flict. Moral and religious convictions are | weaken, by such statements as he made at more sensitive, because more vital clements Belfast. Still, he was there, to a certain in our organisation than opinions and be- extent, on his own ground. Nominally, if liefs on other subjects, and a man who goes not actually, he was addressing a Society of beyond his province, while also transcending Philosophers; and if it was for once agreethe bounds of his knowledge, for the pur- able to them to leave the terrestrial regions pose of undermining such convictions, may of philosophy, and pass into the superlunary inflict irreparable injury upon individuals, realms of metaphysics, it was for them, and, at all events, commits a grave offence more than for the public at large, to remonagainst society. These cautions, we regret to say, are prompted by no imaginary danger, and are suggested by no insignificant name. Professor Tyndall has justly attained an honourable place among those who combine the two offices just mentioned; and though not greatly distinguished for original researches in the fields of Natural Science, he possesses a conspicuous capacity for expounding the results of scientific discoveries to popular audiences. In experiment, in illustration, in lucid exposition, he is among Lecturers of the present day unsurpassed, if not unrivalled; and he has thus won, in an unusual degree, the ear of the public. He is not only a welcome Lecturer, alike to adults and to children, at the Royal Institution, but he is sure of a large and attentive audience in any town in the kingdom. There are few men, in fact, who have done more to render scientific truth familiar to the public at large; and the obligations under which he has thus placed his countrymen will always be gratefully acknowledged. But for this reason it is the less possible to avoid raising a protest when he misuses his position, and thus sets an example which might become a dangerous and mischievous precedent. More than once, in recent years, Professor Tyndall had severely tried the patience, not merely of the public, but of a large number of his scientific brethren, by the rashness with which he had intruded his speculations into regions far beyond those which are properly the province of the Professor of Natural Science. He had discoursed on the office of the Imagination in Science, and had shown that his practice improved upon his preaching. At Belfast, as President of the British Association, he had transcended all the limits of time and space, and had declared that with the retrospective glance of genius he discerned in Matter the promise and the potency of all existence. But the public are well aware that the capacity to do good work is often associated with an inordinate sense of its importance, and they are always very tolerant of an able man who is riding his hobby too hard. Professor Tyndall did no good to the cause of Science, and he strengthened the very cause he desired to strate. But the case, we submit, is different when Professor Tyndall appears distinctly in the capacity of Lecturer to a popular audience. He is then simply in the position of a public teacher, and he shares a teacher's responsibilities. His audience is not supposed to be qualified, as at the British Association, to test his suggestions and make allowance for his speculations. They come as learners, and submit themselves for an hour to his guidance. It is surely a Lecturer's duty, under such circumstances, to restrict himself to the elucidation of truths which he knows to be conclusively established, which are within the range of his own scientific knowledge, and in respect to which he may be sure that he cannot well be misleading his hearers. Common modesty and common courtesy should prevent him from intruding into other fields and disparaging the authority of other teachers. Above all, when his speculations, whatever may be their value, affect the highest problems of life and the very foundations of conduct, he ought scrupulously to abstain from throwing them broadcast before an audience which he may unsettle on such matters, but which he cannot guide. We are compelled, however, plainly to express our conviction that, in the Address which is named at the head of this article, Professor Tyndall has most seriously offended against these obligations. He appears to us, indeed-and we shall call as a witness in support of our complaint one of the most distinguished men of Science in Europe-to have violated the obligations of a man of Science no less than of a popular Lecturer. There is no greater offence against the true spirit of Science than to announce and to assume as a demonstrated truth that which is only a probable opinion; and this is equally true, no matter what the degree of the apparent probability. For a distinguished philosopher to employ his authority in such a manner is either a damaging error of judgment or it is a betrayal of trust. Professor Tyndall, as we shall see, has placed himself between these alternatives. But he has gone further; and on a popular occasion, when he was invited as an instructor and a guide, he has employed his influ ence, and the credit of Science itself, to in- | substance it appears an unexceptionable sinuate doubts respecting one of the pri- statement of facts of physical Science: mary truths of Morality, and respecting the elementary principles of the Christian Religion. It appears to us that such an offence, alike in the interests of Science and of Morality, deserves a prompt exposure and a severe reprobation. The Address in question was delivered on the first of October last, before the Birmingham and Midland Institute. It is entitled Science and Man;' and it raises, without pretending to solve, that which is perhaps the most difficult problem which scientific thought has yet suggested to us. The first part of the Address is occupied with various illustrations of the great doctrine known as the Conservation of Energy. This doctrine was essentially involved in Newton's law, that Action and Reaction are equal and opposite; but in the present day the discovery of the interchangeableness of natural forces of their interchangeableness, moreover, in definite proportions -has thrown a new illumination over the whole field of natural science. It was known, of course, long ago that a cannonball, if suddenly checked in its course by a target, produced heat. But the cardinal discovery of late years consists in the establishment of a fixed relation between the velocity and the mass on the one hand, and the heat generated on the other. We are now justified in assuming, as a general rule, that every physical force which disappears in one form reappears, or becomes only latent, in another. It is a familiar saying with respect to Matter, that none of it is destroyed, but that whatever seems to disappear, like fuel, in the operations of nature, is but reproduced in another shape. It is a precisely similar principle which has now been extended from Matter to the Forces which act upon Matter; and it has become a cardinal principle of modern Science, a starting-point for new investigations and a basis of calculation, that whatever force is lost in one form is developed in another, so that if a force seems to have disappeared, it becomes a duty to attempt to discover its hiding-place. We need not follow Dr. Tyndall in the various instances he gives of the operation of this natural law. He is here on his own ground, and we are glad to listen to him without reserve. Nor need we, at least for the purposes of our argument, hesitate to submit ourselves to his guidance in applying the same law to the physical relations of the human frame. There is one phrase in the following extract to which objection may be taken; but in 'No engine, however subtly devised, can evade this law of equivalence, or perform on its own account the smallest modicum of work. The machine distributes, but it cannot create. Is the animal body, then, to be classed among machines? When I lift a weight, or throw a stone, or climb a mounconscious of actually creating and expending tain, or wrestle with my comrade, am I not force? Let us look to the antecedents of this force. The blood and We derive the muscle and fat of our bodies from what we eat. Animal heat you know to be due to the slow combustion of this fuel. My arm is now inactive, and the ordinary slow combustion of my blood and tissue is going on. For every grain of of heat has been produced. I now contract fuel thus burnt a perfectly definite amount my biceps muscle without causing it to perform external work. The combustion is quickened, and the heat is increased; this additional heat being liberated in the muscle itself. I lay hold of a 56 lb. weight, and by the contraction of my biceps lift it through tissue consumed during this contraction have the vertical space of a foot. not developed in the muscle their due amount of heat. A quantity of heat is at this moment missing in my muscle which would raise the temperature of an ounce of water somewhat more than one degree Fahrenheit. I liberate the weight: it falls to the earth, and by its collision generates the precise amount of heat missing in the muscle. My muscular heat is thus transferred from its local hearth to external space. The fuel is consumed in my body, but the heat of combustion is produced outside my body. The case is substantially the same as that of the Voltaic battery when it performs external work, or produces external heat. All this employ in muscular exertion is the force of points to the conclusion that the force we burning fuel and not of creative will. In the light of these facts the body is seen to be as incapable of generating energy without expenditure, as the solids and liquids of the Voltaic battery. The body, in other words, falls into the category of machines.' The phrase to which we object in this extract is the gratuitous interpolation—' not of creative will '-by which the lecturer indicates and misrepresents the moral principle he is about to assail. At this point we begin to pass from the positive to the negative side of Professor Tyndall's Address, and for the remainder, and the greater part of it, he is chiefly occupied not in the positive exposition of physical science, but in the negative criticism of received truths of morality and religion. We by no means say that the Professor's attack is conducted with deliberate intention, and he is welcome to the benefit of whatever excuse he may derive from being evidently ill-acquainted | Lange, of the manner in which all the funcwith the principles and beliefs on which he tions of the mind and body may be set in is throwing disrespect; though it may be a motion by the slightest conceivable impulse question whether this thoughtlessness on upon the nerves. A merchant sitting at such a subject be not an aggravation of the ease has a telegram delivered to him anoffence. But there can be no doubt, as we nouncing the failure of some firm with have said, that the view thus presented by which he 'is in correspondence. Instantly physical Science respecting the action of he starts from his chair, orders his carriage, our bodily organism exhibits anew, and in drives to the Bank, sends telegrams and what is in some measure a fresh aspect, the writes letters, and then drives home. This old problem how the free will of man and complex mass of action, emotional, intellecthe distinct existence of the human soul are thal, and mechanical, is evoked by the imto be reconciled with the regular course and pact upon the retina of the infinitesimal constitution of nature. The problem, we waves of light coming from a few pencil. repeat, is an old one, and has occupied marks on a bit of paper.' The impulse great reasoners from time immemorial. It which set in motion all this display of force has presented itself sometimes in a purely came from the centre of the nervous systheological form, in the attempt to bring tem. But how did it originate there? Prothe theory of predestination and the facts fessor Tyndall supposes two answers, which of the human will and consciousness within he treats as mutually exclusive. Some perthe grasp of a logical system. But this an- sons, he says, would reply, the human cient problem acquires no doubt a novel soul.' But he proceeds to argue that this is to and more vivid shape under the influence of attempt to explain what is known by what the physical law of the conservation of is unknown. We cannot mentally visualize energy.' So far as that law applies to the the soul as an entity distinct from the body,' case-and it would be rash to assume that and the use of the very term 'Soul' is it applies without reserve or qualification therefore unscientific. From the side of every exertion of force within the body, Science, all that we are warranted in stating whether of brain, of muscle, or of nerve, is that the terror, hope, sensation, and calmust have had a physical antecedent, and culation of Lange's merchant are physical must have a physical consequent. All these phenomena produced by, or associated with, are linked together by mutual action and the molecular processes set up by waves of re-action, and the question arises whether light in a previously prepared brain.' But there remains any room for the interposi- even Professor Tyndall feels compelled to tion of the independent energy of the con- take notice of one fact, which is outside the sciousness and of the will. Contemplating range of his physical observation. He canthe body from the physical side exclusively, not but recognise that the merchant's exciteman would be thus reduced to the condi- ment is accompanied by consciousness, and tion of a mere animal machine, and a phi- he puts the question how this arises. 'What,' losopher who confines himself to this view he asks, is the causal connection, if any, may be tempted to doubt whether the ven- between the objective and the subjectiveerable conceptions of the existence of the between molecular motions and states of soul and of the freedom of the will are not consciousness? My answer is: I do not in some way illusive. If, however, he be a see the connection, nor have I as yet met man of ordinary wisdom, not to say mod- anybody who does.' We are here, he says, esty, he does not fail to reflect at once that upon the boundary line of the intellect it would be the rashest speculation thus to 'where the ordinary canons of Science fail confine himself to one aspect of so great a to extricate us from our difficulties.' If we mystery as human nature. He cannot fail are true to these canons, we must, he mainto recognise that the moral life of mankind, tains, deny to subjective phenomena all intheir loftiest hopes and their most perma- fience on physical processes. Observation, nent efforts, have been bound up with his he admits, proves that they interact, but in belief in the existence of the Soul and in passing from one to the other we meet a Free Will; and however he may be forced blank which mechanical deduction' is unto meditate on the difficulty himself, he re- able to fill. Frankly stated, we have here serves it for silent and mature consideration, to deal with facts almost as difficult to be or for grave discussion in learned society. seized mentally as the idea of a soul. And if you are content to make your "soul" a poetic rendering of a phenomenon which refuses the yoke of ordinary physical laws, I, for one, would not object to this exercise of ideality." But Dr. Tyndall is not restrained by any such scruples, and he launches at once into the great problem of the nature of the human soul and of the human will. He repeats the well-known illustration, given by ory. If we are true,' he says, ' to physical canons '-that is to say if we exclude all other canons whatever-we must deny to subjective phenomena all influence on physical processes;' and yet, as he adds, in the very next sentence :-'observation proves that they interact.' It is not often that a writer claiming to be scientific asserts in one sentence a principle which he admits in the next to be contrary to observation. But even more surprising is the presumption of the Professor's final concession. "If‚' he condescendingly says, 'you are content to make your "soul" a poetic rendering of a phenomenon which refuses the yoke of ordinary physical laws, I, for one, would not object to this exercise of ideality.' That is to say, if we are content to limit our conception of our souls to that negative aspect of them which may be afforded by physical Science, Professor Tyndall will graciously permit us to talk about them. We are to assume that all our knowledge of human nature is limited by the discoveries of the Professor and his friends, and we are to remodel our modes of speech accordingly; but if we will humbly submit our vocabulary to their interpretation, one of these philoso It is difficult to say whether the incoherence or the presumption of this argument is the more surprising. Professor Tyndall, on the basis of a certain physical law, ridicules the notion that the hypothesis of a human soul affords any explanation of his typical merchant's movements. It is treated by him as equally obsolete with another notion, at which he also casts occasional sneers throughout this Address. 'On the same ground,' he says, the anthropomorphic notion of a creative architect, endowed with manlike powers of indefinite magnitude, is to be regarded with consideration. It marks a phase of theoretic activity which the human race could not escape, and our present objection to such a notion rests upon its incongruity with our knowledge.' But having thus pushed aside as unscientific the idea of a human soul, Professor Tyndall is immediately compelled to admit that there are facts of human consciousness which are totally unaccounted for by the physical laws on which he has been insisting. Frankly stated, we have to deal here with facts almost as difficult to be seized mentally as the idea of a soul.' In other words, he acknowledges that in the instance of the merchant something oc-phers, at all events, will consent to our using curs which he does not understand, and he nevertheless persists in assuming that the only things to be considered in accounting for the merchant's action are those which he does understand. If, as he says, the production of motion by consciousness is unpresentable to the mind,' how does he know in what manner or degree this unknown element of consciousness-in other words, of the soul-may determine the merchant's action? Professor Tyndall affords a new and striking repetition of Don Quixote's treatment of his helmet. Instead of a complete helmet, the knight found he possessed only a single headpiece. However, his industry supplied that defect, for with some pasteboard he made a kind of half beaver or vizor, which, being fitted to the headpiece, made it look like an entire helmet.' But with the very first stroke this imperfect helmet fell to pieces. The knight was disconcerted, but again patched it up so artificially that at last he had reason to be satisfied with the solidity of the work, and so, without any further experiment, he resolved it should pass, to all intents and purposes, for a full and sufficient helmet.' Professor Tyndall, however, is even less scientific. He finds an enormous gap in his theory which he avows his inability to fill up, even artificially; but nevertheless he resolves that it shall pass, to ali intents and purposes, for a full and sufficient the 6 the immemorial language of civilised mankind! We are sometimes disposed to apprehend that the sense of humour is dying out of our generation. There is something portentous in the solemnity of our leading magazines, presenting as they do, month by month, some new solution of the problem of the universe on Comtist, or mathematical, or physical principles, and each new discoverer appearing more serious than the last. We long for half an hour of Swift or Pope to afford us a hearty laugh at all this solemn impertinence. But Pope's own Goddess of Dulness must have established her empire over the Midland Institute if they were not sensible of the humorous incongruity of the attitude assumed by their Lecturer. Professor Tyndall, on a platform at Birmingham, condescending, for one,' to allow the human race to talk about their souls, affords a picture which is not surpassed in the Dunciad.' But if it be necessary in these ungenial days to treat with seriousness such an amusing exhibition of unconscious vanity, it is only necessary to remind the reader for a moment of all that Professor Tyndall neglects in this crude definition. Men have learned to talk about their souls, not because in the explanation of life on physical principles they found themselves unable to account for the emergence of consciousness,' but because they have in all ages been sensible of high moral 6 6 and spiritual faculties which seemed to re- | thought it untrue, but he did not fear its veal to them the permanent realities of practical consequences. He showed, on the their existence. Content to make your contrary, in the "Analogy," that, as far as "soul" a poetic rendering of a phenomenon human conduct is concerned, the two theowhich refuses the yoke of ordinary physical ries of free will and necessity come to the laws! It is language only worthy of a same in the end.' A more complete misman whose soul is not above the level of a representation of Bishop Butler's argument laboratory, and is unworthy of any man in could hardly have been offered; and this Professor Tyndall's position. The Soul' misapprehension affords a fair measure of is the rendering, whether poetic or not, of Professor Tyndall's qualifications for disthose lofty faculties which are the organs cussing such a question. In Butler's chapof truth, of beauty, of goodness; which are ter on the opinion of Necessity considered the home of faith, of hope and of love; in as influencing practice,' he is throughout, which the aspiration and the conviction of for the sake of the argument, tolerating an immortality are enshrined, and which are assumption which he at the same time recapable of trampling upon all physical sen- fuses to admit. His argument is summed sations, whether of pleasure or of pain. up at the conclusion of the chapter. That Collect the passages in literature, sacred or which he maintains is, that a Necessity, profane, in which the word Soul' is used, supposed possible, and reconcilable with the and you will have collected a treasury of constitution of things,' does in no sort dethe loftiest emotions and the noblest stroy the proof of future retribution. In thoughts which have animated human na- other words, he says it is unnecessary for ture. In the presence of such recollections, his purpose to discuss the question whether we refrain from characterising as it deserves the opinion of Necessity be true or not. If the request that we should be content to it be true, it is at all events consistent with treat the soul as the poetic rendering of a a state of things under which men are punphenomenon which is not intelligible to ished and rewarded for their actions in the Professor Tyndall. natural course of events. But if it be consistent with an existing state of rewards and punishments, it is also consistent with a future state, and therefore cannot overthrow the revealed doctrine on this subject. says Butler, Necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned,'—that is, of its being possible and reconcilable with the constitution of things-if, upon this supposition it doth not destroy the proof of Natural Religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of Revealed.' But he immediately proceeds to denounce such suppositions as absurd and pernicious. From these things,' he concludes:— · If, But the Professor having confessed that his physical science is completely at fault before the phenomenon of human consciousness, and having been thus compelled to tolerate the use of a word which is a standing protest against his exclusive theories, proceeds, nevertheless, to apply his physical standard of measurement to the profoundest problem of life. 'We now,' he says-unconscious that these admissions have in the least disqualified him-stand face to face with the final problem. It is this: Are the brain, and the moral and intellectual processes known to be associated with the brain-and as far as our experiWe may likewise learn in what sense to ence goes, indissolubly associated-subject understand that general assertion, that the to the laws which we find paramount in opinion of Necessity is essentially destructive physical nature? Is the will of man, in of all religion. First, in a practical sense, other words, free, or are it and nature that by this notion atheistical men pretend to equally "bound fast in fate "?" On the satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and answer to this question depend, as any justify to others their disregard to all religion. person possessing a competent acquaint- And secondly, in the strictest sense, that it is ance with the subject and with history Nature, and to what we may every moment exa contradiction to the whole constitution of is aware, religious, moral and social issues perience in ourselves, and so overturns everyof the highest practical moment. Pro-thing. But by no means is this assertion to fessor Tyndall, indeed, endeavours to put aside the consideration of these momentous issues by sheltering himself under the authority of Bishop Butler. The question of moral responsibility, he allows, here emerges, and it is the possible loosening of this responsibility that so many of us dread.' But he urges that the notion of necessity certainly failed to frighten Bishop Butler. He be understood as if Necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things and with what we experience, were not also reconcilable with Religion, for upon this supposition it demonstrably is so.' Professor Tyndall has treated Bishop Butler as he has treated Nature, and has confined his attention to those parts of him which fell in with his own notions, however |