adopted as the basis of their inquiry are obtained from the returns furnished by the companies to the Board of Trade, the accuracy of which, especially so far as railway employés are concerned, has been very seriously questioned.* But, as the Commissioners remark, the numbers given of deaths are probably more accurate and reliable than those under the head of injured.'t We shall confine ourselves, therefore, to the case of accidents which have proved fatal to the sufferers.

It appears, then, from these returns, that during the four years from 1872 to 1875 as many as 5231 persons lost their lives, under various circumstances, in connection with the working of the railways of the United Kingdom. These are the figures with which we are confronted upon the showing of the companies themselves; and, not forgetting the vastness of our railway system, it must be owned that they are startling. It is true, the Report of the Commissioners goes on to state, that if the cases of railway servants be eliminated, the number of the slain will be only 2271, and that of these 2271 deaths, only 632 were of persons using the railway as passengers; and of this number, only 155 are attributed to causes entirely beyond the control of the sufferers.' But here again comes in the element of uncertainty attaching to these statistics. As one of the Commissioners, Mr. Galt, has pointed out in his valuable observations appended to the Report, there are many cases in which, though there may be slight contributory negligence on the part of travellers, there is also gross and palpable neglect of proper precautions and safeguards upon the part of the companies-a fact which is ignored in the preparation of their returns, where such cases are classed among those of 'passengers killed from their own misconduct or want of caution.' § Taking, however, the figures as we find them, we have to consider whether this loss of life, with the vast amount of physical injury short of death accompanying it, is a necessary ingredient in the working of the railway system. It is in vain to quote aver ages, and to tell us that the proportion of railway passengers killed and mutilated

'from causes beyond their own control' is one in eleven millions. The grisly terror of a railway accident dulls the force of any argument of that kind. The public mind. turns from the computations of the arithmetician to the ghastly multitude of victims, some sent to instantaneous destruction, others yet living, beside or underneath the dead, moaning inarticulately, or vainly shrieking,

'Spotted with nameless scars and lurid blains, Childhood and youth and age writhing in savage pains;'

while the shattered carriages and hissing locomotives swell the hideous pyramid, and fill up the horror of the scene.

'The lore

Of nicely calculated less or more'

is out of place there. As Mr. Galt justly observes, 'It would be hopeless to refer the friends of those who have been killed, or

the survivors who have been maimed for statistics with

life, to.

a view to convince them that they had no cause of complaint, inasmuch as millions of passengers, under favourable circumstances, had escaped without injury.'* The sole question is, Are the causes of these terrible disasters susceptible of remedy?

In our judgment, it is impossible for any impartial person to rise from the perusal of the Report and Minutes of Evidence of the conclusion that, to a very large extent, that Royal Commission, without arriving at the question must receive an affirmative answer. In spite of the loud assertions to the contrary, which are so frequently made, railway

accidents are seldom or never attributable

to mere speed, or we might well despair of their prevention, for speed, at any risk, the public will have—

audax omnia perpeti Gens humana ruit-'

Nor, again, is it often that they can be referred to undiscoverable and irremediable defects in mechanism, or to necessary human frailty. We proceed to survey in detail the causes to which they are really due; and in doing this, we shall follow the classification of the Commissioners, who have arranged the accidents returned to the Board of Trade by the railway companies under these four principal heads :

I. Accidents to trains, causing injury or danger to passengers and railway servants in making journeys by railway.

II. Accidents to travellers, or intending travellers, from collateral causes, as distinguished from train accidents.

* Report, p. 45.

III. Accidents to the public, using or being upon railway stations or premises, otherwise than as travellers.

IV. Accidents to railway servants in the discharge of duties other than those included under the first head.*

We are not sure, we may observe, whether this classification is the best that could be adopted, but for our present purpose it will, we think, be most convenient to adhere to

it.

'Train accidents' may be grouped under two principal divisions--accidents due to defects in the rolling-stock or permanent way, and collisions. To the former of these heads must generally be referred the casualties so often charged upon excessive speed. If the rolling-stock and permanent way are in perfect order, the fastest train may travel as safely as the slowest. On the other hand, negligence in this respect is fraught with the most serious consequences. It will be remembered that the terrible disaster at Shipton was primarily due to the breaking of the tire of a four-wheeled carriage, placed in the immediate rear of two powerful engines. A writer at the time well observed, anything more preventible than an accident arising because a carriage has four wheels instead of six, it is difficult to imagine. And as to tire accidents generally, Captain (now Sir Henry) Tyler, speaking with the great authority which attaches to his scientific eminence, and to his long experience as a Board of Trade Inspector, remarks,§ that they are of all accidents the most inexcusable,' and might be avoided simply by the adoption of wellknown methods of fastening tires to wheels, which would prevent their flying off the wheels in case of fracture.' During the four years over which the inquiries of the Commissioners extend, eighty-one accidents, some of them of the most appalling kind, are referred to defects in rolling stock, and one-fourth of them were tire-accidents.|| With regard to the permanent way, the Commissioners observe that much atten

The sleepers were

tion is given to it by many companies;" but that exceptional cases have occurred in which companies have proved themselves signally remiss' in this respect. The most recent, as it is the most glaring, case of such remissness, they add, was on the Bristol and Exeter Section of the Great Western Railway, the dangerous condition of which attracted no attention until the occurrence of the Long Ashton accident. Sir Henry Tyler, in his Report, says, 'The permanent way at the site of this accident was not in good condition. The off-rail rested loosely on the longitudinal sleeper, and the sleeper loosely on the ballast. The line was not in good level.' * A still worse condition of things is described in the Times' of the 2nd of November last-and the description has not been contradicted, we believe-at the site of a later accident between Blandford and Wimbourne. so rotten,' it is stated, that in very many cases they could be broken to pieces between the finger and thumb; and in a multitude of cases the chairs could be kicked from the rails owing to the decayed condition of the wood.' This is most clearly a cause of accidents which it is within the power of the companies to prevent. As the Commissioners remark, There can be no difficulty in ascertaining, almost day by day, the state of the rails, sleepers, points, and gauge of the permanent way. It is simply a matter of inspection and necessary repair, to neglect which is a direct breach of the company's contract with the public.' † We may further observe, generally, that there exists in certain quarters a tendency greatly to underrate the amount of security which may be obtained, so far as the mechanical instruments of railway travelling are concerned, and to adopt the theory of a necessary percentage of accidents arising from their failure. Nothing can be more arbitrarily irrational than this species of fatalism. So far as the rolling-stock and permanent way are concerned, it is possible, by due care in construction, and reasonable diligence in inspection, to attain almost absolute safety.

We now come to the second group of train accidents-those resulting from collisions, which Mr. Oakley, the General Manager of the Great Northern Railway, pronounces to be the most fruitful source of disasters upon our lines. Collisions are usually attributable to one of two causes; unpunctuality, and the default of railway servants, especially of signalmen and shun

* Report, p. 60. + Ibid. p. 22. Minutes of Evidence, Q. 32,900.

ters.

As regards unpunctuality, it is difficult to see how it can be seriously argued that the responsibility for it does not rest upon the companies. Their lines are under their own absolute control, and there is simply nothing to hinder them from despatching their trains when they please. They usually defend themselves by alleging the occasional sudden pressure of traffic, and the late arrival of passengers, as reasons for the irregularity of their trains; but it is clear that it is quite within their power to obtain, through their employés, such local information as would easily enable them to arrange, upon special occasions, for the prompt conveyance of a greater than the ordinary number of travellers, and they are under no obligation, moral or legal, to con

* Some valuable evidence on this subject was given before the Commissioners by Colonel Rich. The following is an extract from it :

vey those who reach their stations too late. The truth is, that irregularity in the despatch and arrival of trains is mainly due to defective booking arrangements, to inadequacy of the permanent way, and to insufficient establishments; and to the last-mentioned defect the fatal blunders of signalmen and shunters may also be referred in most cases. Existing booking arrangements,' it has been well remarked, invite unpunctuality. Why should tickets be obtainable only within a few minutes of the time of starting? In the principal towns of the United States, railway tickets can be purchased at the stations at any hour of the day, and they are also to be had at the chief hotels and at booking-offices in different parts of each town. It is difficult to see why this system should not be adopted.' Regarding the need of additional rails upon many of our lines, there are some very pertinent remarks in the paper which Lord De la Warr has appended to the Report of the Commissioners. He observes that accom

draw the trains; there is no doubt that there is a

of the mails.

2012. (Earl of Belmore.) Does that arise from attaching too many carriages to one engine? Yes, as a rule.

2014. (Sir J. L. Simmons.) If every train was driven according to the time-table, signals would become almost unnecessary?—Yes, and you would not have so many accidents.

2015. (Chairman, Duke of Buckingham.) Would it be possible, in your opinion, to apply that system of rigid punctuality throughout? Yes, I believe it would be easy.'

It is right to add that there is a great conflict of evidence upon this last point. Mr. Findlay, the chief Traffic Manager of the London and North-Western Railway, goes so far as to say that a general system of unpunctuality does not tend to insecurity (30,843); and Mr. Allport, the General Manager of the Midland Railway, goes even further he finds such a system positively meritorious: under it a man will necessarily feel anxious,' he says, ' and he will therefore be on his guard' (31,747). It is impossible, how ever, as it seems to us, to question the soundness of Sir Henry Tyler's conclusion that habit ual unpunctuality is inexcusable upon any railway,' and that there has been too much of it a great deal' (2611).

+ Sir Charles Adderley remarks, in his circular of the 18th of November, 1874, The Board of Trade wish to remind directors that it is one of the many duties of the responsible office they hold, to see that strict punctuality is maintained on all occasions.

In the opinion of the Board of Trade nothing can justify directors in continuing to advertise trains at a rate of travelling which cannot be punctually observed.'

ways was sufficient, has now become inadequate, in consequence of the large increase of goods, as well as of passenger traffic,' and points out that a large proportion of accidents by collisions occur upon lines when the goods and mineral traffic is most heavy.' * It is needless to dwell further upon a point which is so clear. Nor, again, is it necessary to produce elaborate statistics to prove that the servants of the railways are insufficient in number. Not only are they unable to cope with the traffic at exceptional times, but on many lines they are too few for the satisfactory discharge of even the ordinary business. We are told of men working from week's end to week's end, without taking off their clothes; engine men going to sleep, from absolute fatigue, upon their engines; signalmen utterly wearied out by seventeen or eighteen hours of continuous labour, and unable to say what trains passed up and down;' and 'shunters so tired that they fell down, and were sent into eternity.' The evidence taken by the Royal Commissioners proves only too conclusively that these statements are not unfounded. The Commissioners

*

for 1872

"The want of care or mistakes of officers or servants may to a great extent be obviated by the application of improvements-1, of block telegraph working and suitable signal and point arrangements, with locking apparatus; 2, of proper siding and other accommodation for working the traffic; and 3, by strict discipline, which only can be properly maintained when those other means of safety are provided. Railway work,' this very experienced officer goes on to add, 'is a description of work which must be got through. When it cannot be performed without risk, the risk is incurred. The officers and servants of the companies are too frequently induced, if not compelled, in the absence of necessary means, appliances, or accommodation, to disobey printed rules, or to adopt hazardous methods of working, and in the course of their daily work to become habituated to operations, which they would themselves, in the first instance, see to be objectionable. They are often unduly blamed, when accidents actually occur, because their difficulties in these respects are not sufficiently known or considered.' §

Far too much has been made of the argument from human fallibility' so constantly urged in extenuation of the responsibility for accidents. It is true, the Commissioners observe, that this element of danger can never be eliminated; '|| but it is also true, they point out, that it may be consid

and 40 minutes without any break. They should have more men, but they work the ones they have.' (QQ. 33.865; 33872; 33,882; 33,883; 33,889.) Mr. Galt (p. 68) notes that Harcombe, who was a goods' guard on the Taff Vale Railway, was discharged, avowedly in consequence of the evidence he gave, which the officers of the company, however, did not venture to contradict in a single particular.'

*See especially the evidence of Taylor, Hand, Roberts, Hewitt and Robinson.

+ Minutes of Evidence, Q. 14,499.
Ibid., Q. 30,817.
Page 73.

| Report, p. 12.

erably modified by the adoption of the various improvements specified by Sir Henry Tyler, whose remarks on this subject they fully adopt.

This appears to be the proper place to notice the very important subject of brakepower. It is not easy to overestimate the importance of the continuous brake as a means of preventing collisions, and of modifying their consequences; and it is quite certain, as Lord Carlingford remarked in the House of Lords last April,* that in this matter the companies are in an extremely unsatisfactory position. It was observed by Sir Henry Tyler, in a very able paper read before the Society of Arts, that it is from want of more brake-power, properly applied, that most accidents occur.' cases of collision, he goes on to say,

In

'Where engine-drivers have 'several hundred yards, and perhaps half-a-mile or more, to bring their train to a stand, but are unable to do so from the want of brake-power, the advantages of continuous brakes are obvious, especially on steep gradients and slippery rails. But they are hardly less important for the prevention of loss of life and injury in all other cases, as, for instance, when trains leave the rails owing to the defects in the permanent way, or to their meeting with obstructions; when failures occur of couplings, springs, axles, tyres, or other parts of the rolling-stock; and when there are accidents at facing points or on inclines.'

Colonel Hutchinson stated in his eviwhich he investigated in 1873, thirty-five dence, that out of eighty-five accidents would have been prevented or mitigated by continuous brakes in the hands of the drivers; § and the Commissioners report that their own inquiries confirmed the impression which the inspecting officers' investigations of accidents led them to form, that there was generally an insufficiency of controlling power in trains. They express their decided opinion' that no train can be considered properly equipped which is not furnished with sufficient brake-power to

*See the report of his speech in the 'Times' of April 28, 1877.

Reported in the 'Times' of May 8, 1877.

One of the greatest railway catastrophes which ever took place in this country--that at Shipton two years ago, in which 34 passengers were killed and 65 passengers and 4 servants of the Company were injured--Sir Henry Tyler attributes in great measure to the want of sufficient brake-power. He says if the train had been fitted with continuous brakes throughout its whole length, there was no reason why it should not have been brought to rest without any casualty. (See Report for 1874, Class B.) See also Mr. Galt's observations, p. 58. § Minutes of Evidence, Q. 1296. Report, p. 20.

bring it, at the highest speed at which it will be running upon any gradients within its journey, to an absolute stop within 500 yards; and they add that they have satisfied themselves that there are ample means of accomplishing this object with certainty and safety.'*

We have lingered upon this first class of accidents-accidents to trains - both because of their intrinsic importance, and because the term 'railway accident,' as popularly used, is generally understood to refer to casualties of this kind. Our survey of this part of our subject, although longer than we had proposed, is indeed far from complete. There are several other points upon which we should have been glad to touch, such, for example, as the important question of level crossings. But what we have said will be sufficient, we think, for our present purpose, and we now pass on to consider briefly the causes of the other three classes of railway disasters enumerated by the Commissioners. In Class II., which comprises accidents to travellers, or intending travellers, from collateral causes, as distinguished from train accidents,' 477 deaths are entered as having occurred in the four years under consideration. These deaths are attributed by the companies to the imprudence of the sufferers.' But in many cases-we might indeed say, the great majority of cases-although that imprudence may have existed in a greater or less degree, there has also been on the part of the companies gross absence of the due and proper care and foresight which the law requires of them in the conduct of their business. It appears from a Table given in Appendix B. to the Commissioners' Report, that of the 477 deaths 'from collateral causes,' 340 were occasioned by falling between carriages and platform, or by crossing the line at stations. Now it is perfectly clear that most of these catastrophes might have been prevented by the adoption of continuous footboards, of

*Report, p. 21.

The Government inspectors notice the fact that almost all the level crossings in existence have been the scenes of accidents.' (Report of Royal Commissioners, p. 23.)

Sir Henry Tyler observes, with regard to the present construction of footboards: Nothing can be worse than to see a lot of carriages running with small iron footsteps, which are admirably designed, as I have expressed it, to cut people to pieces between the train and the platform. It is very easy to slip off; there is no necessity to have them, and there is no reason why the companies should not alter them.' (Minutes of Evidence, Q. 2259.) See also the evidence of Mr. Oakley. A few companies, it should be added, have adopted

sufficient width, and by the provision and enforced use of subways and bridges. The accidents comprised in Class III., those occurring to persons other than passengers or railway servants, are distressingly numerous. From 1872 to 1875 no less than 1010 persons lost their lives while trespassing on railways. There can be no doubt that many of these lives would not have been lost if (in the words of the Commissioners) the companies were more strict in enorcing the statutory powers they already possess, and trespass upon the permanent way of railways were absolutely forbidden.'* Again, the number of persons killed, during the same period, in using the authorised level crossings, amounts to 286. It is tolerably clear that here there has been default on the part of the companies in too frequently leaving unguarded crossings where the traffic is great and trains run at high speed.'

The accidents to railway servants, which forms the fourth group of the Commissioners' classification, constitute, as they remark,

very difficult and important subject. 2960 railway employés are reported to have been killed on the lines in the four years over which the inquiries of the Commissioners extended; but of this number of deaths only 238 are attributed by the companies to causes beyond the control of the sufferers;' the rest are imputed to 'misconduct or want of caution.' Upon this view of the matter the Amalgamated Society of Railway Engineers' remark, that in the majority of cases the casualties classed by the companies under this latter head are occasioned (1) by excessive hours of labour; (2) by the non-enforcement of certain of the companies' rules, ostensibly made for the protection of servants; (3) by nonadaptation of the most approved appliances conducive to safety in the working of railways; (4) by the want of proper accommodation in working the traffic; (5) by the employment of inefficient persons for the performance of responsible duties; (6) by the insufficient number of men employed.' The Commissioners observe that they cannot undertake to verify the statistics of the companies or the statements of the men. And we certainly shall not rush in where

continuous footboards; and some others have announced their intention to do so. Many of these footboards, however, form a new source of danger by being very narrow and overhung by the floor of the carriage.

The companies have ample powers for such enforcement, and some-the London, Chatham, and Dover, for example-use them with wise rigour. Report, p. 26.

+ Report, p. 24.