member could not withdraw at any time more than one-half the monthly receipts. The Court said:

"Where a party becomes a member of a Building and Loan Association, he is bound to take notice, not only of his certificate of membership, but also of the Articles of Association and existing by-laws, and the laws of the State where the Association is incorporated, and conducts its business; and the making and adopting of reasonable by-laws, being sanctioned by the laws of the State, and the alteration and amendment of existing by-laws being authorized by the Articles and by-laws, when respondent became a member he accepted the membership with notice of such powers and became subject to such amendments as might be made during his membership, which were reasonable-not an infringement on vested rights, or a violation of the charter or statute."

If the member is bound by amendments which affect his contract, where he makes no promise to comply with any law, rule or requirement, much more is he bound by an express promise to comply with all laws, rules and requirements while a member of the order, to be bound by future enacted laws.

In Pain vs. Societe St. Jeane Baptiste, 52 N. E. 502 (Mass.) the Court held that:

"While a member of a beneficial Association was receiving sick benefits under an existing by-law, an amendment was adopted whereby such benefits were reduced. The by-law in existence when such member joined the Association and under which he contracted, provided for their amendment. Held, that as the right of such members to receive benefits was subject to change, it was not violative of vested rights to make the change at any time." (First paragraph of Syllabus.)

In the opinion the Court says: "The power to amend the bylaws is reserved and there is no limit to the reservation." Miller case the constitution provided at date of his membership that "The National Council of the Knights and Ladies of Security shall alone have the power to amend the Constitution, ritual, laws and rules of discipline of the order, and it shall exercise all the powers of a supreme body of Associations similar to this."

As in the Massachusetts case, so here: there is no limit upon the reserved power to amend. Nay, more: the reservation of power

is of "all of the power of a supreme body of Associations similar to this."

We cited and quoted largely from the opinion in the case of Messer et al. vs. A. O. U. W. 62 N. E. (Mass.) 252, which case was identical with the Miller case, first, in the language of the beneficiary certificate, second, in the provisions of the law of the Society, for amending its laws, and third, in legislation changing from a level rate to an increased classified rate of assessment.

In the opinion the Massachusetts Supreme Court says:

etc., and the subsequent 1898, C. 478, which conto a kind of insurance

"The plaintiffs contend that their certificates of membership constitute a contract that cannot be affected by the recent legislation, or by changes in by-laws, whereby they are to pay classified rates for death benefits. But these certificates are silent in regard to the rates to be paid. They give all the rights and privileges of membership, with a right to participate in the beneficiary fund to the amount of $2,000, to be paid at death. This is on condition that the member complies with 'all the laws, rules and requirements of the order.' The plaintiffs contend that Public St., C. 115, Sec. 8, which authorizes such a corporation to provide in its by-laws, for the payment by each member, of a a fixed sum, statutes, prior to the statutes of tained similar language, looked upon the level assessment plan, in which the assessments to be paid by members are all alike, without reference to their age. They also rely upon the provision for the payment of a fixed rate, in the general laws, originally adopted by the corporation. If we assume without deciding that this contention is correct, this mode of making assessments for the future is simply a detail in the management of the business of the Order, which the lodge might at any time permit to be changed. The certificate holders are members of a fraternal beneficiary Association, which may, from time to time, amend its by-laws and change its method of doing business, as the members determine for the common good. By the express terms of the certificates, the members are to be bound by changes in the by-laws that may be made from time to time. The Legislature might change the statutes affecting such companies, and the companies might, in like manner, change the by-laws, under this power expressly reserved. The case is fully covered by the decisions in Pain vs. Societe, 172

Mass. 319, and Fullenwider vs. The Royal League, 180 Ill. 621." Very much to our gratification the Supreme Court of Kansas, after the second hearing of the Miller case, took our view, both of the mutual relations of the members of Fraternal Benefit Societies, and the law as to the power of such Societies to bind their members by “after enacted" laws. These relations and powers are clearly set forth in the concluding paragraphs of the opinion as follows:

"The by-laws in existence when plaintiff became a member conferred upon the National Council the power to amend its constitution, and also provided that its decisions on all matters pertaining to the Order should be final. The plaintiff, knowing that this power was vested in the National Council, made application to become a member, in which application he agreed, if accepted as a member of the Order, to faithfully abide by all its rules and regulations. He was accepted on the conditions expressed in his certificate of membership, one of which is: "This certificate was issued upon the express condition that the said insured shall, in every particular, while a member of the Order, comply with all the laws, rules and requirements thereof, and shall, at his death, be a member in good standing of said Order.'

"This Association was organized for the mutual benefit and support of its members. It has no capital except what is paid by members for the mutual benefit of all in case of sickness, or their beneficiaries in case of death. It was not organized for profit, but to furnish a cheap rate of insurance for its members. The contractual relation between the members of such Association and the Association should not be measured by the same standard or determined by the same legal principle applicable between an ordinary insurance company and the holder of one of its policies. The insured are members of the Association, each has a voice in all proceedings pertaining to the business or general welfare of the Association, and in some ways it resembles a partnership. All money collected by its scheme of assessment is the common property of the members, to be paid out in such amounts and to such persons as are designated by the member in his certificate upon the happening of a certain event. For the purpose of better carrying out the scheme a National Council was created, upon which was conferred the power to decide all

matters pertaining to the Order, and it was provided that its decisions were final."

"The condition in plaintiff's certificate that he would in every particular, while a member of the Order, comply with all the laws, rules and requirements of the Association, was not only a consent on his part that he would comply with the laws then in force, but it was a consent that he would abide and comply with all reasonable rules and regulations thereafter made in the interest of the association. Every person joining an Association obligates himself, without so expressing it, to conform to and comply with all the existing laws of the Association, and if the provision in the plaintiff's certificate means anything, it means that he agreed to comply with all laws then in force or subsequently enacted by the National Council."

The foregoing decision is far reaching in its results. The Messer case from Massachusetts and the Miller case from Kansas will be leading cases in defining the mutual relations between members of our Societies and establishing and emphasizing the power of our Societies to bind the members by any and all reasonable legislation for the general good of the greatest number.*

*For an excellent discussion of the subject of Judge Huron's paper and large collection of authorities thereon, see 1 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance 703. See also as to after enacted Suicide By-law, Dornes vs. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 75, Miss. 466, 23 So. 191, Lloyd vs. Supreme Lodge K. of P. 107, Fed. 70, 46 C. C. A. 153 and also reported in 98 Fed. 66, 38 C. C. A. 654, Miller vs. Knights and Ladies of Security, 76, Pac. 830.-Editor.

THE BINDING EFFECT ON EXISTING CONTRACTS OF AFTERENACTED BY-LAWS.

An address by Mr. Laurence G. Goodhart, New York, N. Y., read before the Law Section at its meeting held in Chicago, in Feb

ruary, 1904. (Mr. Goodhart died June 30th, 1907.)

Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Law Section:

In a discussion before the Commission which has been sitting in the Empire City, to devise means for the relief of our Court Dockets and which has just concluded its work, it was significantly remarked that the First Judicial Department of the State of New York (which is co-terminus with the County of New York, and but a fraction of the City of New York) deals with more litigation, both in the number of causes and the financial interests involved in one term than does the Judiciary of the remainder of the State in a whole year.

For the same reason, apparently, a greater number of suits involving the very important question with which this paper deals, has been brought and decided in New York State than in the whole country outside of it. Not, please understand, in the Court of "ultimate conjecture," but in the Courts of Nisi Prius.

The suits, so far as they have been instituted, practically cover about every form in which the question here dealt with could possibly arise, and about every form of remedy and relief to which the litigants conceive themselves entitled. It is probably for that reason that I have been honored with your courteous invitation to address you upon a matter which, I take it, is of some importance to this gathering. The question to which I shall ask your attention may be stated as follows:

"What, if any, power has a Fraternal Society to reduce the amount of the benefits, payable under certificates, by by-laws enacted subsequently to the initiation of a member?"

The subject of this address has been somewhat paraphrased for reasons which will later more fully appear. I have said that this