west, and west of Garden City, and extend from near the east line of the county to the west line. "(24) That the lands described in exhibit B, attached to the plaintiff's amended petition, contain more than 50 tracts of such lands described and known as alfalfa lands, and contain more than 7,000 acres, and that such list is a fair average of the alfalfa land of the county. "(25) That there is still another class of alfalfa lands in Finney county which are highly improved, being set to alfalfa, having fruit trees growing thereon, dwellings and other buildings erected thereon, and being surrounded by fences, and some of them being in close proximity to the city of Garden City; all of which greatly enhance the value of said improved alfalfa lands. "(26) That the unimproved alfalfa land described in plaintiff's exhibit B, referred to in finding No. 24, was assessed for the purpose of taxation for the year 1902, and placed on the tax rolls of said county at the average value of $2.50 per acre. "(27) That the actual value of such unimproved alfalfa land in the month of March, 1902, was about $10 per acre,-that is, an average value per acre. "(28) That the average assessed valuation of improved land for the year 1902, as shown by the valuation set opposite such on the tax rolls of the county for that year, is approximately $5.75 per acre. very much less than the amount of the assessment; but the court held that in such a case equity could not intervene in aid of the taxpayer. In Litchfield v. Webster County, 101 U. S. 773, 25 L. ed. 925, it was held that, where a state under whose authority a tax is levied sets up a title in itself to the property taxed adverse to that of the true owner, and forbears to enforce the collection until the title is adjusted, a court of equity will enjoin the collection of the extraordinary compensation which the revenue laws of the state give for a delay in the payment of the taxes. In Conners's Appeal, 103 Pa. 356, it was held that equity would enjoin the collection of a tax clearly in excess of the amount required for the purpose for which the tax was levied. And to the same effect was the decision in St. Clair School Board's Appeal, 74 Pa. 252. This decision is quite similar to those which hold that an injunction will issue to enjoin the collection of a tax in excess of the amount permitted, by the law, to be raised. Cases of this character, however, clearly present a question of illegal taxes, and are not within the scope of this note. In some cases an injunction has been refused upon the ground that the evidence showed that the taxes were not excessive; but in these cases the right to the injunetion was not discussed. Smith v. Kelly, 24 "(29) That the average value in money of such improved alfalfa lands in the month of March, 1902, was about $25 per acre. "(30) That the said lands of the plaintiff were assessed at more than 40 per cent of their actual value in money; that the unimproved alfalfa lands of Finney county were assessed in the year 1902 at 25 per cent of their actual value in money: that the improved alfalfa lands of the county were assessed at less than 25 per cent of their actual value in money." On these findings, the court awarded a permanent, injunction conditioned upon the payment by the plaintiff of the balance of the state taxes for the year 1902. Of these rulings the board of county commissioners complain. Messrs. Edgar Roberts and Hoskinson & Hoskinson for plaintiff in error. Messrs. W. R. Hopkins and R. J. Hopkins for defendant in error. Johnston, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: S. A. Bullard, not being satisfied with the valuation which the local assessor placed on his lands, invoked the jurisdiction and judgment of the board of equalization, but the decision of that board was no more satisfactory than the other, and he then carried the question to the district court, asking that tribunal to revalue his property, and Or. 464, 33 Pac. 642; Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Rahn Twp. 9 Pa. Dist. R. 692; Hampson v. Adams, 6 Ariz. 335, 57 Pac. 621; Iowa & D. Teleph. Co. v. Schamber, 15 S. D. 588, 91 N. W. 78; Fifield v. Marinette County, 62 Wis. 532, 22 N. W. 705. In Oklahoma the statute required the assessment to be made at the fair cash value; and there are numerous cases which hold that injunction would not lie to restrain the collection of excessive taxes, unless it clearly appeared that the assessment had been placed at more than the fair cash value of the property. If it were assessed for more than its fair cash value, the assessment would be illegal under the statute. Weber v. Dillon, 7 Okla. 568, 54 Pac. 894; Martin v. Clay, 8 Okla. 46, 56 Pac. 715; Caffrey v. Overholser, 8 Okla. 202, 57 Pac. 206; Cranmer v. Williamson, 8 Okla. 683, 59 Pac. 249; Alva State Bank v. Renfrew, 10 Okla. 26, 62 Pac. 285; Streight v. Durham, 10 Okla. 361, 61 Pac. 1096; Rose v. Durham, 19 Okla. 373, 61 Pac. 1100. Upon the question of the right of a taxpayer to resort to court to recover taxes paid on erroneous or excessive assessment without previous resort to statutory remedies, see case note to First Nat. Bank v. Hopkinsville, ante, 685. to grant an injunction against the collection | been any ground for finding, that the offiof the tax imposed by the regular taxing cers were actuated by fraud, corruption, officers. If this attack prevails, and it or conduct so oppressive, arbitrary, or cashould be held that the assessment of prop- pricious as to amount to fraud. It is erty in Finney county was such as to in-true that the officers failed to assess the validate the tax against Bullard's lands, it property of the county on the basis of its would necessarily follow that the tax on cash value, which was a plain departure other lands of the county for that year from the requirements of the statute; but would be invalidated. Do the facts alleged it does not appear that, under the system of and found justify such a ruling and result? valuation adopted, Bullard was required to The courts are not charged with the powers pay more than his just proportion of the and duties of assessors, and have no right to taxes if all the property of the county had review the decision of those officers as to been fairly and regularly assessed. In the value of property. The legislature has reaching its judgment, the trial court only placed the responsibility upon the assessors considered the valuation placed upon three in the first instance, and, in case an owner classes of land within the county, and these of property is dissatisfied with their assess- were sand-hill land, like those of Bullard's, ments, he may appeal to the board of equali- improved and unimproved alfalfa lands. zation to review values and correct mistakes What values were placed on a great body of of judgment. When the statute prescribes land not embraced in these three classes does a method for revising or correcting unequal not appear; nor does it appear that, if all assessments, that remedy alone must be were considered, the valuation on Bullard's followed. Since the statute gives no right property could be regarded as excessive, or of appeal from the board of equalization, its that an injustice had been done to him. The opinion and judgment as to valuation is fact that there was not an absolute equality plenary; and it is not within the power of of assessments as between him and some the courts to interfere with a tax merely other taxpayers, or that the assessors, in because the assessment is excessive or un- disregard of the statute, assessed property equal. In Symns v. Graves, 65 Kan. 628, at less than its value, does not of itself 70 Pac. 591, where there was an attack upon justify the interference of a court of equity. the decision of the board of equalization, it Adams v. Beman, 10 Kan. 37. The mere was said that "matters of assessment and fact, too, that the taxing officers made a taxation are administrative in their charac- fraction, instead of the full, value of the ter, and not judicial; and an interference property, the basis of assessment, does not by judges who are not elected for that pur- authorize the granting of an injunction to pose, with the discharge of their duties by restrain the collection of taxes. Challiss those officers who are invested with the v. Rigg, 49 Kan. 119, 30 Pac. 190. While sole authority to make and estimate value, the court has found that the valuation is unwarranted by the law. The district placed on Bullard's property is excessive, court could not substitute its judgment for there is no intimation that it was frauduthat of the board of equalization, and this lently done, nor that it was an intentional court cannot impose its notion of value on discrimination in order to compel Bullard to either." In the same decision the only pay more than his share of the taxes of the grounds upon which there may be judicial county; nor, as before stated, does it appear interference was pointed out where it was that he has been required to pay more than said: "But fraud, corruption, and conduct his proportionate share of taxes. There so oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious as to was a difference of opinion between him and amount to fraud, will vitiate any official the assessors as to the values of his lands as act; and courts have power to relieve compared with those of others. The tax against all consequential injuries. In every law provides a board of equalization to settle case, however, the departure from duty such differences of opinion, and it is one to must be shown by the party seeking redress, which every taxpayer may apply. In reto fall within the well-defined limits of the vising and equalizing assessments, that powers of a court of equity." board has necessarily a broad discretion, and its decision, however erroneous, is plenary and final when fairly and honestly made. Does this case fall within the rules justifying an interference with the discretion and judgment of the board of equalization, | Judge Cooley, in speaking of the finality of and an injunction against the collection of the taxes founded on the valuations of that board? It does not appear that there was such a departure from duty by the officers as will give Bullard a right to this extraordinary remedy. It is not found by the trial court, nor does there appear to have its decision upon a question of excessive or unequal assessments, said: "If fraud is charged, equity may interfere; but equity has no jurisdiction under its general powers to correct a merely unequal or unjust assessment when there is a statutory board that may do so." Cooley, Taxn. p. 528; Lincoln County v. Bryant, 7 Kan. App. 252, | in good faith; and hence it furnished a 53 Pac. 775. The legislature has provided an adequate remedy at law for error and excess in valuations. Bullard availed himself of that remedy and from the board of equalization obtained a review and revaluation of his property, which is binding upon him in the absence of special circumstances entitling him to an appeal to a court of equity. There is no imputation against the good faith of the board in making its decision. It did find some errors in the valuations of the assessors, and did undertake to revise and equalize them. There is no claim that the board did not honestly value Bullard's prop erty, nor any claim or finding that there was fraud, or the equivalent of fraud, in its rules of assessment and equalization. It is true that the court found the value of Bullard's property to be excessive, but an assessment is not fraudulent merely because it is excessive. We then have the judgment of the board that there is equality in the valua tion of the property of the county, and that there is, in fact, no excessive valuation of Bullard's property. The trial court, upon a limited inquiry as to values, has given as its opinion that Bullard's property is valued at 15 per cent higher than some other lands in the county; but the law does not give an appeal from the board of equalization to the court, nor does it warrant the court case for equitable relief. There, too, it was found that no effective remedy could be obtained before the board of equalization, and, besides, it was possible to give relief by injunction in that case without affecting the whole tax levy of the county, or locking up the revenue necessary to conduct the local government. The facts justifying a resort to a court of equity in that case do not exist in this one, and the findings of fact here did not justify the district court in awarding an injunction. The judgment will therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to render judgment for the plaintiff in er for breach. Damages tract. breach of employment con 2. The damages for breach of a contract of employment are not limited to the wages which have accrued at the time of trial in the nisi prius court. (May 26, 1908.) a portion of plaintiff's claim in an action brought to recover damages for breach of an employment contract. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Nims, Hoyt, Erwin, & Vanderwerp, for plaintiff in error: in substituting its opinion of values for that of the officers who are invested by law with the sole authority to determine values. The statute does not contemplate, nor would it be practicable to permit, a review and revaluation in the courts of the state at the instance of taxpayers who might complain of overvaluation by assessors. The remedy for irregular or excessive assess- RROR to the Circuit Court for Muskegon E county to review a judgment denying ments before the board of equalization was deemed by the legislature to be an adequate one, and, in the absence of other grounds, it is an exclusive remedy. Reference is made to Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Atchison County, 54 Kan. 781, 39 Pac. 1039, as an authority for an award of an injunction. That case, aside from being an extreme one, is easily distinguishable from the one before us. There the assessment was not only irregular and excessive, but it was an intentional discrimination against one class of property under which certain taxpayers were required to pay four times more than their proportion of the taxes. The rule adopted for the assessment there was designed to destroy equality and uniformity between classes of property; one basis being used for the disfavored class and another basis for all other property in the county. The rule making such a gross discrimination could not have been adopted or applied Damages for breach of contract of employment are recoverable for the whole contract. Cutter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 95, 39 N. E. 1010; Blair v. Laflin, 127 Mass. 518; Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co. 127 Mo. 520, 30 S. W. 151; Rhoades v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 49 W. Va. 494, 55 L.R.A. 170, 87 Am. St. Rep. 826, 39 S. E. 209; Prichard v. Martin, 27 Miss. 305; Saxonia Min. & Note. See subject note to Howay v. Going-Northrup Co. 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49, as to remedy of wrongfully discharged servant by action for damages for breach of contract, including the measure of damages. Moore, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Reduction Co. v. Cook, 7 Colo. 569, 4 Pac. | Northrup Co. 24 Wash. 88, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1111; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 71 49, 85 Am. St. Rep. 942, 64 Pac. 135. Am. St. Rep. 384, 53 N. E. 181, 54 N. E. 437; Forked Deer Pants Co. v. Shipley, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2299, 80 S. W. 476; Moore v. Central Foundry Co. 68 N. J. L. 14, 52 Atl. 292; Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. 173 U. S. 1, 43 L. ed. 591, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567, 11 Am. Rep. 509; Winkler v. Racine Wagon & Carriage Co. 99 Wis. 184, 74 N. W. 793; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 76 Am. Dec. 140; Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64; Howay v. Going-Northrup Co. 24 Wash. 88, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49, 85 Am. St. Rep. 942, 64 Pac. 135. In the case of a life contract, prospective damages are recoverable in an action for its breach. Brighton v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 103 Mich. 420, 61 N. W. 550, 112 Mich. 217, 70 N. W. 432; Stearns v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 112 Mich. 651, 71 N. W. 148; Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.; Cutter v. Gillette; Moore v. Central Foundry Co.; and Boland v. Glendale Quarry Co..—supra. This suit was brought in justice court on July 3, 1907. The plaintiff filed a written declaration containing a special count alleging a contract, breach, and damages and the common counts, with bill of particulars attached. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice of justification for the discharge of plaintiff and a set-off. The case was tried in justice court before a jury, and, on July 17, 1907, a judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $190. Defendant appealed the case to the circuit court, and, on September 25, 1907, it came on for trial before a jury. Counsel for plaintiff, in his opening statement, said that plaintiff and her daughter Anna were employed by defendant as domestics at defendant's summer home near Muskegon, Michigan, for a period from about June 21, 1907, to which time as defendant should leave said summer home, but to at least October 1, 1907; that, after The declaration alleges a breach of con- plaintiff and her daughter had worked for tract and consequent damage. Williams v. Conners, 53 App. Div. 599, 66 N. Y. Supp. 11; Allen v. Glen Creamery Co. 101 App. Div. 306, 91 N. Y. Supp. 935; Paige v. Barrett, 151 Mass. 67, 23 N. E. 725; Winkler v. Racine Wagon & Carriage Co. supra. Mr. Edward E. Kane, with Messrs. Cross, Lovelace, & Ross, for defendant in error: A. wrongfully discharged employee who sues for damages for breach of a contract of employment for a fixed time less than his life can recover only the actual damages he has sustained down to the time of trial. Mt. Hope Cemetery Asso. v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67, 28 N. E. 834; Van Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 23 L.R.A. 853, 25 S. W. 1113; McMullan v. Dickinson Co. 60 Minn. 156, 27 L.R.A. 409, 51 Am. St. Rep. 511, 62 N. W. 120; Sommer v. Conhaim, 25 Misc. 166, 54 N. Y. Supp. 146; Everson v. Powers, 89 N. Y. 527, 42 Am. Rep. 319; Bassett v. French, 10 Misc. 672, 31 N. Y. Supp. 667, Affirmed in 155 N. Y. 46, 49 N. E. 325; Zender v. Seliger Toothill Co. 17 Misc. 126, 39 N. Y. Supp. 346; Pacific Exp. Co. v. Walters (Tex. Civ. App.) 93 S. W. 496; Darst v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 81 Fed. 284; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 200: Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299, 38 Am. Rep. 8: Roberts v. Crowley, 81 Ga. 439, 7 S. E. 740; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Offutt. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 301; Schroeder v. California Yukon Trading Co. 95 Fed. 298; Howay v. Going defendant under this contract for about ten days they were discharged by defendant without cause; that this suit was then instituted to recover the wages plaintiff and her daughter had already earned and damages for breach of the contract on the part of defendant. After the opening statement had been made, and before any evidence had been introduced, the trial court made a ruling that plaintiff would be limited to recover such damages only as had accrued from the date of her discharge by defendant to the date of trial in justice court, a period of seventeen days. To this ruling plaintiff's counsel excepted. Plaintiff's counsel contended that, if the rule adopted by the court was correct, plaintiff was still entitled to recover such damages as had accrued from the date of her discharge to the date when the case was tried in circuit court. The trial court held that the case must be determined as it existed in justice court, and no damages could be recovered beyond that time, to which ruling plaintiff's counsel excepted. The assignments of error are discussed by counsel under two heads; First, the court erred in holding that plaintiff could not recover damages for the whole contract period, but that she was limited in her recovery to such damages as had accrued at the time of the trial in justice court; second, the court erred in not allowing plaintiff to recover such damages as had accrued up to the time of the trial in circuit court. Before proceeding to discuss the two heads presented by counsel for appellant, some at tention must be given to the contention of counsel for defendant. It is claimed the verdict was a consent verdict, and not appealable. We do not so understand the record. The plaintiff claimed the right to prove her damages in full, but the court ruled she could not make proof of damages later than the date of trial in justice court. Exception was duly taken, and the action of the court is reviewable. It is claimed the special count is not for a breach of the contract, but is an action on the contract to recover plaintiff's wages. We do not agree with this contention. The special count set out the contract and its breach. A bill of particulars was filed, one item of which reads: "To damage by breach of contract being what plaintiff and daughter would have earned if allowed to complete contract, $144." Under her plea, defend ant gave notice of justification for the discharge of plaintiff and her daughter. The defendant was not misled. See Costello v. Ten Eyck, 86 Mich. 348, 24 Am. St. Rep. 128, 49 N. W. 152. expiration of the contract period, it was im possible for the jury to ascertain or assess the damage for the unexpired portion of the contract period subsequent to the time of trial. In support of this contention, the defendant cites the cases of Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381; Fowler v. Armour, 24 Ala. 194; Litchenstein v. Brooks, 75 Tex. 196, 12 S. W. 975, and Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355, in which cases it seems to have been held that, if the suit is begun before the expiration of the contract period, damages can only be allowed to the time of the trial. He asserts that in the case of Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362, 19 Am. Rep. 285, in which full damages were given, the writ was brought after the expiration of the contract period. On the other hand, it has been held in Vermont that, if there has been such a breach as to authorize the plaintiff to treat it as entirely putting an end to the contract, he may recover damages for an entire nonfulfilment, and is not limited to what he has actually sustained at the time of his bringing suit or the time of trial. Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 76 Am. Dec. 140. And We now come to the important question, in Maine, in an action for breach of a conand that is, Was the trial court right in re- tract of hiring, brought before the expira lation to the measure of damages? An ex- tion of the contract period, it was held that amination of the authorities will show that the just recompense for the actual injury there is a hopeless conflict in them. The sustained by the illegal discharge was the precise question is a new one in this state. stipulated wages, less whatever sum the This court has held that, in case of a con- plaintiff actually earned, or might have tract for life, or during one's ability and earned, by the use of reasonable diligence. disposition to perform the duties of his po- Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64. Such would sition, that prospective damages are recov- seem to be the rule in Pennsylvania. See King erable in an action for its breach, and that v. Steiren, 44 Pa. 99, 84 Am. Dec. 419; the plaintiff is entitled to recover such a Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168. And the sum as represents fairly and reasonably the defendant concedes that such is the rule in extent of his loss, the measure of damages England. We do not go into an exhaustive being the present value of the contract. consideration of the decisions upon the quesBrighton v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 103 tion, as we consider it to have been settled Mich. 420, 61 N. W. 550, Id., 112 Mich. in favor of the ruling given at the trial by 217, 70 N. W. 432; Stearns v. Lake Shore our decisions. Paige v. Barrett, 151 Mass. & M. S. R. Co. 112 Mich. 651, 71 N. W. 67, 23 N. E. 725; Blair v. Laflin, 127 Mass. 148. 522; Dennis v. Maxfield, 10 Allen, 138; JewIn Cutter v. Gillette, 163 Mass. 96, 39 N. ett v. Brooks, 134 Mass. 505. See also E. 1011, it was said: "The remaining ques-Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74; Amos v. tion is whether the jury should have been Oakley, 131 Mass. 413; Warner v. Bacon, allowed to assess damages for the period of 8 Gray, 397, 408, 69 Am. Dec. 253; Drumtime subsequent to the trial. The plaintiff mond v. Crane, 159 Mass. 577, 581, 23 was hired for five years from April 25, L.R.A. 707, 38 Am. St. Rep. 460, 35 N. E. 1892, and was discharged about the middle 90. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued of July, 1892. He brought suit on Novem- when he was wrongfully discharged. ber 10, 1892, and the verdict was rendered suit is not for wages, but for damages for on March 15, 1894. The verdict assessed at the breach of his contract by the defendant. the sum of $3,180.95, the plaintiff's whole For this breach he can have but one action. damages for breach of the contract of hiring, In estimating his damages the jury have the and stated that of this amount $1,392.95 was right to consider the wages which he would the damage to the time of trial. The defend- have earned under the contract, the probabilant concedes that the plaintiff is entitled to ity whether his life and that of the defendrecover damages for an entire breach, so far ant would continue to the end of the contract as such damages can be ascertained, but con- period, whether the plaintiff's working abiltends that, as the trial occurred before the ity would continue, and any other uncertain His |