with by agreement of the parties.382 And it has been held that the notice is unnecessary when, at the time of making the lease, it is provided that the tenancy shall expire at a certain time, or on the happening of some contingency.388 Furthermore, such statutes have been construed to apply only to the termination of the tenancy by the direct act of the landlord, as by entry or notice, and not to change the rule which previously existed, that the tenancy will terminate by operation of law upon the conveyance or lease of the premises by either the landlord or the tenant, or upon any act of the tenant hostile to the landlord's title, or on the death of either Party,384

Upon the termination of a tenancy at will by the lessor, or by his death, the tenant is, at common law, entitled to the enblements, or annual crops sown by him, and, upon its termination by the lessee's death, his representative has the same right; but the lessee has no such right if he himselt terminates the tenancy. 385 And on the termination of the tenancy by the lessor, the tenant has a reasonable time within which he may enter for the removal of his goods.386

882 Fajon v. Goodale, 8 Allen (Mass.) 202; Davis v. Murphy, 126 Mass. 14.

383 Ashley v. Warner, 11 Gray (Mass.) 43; Hollis v. Pool, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 350; Thurber v. Dwyer, 10 R. I. 355; Creech v. Crockett 5 Cush. Mass.) 133.

884 Howard v. Merriam, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 563; Clark v. Wheelock, 99 Mass. 14, 3 Gray's Cas. 456; Curtis v. Galvin, 1 Allen (Mass.) 215, 3 Gray's Cas. 455; Seavey v. Cloudman, 90 Me. 536; Esty v. Baker, 50 Me. 325, 79 Am. Dec. 616; Reed v. Reed, 48 Me. 388; Simp son v. Applegate, 75 Cal. 342; Amick v. Brubaker, 101 Mo. 473.

385 Litt. § 68; Co. Litt. 55b, 56a, 63a; Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43, 3 Gray's Cas. 441; Davis v. Brocklebank, 9 N. H. 73; Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24.

886 Litt. 69; Cornish v. Stubbs, L. R. 5 C. P. 334; Moore v. Boyd, 24 Me. 242; Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 43, 3 Gray's Cas. 441; Clark v. Wheelock, 99 Mass. 14, 3 Gray's Cas. 456; Leavitt V. Leavitt, 47 N. H. 329.

II. (C). TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEAR.

A tenancy from year to year is a term for one year certain, continuing for successive years, unless due notice be given to determine it at the end of the first or any subsequent year.

The tenancy may be created either expressly or by a letting for an indefinite time, subject to the payment of an annual

rent.

The tenant may assign his interest, and on his death it passes to his personal representative.

The tenant is estopped to deny his landlord's title, and is liable for waste.

The tenancy is, at common law, terminable only by a half year's notice to quit, expiring at the end of any current year. The length of notice is now generally fixed by statute.

Tenancies from quarter to quarter, from month to month, or from week to week are similar in character to tenancies from year to year, and are terminable by notices of a quarter, a month, and a week, respectively.

57. Nature and creation.

Tenancies at will were early found to be oppressive and unjust to the tenant, since he might be turned out of possession before his crop was fit for harvesting; and though he had the right to enter and carry off the crop when ripe, he was subjected to great inconvenience. Furthermore, such tenancies were hostile to the policy of the state, which seeks to cherish the proper cultivation of the soil. Consequently, as early as the reign of Henry VIII., it was held that a general occupation, without any express limitation as to time, but with the reservation of annual rent, was to be regarded as a tenancy from year to year, terminable only at the end of any year of the holding by the giving of proper notice.387 Accordingly, in the absence of a statutory provision to the

387 Right V. Darby, 1 Term R. 159, 3 Gray's Cas. 413; Doe v. Porter, 3 Term R. 13; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 47 N. H. 329.

contrary, a tenancy from year to year generally arises in the case of a general letting without limitation as to time, accompanied by the reservation or payment of an annual rent.388 As a result of these principles, the tenancy at will which, by the Statute of Frauds, is created by a parol lease, is frequently, as stated above, by occupancy and payment of rent thereunder, changed into a tenancy from year to year.389 On the other hand, if no rent is reserved or paid, and no time for the termination of the occupancy is named, the tenancy is one at will.390 A tenancy from year to year may also be created by express agreement of the parties, as when the lease is in terms "from year to year," or it is "for one year, and an indefinite period thereafter."91

If rent is reserved or paid with reference to a quarterly, monthly, or weekly holding, the tenancy is one from quarter to quarter, month to month, or week to week, as the case may be, and the conditions of the holding are the same as in the case of a tenancy from year to year, except as regards the length of the term, and the notice required for its termina

388 4 Kent, Comm. 114; Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128, 3 Gray's Cas. 417; Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84, 14 Am. Rep. 615; Ridgely v. Stillwell, 25 Mo. 570; Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 616, 3 Gray's Cas. 446; Dunne v. Trustees of Schools, 39 Ill. 578; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13.

389 See ante, § 37(b), and authorities cited.

890 Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128, 3 Gray's Cas. 417; Herrell v. Sizeland, 81 Ill. 457; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13; Right V. Darby, 1 Term R. 159, 3 Gray's Cas. 413; Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84, 14 Am. Rep. 615.

Sometimes it is stated, as in 4 Kent, Comm. 113, that a general holding creates a tenancy from year to year, without regard to whether the reservation of annual rent or other circumstances indicate a yearly tenancy. The incorrectness of such statements is shown in the learned note to the later editions of Taylor, Landl. & Ten., at section 55.

391 1 Woodfall, Landl. & Ten. 220; Fawcett, Landl. & Ten. (2d Ed.) 144; Doe v. Green, 9 Adol. & E. 658; Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494, Finch's Cas. 773.

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tior, and such tenancies are generally regarded, for the purpose of classification, as tenancies from year to year.

392

A tenancy from year to year does not determine and re commence with every year, but the tenant has a lease for one year certain, with a growing interest during every year thereafter, springing out of the original contract,393 and the same principle applies to a similar letting measured by a less term, as from week to week.394 This matter is important, since, if the tenancy were regarded as recommencing every year, the landlord would, under the rule referred to above,395 be liable for injuries to third persons resulting from defects existing at the beginning of any year. 396

58. Incidents of tenancy.

A tenancy from year to year is in reality a species of estate for years, the chief difference being that, since the term of its duration is not fixed, a notice is necessary for its termination. Consequently, the incidents of the tenancy are generally similar to those of an estate for years.397 The

892 1 Taylor, Landl. & Ten. § 57; Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 616, 3 Gray's Cas. 446; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 96; Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. St. 206.

898 Cattley v. Arnold, 1 Johns. & H. 651; Gandy v. Jubber, 9 Best & S. 15. See Gladwell v. Holcomb, 60 Ohio St. 427, 71 Am. St. Rep. 724.

894 Bowen v. Anderson [1894] 1 Q. B. 164, overruling Sandford v. Clarke, 21 Q. B. Div. 398. Contra, Borman v. Sandgren, 37 Ill. App. 160; Griffith v. Lewis, 17 Mo. App. 605. The two cases last cited are based on Gandy v. Jubber, 5 Best & S. 78, and make no reference to the opinion on appeal in that case (9 Best & S. 15), in which a contrary view was taken, in accordance with the statement in the text.

895 See ante, § 44(d).

396 See Gandy v. Jubber, 9 Best & S. 15; Bowen v. Anderson [1894] 1 Q. B. 164.

397 1 Washburn, Real Prop. 384; Oxley v. James, 13 Mees. & W. 209; Kitchen v. Pridgen, 3 Jones (N. C.) 49.

interest of the tenant may be assigned,398 and passes on his death to his personal representative.399

A tenant from year to year is liable for voluntary waste committed by him, and also, by some decisions, for permissive waste;400 and he is, like any other tenant, estopped to deny his landlord's title.401

59. Termination.

A tenancy from year to year is terminable by proper notice at the end of the first, as well as of any subsequent, year, unless, in creating such tenancy, the parties use words showing an intention to create a tenancy for two years at least.402

The notice necessary to terminate a tenancy from year to year was, in the case of agricultural tenancies, required to be given half a year before the termination of any year, in order that the tenant might be enabled to reap, before he was dispossessed, the crops sown by him, and this requirement of six months' notice was extended to similar tenancies of other property not used for agricultural purposes.408 This early doctrine that a notice is necessary in order to terminate a tenancy from year to year has been adhered to in numerous cases in England and this country,104 but the length of

398 1 Washburn, Real Prop. 384; Cody v. Quarterman, 12 Ga. 386; Pleasant v. Benson, 14 East, 234.

* Doe v. Carter, 8 Term R. 60; Cody v. Quarterman, 12 Ga. 386; Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494, Finch's Cas. 773; Kitchen v. Pridgen, 3 Jones (N. C.) 49.

400 See post, § 254.

401 Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 436.

402 1 Woodfall, Landl. & Ten. 154; Doe v. Smaridge, 7 Q. B. 957, 3 Gray's Cas. 428; Lesley v. Randolph, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 123; Fox v. Nathans, 32 Conn. 848; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180, Finch's Cas. 775.

403 Doe v. Porter, 3 Term R. 13; Gladwell v. Holcomb, 60 Ohio St. 427, 71 Am. St. Rep. 724; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 96.

404 Right v. Darby, 1 Term R. 159, 3 Gray's Cas. 413; Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 89, 3 Gray's Cas. 450; Stedman v. McIntosh,