cult to foresee situations in which approximately the same type of aircraft would be produced both here and abroad so as to permit the cost comparisons necessary in order to calculate the subsidy. For example, in the case of technological advances in the United States, how would the foreign cost of such an advance be computed? The aircraft industry is still relatively new and subject to constant change in its methods and costs of production, which vary widely from company to company and from country to country.

S. 2344 directs that in those cases where aircraft with similar plans and specifications have not been constructed abroad, the CAB shall estimate the foreign costs by use of a formula or formulas. It is our feeling that mathematically accurate costs and a differential subsidy determined by means of an arbitrary formula would be extremely difficult to justify.

Obviously, efforts could be made to profit from the experience of the Maritime Administration and Commission. Perhaps a more workable method could be devised to determine the proper size of the differential subsidy, or possibly the detailed formula approach could be discarded in favor of an arbitrary or simpler method which would produce the desired results. In any case, it appears that administrative costs might be high and that quite a large staff of supervisors, inspectors, and cost accounting personnel might be required.

PAYMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE FEATURES

S. 2344 provides that in addition to the construction-differential subsidy, the Board shall pay the cost of any features incorporated in flight equipment for national defense purposes. Presumably, this would include the cost of any changes made in the aircraft over and above commercial requirements, which are deemed necessary to make the aircraft suitable for economical and rapid conversion to military usage in time of war or emergency. However, the proposed legislation does not define such features.

We believe that considerable difficulty would be encountered in attempting to distinguish between national defense and commercial features in aircraft, because of the many national defense features which are inherent in any transport. For example, in the case of speed, where would the line be drawn between commercial and national defense needs?

In the maritime field, numerous difficulties have arisen in interpreting the national defense provisions of the Maritime Act because of the generality of the applicable language.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now hear from Charles F. Horne, Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES F. HORNE, ADMINISTRATOR OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HORNE. Mr. Chairman, I am Charles F. Horne, Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

Mr. Chairman, I am very gratified to appear here today to present the information on foreign jet transport aircraft which you require for your consideration of proposed additional prototype and construction subsidy legislation. You have indicated, Mr. Chairman, that you would be particularly interested in the report by the CAA foreign survey group, and other information about the availability of foreign jet transports, their cost of manufacture and operation, and their operating characteristics. First, then, let me introduce for the record the report entitled "Foreign Civil Transport Aircraft Development Progress," made for the Prototype Aircraft Advisory Committe of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very pleased to have that in our files. It is an excellent report. We have gone over it and we are finding that it is of great value to us.

Mr. HORNE. The group that went to Europe last year and wrote the report, found that British experience gave them an apparent 3

to 5-year advantage over the United States in the turbine-powered aircraft field at that time. British Overseas Airways Corp. now has in operation several jet-powered Comets on the route from London to Johannesburg, South Africa. More Comets will go into operation shortly, and possibly well before the end of this year they will be operating between New York and the British West Indies. The competitive impact of the British jets on United States-flag carriers is shown on this map. Heavy lines indicate routes on which the Comet will be operated by the British and others. Light lines show the routes of United States-flag carriers.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is quite apparent that the wisdom of many of the remarks by Senator McCarran is shown by this chart, and the definite competition that there will be between the British Comet and our own airlines. As you can see, sir, the routes are parallel and the competition will be very keen, just as Senator McCarran indicated. There are definite limitations on what can be done to hasten the development of competitive United States aircraft. At best, as a most optimistic estimate it would take a minimum of 3 years to get a United States manufactured jet transport ready for airline service; a realistic estimate would be 5 to 6 years. In addition to the basic design work-part of which has been completed by some of our major manufacturers-there must be extensive testing of the aircraft in connection with its airworthiness certification, functioning and reliability tests, and proving runs. Further, of course, the airline itself must become familiar with the aircraft, train crews, set up maintenance, et cetera. All of this takes time. In my opinion we are already overdue to conduct tests on certain existing types of jet aircraft to obtain design, operating, airway and airport data urgently needed by the Government to pave the way for safe and efficient use of these new aircraft.

In terms of legislation, the testing can be accomplished under the existing authority of Public Law 867, the Prototype Testing Act, which originated in this committee. No new legislation is required. We have a pending application for appropriations needed for this purpose. I sincerely hope we get these funds.

Other witnesses before this committee will testify more about the jet aircraft which the United States manufacturers can build. In order to assist you in determining how these aircraft would measure up against those now being built and developed abroad, I would like to supplement the findings given in the foreign survey group report with an over-all comparison of United States and foreign designs, and provide information on availability and costs.

We have shown in tables A and B-which are attached here and which I submit for such uses as you care to make of them--the principal characteristics and performance values on turbine-powered civil transports, both turbo-jet and turbo-prop powered. These figures, taken from available sources, are intended to provide an over-all general comparison. The rapid advances in airframe and powerplant design, the many unknown factors in the civil operation of turbine-powered transports, and the competitive aspects of transport manufacture, preclude accurate comparison at this time. Testimony by manufacturers, operators, and others will shed additional light

Of the jet transports listed, only the Comet I is in scheduled operation. I have here a picture of Comet I, three of them flying in formation, indicating, to some degree, the advances which the United Kingdom has made in the practical development and use of this type of transport. This Comet I has had the benefit of a well-planned and well-executed program of airworthiness and airline testing, under a wide variety of conditions, since the first flight in July 1949. The Comet II was first flown in February of this year, and probably will not go into scheduled operation until sometime in 1953.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Comet II radically changed from Comet I? Mr. HORNE. Not radically, sir, but very importantly changed in the great increase in its engine power and in its fuel capacity, so that it will have a much longer range and, therefore, be much more practical in operation for long hauls, for which it was primarily designed.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it have a greater carrying capacity, a greater pay load?

Mr. HORNE. About the same, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the weakness in the Comet, its pay load. Mr. HORNE. In my opinion, sir, that might prove to be one of its weaknesses in the future; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Forty percent less than the conventional pistonengine type plane.

Mr. HORNE. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And 40 percent is quite a lot of percentage.

Mr. HORNE. It certainly is, sir, when you measure it in dollars and passengers.