defects of the Russian army, as has been observed, arise in a great measure from the semi-barbarism in which that empire still is: they arise also partly from the circumstance, that her armies are necessarily composed of a great variety of nations differing from one another, not only in customs, feelings and temperament, but also in the degree of their civilization and knowledge of war; and therefore requiring different modes of management, and effectually preventing any comprehensive and regular plan. From this view of the character and constitution of a Russian army, we may perceive the striking contrast they form to an army of Frenchmen: the latter uncommonly quick in their manœuvres, not difficult to be repulsed when the assailants, or to be driven back and thrown into confusion when assailed, but recovering their order in a very short space of time, and with as much ease and precision as if it were a review day, and not a day of battle before a superior or victorious enemy. Their discipline and obedience, so far as they go, are perhaps nearly as perfect as those of the Russian soldiers; but they do not extend so far: they interpose their own notions of what they ought to do, if circumstances change; whereas, in the opinion of a Russian soldier, circumstances have nothing to do with his orders: he will continue to obey them, even though his obedience is prejudicial to the army in which he serves, and in fact contrary to the wishes and design of his officer. While a French soldier thinks he is marching to victory and glory, he will endure any privation; he will expose himself to any danger or fatigue, with unabated spirits and confidence: but if he is to fight for

safety, not for glory, his character changes. A Russian soldier, on the other hand, looks to nothing beyond the commands of his officer : whether those commands are issued for the purpose of offensive or defensive warfare; under circumstances that pronounce success and glory, or only escape from destruction, they are obeyed with the same implicitness: in short, a Russian is a good soldier, so far as a good soldier and a perfect machine are synonymous, and passive bravery is an essential quality in one; whereas a Frenchman is a good soldier, in so far as the character of a good soldier depends on the most perfect discipline, united with the love of glory, and the desire to render France the mistress of Europe.

This statement will explain some of the causes which prevented France, in her former wars with Russia, from making less impression on that power than on the other powers of Europe:-but there were other causes, which it will be proper to state, since they will enable us more fully to estimate and balance the advantages and disadvantages of the two nations in the war which we are about to narrate. Though it cannot be denied that the military successes of the French have been mainly owing to the superior number and character of their troops, yet we must search deeper, if we wish to ascertain the whole chain of causes which have contributed to those successes. France, as well in the days of her ancient monarchy, as under her new dynasty, has known the advantages of intrigue; and unfortunately, in the contests between revolutionary France and the powers of the continent, intrigue has been too successful. The generals of her opponents have been as often seduced by 2 B4

means

that any people should find motives for fighting for a weak and oppressive government: but, however it may contradict our experience, or our theories, the fact is well established: and it is fortunate that it is so; since perhaps this blind and semibarbarous preference of a weak and wicked government, merely because it is the government of one's own country, is a more effectual safeguard against the intrigues and power of France, than the more enlightened and rational attachment to individual liberty: the latter is too apt to be deceived by French promises, and to expect from them a reformation of public abuses: the former has implanted in the breast such an instinctive dread of every thing foreign, and such an indifference about personal liberty and rights, that Fench intrigue must be displayed, and French promises made, in vain. The French, therefore, a very national people, and who had derived great advantages, in their wars, from this nationality, were now about to commence hostilities against the Russians, who were at least equally national: from this cause of their former successes, therefore, the French in their contest with the Russians had little to hope.

Another cause of French success must be traced in the very decisive manner in which they conduct war: perhaps decision is not the term which most aptly and precisely designates what we mean: it is more than decision, it is the adoption of the most bold and apparently hazardous plan; a plan which, seeming to indicate a consciousness of superiority, in most cases has produced to the French all the advantages of superiority, by intimidating their opponents. Bonaparte well knows how difficult it is to distin

guish between rational boldness and rashness: he acts on this principle, and has thus too frequently succeed. ed in conquering his enemy by his own rashness. But this plan was not likely to succeed so well in Russia, and among the Russian people, as it had done elsewhere: when he penetrated into the very heart of Germany, though he was thus placed at an immense distance from his own territories, he still was in the midst of a people at least not hostile to him, and of a country ex tremely fertile. The Austrian government issued no orders to impede his progress by laying waste the country; and if they had issued these orders, their subjects possessed too little attachment to them, and too small a portion of nationality, to have obeyed them:but in Russia the case would be completely reversed; he would be much further removed from his own territories and resources; he would be in the midst of a comparatively barren and uncivilized country, where the means of subsistence were neither so abundant, nor so easily and regularly procured; and above all, he would be in the midst of a people, who were naturally disposed to resist the French by all possible means, and who, at the command of their sovereign, would undergo the greatest privations for this, or any other purpose of his pleasure. The only hope of success, therefore, which Bonaparte could indulge, if he was fully aware of the character of the Russians, must have been from his knowledge of the emperor Alexander: him he had once already intimidated or cajoled; and he must have expected, if he entered on the war, with such very formidable means, in a rapid and decisive manner; if he penetrated into the heart of Russia, so as to threaten

either Moscow or Petersburgh, and especially if he signally defeated the Russian army, that Alexander would sue for peace on his own

terms.

The plan of the campaign, on the part of the Russians, was founded on a regard to all these circumstances; on the experience that Bonaparte always pushed forward in the hope of signalizing the commencement of hostilities by some splendid if not decisive action; on the belief that he might thus be drawn into the interior of Russia; and on the firm conviction, that if he were thus drawn into the interior, he would find every Russian hostile to him, and perfectly disposed to contribute to the destruction of his army, by the abandonment of their homes, and the devastation of their country. By this plan of continually retreating before him, the French commissariat, so perfect under other circumstances, would be of little service, while the Russians would feel little or no distress from their deficency in this respect. The climate of Russia and the season of the year were also taken into the account, in forming the plan of the campaign, so that in every point of view it presaged to the Russians victory, and to the French defeat and disgrace. There were, however, two circumstances to be guarded against, either of which might render the plan destructive: in the first place, it would be necessary for the Russians to oppose the progress of the French in every situation where it could be done with advantage, but carefully to guard against committing themselves in a decisive battle: this with most troops would have been extremely difficult: in the moment of real or supposed victory, soldiers are apt to be hurried away

by an enthusiastic feeling, which their officers often participate in, instead of checking: but there was little danger that this would happen with the Russians: their cold and implicit obedience would rise superior even to their hatred of the French: and the assurance that it was the will of their emperor that they should continue to retreat, even after a victory, would reconcile them to the plan of the campaign. But the greatest danger and difficulty in the way of the regular and full execution of this plan, arose from the character of the emperor Alexander: he was known to be timid and irresolute; and it was apprehended, that though he had given his assent to the plan, and must be convinced that the advance of the French and the devastation of the country were parts of that plan, and therefore ought not to be regarded with dismay; yet when they actually occurred, he would be for concluding a peace with Bonaparte. It was therefore judged prudent, that, after reviewing and exhorting his troops at Wilna, he should return to Petersburgh, where he would be not only at a distance from the intrigues of the French, and unacquainted personally with their advance and the devastation of the country; but also surrounded by nobles, whose interest it was to be at peace with England, and who therefore would not permit him to listen to any terms which Bonaparte might propose.

On the 9th of May Bonaparte set out from St. Cloud; and on the 6th of June he crossed the Vistula; on the 22d of that month he formally declared war against Russia: on which occasion he issued an address to his soldiers, in which, after accusing Russia of having broken

her