A married woman may transfer land by a conveyance inter vivos, in which her husband joins, and, in some states, without his joinder; and she can usually transfer it by will without his joinder. The common-law rule that a conveyance directly be. tween the husband and wife is void is still the law in many states, though a conveyance from him to her, if meritorious, is upheld in equity.

A conveyance inter vivos by an infant may usually be avoided by him after arriving at majority, or, in case of his death, by his successors in interest. A conveyance to him may likewise be avoided by him after arriving at majority The age at which one can make a transfer by will is fixed by statute in the different states.

A conveyance by one mentally incapacitated is by some decisions absolutely void, and, by others, merely voidable, and in some states it is valid in favor of an innocent purchaser for value. A will made by one so incapacitated is void.

A corporation has power to acquire land so far as is reasonably incidental to the purposes of its creation, and may transfer it in carrying out such purposes.

At common law, while an alien could acquire land by voluntary conveyance, and hold it till dispossessed by the state, he could not acquire it by act of the law, as by descent, nor could

relationship be traced from or through him for the purpose of claiming by descent. In many states these disabilities have been entirely removed by statute, and in other states considerably restricted.

501. Married women.

At common law, a married woman could not dispose of her land by her sole deed, and could convey it even in conjunction with her husband only by the levy of a fine.1 In this country a conveyance jointly with her husband, acknowledged by her apart from him, was, however, at a quite early date, substituted for a conveyance by means of a fine,2 and this mode of conveyance is no doubt legal in all the states. In most states, moreover, at the present day, the formality. of a separate acknowledgment by the wife is dispensed with, and the statutes extending her rights over her property free from any control by her husband have in some states given her power to convey her lands by a conveyance executed by her alone, without the joinder of her husband. Such right of sole transfer has for many years been recognized by courts of equity in connection with her equitable separate estate, the right being, however, in some jurisdictions, dependent upon an express grant of the power of disposition in the instrument creating the estate.

The later decisions, under the influence, more or less direct, of the statutes enlarging the powers of married women,

11 Bl. Comm. 444; 2 Bl. Comm. 293; 2 Kent's Comm. 150; Williams, Real Prop. (18th Ed.) 288; Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N. Y. 9, Finch's Cas. 987.

2 Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 94; Manchester v. Hough, 5 Mason, 67, Fed. Cas. No. 9,005; Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 14; Jackson v. Gilchrist, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 89, 110.

1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 6500, where the statutory provisions are summarized.

42 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1392 et seq.; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 1104, 1105; ante, § 177.

uphold conveyances made in her behalf by a person holding her power of attorney; and the fact that her attorney is her husband, and that he executes the conveyance in his own right, as well as in her behalf, does not render it invalid.®

At common law the husband could dissent from, and so invalidate, a transfer made to the wife." The modern statutes excluding the husband's rights in her property, and his control thereover, are, however, inconsistent with the existence of any such right in him.

Conveyances between husband and wife.

At common law, a conveyance by a married woman directly to her husband was void, they being regarded in law as but one person, and this is still quite generally the rule, in spite of the statutes enlarging her property rights. Un

8

• In such cases, the power of attorney has usually been executed by the husband jointly with the wife. Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55; Hull v. Glover, 126 Ill. 122; Fulweiler v. Baugher, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 45. Except when the husband himself is appointed attorney, as to which see cases in next note.

In a number of states there is a statutory provision authorizing the wife to convey by attorney. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 6506. Contra, to the effect that the wife cannot convey an interest in land by attorney, see Dawson v. Shirley, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 531; King v. Nutall, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 221; Batte v. McCaa, 44 Ark. 398; Earle's Adm'rs v. Earle, 20 N. J. Law, 347; Sumner v. Conant, 10 Vt. 9; Mott v. Smith, 16 Cal. 533.

• Weisbrod v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 18 Wis. 35, 86 Am. Dec. 743; Munger v. Baldridge, 41 Kan. 236, 13 Am. St. Rep. 273; Wronkow v. Oakley, 133 N. Y. 505, 28 Am. St. Rep. 661.

7 Co. Litt. 3a; 2 Bl. Comm. 293; 2 Kent's Comm. 150; Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 92; Melvin v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimack River, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 161, 167; Baxter v. Smith, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 427, Finch's Cas. 980.

81 Roper, Husb. & Wife, 53; Brooks v. Kearns, 86 Ill. 547; Preston v. Fryer, 38 Md. 221; Luntz v. Greve, 102 Ind. 173; White v. Wager, 25 N. Y. 328; Rico v. Brandenstein, 98 Cal. 465.

der some statutes, however, she may make such a conveyance to him as freely as to other persons, the statute expressly giving her the same rights to alien her separate property as if she were unmarried. She might, even at common law, convey land to a third person, to be conveyed to the husband, in the absence of any coercion or undue influence on the husband's part.10

At common law, the husband could not convey to the wife, and this rule still exists in some jurisdictions.11 In others it has been changed by the modern statutes with reference to married women.12 Land could, however, always be transferred indirectly from the husband to the wife by making use of a third person as a conduit of title,13 and a conveyance directly from the husband to the wife, not in fraud of his creditors, and otherwise meritorious in character, has usually been upheld in equity as a settlement on the wife.14

• Wells v. Caywood, 3 Colo. 487; Savage v. Savage, 80 Me. 472; Robertson v. Robertson, 25 Iowa, 350.

10 Scarborough v. Watkins, 9 B. Mon. (Ky.) 540, 50 Am. Dec. 528; Gebb v. Rose, 40 Md. 387; Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 110; Jasper v. Maxwell, 16 N. C. 357; Garvin v. Ingram, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 130; Shepperson v. Shepperson, 2 Grat. (Va.) 501.

111 Bl. Comm. 442; 2 Kent's Comm. 129; Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57; Carrington v. Richardson, 79 Ala. 101; Coates v. Gerlach, 44 Pa. St. 43; Frissell v. Rozier, 19 Mo. 448; Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 40; Johnson v. Vandervort, 16 Neb. 144; Humphrey v. Spencer, 36 W. Va. 11; Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50 (Gil. 32), 88 Am. Dec. 49; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610.

12 Baygents v. Beard, 41 Miss. 531; Walker v. Long, 109 N. C. 510; Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 91; Booker v. Worrill, 55 Ga. 332. 18 Jewell v. Porter, 31 N. H. 34; McMillan v. Cheeney, 30 Minn. 519. And this could be effected, under the Statute of Uses, by a conveyance to a third person of the legal title, to the use of the wife, the use being executed by the statute in the latter. 1 Roper, Husb. & Wife, 53.

14 Moore v. Page, 111 U. S. 117; Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 228; Powe v. McLeod, 76 Ala. 418; Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57, 11 Am. Dec. 396; Albright v. Albright, 70 Wis. 528; Wilder v. Brooks, 10 Minn. 50 (Gil. 32), 88 Am. Dec. 49; Vought's Ex'rs v.

Transfer by will.

10

18

Under the English Statute of Wills, as declared by a statute passed two years later, a married woman had no power to dispose of her legal interest in lands, nor could she so dispose at common law of her legal personal property, since this belonged to the busband. In most of the states she can, at the present day, dispose of her real or personal property by will without her husband's consent, as if sole,1 and she can, in all jurisdictions, so dispose of her equitable separate estate.18

At common law, any person under the age of twenty-one is an infant; but by statute in a number of states the period of infancy is, in the case of females, reduced to eighteen years, and, in some, the marriage of a female infant gives her the powers of an adult married woman.19

A transfer inter vivos of an estate or interest in land by an infant is voidable, though not void,-that is, it is effective to transfer title unless it is repudiated by him after attaining his majority;20 and it may be repudiated by him,

Vought, 50 N. J. Eq. 177; Johnson v. Vandervort, 16 Neb. 144; Wells v. Wells, 85 Miss. 638; Furrow v. Athey, 21 Neb. 671, 59 Am. Rep. 867; Turner v. Shaw, 96 Mo. 22, 9 Am. St. Rep. 319; Coates v. Gerlach, 44 Pa. St. 43; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Humphrey v. Spencer, 36 W. Va. 11.

18 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 5, § 14.

16 1 Jarman, Wills, 39, Bigelow's note.

17 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, 8 6460; 1 Woerner, Administration, § 21. 18 1 Jarman, Wills, 41; 2 Perry, Trusts, § 668.

191 Bl. Comm. 463; 2 Kent's Comm. 233; 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, § 6601.

20 Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 617; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; Slaughter v. Cunningham, 24 Ala. 260, 60 Am. Dec. 463; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236, 35 Am. Rep. 318; Gillesple v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70, 29 Am. Rep. 445; Green v. Wilding, 59 Iowa, 679, 44 Am. Rep. 696; Logan v. Gardner, 136 Pa. St. 588, 20