But are not many individuals and some races of men placed by the Creator "under unfavorable circumstances, at least under such as might be advantageously modified?" Surely these reviewers must be living in an ideal world, surrounded by "the faultless monsters which our world ne'er saw," in some elysium whero imperfection and distress were never heard of! Such arguments resemble some which we often hear against the Bible, holding that book responsible as if it origi nated certain facts on the shady side of human naturo or the apparently darker lines of Providential dealing, though the facts are facts of common observation and have to be confronted upon any theory.

The North American reviewer also has a world of his own-just such a one as an idealizing philosopher would be apt to devise-that is, full of sharp and absolute distinctions: such, for instance, as the "absolute invariableness of instinct; "an absolute want of intelligence in any brute animal; and a completo monopoly of instinct by the brute animals, so that this "instinct is a great matter" for them only, since it sharply and perfectly distinguishes this portion of organic Nature from the vegetable kingdom on the one hand and from man on the other: most convenient views for argumentative purposes, but we suppose not borne out in fact.

In their scientific objections the two reviewers tako somewhat different lines; but their philosophical and theological arguments strikingly coincide. They agree in emphatically asserting that Darwin's hypothesis of the origination of species through variation and natu ral selection “repudiates the whole doctrine of final

causes," and "all indication of design or purpose in the organic world. . . . is neither more nor less than a formal denial of any agency beyond that of a blind chance in the developing or perfecting of the organs or instincts of created beings. It is in vain that the apologists of this hypothesis might say that it merely attributes a different mode and time to the Divine agency-that all the qualities subsequently appearing in their descendants must have been implanted, and have remained latent in the original pair." Such a view, the Examiner declares, "is nowhere stated in this book, and would be, we are sure, disclaimed by the author."

We should like to be informed of the grounds of this sureness. The marked rejection of spontaneous generation-the statement of a belief that all animals have descended from four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number, or, perhaps, if constrained to it by analogy, "from some one primordial form into which life was first breathed "-coupled with the expression, "To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes," than "that each species has been independently created "-these and similar expressions lead us to suppose that the author probably does accept the kind of view which the Examiner is sure he would disclaim. At least, we charitably see nothing in his scientific theory to hinder his adop tion of Lord Bacon's "Confession of Faith" in this regard―

"That, notwithstanding God hath rested and ocasod from creating [in the sense of supernatural origination], yet, nevertheless, he doth accomplish and fulfill his divino will in all things, great and small, singular and general, as fully and exactly by providenco as ho could by miracle and new creation, though his working be not immediato and direct, but by compass; not violating Nature, which is his own law upon the

creature."

However that may be, it is undeniable that Mr. Darwin has purposely been silent upon the philosophi cal and theological applications of his theory. This reticence, under the circumstances, argues design, and raises inquiry as to the final cause or reason why. Here, as in higher instances, confident as we are that there is a final cause, we must not be over-confident that we can infer the particular or true one. Perhaps the author is more familiar with natural-historical than with philosophical inquiries, and, not having decided which particular theory about efficient cause is best founded, he meanwhile argues the scientific questions concerned-all that relates to secondary causes-upon purely scientific grounds, as he must do in any case. Perhaps, confident, as he evidently is, that his view will finally be adopted, he may enjoy a sort of satisfaction in hearing it denounced as sheer atheism by the inconsiderate, and afterward, when it takes its place with the nebular hypothesis and the like, see this judgment reversed, as we suppose it would be in such event.

Whatever Mr. Darwin's philosophy may be, or whether he has any, is a matter of no consequence at all, compared with the important questions, whether a theory to account for the origination and diversifi

cation of animal and vegetable forms through the operation of secondary causes docs or does not exclude design; and whether the establishment by adequate evidence of Darwin's particular theory of diversification through variation and natural selection would essentially alter the present scientific and philosophical grounds for theistic views of Nature. The unqualified aflirmative judgment rendered by the two Boston reviewers, evidently able and practised reasoners, “must give us pause." We hesitate to advance our conclusions in opposition to theirs. But, after full and serious consideration, we are constrained to say that, in our opinion, the adoption of a derivative hypothesis, and of Darwin's particular hypothesis, if we understand it, would leave the doctrines of final causes, utility, and special design, just where they were before. We do not pretend that the subject is not environed with difliculties. Every view is so environed; and every shifting of the view is likely, if it removes some difficulties, to bring others into prominence. But we cannot perceive that Darwin's theory brings in any new kind of scientific difficulty, that is, any with which philosophical naturalists were not already familiar.

Since natural science deals only with secondary or natural causes, the scientific terms of a theory of derivation of species—no less than of a theory of dynamics-must needs be the same to the theist as to the atheist. The difference appears only when the inquiry is carried up to the question of primary cause-a question which belongs to philosophy. Wherefore, Darwin's reticenco about efficient cause does not disturb us. He considers only the scientific questions. As

already stated, we think that a theistic view of Nature is implied in his book, and we must charitably refrain from suggesting the contrary until the contrary is logically deduced from his premises. If, however, he anywhere maintains that the natural causes through which species are diversified operate without an ordaining and directing intelligence, and that the orderly arrangements and admirable adaptations we see all around us are fortuitous or blind, undesigned results-that the eye, though it came to see, was not designed for seeing, nor the hand for handling-then, we suppose, ho is justly chargeable with denying, and very needlessly denying, all design in organic Nature; otherwise, wo suppose not. Why, if Darwin's well-known passago about the eye-equivocal though some of the langungo be-does not imply ordaining and directing intelligence, then he refutes his own theory as effectually ns any of his opponents are likely to do. He asks:

"May we not believe that [under variation proceeding long enough, generation multiplying the better variations times enough, and natural selection securing the improvements] a living optical instrument might be thus formed as superior to one of glass as tho works of the Creator are to those of man7"

This must mean one of two things: either that the living instrument was made and perfected under (which is the same thing as by) an intelligent First Cause, or that it was not. If it was, then theism is nsserted; and as to the mode of operation, how do we know, and why must wo believe, that, fitting precedent forms being in existence, a living instrument (so different

1 Page 188, English edition.