alleged contract right, when brought into question by subsequent litigation, is not res judicata. (Commonwealth v. Douglass, 328.)

13. JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-EVIDENCE OF ISSUES. In order that a judgment in one action shall operate as an estoppel in another, between the same parties, it must be made to appear, not only that there was a substantial identity of Issues, but also that the issue as to which the estoppel is pleaded was actually determined in the former action; and where the record is uncertain, parol evidence is admissible to show what issues were determined in the former suit. The burden of proof is upon the party pleading the estoppel to establish the fact of the adjudication by extrinsic evidence, if necessary. Evidence is not admissible in such case to contradict the record. (Slater v. Skirving, 444.)

14. JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-WHERE THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES.-If in one action, the plaintiff alleges several facts, the proof of any of which entitles him to a recovery, and there is a general finding against him, it must be conclusively presumed in another action between the same parties founded upon the same facts that each fact so averred was determined against such plaintiff, whether or not any evidence was offered in the former case in support of each of such facts. (Slater v. Skirving, 444.)

15. JUDGMENTS-ENTRY NUNC PRO TUNC.-Entry of a judgment, nunc pro tunc, can be made only upon evidence furnished by the papers and files in the cause or something of record, or in the minute-book or judge's docket as a basis to amend by. (Missouri etc. Ry. Co. v. Holschlag, 417.)

16. JUDGMENTS-ENTRY NUNC PRO TUNC.-Written opinfons by judges of trial courts are not required nor provided for by law. Such an opinion is not a paper in the case constituting a part of the record, and an entry thereon by the clerk of the date It was filed with him is not evidence of the date that the judgment was rendered, upon which an entry nunc pro tunc can be based. (Missouri etc. Ry. Co. v. Holschlag, 417.)

17. JUDGMENT-ENTRY NUNC PRO TUNC-TIME—NOTICE. A court is invested with authority to make its records disclose what actually transpired. Hence, if, in any proceeding pending in a court, a judgment is actually pronounced or an order actually made. and if, for any reason, such judgment or order is not recorded, then, at any time afterward, upon proper notice being given to the parties interested and the facts being established that such judg ment was pronounced or such order made, the court may cause such order or judgment to be spread upon its records as of the date it was pronounced or made. (Hyde v. Michelson, 533.)

18. JUDGMENT-ENTRY NUNC PRO TUNC-TIME.-A code section providing that an action to vacate or modify a judgment rendered must be brought within three years after such judgment is pronounced has no application to a proceeding brought to obtain a nunc pro tunc entry of a judgment, and such entry may, therefore, be made more than three years after the actual rendition of the judgment. (Hyde v. Michelson, 533.)

19. JUDGMENT-ENTRY NUNC PRO TUNC-RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES.-A party to an action cannot prevent the court from entering, nunc pro tunc, the judgment pronounced by it, by showing that a third person, not a party to the action, has acquired an interest in the property involved in the litigation since the rendition of the judgment. The rights of such third person, where he is not before the court, are not adjudicated in the nunc pro tune proceeding. (Hyde v. Michelson, 533.)

20. JUDGMENTS-VACATING FOR FRAUD.-In order to set aside a judgment alleged to have been obtained by fraud, it must

appear that fraud was practiced in the very act of obtaining it.
The fact that the judgment was based on a deed afterward found
to be a forgery, is not suflicient to vacate it for fraud, unless that
defense was prevented by fraud at the time that the judgment was
obtained. (Bates v. Hamilton, 407.)

21. JUDGMENT-LIABILITY FOR ACTS DONE AFTER PAY-
MENT OF.-If a judgment is paid by a surety of one of the defend-
ants, and thereafter he and others seize and sell property in pre-
tended satisfaction of it, their acts constitute a naked trespass, for
which all are jointly and severally liable. (March v. Barnet, 44.)
See Contempt, 7; Insane Persons, 4, 5; Receivers, 1; Setoff.

JUDICIAL NOTICE
See Evidence, 6.

JURISDICTION.

JURISDICTION-REMOVAL

AND REMANDING OF
CAUSE APPEAL.-The federal courts are the exclusive judges of
their own jurisdiction. Hence the action of a circuit court of the
United States in remanding a cause removed thereto from a district
court of the state is conclusive; and the action of the state court in
then taking jurisdiction is not reviewable on appeal. (Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Luck, 869.)

See Contempt, 4-6, 11, 16; Courts, 1, 3, 4; Homicide, 2; Judgment, 6,
7; Municipal Corporations, 1.

JURY TRIAL.

See Trial.

LACHES.

See Injunction, 4, 5; Mortgage, 10.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. LANDLORD AND TENANT.-THE RULE OF CAVEAT
EMPTOR as between landlord and tenant applies only so far as
the rights of the parties rest upon contract, or when the tenant
has an opportunity to examine the premises, and the defect is so
obvious and the danger so apparent that he can see them by using
ordinary care and diligence. (Willcox v. Hines, 770.)

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT-CONTRACT TO REPAIR.-One
not a party to a lease cannot recover of the landlord for injuries
received because of his breach of a covenant to repair. (Willcox v.
Hines, 761.)

3. A LANDLORD IS ANSWERABLE TO A MEMBER of the
lessee's family for injuries received from the defective condition
of the leased premises independently of any covenant in the lease,
if the landlord knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care might
have known, of the dangerous and unsafe condition of the prem-
ises, and the person injured, without being guilty of contributory
negligence on his part, was without such knowledge. (Willcox v.
Hines, 761.)

4. LANDLORD AND TENANT--DUTY OF UPON THE LEAS-
ING A PART ONLY OF THE PREMISES.-Where, after con-
structing a grating in a sidewalk, the owner leases part only of
the premises, as where he leases the lower story and retains pos-
session of the upper he still owes to the public and to the muni-
cipality the implied duty to use reasonable care in inspecting and

repairing the grating, though the tenant has, by implication, the
exclusive right to use it. (Canandaigua v. Foster, 575.)

5. LANDLORD AND TENANT-NEGLIGENCE-NOTICE OF
CONDITION OF PREMISES.-Evidence that a landlord's agent
knew of the dangerous condition of the premises, that the landlord
promised to repair them, and that he sent a carpenter to make such
repairs, is sufficient to charge him with notice of the condition of
the premises and to fix upon him a liability for such condition. (Will-
cox. v. Hines, 761.)

6. LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR DANGER-
OUS CONDITION OF PREMISES.-If a landlord, seeing that the
leased premises are in a dangerous condition, agrees to send some
one to repair them and put them in a safe condition, and he sends
one who leaves them unsafe, in consequence of which a person is
injured such landlord is answerable therefor. (Willcox v. Hines,
761.)

FOR DEFECT-
NEGLI-

7. LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY
IVE CONDITION OF PREMISES. FOUNDED UPON
GENCE.-There is a liability not founded upon contract existing
against a landlord for his negligence or wrong in leasing dangerous
premises, for which a tenant or other occupant may recover if in-
jured, when the defect is of a hidden character known to the land
lord and not disclosed to the tenant or other occupant. (Willcox v.
Hines, 770.)

8. LANDLORD AND TENANT-HIDDEN DEFECTS-LIABIL-
ITY OF LANDLORD FOR.-A landlord is answerable to his tenant
for injuries received by the latter from hidden defects in the leased
premises existing at the date of the lease of which he was ignorant
and of which the landlord knew, or might have known, had he exer-
cised reasonable care and diligence. This liability does not rest
upon contract or warranty, but on the obligation implied by law
that the landlord will not expose the tenant or the public to danger,
of which he knows, or in good faith should know, and which the
tenant does not know and cannot ascertain by the exercise of rea-
sonable care and diligence. (Willcox v. Hines, 770.)

9. A LANDLORD IS LIABLE FOR SUCH DEFECTS and dan-
gers as were in existence when the lease was made, provided he
knew of them, or ought to have known of them, and provided also
that the tenant did not know of them and could not know of them,
both parties exercising reasonable care and diligence. (Willcox v.
Hines, 770.)

10. LANDLORD-WHEN BOUND BY STATEMENTS OF HIS
EMPLOYES.-If a landlord sends a carpenter to repair premises,
and the latter, after making some repairs, assures an occupant
that they are safe, his statement is admissible against the landlord.
(Willcox v. Hines, 761.)

11. LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEATH OF TENANT FOR
LIFE-RIGHTS OF HIS LESSEE.-The death of a life tenant
terminates the lease of the premises between him and his lessee,
and the lessee may at once surrender the possession discharged of
any liability to the reversioner for rent thereafter accruing. (Guth-
mann v. Vallery, 475.)

12. LANDLORD AND TENANT. THE LESSEE OF A TENANT
FOR LIFE is bound to take notice of the extent of his landlord's
title, and on the termination of the life estate he becomes a tenant
at sufferance. (Guthmann v. Vallery, 475.)

FROM TENANT

13. LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSEE
FOR LIFE-LIABILITY FOR RENTS.-A lessee from a tenant for
life, who remains in possession of the premises after the termination

of the life estate without any contract with the reversioner or protest or objection from him, becomes liable to the latter for the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises, but not liable on his contract with the tenant for life. (Guthmann v. Vallery, 475.)

14. LANDLORD AND TENANT-LESSEE FROM TENANT FOR LIFE-RIGHT OF REVERSIONER TO RENTS.-If the lessee of a tenant for life remains in possession after the termination of the life estate without any contract with the reversioner, and pays the full amount of rent reserved in the lease to the administrator of the tenant for life, the reversioner has no claim against the estate of the life tenant for the rent thus paid, and the administrator of such estate, though he has converted such money to his own use, or the use of another, is not liable to the reversioner therefor. (Guthmann v. Vallery, 475.)

LARCENY.

BY

1. LARCENY-WHAT CONSTITUTES-TAKING FEAR INDUCED BY THREATS.-To constitute larceny, the taking must be not only felonious, but without the consent of the owner; but a felonious taking with the consent of the owner, when the giving of such consent is not a voluntary act, but is the result of actual fear induced by threats calculated to excite a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, is a taking without the owner's consent and a larceny, and whether such apprehension of danger existed, and, if so, whether it was a reasonable apprehension, are questions of fact, and must be determined in each particular case, by the language of the menaces of the accused, his actions, and the circumstances surrounding the person who thus parts with his property. (State v. Kalla ner, 116.)

2. EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP.-On a trial for theft, where it is proved on the part of the prosecution that, at the time of the sale of the animal alleged to have been stolen, the accused stated that it belonged to him, he is entitled to prove that a woman claimed the ownership of, and authorized him to sell, the animal, that she was proposing to sell it to others, and that after he sold it she proposed to refund the money. These facts are admissible, whether the accused has testified or not, or whether the statements of the woman were made before or after the taking by the accused. (Kimball v. State, 799.)

3. LARCENY EVIDENCE OF THREATS.-Threats by a person accused of larceny to bring a civil suit against a house owner and attach all of his property, uttered in connection with a threat to burn his house with its inmates, are admissible in connection with and as introductory to such other threat, although they are not by themselves a ground for a charge of larceny. (State v. Kallaher, 116.)

4. LARCENY EVIDENCE OF FEAR INDUCED BY THREATS. In a prosecution for larceny, evidence that the accused threatened to burn a dwelling-house with its inmates unless the owner thereof Immediately complied with his demand for money, is admissible as tending to show that such owner parted with his money under a reasonable fear, induced by such threats of immediate bodily injury to himself and his family. (State v. Kallaher, 116.)

5. LARCENY.-INSTRUCTIONS. in a prosecution for larceny, that the crime of larceny is included in the crime of robbery, but that, in the opinion of the court, the proof in the case at bar would not admit of a conviction for robbery, though irrelevant and erroneous, are not ground for reversal unless prejudicial to the accused. (State v. Kallaher, 116.)

6. LARCENY-INTENT-INSTRUCTIONS.-If the possession of
the property of another, to which the taker has no claim, is ob
tained openly, but by deception, artifice, or fraud designed by the
taker to secure the possession of such property which is subse-
quently converted to the use of such taker, the jury is justified in
finding that the taking was with a felonious intent, and that larceny
was committed, if that and the other facts in the case are sufficient
to constitute the crime, and an instruction to that effect is proper.
(State v. Kallaher, 116.)

See Bailment, 1; Burglary, 6.

LICENSE.

See Private Ways, 2, 3.

LIENS.

1. LIENS - DESCRIPTION-CONSTRUCTION OF.-A writing
purporting to create a lien on all the estate of a party thereto must
be so construed as to comprehend all that part of his property sus-
ceptible of being impressed with a lien, by a writing of that pur-
port, executed and recorded in the manner in which it was. (Hig-
gins v. Higgins, 57.)

2. LIENS-GENERALITY OF DESCRIPTION IN INSTRU-
MENTS CREATING.-A writing purporting to create a lien on all
the estate of one of the parties thereto during his life not in-
valid for want of definiteness of description; and if such writing
is acknowledged and recorded in the manner required for instru-
ments affecting the title to real property, all subsequent purchas-
ers and encumbrancers of property of that class hold their inter-
ests subject thereto. (Higgins v. Higgins, 57.)

See Chattel Mortgages, 2; Executions, 2, 11; Judgment, 4, 5; Mar-
riage and Divorce, 3; Mechanics' Liens; Mortgage, 1; Ware
housemen, 2, 3.

LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS.

1. LIMITATIONS-SHORTENING TIME WITHIN WHICH TO
BRING ACTIONS.-The time within which to bring an action may
be lessened by statute, as to existing causes of action, provided
the suitor has still a reasonable time, after the law is passed, in
which to commence his suit, and, upon the failure of the statute
to fix such time, the court is to decide what is a reasonable time,
which is to be computed from the day when such law was passed,
and not from the time it took effect. (Merchant's Nat. Bank v.
Braithwaite, 653.)

2. ACTIONS-SHORTENING TIME WITHIN WHICH TO COM-
MENCE. It is not essential to the validity of a law shortening the
time within which actions may be brought that it shall, as to exist-
ing causes of action, fix a certain time after its enactment within
which such actions must be enforced, provided the time actually
left in which to sue is not unreasonable. (Merchant's Nat. Bank v.
Braithwaite, 653.)

3. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-EXTENDING TIME BY NE-
GLECTING TO MAKE DEMAND.-A creditor cannot, by neglect.
Ing to make a demand, extend the time allowed by law in which to
sue his debtor. (Winchester etc. Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe, 356.)
4. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-WHEN THE STATUTE BE-
GINS TO RUN.-The statute of limitations begins to run from the
time that the debtor is subject to be sued, or from the time that
the creditor can, by his own act, or of his own volition, become