sufficient facts to confer jurisdiction on the county court of Otoe county, and, this being true, the appointment of the administrator is not subject to collateral attack. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, was an action similar in character to this, and the jurisdiction of the court appointing the administrator was attacked. In the opinion Judge Cobb says: “And, again, I do not think that in any event her appointment as administratrix of the deceased could be attacked collaterally." Estate of Moore v. Moore, 33 Neb. 509, was an appeal from an order allowing a claim against the estate. One of the heirs had filed objections to the claim, one objection being that the administration was void for want of jurisdiction in the court. The objections to the jurisdiction were the same as in this case, to wit, that the decedent was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no estate to be administered therein. It was held that the appointment was not open to attack in this manner, Norval, J., saying: "The application for the appointment of an administrator must allege the necessary jurisdictional facts, for if a want of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the face of the record, it is fatal to the proceedings, and the objection can be urged at any time. . . . . The right of the plaintiff in error to question the authority of the county court to grant letters of administration on the hearing of his objection to the allowance of the claim filed against the estate depends upon whether the record of the county court on its face shows the lack of jurisdiction to make 655 the appointment. It cannot be doubted that where a sufficient petition for administration is presented to the proper county court, and the statutory notice is given, its action in appointing an administrator is valid and binding unless revoked or set aside on appeal." These decisions control the present case, and we think that they are in accord with the vast weight of authority elsewhere, as well as consonant with sound principle. The district court, therefore, erred in giving the instruction complained of.

Reversed and remanded.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-APPOINTMENT OF -COLLATERAL ATTACK.-The appoint ment of an administrator cannot be impeached collaterally: Riser v. Snoddy, 7 Ind. 442; 65 Am. Dec. 740; Abbott v. Coburn, 28 Vt. 663; 67 Am. Dec. 735. It is a judicial act and, if the court has jurisdiction, the grant, though irregular, is valid, and cannot be avoided collaterally by showing that the person to whom the grant was made was not competent to qualify: Palmer v. Oakley, 2 Doug. 433: 47 Am. Dec. 41; extendea note to Ex parte Maxwell, 79 Am. Dec. 65, 66; but a grant of letters of administration on the estate of one who did not reside within the

jurisdiction of the court making the grant at the time of his death, is void and may be attacked collaterally: People's Sav. Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I. 258; 2 Am. St. Rep. 894.

GUTHMANN V. VALLERY.

[51 NEBRASKA, 824.]

LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEATH OF TENANT FOR LIFE-RIGHTS OF HIS LESSEE.-The death of a life tenant terminates the lease of the premises between him and his lessee, and the lessee may at once surrender the possession discharged of any liability to the reversioner for rent thereafter accruing.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.-THE LESSEE OF A TENANT FOR LIFE is bound to take notice of the extent of his landlord's title, and on the termination of the life estate he becomes a tenant at sufferance.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSEE FROM TENANT FOR LIFE-LIABILITY FOR RENTS.-A lessee from a tenant for life, who remains in possession of the premises after the termination of the life estate without any contract with the reversioner or protest or objection from him, becomes liable to the latter for the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises, but not liable on his contract with the tenant for life.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSEE FROM TENANT FOR LIFE-RIGHT OF REVERSIONER TO RENTS.-If the lessee of a tenant for life remains in possession after the termination of the life estate without any contract with the reversioner, and pays the full amount of rent reserved in the lease to the administrator of the tenant for life, the reversioner has no claim against the estate of the life tenant for the rent thus paid, and the administrator of such estate, though he has converted such money to his own use, or the use of another, is not liable to the reversioner therefor.

H. D. Travis, for the appellant.

M. Gering, for the respondent.

825 RAGAN, C. Charles Guthmann was seised in fee of certain real estate situate in Cass county. He devised the same by his will to his daughter, Minnie E. Guthmann, subject to a life estate therein in favor of his wife, Mary J. Guthmann, and died. His widow took possession of the real estate and leased it from March 1, 1893, to March 1, 1894, at an agreed rental of one hundred and fifty dollars, and for such rent accepted the tenant's note due March 1, 1894, and on the 27th of July, 1893, the tenant for life died. Jacob Vallery, Sr., was appointed administrator of the estate of the life tenant and after the rent note matured he collected the same. The tenant of the tenant for life remained in possession of the premises until the expiration of the lease executed between said parties. The record does not show that this tenant remained in possession after the death of the tenant for life with the consent of the owner of the reversion,

nor that the reversioner objected to the possession retained by such tenant. Minnie E. Guthmann, the owner of the reversion, sued Jacob Vallery, Sr., in the district court of Cass county, to recover the rent of the premises from the death of the life tenant until the expiration of the lease made by her as fixed by the lease between the tenant and the life tenant. The trial resulted in a judgment dismissing Miss Guthmann's action, and she brings that judgment here for review on error.

One cannot convey to another a greater interest in real estate than he is himself possessed of, and the lease of the real estate made by the widow terminated at her death. Upon the termination of the life estate the tenant in possession became a tenant at sufferance, and he might then 826 have abandoned possession of the premises, as he was under no obligation to occupy as the tenant of the reversioner; and probably, although we do not decide the point, had he abandoned the premises, he would have been discharged from any liability for rent even to the administrator of the life tenant: Hoagland v. Crum, 113 Ill. 365; 55 Am. Rep. 424; 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, sec. 124. On the termination of the life estate, the reversioner became at once entitled to the possession of the real estate; and it seems that the life tenant's tenant in possession would not have been entitled to a notice to quit the premises or demand for the possession thereof from the owner of the reversion in order to enable the latter to maintain an action for possession. This is because the tenant, at the time he entered possession under his lease from the life tenant, was charged with notice of the extent of his landlord's title. The tenant of the owner of the life estate, having remained in possession of the premises after the termination of that estate without protest or objection from the owner of the reversion, became liable to the reversioner for the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises at the time they were occupied after the termination of the life estate: Hoagland v. Crum, 113 Ill. 365; 55 Am. Rep. 424; Wright v. Roberts, 22 Wis. 165. Whether the tenant, after the termination of the life estate, was liable to the estate of the life tenant for rent of the premises we do not decide; but whether liable or not, the tenant recognized his promise as binding and paid the full rent reserved to the administrator of the life tenant. It is clear that the reversioner has no claim against the estate of the life tenant for this rent or any part of it. The contract between the life tenant and her lessee was not made for or on behalf of the reversioner, nor was she a party to this contract. The lessee

did not pay this money to the administrator of the estate of the life tenant for the use of the reversioner; and if the lessee has any claim against the estate of the life tenant by reason of having paid rent for a full term which failed, the reversioner 827 has not succeeded by assignment, or otherwise, to that claim, nor is she entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the lessee, if she have any, against the estate of the life tenant. The question then is, whether Vallery, because he collected from the lessee of the life estate the rents reserved by the lease after its termination, is liable to the reversioner for such rents. If Vallery is liable, it must be because he has appropriated to his own use, or the use of another, property which belongs to the reversioner without the latter's consent, or that he has exercised dominion over such property of the reversioner in exclusion and in defiance of his rights. But the rents which the lessee paid to Vallery were not the property of the reversioner. There was no contract existing between this lessee and the reversioner as to this rent; and if it be true that the lessee was not indebted to the estate of which Vallery was administrator, and that the lessee should have paid this rent money to the reversioner for the use and occupation of the premises instead of paying it to the estate of the tenant for life, still it does not follow that the reversioner is entitled to make Vallery account to her for it. When the life estate terminated the reversioner became entitled to the immediate possession of the estate; to collect rents from tenants who occupied it as such; to collect from the tenant at sufferance the value of the use of the premises so long as such tenant occupied it; but it by no means follows that, because the reversioner was possessed of these rights, therefore she was the owner of the moneys which the lessee saw fit to pay to the estate of the life tenant, or the administrator of that estate, in discharge of his contract made with the tenant for life. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSEE OF LIFE TENANTDEATH OF LIFE TENANT-RIGHTS OF REVERSIONER.—A tenant for life has the power of making underleases for a lesser term; and the under-tenant has the same rights and privileges during his tenancy as are incident to a tenant for life: Miles v. Miles, 32 N. H. 147; 64 Am. Dec. 362, and extended note, 369; Wiggin v. Wiggin, 43 N. H. 561; 80 Am. Dec. 192. Where a tenant for life leases the estate for a term of years at a yearly rent, and dies before one of the rent days, the rent cannot be apportioned, and the tenant may quit free of rent from the last rent day; but if he remains, and the reversioner acquiesces, the latter may recover for his use and occupation from the lessor's death: Hoagland v. Crum, 113 Ill. 365; 55 Am. Rep. 424.

CRAM V. SICKEL.

[51 NEBRASKA, 828.]

AGENCY-ATTORNEY HOLDING CLAIM FOR COLLEC TION-AUTHORITY-NOTICE.-A debtor who deals with an attorney holding a claim against him for collection is bound to take notice of the attorney's authority.

AGENCY-AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY FOR COLLECTION.-An attorney who holds a claim for collection has no authority to receive anything in payment of such claim except money, unless especially authorized to do so by his principal, nor to release one of two joint debtors in consideration of the other giving security for the debt.

OF UNAUTHORIZED

CON

AGENCY-REPUDIATION TRACT.-If a principal repudiates the unauthorized contract of his agent within a reasonable time after being informed thereof, and restores to the owner all fruits which have come into his hands as the result of such unauthorized contract, he cannot be held liable thereon.

AGENCY-ESTOPPEL AS TO UNAUTHORIZED ACTS.-In order to estop a principal because of his approval of an unauthorized act of his agent, it is not enough to show that he has in some manner approved of such act; but it must also appear that he approved it with knowledge of what the agent had done and promised in his principal's behalf.

J. S. Bishop, for the appellant.

D. L. Love, for the respondent.

828 RAGAN, C. George F. Cram sued Bernard Sickel and Luther P. Ludden, copartners, in the district court of Lancaster county to recover a balance on account for goods sold and delivered by Cram to Sickel and Ludden. The defendants below had a verdict and judgment, and Cram prosecutes here a petition in

error.

To a proper understanding of the points presented in this case a short statement of the facts admitted and established by the finding of the jury becomes essential.

Prior to August, 1892, Sickel and Ludden dissolved their copartnership, the agreement of dissolution providing that Sickel should assume the liabilities and be entitled to the assets of the firm. Prior to August, 1892, Cram sent the account he held against Sickel and Ludden 829 to an attorney at law residing in Lincoln, Nebraska, for collection. Sickel was at that time indebted to the attorney, and the latter presented the claims of Cram to Sickel for payment, and the negotiation between them resulted in Sickel giving to the attorney a note of the firm of Sickel & Ludden, payable to the attorney's order for the full amount of the Cram claim and the amount which