peace; since the ordinary principles of policy | been the most wilful disturber of the public peace, never recurred, but were superseded permanently to raise certain suspicions respecting her possible by extraordinary apprehensions and extraordinary deportment. On the other hand, besides the est precautions. The "three northern powers" were sential antagonism between the political principles now fused, as it were, into an almost inseparable of St. Petersburg and Paris, she had actually sufwhole; and it may well be questioned, at this fered, no less than other nations, from French stage of the drama, whether Germany will ever aggression; she had been one of the principal insecure, for national purposes, a more efficient uni-struments in repelling and chastising it; and she ty than that which community of recollections, was now the most hearty and cordial coöperator responsibilities, and fears had established between in the measures by which such possibilities were Prussia, Austria, and Russia.* to be obviated for the future. There was no reason, therefore, to doubt the original sincerity of her councils. But the fact still remained that she was the only leading power besides France who had something definite to desire; and this presumed community of feeling between the unsatis fied and the dissatisfied, left an opening for overtures which, if they have not resulted in any important combinations, have originated schemes of policy familiar, by name at least, to most of our readers. Indeed, this brief allusion to the circumstances of the great settlement, will explain much of that foreign policy of France, projected or pursued, which is now so interesting, and which we have recently had occasion to describe.

On such considerations as these was based the system which, for three and thirty years of general peace, was substantially allowed to regulate the public policy of Europe. Looking at the five dispensing powers, we may say that the elements of disturbance appear to be confined to France and Russia. Between them lay a compact mass of strength, invested solely with the functions of conservatism. All the interests of Prussia and Austria were in the maintenance of the status quo. The former power, by the events of the war, had finally secured that increase of territory demanded by the previous disproportion between her resources and her obligations; and for which, in the past century, she had so desperately struggled. The latter power was still more deeply interested in the preservation of the existing equilibrium. Less, relatively speaking, than either of her two northern neighbors had she gained from the dividend of territorial spoils; and there were obvious reasons for apprehending that any further change would be to her prejudice, if not at her expense. Besides this, her peaceable rule in her own provinces depended in no slight degree upon the predominance of those political principles, the maintenance of which, as well as of the territorial arrangements, had now been stipulated by the system established, and which, in fact, she herself had been mainly instrumental in imposing. Italy and Germany served for little but to swell the influence of Austria and Prussia. In the position of Russia there was somewhat more ambiguity. Her enor-curity was thought to demand. Comparatively mous extent of territory, so disproportioned to that of her neighbors; her comparative immunity from the worst consequences of war; the restless character of her policy; and the notorious direction of her ambition towards ends irreconcilable with the equilibrium of Europe-concurred with the traditions of the old system, under which she had

That denunciation of "the Treaties of 1815," which was incessantly repeated by the government restored under these very compacts; which was the first cry of the victorious insurgents of July, and the first proclamation of the young republic of February last, rested entirely upon the circumstances which we have been relating. It is true that, looking strictly to the due and lawful influence of France in the European system, it could not be then argued from facts, and assuredly it cannot be now shown from experience, that she had suffered any serious penalty or deprivation. No such arbitrary interference with her territory took place as had awaited other states less actively concerned. It was only after a repetition of great prevocations that the line of her frontier was subjected to the modifications which the common se

A

speaking, little indignation was expressed against the treaty of May, 1814, by which the affairs of France had been originally arranged; and which fixed her frontiers according to the line of November, 1792. But, though the further cessions now exacted were, certainly, not disproportioned to the provocation given, they formed a pretext for an outery, which has but little abated ever since. * After looking back at the politics of the last thirty part of the department of Ardennes was taken off, years, the reader may be amused with the following opinion of one of the most sagacious, well-informed, and exas was also the Saarbruck district, up to Landau, perienced writers of his day:This transient union of while Chambéry reverted again to its ancient Austria, Prussia, and Russia (in 1772) was a singular lords; Geneva received a little enlargement, and phenomenon, produced by a conjunction of extraordinary circumstances, assisted by the genius of one of the great- the protectorate of the tiny principality of Monaco est men of any age, and beyond the sphere of all the cal- was transferred to Sardinia. "The line of the culations of ordinary politics. Such phenomena must al-Rhine" was not lost by the treaties of 1815; for ways defeat them; they exceed the science, and expose its insufficiency. A similar combination will, perhaps, it had never belonged to any France recognized not occur in the course of many centuries; it could never last; its permanence would be in contradiction to the na ture of things, and to the necessary order of all political relations."—Gentz's Reply to Hauterive's "Etat de la France à la Fin de l'An VIII.," (written in 1801,) chap. 3. Now who will be bold enough to pronounce upon state of Europe?

the

in the history of peaceful and independent Europe;' nor had it been temporarily gained but by the most violent and arbitrary invasion of ancient rights-by the annexation of Belgium, the subjugation of Holland, and the violent dispossession and

ejection of some score of the princes of Ger- de Polignac-English as was that minister in his many. Yet this is the frontier termed "natural" personal inclinations-there is scarcely a statesman by French writers; for the restoration of which half to be found who did not advocate the Alliance Russe the nation has been clamoring and cabelling ever as the true policy of France. Most emphatically is since 1815, and the loss of which they have never it worth remarking, that this policy, which repreceased to represent as an indignity and a stigma. sented nothing but the selfishness of dynastic ambiIt is certain, indeed, that all this agitation and tion or popular interests, was the darling system of struggle on the part of France against the settle- the republicans, as well as of legitimists; while ment of 1815, has sprung exclusively from an am- it was reserved for a constitutional government to bitious desire to recover an influence which was not forego such intrigues for the nobler consideration legitimate; and a frontier which, however geo- of succoring the struggles of independence. The graphically natural, was never historically rightful. legitimists, with all their confessions of obligation It has been a mere question of territory, not of the republicans, with all their professions of genprinciple. As far as the other and more justly erosity and liberalism-concurred in taking territooffensive ordinances of the congress went, they rial aggrandizement as the groundwork of their have long ago been cancelled. Whatever curb policy. It was the government of Louis Philippe may have been kept upon Italy and Germany, which exchanged such visionary conspiracies for France has been left to modify her institutions the more disinterested objects of the Alliance Anand government as seemed best to her, in the full-glaise, and the cordial promotion of constitutional reest license of political freedom; and few will deny forms. The common cry of M. de Chateaubriand that she has availed herself largely enough of the and M. Louis Blanc was, "the line of the Rhine" privilege. If the necks of the French were still at whatever expense to the nations of Europe, or galled by a government of a dynasty imposed by whatever violence to the duties of France. That an armed alliance, there would be more reason in of M. Guizot and his colleagues was constitutional these restless clamors for a new organization of freedom, and the entente cordiale by which alone so the political system; but, as it is, such protests honorable a cause was to be secured. Alas! that can be only regarded as the irrepressible symptoms it should not have remained so to the end.

of feverish and dissatisfied ambition.

The old federative system of France consisted in such a concerted alliance with the several minor powers as should make them at all times available for any combination against one of the leading states; and it is surprising to what an extent this system was practically carried, considering the adroitness and versatility requisite to the successful adoption of so singular a policy. How the states of the empire were conciliated to this scheme, and how closely they became attached to France, we explained on a very recent occasion. Spain-for after the peace of the Pyrenees the kingdom of Philip II. had definitively fallen to the second rank of European powers-was virtually consigned to the influence of France by the Treaty of Utrecht, and was formally attached to her train by the Fam

From what we have premised, no difficulty will be found in comprehending the various schemes of policy by which French cabinets have been, and still are tempted. The problem being to recover some of the lost influence of France, and to supersede existing arrangements on the eastern frontier by some adjudication more flattering to the nation, there appeared to be two systems of operation that of the Alliance Russe, and that of the old federative policy of Richelieu and the Capets. The first system was based upon the probabilities of conciliating the court of St. Petersburg by a community of interests created for the occasion. As France and Russia were the only two powers who wanted anything, there appeared a natural opportunity of reciprocating good offices, and of combin-ily Compact. Naples and Parma, through the ing their efforts for the attainment of their respective ends. Sometimes this system was developed in a deliberate scheme for an offensive alliance, such as we described the other day in the case of the French republicans, where the partition of Turkey on one side, and the annexation of the Rhenish provinces on the other, were to be the undissembled conditions of the projected treaty. At other times it was advocated with less determined, and, perhaps, less daring purposes, assuming the form merely of a certain leaning towards the Russian connection as a principle of policy, in preference to any approaches to other courts of Europe. It is to be observed that this was the characteristic policy of all the governments of the restoration. Notwithstanding the indebtedness of that dynasty to Great Britain and her other allies, the Bourbons were no sooner seated on the throne than they turned towards St. Petersburg with the views which we have been describing; and from M. de Richelieu even down to M.

same connection, were united in the same interests; and the antagonism traditionally subsisting between the emperor and the pope, together with the natural apprehensions of the republics of Genoa and Venice, combined to bring the whole Italian Peninsula within the sphere of attraction; and even in Malta, from the constitution and traditions of the order, French influence was usually predominant. So intimately was Poland connected, after the same curious fashion, with France, that its dependence was recognized in the proverbs of the nation; and Turkey itself, which owed to this very policy of the Most Christian King its introduction into the European system, was attached to the same scheme so strongly, that a rupture between Louis XIV. and the Porte is recorded in history as a prodigious and unnatural occurrence, and the old traditional tie of amity was, in fact, only definitely snapped by Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. This system received its first severe blow at the par

tition of Poland; but it was renewed on a gigantic | political relations of the present day, that it may scale by Napoleon; its revival and adaptation to be of some advantage to notice it.

the present state of things was warmly advocated Of all the creations of the Vienna congress, by the French republicans; and only eighteen there was none which, superficially viewed, apmonths ago, it was represented by M. Capefigue as the policy which the state of Europe, the course of events, and the constitution of M. Guizot's cabinet, were irresistibly conspiring to restore.

The operations of the general system we have been here describing, compose the political history of Europe during the thirty years' peace; and it will only be necessary to say a few words upon the modifications of the original settlement which had been introduced in the interval, before we come to that present state of things, to the illustration of which the previous remarks have been directed. The reader, we hope, will not have come thus far, without discovering the point de depart to which he is approaching. A just comprehension of the state of Europe is only to be derived from a clear view of the actual system under which its family of nations have been living up to the moment of the changes now threatened, and from a due understanding of the functions discharged by each particular state in the preservation of the general equilibrium. It is only by appreciating what existed, that we can determine what it really is, that has been, or is likely to be, destroyed. It is only by reviewing the principles which have hitherto influenced, and the compacts which have hitherto guided, the public policy of Europe, that we can properly comprehend the character and significance of those movements by which it is now hoped to supersede them.

peared a more excellent or admirable work than the kingdom of the Netherlands. It fulfilled all the conditions required in the territorial distribution of this part of Europe; it indemnified a princely house which had deserved well of the dispensing powers; and it seemed obviously and equally calculated for the best interests of the states which were to compose it. The Austrian provinces of the Netherlands, and the independent republic of Holland had, before the first revolution, formed the rampart of Northern Europe against France, which it was now desired to reconstruct; and so naturally was the proposed scheme recommended, that even in the preceding century the union of Holland with the Austrian Netherlands, under a prince of the House of Orange, was advocated as one of the best imaginable combinations for the tranquillity of Europe. For the last twenty years Austria had waived her claims over these distant and costly provinces; and there appeared no possibility of organizing them more judiciously than by uniting their interests with those of their maritime neighbors. Holland was a commercial, Belgium a manufacturing state; what one country fabricated, the other might export; and thus the capabilities of each would be combined for the advantage of both. Even as regarded historical traditions, there was something to be said for the reconstitution of the Netherlands. Nothing, at all events, could appear more reasonable or commendable than the experiment. It was in vain hinted that strong diversities of religious faith and hereditary institutions would probably conspire, with the inextinguishable instinct of nationality, to create repugnances incompatible with its success. Such objections were overruled; and the kingdom of the Netherlands took its appointed place among the powers of Europe. Everybody remembers the sequel. At the very first shock the artificial edifice fell asunder; and the Belgians demanded an acknowledgment of their separate nationality. Europe had combined, by solemn stipulations, to guarantee the House of Orange in the possession of this dominion; and the House of Orange claimed the benefit of the suretyship. Yet the constructing powers reconsidered Not their work by the light of experience; and owing

The interval between the original pacification and the present convulsions, is divided into two equal portions by the French revolution of July, 1830; which conveniently separates one period from another, and introduces an epoch which may be regarded as a kind of transition period between that which preceded it, and that which perhaps is now to follow. Up to that year, the policy of the allied powers, which we have described above, had an almost undisputed sway; and the incidents of European history during the fifteen years which intervened were mainly confined to such manifestations of its force as were supplied by the successive suppression of liberal movements in Naples, Piedmont, Portugal, and Spain. But the revolution of July gave a new aspect to affairs.

only was France-a leading power-transformed to the new-born cordiality between England and into a real constitutional monarchy, and transferred, in the balance of political principles, from the side of the allies of Laybach, to the side of Great Britain and its reformed parliament, but the effect of this metamorphosis was most sensibly felt in the several revolutions which followed, then as now, in the train of Parisian catastrophies. We need not repeat the story of eighteen years ago; but the moral of the Belgian question, and the decision of Europe on its merits, is so strikingly illustrative of the change then introduced into the political system, and has so pointed a bearing upon the

France, liberal principles carried the day. France and England said "yes;" the three northern powers abstained, in the face of such a combination, from saying "no ;" and Belgium became an independent state. What is now remarkable is, that this concession to the reasonable requirements of a people, has not been attended with any of the political results which might have been predicted from such a reversal of the original scheme. Independent Belgium appears just as little likely as the Southern Netherlands would have been to subserve the interests or ambition of France. Whether

from the “English intrigues" at the siege of Ant- | rope had since been governed. Cracow seems to werp, as M. Louis Blanc thinks, or from the good have been "the diamond necklace" of 1846! sense of the people and the government as we From the height we have at length attained, should rather suggest, it is certain that Belgium we are enabled to take a comprehensive glance at has discharged her European duties, in her own the present state of Europe. We can observe way, as well as the allied sovereign were for mak- | how far the harmony and effectiveness of the gening her do, in theirs; the difference being this, that whereas the fire-proof fabric of the congress of Vienna was in a blaze with the first sparks of revolution, the more natural edifice substituted by the conference of London, has remained safe and entire in the very heart of a conflagration; and may now be envied by some of those states which looked so suspiciously on its reconstruction. The subsequent events in the Spanish Peninsula illustrated still more conspicuously the influence exercised upon the destinies of Europe by the element thus powerfully introduced into the operations of the political system. In spite of the resistance, still passive, of the three northern powers, the triumph of constitutional principles over the doctrines of absolutism was again openly symbolized in Portugal and Spain. In fact, the quadruple alliance was the counter-manifesto to the holy alliance.

eral system has been disturbed, or is threatened,
by the recent catastrophes; and whether any of
its members, either from internal disorganization
or external pressure, have been rendered incapable
of discharging their appointed functions.
We can
examine the perils to which the body politic may
appear exposed through any of the ordinary sources
of disorder, such as the undue aggrandizement of
any leading power, or the destruction of any mi-
nor power having a critical mission in the system,
or from the constitution of a power altogether
new. Should no such serious convulsions appear
probable, we can ascertain how far the reciprocal
relations of European states have been affected by
the recent movements; and what modifications of
the system we have been describing may now be
feared or be expected.

Eight months ago it did certainly appear probable that the public law of 1815 would be swept away by the storms of the present year, as completely as that of 1648 had been scattered to the winds by the revolutions of 1791; and that the total subversion of the political fabric would leave no occasion for any such comments as we are here offering. But this extreme hazard appears now to be passed. The force of the shock it may be hoped is spent ; and though the constitutional edifices of the continent are still trembling on their bases, there seems no longer such serious reason for apprehending any permanent loss of equilibrium. France, which gave, as usual, the first sig

We need not make any specific allusion to the events immediately preceding the revolutions of last February and March. It is worth remarking, however, how general seems to have been the persuasion, in political and diplomatic circles, even before these convulsions, that the time had come for the convocation of another congress, not only to settle those numerous points of international differences which the mere lapse of thirty years, even under the most effective of systems, would be sure to introduce, but even to undertake the remodelling of Europe upon a scheme which would supply the omissions, as well as correct the errors, of the Congress of Vienna.* We may be now almost in-nal of disturbance, has also set the unexpected clined to smile at our agitation upon the Spanish marriages, or the Swiss schism; but the last breach of public faith with respect to Poland will hardly be forgotten, even amidst a whirlwind of revolutions. It is remarkable that M. Capefigue's treatise on the acts and guarantees of the Vienna Congress, the title of which we have prefixed to these observations, was called forth solely by this deed, which he regarded as virtually repealing that code of public law which the treaties of 1815 had created; and by which the political system of Eu-introduced entirely new principles into the general

example of returning wisdom; and what we have recently asserted of the domestic proceedings of the French nation, may now be yet more unhesitatingly predicated of its external relations. As far as we may judge from what has apparently become the set tide of events, the France of 1848 is not likely to assume any other attitude towards Europe than that of the France of 1847. Hitherto, French revolutions have affected, more or less violently, the system of Europe, because they

*The amusing pamphlet which we have placed at the policy of a country so capable of influencing the head of the present paper, is an illustration of the spirit great European commonwealth. Thus the revohere spoken of. European Remodellings" was written lution of 1789 overthrew all public law whatever; before the events of February; and yet purposes, in or der to avoid the definite tendencies of national ambition, because French influence became supreme in conand remedy certain anomalies, a reconstruction of the tinental Europe, and the principles of the first Continent little less thorough than that actually portend-revolutionists survived through all the changes of ed six months ago. Germany was to be reduced to the five independent states of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover: the inheritances of the extinguished houses being divided among the survivors, according to the relationship of their sovereigns or the natural suggestions of locality. Charles Albert was to be sovereign of the Lombard Venetian kingdom from Venice to Genoa, with his capital at Milan. Tuscany was to absorb the minor duchies. Poland was to be reconstituted. Russia was to have the Danubian provinces; but Austria, as mistress of the northern half of European Turkey, was to be interposed between her legions and the glistening bait of the Bosphorus.

the Parisian constitutions. In the same way the revolution of 1830 produced its effects, because the principles of those parties who achieved it continued to shape the policy of the government afterwards; and constitutional France, as we have already said, was in this way drawn towards the English alliance, from the Alliance Russe, and from the compacts of Verona, which had moulded the policy of her former cabinets. And similarly, if

particular forms into which this order may be developed, it signifies but little. Under any probable conditions, France will still apparently be the France of the last fifteen years, as well with respect to her European mission as to her domes

the existing French government really represented there should still survive a possibility of such a the identical republic which was proclaimed in catastrophe, is part of the price which FrenchFebruary last from the steps of the Hotel de Ville, men must pay for their republic; but the hazard we might confidently anticipate that the foreign is less than could have been hoped for some politics of the republicans, such as we on that oc- months back. Order will, in all likelihood, retail casion described them, would very characteristic- its present supremacy over anarchy; and as to the ally modify the mission of France, and materially influence, if not altogether subvert, the system of Europe. It is now, however, notorious that this is not the case. Excepting in so far as the effects of the original impulse may survive, (and these, we should imagine, must have been considerably tic government. It may, perhaps, be thought, qualified by subsequent warnings,) it can hardly that a possible restoration of the elder Bourbons be said that republican France is now exerting on might involve a return to the old legitimist policy, the affairs of Europe any influence, beyoud or be- and revive the combinations of 1823; but this is a side that legitimate influence which pertains to so contingency not very probable—in either of its asgreat a nation. The foreign policy of the French sumptions. As far as speculation can be warRepublic, as defined by M. de Lamartine, was in- ranted in such a case as this, we may anticipate deed something to feed the speculatious of Eu- that the foreign policy of the republic will be rope but as interpreted by General Cavaignac, it nearly the foreign policy of the constitutional is little but the policy of the best periods of the monarchy, with the advantage, perhaps, of being constitutional monarchy. We might, perhaps, exempted from those complications which dynassay even more than this; for it may indeed be tic interests were found to create. We may see questioned whether any recent French government another Ancona perhaps; but not another Marenwould have been strong enough, as things then go. There is no reason why the National Asstood, to hold a French army well in hand at the sembly should be "republican" on this point foot of the Alps, while trumpets were sounding alone; nor has it given any indications of being on the Tessino. France is not only recovering so disposed. Propagandism has been disclaimed her position, but she is fencing about with the and discouraged as pointedly as communism; and cautious jealousy which recent perils have sug-the cry of " Poland" had no better success than gested. It would be difficult to select any period the cry of " organized labor." These presumpsince the last war, at which her external demean- tions are confirmed by the attitude already taken or has been characterized by more satisfactory by the French government upon the Italian quesmoderation or greater prudence, than under the tion, which has brought about a situation singubrief interlude of the Cavaignac dictatorship. Even larly analogous to that of 1831. While we write, if the style and title of the republic be finally re- France and England are again acting in concert tained, yet it does not seem likely that any very to procure a modification of the treaties of 1815 formidable anomaly will be introduced into the in favor of an insurgent people at the hands of an system of monarchical Europe. The draft of the ancient ally; and most earnestly is it to be hoped constitution as (perhaps not finally) revised, pro- that the affairs of Lombardy may be arranged as vides for as staid and as respectable an impersona-temperately as were the affairs of Belgium-with tion of sovereignty as is perhaps consistent with the character of the crisis. A president, elected for four years, and reëligible after a like interval, The respective positions of Austria and Prussia with no inconsiderable patronage, and with a are characterized by singular embarrassments. In traitement more munificent than that of the First the first place, there is this most important fact to Consul, and only inferior to that of the Grand be noticed, that-as regards the joint relations Electeur of M. Sieyès, will be an acceptable sub- previously subsisting between these states towards stitute for a committee of public safety, or a di- the rest of Europe-that alliance of the three rectory. Most reports concur in designating the northern powers, of which we have recorded the present chief of the executive power as the proba- origin and the influence, must now be considered ble inaugurator of this new office; and if this at least suspended, if not finally broken up. In should indeed be the result of the approaching fact, no incident of the late convulsions has been election, Europe, as well as France, will appa- more remarkable than this, that Berlin and Vienna rently have reason to be thankful. A firm and have been made to impersonate the traditional temperate policy, combining the national readiness character of revolutionary Paris; and to proclaim for war, with a resolute determination, upon any on their own proper territories those very principles creditable conditions, to preserve peace, is what the which it has hitherto been their chief political events of the last three months lead us to hope from function to neutralize and denounce. The drag has General Cavaignac. As regards the internal con- not only slipped away from the wheel of the dition of his country, there is no present prospect machine, but it is now actually dangling at the of its falling into any such contagious or uncon- horses' heels, and stimulating their speed. That trollable disorganization as would affect its rela- combination which represented the principle of tions with the other powers, of Europe. That conservatism in the system has disappeared.

equal advantage to the system of Europe, and less incidental disturbance of its peace.