of about as carefully and skillfully as the unpluined biped does an eccaleobion.'

As to the real intelligence of the higher brutes, it has been ably defended by a far more competent observer, Mr. Agassiz, to whose conclusions wo yield a general assent, although we cannot quite place the best of dogs "in that respect upon a level with a considerable proportion of poor humanity," nor indulgo tho hope, or indeed the desire, of a renewed acquaintanco with the whole animal kingdom in a future life."

The assertion that acquired habitudes or instincts, and acquired structures, are not heritable, any breeder or good observer can refute.'

That "the human mind has become what it is out of a developed instinct," is a statement which Mr. Darwin nowhere makes, and, wo presume, would not accept. That he would have us believe that individ

1 Vide Edinburgh Review for January, 1860, article on “Acclima tization," etc.

"Contributions, Essay on Classification," etc., vol. I., pp. 60–66. Still stronger assertions have recently been hazarded—even that heritability is of species only, not of individual characteristics— strangely overlooking the fundamental peculiarity of plants and ani mals, which is that they reproduce, and that the species is continued as such only because individuals reproduce their like.

It has also been urged that variation is never cumulative. If this means that varieties are not capable of furtlier variation, it is not borno out by observation. For cultivators and breeders well know that the main difficulty is to initiate a variation, and that new varieties are par. ticularly prone to vary more.

North American Review, April, 1860, p. 475.

No doubt he would equally distinguish in kind between inafinet (which physiologically is best conceived of as congenital habit, so that habits when inherited become Instincts, just as varieties becomo fixod

ual animals acquire their instincts gradually,' is a statement which must have been penned in inadvertence both of the very definition of instinct, and of everything we know of in Mr. Darwin's book.

It has been attempted to destroy the very foundation of Darwin's hypothesis by denying that there are any wild varieties, to speak of, for natural selection to operate upon. We cannot gravely sit down to prove that wild varieties abound. We should think it just as necessary to prove that snow falls in winter. That variation among plants cannot be largely due to hy

into races) and intelligence; but would maintain that both are endow. ments of the higher brutes and of man, however vastly and unequal their degree, and with whatever superaddition to simple intelligence in the latter.

[Prof. Joseph Le Conte, in Porular Science MontILY, September, 1875, refers to his definition of instinct as "inherited experience," published in April, 1871, as having been anticipated by that of Hering, us" inherited memory," in February of the same year. Doubtless the idea has been expressed by others long before us.]

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To allow that "brutes have certain mental endowments in common with men,".... desires, affections, memory, simple imagination or the power of reproducing the sensible past in mental pictures, and even Judgment of the simple or intuitive kind”—that "they compare and judge" (“Memoirs of American Academy," vol. viii., p. 118)—is to concede that the intellect of brutes really acts, so far as we know, like human intellect, as far it goes; for the philosophical logicians tell us all reasoning is reducible to a series of simple judgments. And Aris totle declares that even reminiscence-which is, we suppose, “reproducing the sensible past in mental pictures "—is a sort of reasoning (τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις).

On the other hand, Mr. Darwin's expectation that "psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation," seems to come from a school of philosophy with which we have no sympathy.

American Journal of Science, July, 1860, p. 148.

bridism, and that their variation in Naturo is not cssentially different from much that occurs in domestication, and, in the long-run, probably hardly less in amount, we could show if our space permitted.

As to the sterility of hybrids, that can no longer bo insisted upon as absolutely true, nor bo practically used as a test between species and varieties, unless wo allow that hares and rabbits are of one species. That such sterility, whether total or partial, subserves a purpose in keeping species apart, and was so designed, wo do not doubt. But the critics fail to perceive that this sterility proves nothing whatever against the derivative origin of the actual species; for it may as well have been intended to keep separate those forms which have reached a certain amount of divergence, as those which were always thus distinct.

The argument for the permanence of species, drawn from the identity with those now living of cats, birds, and other animals preserved in Egyptian catacombs, was good enough as used by Cuvier against St.-Ililaire, that is, against the supposition that time brings about a gradual alteration of whole species; but it goes for little against Darwin, unless it be proved that species never vary, or that the perpetuation of a variety necessitates the extinction of the parent breed. For Darwin clearly maintains-what the facts warrant -that the mass of a species remains fixed so long as it exists at all, though it may set off a variety now and then. The variety may finally supersede the parent forin, or it may coexist with it; yet it does not in the least hinder the unvaried stock from continuing truo to the breed, unless it crosses with it. The common

law of inheritance may be expected to keep both the original and the variety mainly true as long as they last, and none the loss so because they have given rise to ocensional varieties. The tailless Manx cats, like the curtailed fox in the fable, have not induced the nor mal breeds to dispense with their tails, nor have the Dorkings (apparently known to Pliny) affected the permanence of the common sort of fowl.

As to the objection that the lower forms of life ought, on Darwin's theory, to have been long ago improved out of existence, and replaced by higher forms, the objectors forget what a vacuum that would leave below, and what a vast field there is to which a simple organization is best adapted, and where an advance would be no improvement, but the contrary. To accumulate the greatest amount of being upon a given space, and to provide as much enjoyment of life as can be under the conditions, is what Nature seems to aim at; and this is effected by diversification.

Finally, we advise nobody to accept Darwin's or any other derivative theory as true. The time has not come for that, and perhaps never will. We also advise against a simular credulity on the other side, in a blind faith that species-that the manifold sorts and forms of existing animals and vegetables-"have no secondary cause." The contrary is already not unlikely, and we suppose will hereafter become more and more probable. But we are confident that, if a derivative hypothesis ever is established, it will be so on a solid theistic ground.

Meanwhile an inevitable and legitimate hypothesis is on trial-an hypothesis thus far not untenable-a

trial just now very useful to scionco, and, we conclude, not harmful to religion, unless injudicious assailants temporarily make it so.

One good effect is already manifest; its enabling the advocates of the hypothesis of a multiplicity of human species to perceive the double insecurity of their ground. When the races of men aro admitted to be of one species, the corollary, that they are of one origin, may be expected to follow. Those who allow them to be of one species must admit an actual diversification into strongly-marked and persistent varieties, and so admit the basis of fact upon which the Darwinian hypothesis is built; while those, on the other hand, who recognize several or numerous human species, will hardly be able to maintain that such species were primordial and supernatural in the ordinary sense of

the word.

The English mind is prone to positivism and kindred forms of materialistic philosophy, and wo must expect the derivative theory to be taken up in that interest. We have no predilection for that school, but the contrary. If we had, we might have looked com placently upon a line of criticism which would indirectly, but effectively, play into the hands of positivists and materialistic atheists generally. The wiser and stronger ground to take is, that the derivative hypothesis leaves the argument for design, and therefore for a designer, as valid as it ever was; that to do any work by an instrument must require, and therefore presuppose, the exertion rather of more than of less power than to do it directly; that whoever would be a consistent theist should believe that Design in the natural