statute. The statute must be construed strictly, and until such authority is presented, I shall hold that the paragraph quoted does not cover such an offense."

Of course, the indictment must allege that the forged or altered paper was transmitted to the officer of the Govern

ment in support of, or in relation to, a pending claim. In other words, it must appear that there was an account or claim against the United States. United States vs. Kessel, 62 Federal, 59. See also U. S. vs. Albert, 45 Federal, 552; United States vs. Kuentsler, 74 Federal, 220; United States vs. Hansee, 79 Federal, 303; De Lemos vs. United States, 91 Federal, 497.

In De Lemos vs. United States, 91 Federal, 499, the case arose by reason of the forgery of an endorsement to a genuine Government draft, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an indictment, to be good under 5421, on such a state of facts, should lay the charge on the endorsement, and not on the draft because it was the endorsement that was forged, and not the draft.

§ 174. Having Forged Papers in Possession.-Section 30 of the new Code is in the following words:

"Sec. 30. Whoever, knowingly and with intent to defraud the United States, shall have in his possession any false, altered, forged, or counterfeited deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, for the purpose of enabling another to obtain from the United States, or from any officer or agent thereof, any sum of money, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

The new section fixes a maximum punishment, and contains the word "contract." The old statute 5422 left the punishment to the discretion of the Court. These are the only two differences between the old and the new.

§ 175.

False Acknowledgments.-Section 31 of the new Code reads as follows:

"Sec. 31. Whoever, being an officer authorized to administer oaths or to take and certify acknowledgments, shall knowingly make any false acknowledgment, certificate, or statement concerning the appearance before him or the taking of an oath or affirmation by any person with respect to any proposal, contract, bond, undertaking, or other matter, submitted to, made with, or taken on behalf of, the United States, and concerning which an oath or affirmation is required by law or regulation made in pursuance of law, or with respect to the financial standing of any principal, surety, or other party to any such proposal, contract, bond, undertaking, or other instrument, shall be fined not more