In United States vs. Morse, 161 Federal, 429, the Court held that the word "entry" in the statute means "any item in an account." In United States vs. Wilson, 176 Federal, 806, District Judge Sheppard held that the intent to deceive may be inferred from the making of the entry, and such false entry may be made either personally, or by direction. In Morse vs. United States, 174 Federal, 539, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the doctrine that false entries may be made by direction. In other words, the defendant, in that case, did not make the entries with his own pen. All of them were made by the employees of the company, as a part of their routine work. The Court held that it was wholly immaterial whether such officer acts through a pen or a clerk controlled by him.

§ 378a. False Entries and False Reports Continued. One is guilty under this section for causing or procuring the making of false entries. Richardson vs. U. S., 181 Federal, 1. The concealment of facts necessary to enable the bookkeeper to make entries would not be a false entry by the officer so concealing. U. S. vs. McClarty, 191 Federal, 532. False reports made by a clerk under the direction of one of the persons mentioned in the statute is the same as though such person himself made the false report. Kettenbach vs. U. S., 202 Federal, 377.

§ 3786. Admission of Books.-The books of the national bank in which the offense is charged to have occurred are always admissable without proof that they were correctly kept. In other words, they are admitted in evidence after proof that they are such books. When, however, books of a bank not involved in the prosecution are sought to be introduced there must first be the proof that they were correctly kept, etc. Phillips vs. U. S., 201 Federal, 260.

$379. Other Cases.-In United States vs. Morse, 161 Federal, 429, the Court held that the subsequent return of the money was no defense to a prosecution for misapplication, such fact being only evidence to negative the officer's intent to defraud at the time of the alleged offense, and thus testimony could be introduced for jury purposes. In United States vs. Hillegass, 176 Federal, 444, will be found a copy of indictment for aiding and abetting under this statute.

See also Brown vs. United States, a prosecution for aiding and abetting, 142 Federal, page 2. In Walsh vs. United States, 174 Federal, 621, the defendant was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed while he was on bond. After the affirmance, the United States filed a motion to have him appear and show cause why his bail should not be set aside. The Court refused the petition, on the ground that no unusual reason was shown why he was not likely to remain within the jurisdiction pending a motion for re-hearing which he had made. In Walsh vs. United States, 174 Federal, 615, the Court held that it was misapplication for an officer of a national bank, who is also a promoter of various enterprises, to obtain the funds of the bank on the security of unmarketable bonds of his own enterprises at the risk of the interests of the bank. In that case, it was also determined on the same writ of error that a juror on a criminal case cannot afterwards impeach a verdict in which he joined.

In Woods vs. United States, 174 Federal, 651, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the wellestablished doctrine in a bank case applicable in all Federal criminal cases, that a general verdict and judgment on an indictment containing several counts, cannot be reversed on error, if one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment.

It has been held, of course, that a conspiracy to violate this section is indictable under Section 5440 of the old Code, Scott vs. United States, 130 Federal, 429.

For a definition of "moneys, funds, and credits," see United States vs. Smith, 152 Federal, 542, which holds, in substance, that the word "moneys" refers to the currency or circulating medium of the country; the word "funds" refers to Government, State, county, municipal, or other bonds, and to other forms of obligations and securities in which investments may be made; and the word "credits" refers to notes and bills payable to the bank, and other forms of direct promises to pay money to it.

In Thompson vs. United States, 159 Federal, 801, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approves an indictment against a cashier, which charged that that officer unlawfully "converted" certain moneys, funds, and credits to the use of another. The Court said:

"The word 'convert' has such force at Common Law that when used in an indictment with a statement as to whose use the conversion was made, it needs no amplification, any more than the word 'embezzle' or the words 'take, steal, and carry away' (citing the Jewett case, 100 Federal, 832). It is true that the word 'convert' is also awkward in the place where we find it here, but no objection was attempted on that ground, and its use, as used here, has been accepted by the Supreme Court in a like connection for the same purpose. Coffin vs. United States, 156 U. S., 432, 39 Law Ed., 481; same case, 162 U. S., 666, 40 Law Ed., 1109. The word 'convert' under the circumstances, must be accepted as intending exactly the same thing as when spoken in connection with the use of the person who was guilty of the conversion."

In the case of United States vs. Steinman, 172 Federal, 913, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that wilful misapplication of the funds of a national bank, in order to constitute an offense under this section, must be a wilful misapplication, for the use or benefit of the accused, or of some person or company other than the banking association, with intent to injure and defraud the association, or some other body, etc.; being entirely different from facts constituting unofficial maladministration, subjecting the bank to a forfeiture of its charter, and an unintentional overdraft by a depositor in good standing and possessing ample means to pay, or an overdraft to be paid pursuant to a prior agreement, resting on abundant credit, does not constitute misapplication.

In that case also, there was a count for aiding and abetting, and the Court held that in a prosecution for aiding and abetting the officers of a national bank to wilfully abstract the funds of the bank, by means of certain overdrafts, evidence that prior to the making of such overdrafts, it was agreed that the bank should furnish funds for the operations of certain corporations, in which the accused and the bank's president and cashier were officers, and that from time to time notes should be given by such corporations to take up the overdrafts, and that at the time of the advances the value of the corporations' property was more than three hundred thousand dollars, while the overdrafts aggregated only thirty thousand dollars, was admissible to show absence of criminal intent.

§ 380. The National Bankrupt Act, passed in 1898, in answer to a universal demand, and under the authority of the Constitution, has been amended twice by Congress in matters that do not relate to its criminal sections. Original Section 29 of the Bankrupt Act, which is the law today with reference to offenses against that Act, reads as follows:

"Sec. 29. a. A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use, embezzled, spent, or unlawfully transferred any property or secreted or destroyed any document belonging to a bankrupt estate which came into his charge as trustee.

"b. A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed two years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently (1) concealed while a bankrupt, or after his discharge, from his trustee any of the property belonging to his estate in bankruptcy; or (2) made a false oath or account in, or in relation to, any proceeding in bankruptcy; (3) presented under oath any false claim for proof against the estate of a bankrupt, or used any such claim in composition personally or by agent, proxy, or attorney, or an agent, proxy, or attorney; or (4) received any material amount of property from a bankrupt after the filing of the petition, with intent to defeat this act; or (5) extorted or attempted to extort any money or property from any person as a consideration for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings.

"c. A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, and forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon become vacant, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a case in which

he is directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchased, while a referee, directly or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy of which he is referee; or (3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit a reasonable opportunity for the inspection of the accounts relating to the affairs of, and the papers and records of, estates in his charge by parties in interest when directed by the court so to do.

"d. A person shall not be prosecuted for any offense arising under this act unless the indictment is found or the information is filed in court within one year after the commission of the offense."

Section a of the Act relates alone and exclusively to punishment of the trustee for having knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use, embezzled, or spent, or transferred, or secreted, or destroyed any of the property, or any document belonging to an estate which he administers as such officer of the Court.

A satisfactory indictment under this section must necessarily allege an adjudication, the time and date of the appointment of the trustee, and his qualification, and then set out specifically the property he is charged to have converted, destroyed, or transferred, as fully and specifically as if the offense was for larceny, with the exception that consent of the bankrupt is unnecessary, for the reason that the title vests in the trustee under the statute. The section includes not only an appropriation to the trustee's own use, but an unlawful transfer of the property for the use of another. It is true the word "unlawfully" as used with reference to the transfer would perhaps include some sort of a gain or motive beneficial, or supposedly beneficial, to the trustees. If, however, the proof showed a reckless disregard of his obligations and duties as trustee, in the way of wilful destruction or secretion of the property or documents of the estate, manifestly for the purpose of defeating a proper administration of the trust, a case would be made out under this section.

§ 381. Other Offenses of the Section.-Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, of sub-division b of Section 29, relate to offenses committed by the bankrupt. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of subdivision b of Section 29, create offenses that may be committed by persons who are not bankrupts. Section c of subdivision b of Section 29 relates to offenses by the referee in