sembly notified a lecture bureau located at Kansas City, Missouri, which had contracted to furnish a course of lectures to be given in the Auditorium under the auspices of the Sparta high school, that the Auditorium was on the "we don't patronize" list. This notice was given by letter, and in the letter it was suggested that the bureau should use

its influence with the school board to have the lectures held in some other building, so that union men and women who felt an interest in the lectures would attend them. Professor L. J. Sexton was in charge of the high school and had arranged for the course of lectures. He went before the labor assembly and asked that an exception be made as to these lectures, as he had already contracted for the use of the building with a view to having the lectures delivered therein. His request was complied with, the labor assembly so notified the bureau, and the Auditorium was used for the lecture course. As this matter was adjusted prior to the filing of the bill, it is manifest that it afforded no basis for invoking the aid of a court of equity. It appears from the testimony of Eiker, the owner of the hearse mentioned in the bill, that there was no yearly contract between himself and appellees, as is averred by the bill, and that, while on one occasion after he was advised that appellees had been placed on the "unfair list" he used on the hearse a team not owned by appellees, he had since that occasion used appellees' teams, and that no one had undertaken to interfere with him in so doing.

One of appellees had until recently been a member of the Teamsters' Union. Both are still members of the Merchants' League of Sparta, an organization which in its aims and purposes does not seem dissimilar to the ordinary union. Appellees were entirely willing to use the methods of such organ izations so long as they profited thereby, but were not willing to abide regulations of the character of those to which they themselves had given assent, when by so doing it seemed to them that their profits would be slightly decreased.

In our judgment, equity should not interfere in this controversy.

Same- presumption.

2. In case of the remarriage of a woman whose husband had not been heard from for three years, the presumption of innocence will overcome the presumption of his continued life.

Same - duration of time.

tion, and repute after the expiration of 3. Continued marital relations, cohabitaseven years from the disappearance of the former undivorced spouse of one of the parties to a marriage contract will validate the marriage, unless the absent person reappears. Same

· presumption of divorce.

4. Divorce from a former spouse will not be presumed from a marriage contract if no record thereof can be found in the counties where it should have been granted. Dower - estoppel. husband's lifetime, to another man, and, 5. The marriage of a woman during her at his death, her taking property from him by will and subsequently remarrying her husband, will not estop her from claiming dower in land sold by her husband prior to such transactions, since her conduct could not have misled the purchasers; nor is she estopped by her husband's representa

tions in the deeds.

The earlier cases on this subject are collected in a note to Megginson v. Megginson, 14 L.R.A. 540.

There are to be found in the books freor in effect, of the general rule that, where a quent judicial expressions, either actually marriage is once shown, it is presumed to be valid until the contrary is shown. This presumption may be compared to the trunk of a tree of which nearly all other presumptions arising from marriage are branches.

Most important of these branches are, the presumption that no impediment existed to a marriage proved to have been contracted, and the presumption, where an impediment is shown in fact to have existed in the form of another marriage, that the impediment ceased to exist before the second marriage by reason of the death or the divorce of the former spouse.

So, therefore, it will be seen that, generally speaking, the presumption in favor of the validity of a marriage shifts to the second marriage of one who remarries during the life of a former spouse.

But the courts have sometimes refused to indulge this, and other presumptions, and

category of absolutism and inflexibility, to

The presumption of innocence in remarriage will overcome presumption of life.

Johnson v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 611, 55 Am. Rep. 884, 3 N. E. 232; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 338, 90 N. W. 66; Cooper v. Cooper, 86 Ind. 75; Kelly v. Drew, 12 Allen, 107, 90 Am. Dec. 138; Cash v. Cash, 67 Ark. 278, 54 S. W. 744; Murchison v. Green, 128 Ga. 339, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 702, 57 S. E. 709; Bowman v. Little, supra.

An illegal marriage may be validated by continued cohabitation as husband and wife after removal of the disability rendering the marriage void.

Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; McFarland v. McFarland, 51

A subsequent ceremonial marriage is not inconsistent with a prior common-law marriage of the same parties, and does not necessarily overcome the presumption thereof arising from matrimonial cohabitation, repute, and the declarations and acts of the parties. Adger v. Ackerman, 52 C. C. A. 568, 115 Fed. 124; Kromer v. Friday, 10 Wash. 621, 32 L.R.A. 671, 39 Pac. 229 (in effect); Shank v. Wilson, 33 Wash. 612, 74 Pac. 812. It was held in Moore v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 24 So. 374, that proof that a woman married a man and devised all of her property to him did not create the presumption that she, at the time of the marriage, did not know that he formerly cohabited with another woman, and that children were born to them.

A husband who lives and cohabits with his wife, having children by her, is presumed to have an affection for her; which presumption will continue until overthrown by a fair preponderance of evidence to the contrary. Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266. 43 L.R.A. 114, 72 Am. St. Rep. 98, 55 Pac. 46.

The presumption ordinarily obtaining, that persons married and living together cohabited as man and wife, will not be invoked to show condonement of cruelty, as against the positive testimony of the wife, in her action for divorce on that ground, that she did not cohabit with him after the commencement of the action. Denison v. Denison, 4 Wash. 705, 30 Pac. 1100.

Authority of celebrant.

If a marriage ceremony is proved, it is presumed that the celebrant was duly authorized. Franklin v. Lee, supra.

Chamberlain, 68 N. J. Eq. 736, 3 L.R.A. (N. S.) 244, 111 Am. St. Rep. 658, 62 Atl. 680; Barker v. Valentine, 125 Mich. 336, 51 L.R. A. 787, 84 Am. St. Rep. 578, 84 N. W. 297; Adger v. Ackerman, 52 C. C. A. 568, 115 Fed. 130; Pittinger v. Pittinger, 28 Colo. 308, 89 Am. St. Rep. 193, 64 Pac. 195.

No presumption of divorce follows from remarriage.

Adger v. Ackerman, supra; Shank v. Wilson, 33 Wash. 612, 74 Pac. 812; Betsinger v. Chapman, 88 N. Y. 487; Ellis v. Ellis, 58 Iowa, 720, 13 N. W. 65; Gilman V. Sheets, 78 Iowa, 499, 43 N. W. 299; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 113 Iowa, 324, 85 N. W. 31; Casley v. Mitchell, 121 Iowa, 97, 96 N. W. 725.

vor of the regularity and legality of his act. People v. Schoonmaker, 117 Mich. 190, 72 Am. St. Rep. 560, 75 N. W. 439.

The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony and all prerequisites to a valid marriage will be presumed until the contra is made to appear. Re Sloan (Wash.) 96 Pac. 684.

It is said in Delpit v. Cote, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 20 C. S. 338, that Catholics seeking marriage before a Protestant minister would be presumed to have renounced the Catholic faith, if that Church could exercise a compulsory jurisdiction over its members to the extent of forbidding their marriage before a Protestant clergyman.

Capacity of the parties.

In this connection, the only cases considered are those involving the presumption as to the capacity of the parties when only a single marriage is before the court. The cases having to do with the existence or force of such presumption where more than one marriage is shown will be found infra, under "Conflict of presumptions."

Where a marriage has been solemnized according to the forms of law, every presumption will be indulged in favor of its validity, including capacity of the parties to enter into the marital contract. Schmisseur v. Beatrie, 147 Ill. 210, 35 N. E. 525; Barber v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N. E. 93; Potter v. Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, 96 Am. St. Rep. 322, 68 N. E. 81; Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Beardsley, supra; Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N. J. Eq. 231, 34 Atl. 682.

of marriage and cohabitation of the parties under the belief that they were lawfully married. Murchison v. Green, 128 Ga. 339, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 707, 57 S. E. 709; Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78.

A presumption of the death of a party does not arise until he has been absent, without intelligence concerning him, for the period of seven years.

Hyde Park v. Canton, 130 Mass. 505; State v. Henke, 58 Iowa, 457, 12 N. W. 477; State v. Rocker, 130 Iowa, 239, 106 N. W. 645; Puckett v. State, 1 Sneed, 355. Relations between a man and woman, illicit in their inception, will be presumed to continue to be of that character until a changed relation is proved.

White v. White, 82 Cal. 427, 7 L.R.A. 799, 23 Pac. 276; Cartwright v. McGown, 121 II. 388, 2 Am. St. Rep. 105, 12 N. E. 737; Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa, 282, 57 as legitimate, and they were reputed to be husband and wife until their separation by death. Bergdoll's Estate, 7 Pa. Dist. R. 137.

Presumption of continuance.

The cases involving the question of the application of the rule as to the presump tion of the continuance of a marriage where a subsequent marriage is shown will be found infra, under "Conflict of presump

tions."

The marital relation, once established, is supposed to continue until it is proved to have been dissolved. Re Hamilton, 76 Hun, 200, 57 N. Y. S. R. 810, 27 N. Y. Supp. 813; Wallace v. Pereles, 109 Wis. 316, 53 L.R.A. 644, 83 Am. St. Rep. 898, 85 N. W. 371.

Where a marriage has been proved, the party asserting its dissolution must establish it. Wilson v. Allen, 108 Ga. 275, 33 S. E. 975.

When the defendant's marriage has been proved in a prosecution for adultery, it will be presumed to have continued until its dissolution by death or divorce is affirmatively shown. State v. Eggleston, 45 Or. 346, 77 Pac. 738.

The presumption of the continuance of the marital and family relation obtains in favor of one seeking to recover for goods sold and delivered by him at the family residence with no knowledge of a contemplated separation. Arnold v. Keil, 81 Ill. App. 237. In Stoutenborough v. Rammel, 123 Ill. App. 487, which was an action against the husband and wife to recover for furniture purchased by the wife, it was held that, the marriage being shown, the presumption attached that it continued; and that the husband and wife were living together in the family relation.

A statute creating a presumption of death after an absence of seven years has no application to a proceeding for divorce, so as to cast upon the plaintiff the burden of proving her husband to be alive. Spiltoir v. Spiltoir (N. J. Ch.) 64 Atl. 96.

The presumption that coverture once established is presumed to continue until the

Mich. 70, 56 N. W. 234; Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 21 N. E. 106; Spencer v. Pollock, 83 Wis. 215, 17 L.R.A. 848, 53 N. W. 490; Marks v. Marks, 108 Ill. App. 371; Cram v. Burnham, 5 Me. 213, 17 Am. Dec. 218; State v. Whaley, 10 S. C. N. S. 500; Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa, 282, 57 N. W. 851.

Deemer, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

One Frank E. Smith at one time owned the lands in controversy. He sold a tract to defendant Richards in the year 1888, and in the conveyance described himself as an unmarried man. In the years 1890 and 1891 he sold tracts to defendant Griffith, his wife, Anna, joining in the conveyance. contrary is shown obtains in favor of a woman alleging coverture to bar the statute of limitations running against a debt. Summerhill v. Darrow, 94 Tex. 71, 57 S. W. 942.

In

But a woman attacking a claim to land by adverse possession and improvements upon the ground that the statute did not run against her by reason of coverture incurs the burden of showing not only coverture at the time the adverse possession is alleged to have commenced, but also that it continued for a time sufficient to prevent the statute from taking effect. Corley v. Anderson, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 213, 23 S. W. 839.

The rule that a marriage once proved is presumed to have continued does not arise in favor of a mortgagor contesting the mortgage upon the ground of the nonjoinder of the wife, where it appears that she lived in a distant state for over thirty years, during which time, for periods of at least ten years at a time, they had no communication from, or knowledge of, each other, and that, after the lapse of one or more of those periods, she was living with another man and going by his name. Canadian & A. Mortg. & T. Co. v. Bloomer, 14 Wash. 491, 45 Pac. 34.

Where a woman abandoned her husband in Wales, and came to this country with the express intention of marrying another, and apparently in reliance upon his statement that her marriage in Wales would not be binding here, the cohabitation between her and the second husband was illicit in its origin, and, in the circumstances, will be presumed to have continued such. Jones v. Jones, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 223.

Foreign marriages.

For the purpose of determining the validity of a marriage in another state, the laws of such state, in the absence of proof to the contrary, will be presumed by a court to be the same as the laws of its own state. Re Richards, 133 Cal. 524, 65 Pac. 1034; Re Harrington, 140 Cal. 244, 98 Am. St. Rep. 51, 73 Pac. 1000; Re Hamilton, supra.

The common law as it exists in Michigan, recognizing as a marriage a declaration of marriage before a third person, followed by

the year 1899 he sold other tracts to defendants Fuller and Grobe, and in the conveyance described himself as a widower. Plaintiff claims that she married Smith in the year 1875; that she was never divorced from him, was his lawful widow at the time of his death; and that she never released her dower interest in any of the lands sold by him to the defendants. Defendants claim title under their conveyances from Smith, and deny that plaintiff is Smith's widow. The facts in the case are complicated, and the application of the law thereto of considerable difficulty. It appears that plaintiff was married in April of the year 1872 at Farmington, Iowa, to one Sylvanders. They lived together as husband and wife for three or four months, when Sylvanders left home cohabitation, will be presumed to prevail in Canada, where the alleged marriage was celebrated. People v. Loomis, 106 Mich. 250, 64 N. W. 18.

In an action for, bigamy proof of a ceremonal first marriage; in a foreign country, of defendant when he was fourteen years of åge, solemnized by one in holy orders, and followed by cohabitation of the parties as man and wife, raises a presumption that the defendant was capable of contracting marriage according to the laws of that country. Sokel v. People, 212 Ill. 238, 72 N. E. 382.

Where, in a prosecution for bigamy, a marriage in another state is shown, and it is valid according to the lex fori, it will, in the absence of proof of the foreign law, be presumed to be in accordance with the lex loci contractus. Dale v. State, 88 Ga. 552, 15 S. E. 287.

with the ostensible purpose of going to Burlington, Iowa, on a business trip, and, so far as the record shows, has never since been heard from. Plaintiff continued to live in Farmington until September, 1875, when she claims to have married Smith, who for a number of years had resided in that vicinity; the marriage, according to her contention, having been solemnized by a justice of the peace at the town of La Grange, in the state of Missouri. On the same day, or very soon thereafter, they returned to Lee county, Iowa, announced their marriage to their friends, and lived together there or in that vicinity as husband and wife for about seven years, excepting one year of that time, during which Smith was absent. The testimony is ample and undisputed that they other state upon the remarriage of a divorced person rests upon one asserting such restrictions as a defense to a prosecution for adultery with the divorced person. State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 40 L.R.A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936, 38 Atl. 81.

But proof of the solemnization of a marriage in a foreign country, aided by the concomitant presumption in favor of its validity, is insufficient to sustain a conviction in a prosecution for bigamy, based on that marriage and a subsequent one in this country, in the face of proof that both parties were under the age fixed by the law of the foreign country, and testimony of a competent witness that such law rendered the marriage absolutely void. Canale v. People. 177 Ill. 219, 52 N. E. 310.

In a prosecution for adultery in that the defendant, having a lawful wife, contracted a marriage with another and lived with her in unlawful cohabitation, the second marriage being admitted, proof of the former ceremonial marriage, solemnized by a priest in another country, raises the presumption that it was in accordance with the laws of that country and valid,-especially if followed by cohabitation; and the burden is on the defendant to show that the law required some further act to make it valid. Lanctot v. State, 98 Wis. 136, 67 Am. St. Rep. 800, 73 N. W. 575.

One contending that a contract of marriage per verba de prasenti, entered into in another state, is in violation of the restrictions which the law of that state imposes, has the burden of establishing the existence of such restrictions. Laurence v. Laurence, 164 Ill. 367, 45 N. E. 1071.

The burden of proving restrictions in an

upon one who is married on the high seas with the avowed purpose of evading the laws of his residence. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 42 L.R.A. 343, 66 Am. St. Rep. 74, 54 Pac. 143.

An intent to evade the laws of a state in which a divorce was granted, making remarriage of the divorced person unlawful, will not be assumed from the fact of his contracting a marriage in another state immediately before returning to that where the divorce was granted, merely from the presumption that everyone knows the law. State use of Newman v. Kimbrough (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 L.R.A. 668, 59 S. W. 1061.

Effect of ceremonial marriage to overcome presumption arising from cohabitation and reputation.

In determining who is entitled to dower in a deceased's estate, the presumption of marriage arising from cohabitation and repute may be overcome by proof that the claimant abandoned the deceased, went to her home, assumed her maiden name, and declared that she was a single woman; that, upon visiting the city of his home, she made no inquiries for him; and that he subse