transfer the title to the wrongful possessor, enabling him to assert his ownership in an action of ejectment or otherwise against the whole world, including the original owner," and as rendering necessary a legal conveyance in order to revest the ownership in the latter, after the lapse of the statutory period.R

The adverse possession which is required in order to divest the title of the true owner, under the construction placed upon the Statute of James as well as upon the state statutes, corresponds in a general way to disseisin at the common law. It may, however, occasionally exist under circumstances which would not have given rise to a disseisin, and the use of the latter term, as well as of the correlative expressions "disseisor" and "disseisee," while permissible and highly convenient, is not always absolutely accurate ac cording to the old law.

437. Duration and continuity of possession.

The Statute of James barred the right of entry at the end of twenty years after the right or title accrued, and this

Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16, Finch's Cas. 1053; Hughes v. Graves, 39 Vt. 359, 3 Gray's Cas. 40; Harpending v. Reformed Protestant Dutch Church of New York City, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 455; Sherman v. Kane, 86 N. Y. 57; Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256, 59 Am. Dec. 115; Schock v. Falls City, 31 Neb. 599; Jacks v. Chaffin, 34 Ark. 534; Mitchell v. Campbell, 19 Or. 198; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cusenberry, 86 Tex. 529; McDuffee v. Sinnott, 119 Ill. 449; Sutton v. Pollard, 96 Ky. 640; Way v. Hooton, 156 Pa. St. 8.

7 Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533; Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256, 59 Am. Dec. 115; Cannon v. Stockmon, 36 Cal. 535, 95 Am. Dec. 205; Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34; Hall v. Hall, 27 W. Va. 468, 480.

8 Inhabitants of School Dist. No. 4, in Winthrop, v. Benson, 31 Me. 381, 3 Gray's Cas. 38, Finch's Cas. 1059; Riggs v. Riley, 113 Ind. 208; Allen v. Mansfield, 82 Mo. 688; Bell v. Adams, 81 N. C. 118; Bruce v. Washington, 80 Tex. 368; Todd v. Kauffman, 8 Mackey (D. C.) 304.

period has been adopted in a number of the states of this country, while in a few a greater period is required to bar the right of action, and in some a much less period.

In a number of the states there are statutory provisions for what are known as "short limitations," in effect considerably reducing the ordinary period in cases when the adverse possession is by one claiming under "color of title,"—that is, by one who has, in taking possession, acted on the strength of a conveyance or judicial decree purporting to rest the title in him, but which, for some reason, fails to do so. In some states, such a provision exists in favor of one occupying under a particular class of conveyance or decree, as when it is provided that a junior patent from the state under which one occupies cannot be attacked after a certain number of years, and such a provision is frequently found in favor of a purchaser at certain classes of judicial sales, or at tax sales. The possession under such a "short limitation" act is usually required to be accompanied by the payment of taxes on the land by the person in possessiu. .10

The adverse possession must continue without interruption for the statutory period, and, if an interruption occurs, and possession is thereafter resumed, the limitation period commences to run only from the time of such resumption.' The interruption of continuity may result from the cessation by the person in possession of his exercise of acts of possession or ownership over the land,12 but the mere fact that

• See Wood, Limitations, § 254.

10 The "short limitation" acts of the several states are well sum. marized in 2 Dembitz, Land Titles, § 186.

11 Steeple v. Downing, 60 Ind. 478; Ross v. Goodwin, 88 Ala. 390; Armstrong v. Risteau's Lessee, 5 Md. 256, 59 Am. Dec. 115; Old South Soc. v. Wainwright, 156 Mass. 115; Bliss v. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 235.

12 Downing v. Mayes, 153 Ill. 330, 46 Am. St. Rep. 896; Stephens V. Leach, 19 Pa. St. 262; Nixon v. Porter, 38 Miss. 401; Sharp v.

the acts of possession are not continuous, or that the owner does not continue in actual occupancy, does not necessarily show an interruption of the possession, this depending on the character of the acts necessary to constitute actual possession, and the circumstances of the particular case.13

A recognition of the true owner's right to possession is sufficient to break the continuity of the possession. The adverse possession is also interrupted if the owner enters on the land, provided this is done openly and under claim of right, with a clearly asserted purpose of taking possession,15 as it is by the enforcement of or submission to a judgment in an action of ejectment brought by the owner, though a mere recovery in ejectment, without any action with reference thereto, does not have such an effect.1

438. Tacking.

The question quite frequently arises whether one who has not been in possession of the land for the statutory period

Johnson, 22 Ark. 79; Barrell v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 27 Or. 79.

13 Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297, Finch's Cas. 1040; Downing V. Mayes, 153 Ill. 330, 46 Am. St. Rep. 896; Ford v. Wilson, 35 Miss. 490, 72 Am. Dec. 137; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536.

14 Nebraska Ry. Co. v. Culver, 35 Neb. 143; City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 63 Minn. 330; Lovell v. Frost, 44 Cal. 471; Litchfield v. Sewell, 97 Iowa, 247; Ingersoll v. Lewis, 11 Pa. St. 212, 51 Am. Dec. 536; Williams v. Scott, 122 N. C. 545; Warren v. Bowdran, 156 Mass. 280.

15 Burrows v. Gallup, 32 Conn. 493, 87 Am. Dec. 186; Bowen v. Guild, 130 Mass. 121, 3 Gray's Cas. 86; Altemas v. Campbell, 9 Watts (Pa.) 28, 34 Am. Dec. 494; Musser-Sauntry Land, Logging & Mfg. Co. v. Tozer, 56 Minn. 443; Evitts v. Roth, 61 Tex. 81; Campbell v. Wallace, 12 N. H. 362, 37 Am. Dec. 219.

16 Moore v. Greene, 19 How. (U. S.) 69; Smith v. Hornback, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 232, 14 Am. Dec. 122; Bishop v. Truett, 85 Ala. 376; McGrath v. Wallace, 85 Cal. 622; Gould v. Carr, 33 Fla. 523; Forbes v. Caldwell, 39 Kan. 14; Mabary v. Dollarhide, 98 Mo. 198, 14 Am. St. Rep. 639.

may add or "tack" to his possession that of another person, previously in possession, in order to make up such period, or, in other words, whether recovery of the land by the original owner is prevented by adverse possession for the statutory period, irrespective of whether this adverse possession was by one person for the whole period, or by different persons in succession. That an heir is entitled to tack his ancestor's possession to his own is generally conceded,17 and the great weight of authority is to the effect that one in adverse possion can transfer his rights, such as they are, to another, by a conveyance of the land, or otherwise, so as to enable such other to tack his predecessor's possession to his own,18 though there are a few decisions to the effect that the disseisor has no rights thus capable of voluntary transfer.19 Even a purchaser at execution sale has been allowed to tack the possession of the execution defendant. 20 A merely oral transfer of the previous predecessor's rights is usually regarded as sufficient.21 It is necessary, however, that there be a trans

17 McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32, 3 Gray's Cas. 124; Overfield v. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173, 3 Gray's Cas. 117; Williams v. McAliley, Cheves (S. C.) 200; Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241, 3 Gray's Cas. 121; Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Or. 515.

18 Overfield v. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173, 3 Gray's Cas. 117; McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32, 3 Gray's Cas. 124; Gage v. Gage, 30 N. H. 420; Frost v. Courtis, 172 Mass. 401. And see cases cited post, note 21.

10 Potts v. Gilbert, 3 Wash. C. C. 475, Fed. Cas. No. 11,347, 3 Gray's Cas. 115; King v. Smith, Rice (S. C.) 10; Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28.

20 Hall v. Hall, 27 W. Va. 468; Miller v. Bumgardner, 109 N. C. 412. See Doe d. Hester v. Coats, 22 Ga. 56.

21 Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297, Finch's Cas. 1040; McNeely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32, 3 Gray's Cas. 125; Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 Ill. 649; Davock v. Nealon, 58 N. J. Law, 21; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152; Com. v. Gibson, 85 Ky. 666; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz, 106 Wis. 499; Rowland v. Williams. 23 Or. 515. But see Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush.

fer or some sort of contractual connection between the respective possessions in order that they may be tacked, and one who disseises another who is already in adverse possession cannot tack the former's possession to his own.22 There can, of course, be no tacking if the possession of one person does not immediately follow upon that of the other, since in that case the element of continuity is absent.23

It has been held that one claiming as remainderman under a will may tack to his own possession the possession of the testator and the life tenant under the will, since the possession of each is under the same title.24 The possession of the widow of the owner has been regarded as not so connected with that of the latter as to entitle her to tack his possession to her own after his death.25 Under statutes, however, by which she is given certain rights of possession even before the assignment of dower, their possessions may be tacked.28 (Mass.) 241, 3 Gray's Cas. 121; Ward v. Bartholomew, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 409.

22 Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152, Finch's Cas. 1007; Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241, 3 Gray's Cas. 121; Lucy v. Tennessee & C. R. Co., 92 Ala. 246; Locke v. Whitney, 63 N. H. 597; Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 531; City & County of San Francisco v. Fulde, 37 Cal. 349, 99 Am. Dec. 278; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Heflin v. Burns, 70 Tex, 347; Jarrett v. Stevens, 36 W. Va. 445; Low v. Schaffer, 24 Or. 239; Erck v. Chuch, 87 Tenn. 580. But see Scales v. Cockrill, 3 Head (Tenn.) 432; Davis v. McArthur, 78 N. C. 357.

23 See Winslow v. Newell, 19 Vt. 164; Kilburn v. Adams, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 33, 39 Am. Dec. 754; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Philyaw, 88 Ala. 264; Warren v. Frederichs, 76 Tex. 647; Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218, 27 Am. Rep. 226. See. also, Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297, Finch's Cas. 1040.

24 Haynes v. Boardman, 119 Mass. 414, Finch's Cas. 1042. Contra, Austin v. Rutland R. Co., 45 Vt. 215.

25 Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241, 3 Gray's Cas. 121; Robinson v. Allison, 124 Ala. 325. But see Mills' Heirs v. Bodley,

4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248; Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482.

26 McEntire v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347.