1. CONTEMPT.-TO CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIVE CON-
TEMPT of court, there must have existed, at the time, some order
or writ within the jurisdiction of the court to make, which the al-
leged contemner has disobeyed or violated. (Ex parte Lake, 818.)
2. COURTS.-POWER GIVEN TO COURTS TO ENFORCE
ORDERS can never reach beyond those made in the legitimate exer-
cise of such power, and never to those orders which it has no au-
thority, by reason of want of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to make. (In
re Knaup, 435.)
3. CONTEMPT.-THE RIGHT TO PUNISH for contempt dis-
obedience to all lawful mandates of a court is not a mere formal in-
cident to a court, but an inherent power essential to its very exist-
ence, and granted as a necessary incident in its establishment. (In
re Knaup, 435.)
4. CONTEMPT-IRREGULAR ORDER.-If the court has juris-
diction in the matter of making an order, and the order as made is
irregular or improper in some mere matter of detail, it is still
obligatory upon the party against whom it is issued, until set aside
or reversed by some appellate court on appeal, and he may be pun-
ished for contempt for disobedience of, or resistance to, such order.
(In re Knaup, 435.)
5. CONTEMPT — JURISDICTION. - Power conferred upon a
court to commit to prison one who refuses to obey a writ of habeas
corpus, to remain there until he is willing to obey such writ and
pay all costs of the proceedings, is exclusive, and an officer who
removes a prisoner pending an application for such writ cannot be
punished until the writ has issued and the officer has disobeyed it.
(Ex parte Lake, 848.)
6. CONTEMPT-JURISDICTION.-Unless the court has juris-
diction of the supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process,
within the jurisdiction of the court to make, has been resisted or
disobeyed, the court has no power to punish for contempt. Juris-
diction over the party does not confer power to punish for contempt
unless some such order, decree, or process has been disobeyed, or
the party is guilty of some act of the nature of malpractice in the
case, or has disobeyed reasonable rules of court. This rule does not
apply to contempts arising from newspaper articles pertaining to
pending cases. (Ex parte Lake, 848.)
7. CONTEMPT-JUDGMENT DURING VACATION.-An order
or judgment of a court, made during vacation, adjudging a person
guilty of contempt for default in the payment of alimony previously
ordered to be paid is void, and may be attacked on habeas corpus.
(Ex parte Ellis, 831.)
8. CONTEMPT.-PROCEEDINGS DURING VACATION of a
court adjudging a person guilty of contempt in disobeying the pre-
vious order or judgment of the court are not judicial, but the per-
sonal acts of the judge at a time when he has no power to act, and
for that reason void. (Ex parte Ellis, 831.)
9. CONTEMPT-FAILURE TO TURN PROPERTY OVER TO
RECEIVER.-If an officer of an insolvent corporation, through di-
rection of some of its stockholders, has obtained the transfer of
part of its property to himself as an individual, the court having
jurisdiction of the property of the corporation has authority to order
him to turn such property over to the receiver for administration
under the orders of the court, and, upon his failure to turn over
the property in obedience to such order, he may be committed to
Jail for contempt. (Ex parte Tinsley, 818.)
10. CONTEMPT-FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER-PUNISH.
MENT.-If a court, in punishing for a contempt for failure to obey
a valid order of the court to turn over certain property, merely fines
the contemner and orders him into custody until he complies with
such order, without imposing any imprisonment as part of the
penalty, such punishment is not void as imposing an unlawful im-
prisonment. In such case, any imprisonment would be self-inflicted,
as it might be avoided by paying the fine and obeying the order of
the court. (Ex parte Tinsley, 818.)
11. CONTEMPT-ORDERING PROPERTY TURNED OVER TO
RECEIVER-HABEAS CORPUS.-If a court has acquired jurisdic-
tion over the property of an insolvent corporation and of a claimant
thereto, or of a part thereof, its order on him to assign and turn
over such property to a receiver for its preservation must be obeyed,
however erroneous it may be; and the fact that the order may be
too broad, and require the transfer of some of the property wrong-
fully, does not justify the claimant in refusing to obey. If the
order is thus void in part, the remedy of the claimant is to apply
to the court for a modification. If he fails to pursue this remedy,
and disobeys the order, he may be committed for a contempt of
court. Upon an appeal from the order committing him for contempt,
or on habeas corpus proceedings for his release from such commit-
ment, no error in the prior order requiring him to assign and turn
over the property can be considered. The only question which can
be presented is, whether the court had jurisuiction to make such
prior order. (Ex parte Tinsley, 818.)
12. REPLEVIN AGAINST SHERIFF-CONTEMPT.-Property
in the hands of an officer in a replevin suit is in the custody of the
law and an attempt to wrest such possession from the officer by
means of another action of replevin is a contempt of court. (Welter
V. Jacobson, 632.)
13. EXECUTIONS - SUPPLEMENTAL
то
DISCLOSE ASSETS-COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT.-Under a
statute providing that a defendant may be examined in court as to
his means and ability to satisfy a judgment, he may be committed
by the court for contempt in refusing to submit to such examina-
tion, but not for his refusal or failure to deliver to the court prop-
erty which his examination has discovered. (In re Knaup, 435.)
14. EXECUTIONS - SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION ΤΟ
DISCLOSE ASSETS-COMMITMENT FOR CONTEMPT.-Under
a statute, providing that defendant may be examined in court as to
his means and ability to satisfy the judgment, the court has no
power to commit him for contempt for failure to obey its order to
deliver up bonds, notes, or other personalty which his examination
shows he has on his person. (In re Knaup, 435.)
15. EXECUTIONS-GARNISHMENT IN AID OF COMMIT-
MENT FOR CONTEMPT-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.-Under
a statute providing that, if it shall be made to appear that any gar-
nishee had, before his garnishment, executed to any defendant a
negotiable promissory note which at the time of the garnishment
was unpaid, the court may order the defendant to deliver such note
into court, and, upon his failure or refusal to comply with such
order, may attach his person, the court may, in garnishment pro-
ceedings against a corporation in aid of execution, commit the execu-
tion defendant to jail for failure to obey an order of court to deliver
to it or to its receiver negotiable bonds of such corporation trans-
ferred to him and found to be in his possession under his examina-
tion in court as to his means and ability to satisfy the judgment,
although it is beyond the power of the court, at the time of such
examination, to commit him for contempt for his refusal to deliver
to the court the property then found to be in his possession. Such
commitment for contempt in the garnishment proceeding is hot an
imprisonment for debt. (In re Knaup, 435.)
16. CONTEMPT - JURISDICTION HABEAS CORPUS.-Pro-
ceedings adjudging a party guilty of contempt of a court having no
Jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the person are null and vold,
and the alleged contemner is entitled to his release on habeas corpus.
(Ex parte Lake, 848.)
17. CONTEMPT-EXTRADITION-HABEAS CORPUS.-An ex-
tradition agent is not guilty of contempt of court in departing hastily
and clandestinely from the state with his prisoner, after receiving
him under a warrant issued by the governor pending an applica-
tion by the prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release
from custody under another charge, although such agent, by his
attorney, has protested against the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. (Ex parte Lake, 848.)
See Habeas Corpus, 1, 2; Mandamus, 3.
1. CONTRACTS-CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT ACTION.-
A mere naked promise, without consideration, from one to another,
for the benefit of a third person, cannot sustain an action. (Hicks
v. Hamilton, 431.)
2. CONSIDERATION-PAYMENT OF-WHEN CANNOT BE
DISPUTED.-If the payment of a consideration is recited in a con-
tract, the parties are estopped from disputing such payment for the
purpose of destroying the effect and operation of the contract. (Mc-
Pherson v. Fargo, 723.)
3. CONTRACT-RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM.-Where the
terms of a contract are reduced to writing and signed by one of the
parties, with the understanding that it shall be signed by the other,
the former cannot withdraw from the contract on the ground that
the latter has not signed it, unless such signing has been requested
and a reasonable time given to comply with the request. (McPher-
son v. Fargo, 723.)
4. STATUTE OF FRAUDS SIGNATURE BY ONE PARTY
ONLY.-Only the party to be charged is required to sign an agree-
ment under the statute of frauds. (McPherson v. Fargo, 723.)
5. CONTRACT-SIGNING BY ONE PARTY-WHEN NOT NE-
CESSARY BY THE OTHER.-When an agreement is reduced to
writing respecting the purchase and sale of real property executed
by the vendor and left with a third person with the understanding
that it shall be signed by the purchaser, who thereafter accepts
and places it of record, but without signing it, it thereby becomes
binding on all of the parties, and the vendor cannot afterward recede
therefrom. (McPherson v. Fargo, 723.)
6. CONTRACTS.-THE LAW OF THE PLACE where a con-
tract is to be performed governs, subject to the rule that a con-
tract, void by the law of the place where made, is void everywhere.
(Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eubanks, 361.)
7. CONFLICT OF LAWS-CONTRACT TO BE PARTLY PER-
FORMED IN TWO OR MORE STATES.-If a contract is entire
and indivisible, and is to be partly performed in the state where it
is made and partly in other states, the law of the former controls
its validity, and any stipulation which is invalid in the state where
it is entered into is invalid everywhere. (Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v.
Beebe, 253.)
8. PRACTICE QUESTION OF LAW, WHAT IS.-Whether the
parties assented to a contract is a question of law when the facts
are not disputed. (McPherson v. Fargo, 723.)
See Insane Persons, 1, 2,
CONVEYANCES.
See Agency, 5, 6; Deeds,
ALIENS.-A state has the right to debar aliens from holding shares
in her corporations, or to admit them to that privilege only on such
terms as she may prescribe. Aliens may be excluded from member-
ship in domestic corporations, unless they enter them on conditions
which subject their investments to such burdens of taxation as the
state may think proper to impose. (State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 138.)
2. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-PLEADINGS.-Though a for-
eign corporation is prohibited from maintaining an action unless it
complies with provisions of the statutes of the state, it need not
allege such compliance in its complaint. In the absence of any
showing to the contrary, it will be presumed to have complied, and,
if it has not, the defendant must plead that fact in his answer.
(Acme Mercantile Agency v. Rochford, 714.)
3. CORPORATIONS-ASSIGNMENT-RATIFICATION AFTER
ATTACHMENT.-A ratification of a void corporate assignment by
the board of directors, after a corporate creditor has commenced
suit in attachment, and summoned the assignee as garnishee, does
not affect the rights of the attaching creditor. (Calumet Paper Co.
v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
4. CORPORATIONS-ASSIGNMENT-RATIFICATION.-A cor-
porate assignment, unauthorized by the board of directors, can be
ratified only by such board as a body, and not by its members sev-
BE
erally. (Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
5. CORPORATIONS-VOID ASSIGNMENT-HOW MAY
ATTACKED.-A void assignment by an insolvent corporation may
be attacked in a suit in attachment by the creditors of the corpora-
tion. (Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
6. CORPORATION-VOID ASSIGNMENT.-An assignment by
a corporation executed by two of its five directors is void for want
of authority. (Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
7. CORPORATIONS-ASSIGNMENTS.-As a general rule, a cor-
porate assignment must be executed by the board of directors, or a
quorum thereof, at a meeting duly called for that purpose, or by
the president or some other officer of the corporation, as authorized
by the directors. (Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co.,
425.)
8. CORPORATIONS-INSOLVENCY.-AN ASSIGNMENT FOR
Such resolution
THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS by an insolvent corporation must
be made by resolution of the board of directors.
cannot be passed when a minority only of such board is present.
(Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
9. CORPORATIONS - ASSIGNMENT — ATTACK. - An assign-
ment by an insolvent corporation is not a judicial proceeding, and
anyone asserting rights under it, as against a stranger, has the bur-
den of proof to show at least an assignment valid on its face. The
other party may show that it is invalid by reason of extrinsic facts,
or that it was unauthorized by a legal meeting of the directors.
The validity of such an assignment may be attacked by a creditor
of the corporation, by suit in attachment, or other collateral pro-
ceeding. (Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell etc. Printing Co., 425.)
10. CORPORATIONS.-A SUIT FOR DIVIDENDS declared by a
corporation cannot be maintained until a demand is made. (Win-
chester etc. Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe, 356.)
11. CORPORATIONS.-A RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DIVI-
DENDS declared by a corporation accrues when each dividend is de-
clared. (Winchester etc. Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe, 356.)
See Assignment for Benefit of Creditors; Attachment; Limitations
of Actions, 7; Receivers; Taxation, 1-7
1. COTENANCY-PARTITION OUSTER-LIABILITY FOR
RENTS.-If neither cotenant occupies the common property for
his own use, and one of them rents it, or any part of it, to third
persons and collects the rents, or if he denies the right of the other
to a part thereof, and thereby, pro tanto, ousts him, an account-
ing may be had in a suit for partition, if there is anything due
at the time that suit is begun and such relief is asked at that time,
and, if not, a suit in equity for an accounting may be maintained
after the termination of the partition suit. (Bates v. Hamilton, 407.)
2. COTENANCY-RIGHTS TO RENTS.-The rights of cotenants
to accruing rents, issues, and profits, from the common property,
do not depend upon an express contract between them. They at-
tach as incidents to their ownership of the res. (Bates v. Hamilton,
407.)
3. COTENANCY-LIABILITY FOR RENTS—ACCOUNTING.—
If one tenant in common collects rents from the common prop-
erty, he becomes a trustee of the amount collected for the bene-
fit of all the tenants in common, in the proportion of their respec-
tive holdings, and a proceeding in equity for an accounting is a
proper remedy, if the rights of the other tenants are denied, or if
the tenant refuses to give them their respective shares. (Bates v.
Hamilton, 407.)
4. COTENANCY-LIABILITY FOR RENTS AND INTEREST.—
If a cotenant collects the rents arising from the common property,
and refuses to pay any part of them over to his cotenants for a
long time, he is liable for interest thereon from the time he col-
lected them, although he has made no interest himself. (Bates v.
Hamilton, 407.)
5. COTENANCY-MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY AS TRUS-
TEE.-If a cotenant, as trustee of the common property, exercises
proper diligence, and acts upon the advice of counsel, he is not
liable for losses occurring from matters as to which it is doubtful
what the law really is. (Bates v. Hamilton, 407.)
6. COTENANCY-MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY AS TRUS-
TEE.-A cotenant, as trustee of the common property, is not liable
for losses thereto, if he acts in good faith, and exercises such care
as an ordinarily prudent man would employ in the management
of his own affairs. (Bates v. Hamilton, 407.)
7. COTENANCY - PAYMENT OF TAXES - REIMBURSE-
MENT.-Upon the death of one of two cotenants, it is the duty
of the survivor to pay the taxes for the current year assessed
against the common property, and the probate court must give him
credit for one-half of the amount paid, against the estate of the
deceased. (Bates v. Hamilton, 407.)
1. COURTS-STATE AND TERRITORIAL-ADMISSION
STATE-JURISDICTION.-Upon the admission of a territory as a
state, the judgments of the territorial courts pass under the juris-
diction of the state courts of similar jurisdiction, and the latter have
power to issue execution thereon, and the judges thereof have au-
thority to institute supplementary proceedings based on such judg
ments. (Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Braithwaite, 653.)
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