170. Contracts and conveyances by cotenant. Contribution as between cotenants. 172. Acquisition of adverse title by cotenant. 173. Actions by cotenants. 174. Voluntary partition. 175. Compulsory partition. Estates and interests in land, whether present or future, may belong to two or more individuals, in such a way that the latter have concurrent or simultaneous interests in the whole of certain land, and not separate interests in distinct parts. Such concurrent ownership may take the form of (1) joint tenancy; (2) tenancy in common; (3) coparcenary; (4) tenancy by entireties; (5) community property; (6) partnership property. Joint tenancy exists when a single estate in land is owned by two or more persons claiming under one instrument; its most important characteristic being that, unless the statute otherwise provides, the interest of each joint tenant, upon his death, inures to the benefit of the surviving joint tenant or tenants, to the exclusion of his own heirs, devisees, or personal representatives. Tenancy in common exists when two or more persons hold separate estates in undivided shares in land, claiming either under different titles, or under a single instrument not showing an intention to create a joint tenancy. At common law, a tenancy in coparcenary or parcenary arises when, on the death of one having an estate of inheritance, it descends to two or more heirs. It is frequently changed into tenancy in common in this country. Tenancy by entireties is the tenancy by which husband and wife hold land conveyed or devised to them by a single instrument, which does not expressly require them to hold it by another character of tenancy. The survivor of the marriage takes the whole property so held. Community property is such property as belongs, under the community system prevailing in certain states, equally to man and wife, as having been acquired by their joint efforts. Partnership property is property the beneficial interest in which is applicable to the payment of the debts of a firm, usually as a result of its purchase with the firm's funds for firm purposes, the legal title being vested in one or more firm members, or in a person not a member. There may be an ouster of one tenant in common, joint tenant, or coparcener by another, but there is no presumption of ouster from the fact that one is in sole possession. One cotenant cannot, by his conveyance of his interest in a part of the common property, affect the rights of the other cotenants as regards that part. One cotenant cannot usually demand contribution from the others on account of improvements made by him, though he may, by the weight of authority in this country, have contribution for necessary repairs made by him after asking the others to join therein. An adverse title acquired by one cotenant will, by the decisions in this country, usually inure to the benefit of the others, upon contribution by them to the cost of its acquisition. Property held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or coparcenary may be divided among the cotenants, either by agreement (voluntary partition), or by legal proceedings (compulsory partition). (369) $161. The general nature of concurrent ownership. While, as a general rule, lands or estates therein are held by one person in severalty, that is, in his own right only, without any other person being joined or connected with him in point of interest, during the continuance of his estate therein, this is not necessarily the case, and two or more persons may have concurrent interests in the land; the common characteristic of all such interests being that the owners have no separate rights as regards any distinct portion of the land, but each is interested, according to the extent of his share, in every part of the whole land.1 Such concurrent ownership bears different names, and presents different characteristics, according to the various methods and circumstances of its creation. Each of the various forms of such ownership will be here considered separately, and subsequently some characteristics common to two or more of :hem will be considered. § 162. Joint tenancy. In the case of a joint tenancy, all the tenants have together, in the theory of the law, but one estate in the land, and to this are to be traced the various characteristics of the tenancy. Furthermore, all the tenants, whether only two, or more than two, constitute for some purposes but one tenant, or, as it is more specifically stated, each tenant is regarded as the tenant of the whole, for purposes of tenure and survivorship; while for purposes of alienation and forfeiture each has his own share only." 1 See 2 Bl. Comm. 179; 2 Cruise, Dig. tit. 18, c. 1, § 1; Digby, Hist. Real Prop. (4th Ed.) p. 274; Challis, Real Prop. 293. 2 Co. Litt. 186a; 1 Preston, Est. 136; 4 Kent, Comm. 360, note (a); 1 Washburn, Real Prop. 406; Challis, Real Prop. 296. This is appar ently the meaning of the statement in the books that each tenant holds "per my et per tout," whether "my" means "half," or whether it neans "nothing,"-a matter on which there has been a conflict of opinion. See authorities cited supra. See, also, 2 Blackstone, 182; Williams, Real Prop. 136, and American note. Likewise, as between each other, joint tenants have each the right to a share of the rents and profits of the land.3 In a joint tenancy there are said by Blackstone to be four unities, to wit, unity of interest, of title, of time, and of possession, or, in other words, joint tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession. Of these, the unity of possession, only, exists in all forms of concurrent ownership. The unity of interest refers to the necessity that all the tenants have interests of the same duration, and accordingly one cannot be tenant for life and another for years; one cannot be tenant in fee, and the other in tail. This requirement is a necessary result of the theory that together they have but one estate. The requirement of unity of time involves a necessity that the interests of all the joint tenants should vest at the same time. Thus, if, after a lease for life, a remainder be limited to the heirs of A. and B., and during the continuance of the particular estate A. and B. die at different times, the heir of A. and the heir of B. 5 Williams, Real Prop. 132; 4 Kent, Comm. 359. See infra, § 121. 42 Bl. Comm. 180. As stated by Mr. Challis, this theory of the four unities has perhaps attracted attention rather by reason of its appearance of symmetry and exactness than by reason of its practical utility, and it means merely that each joint tenant stands in all respects in exactly the same position as each of the others, and anything which creates a distinction either severs the tenancy or prevents it from arising. Challis, Real Prop. 295. Co. Litt. 188a; 2 Cruise, Dig. tit. 18, c. 1, §§ 12-15; 2 Bl. Comm. 181; 4 Kent, Comm. 357. An estate may, however, be limited to two persons in joint tenancy for less than a fee, as for their lives, with remainder to one of them in fee, in which case, if he who has the fee dies first, the survivor, by right of survivorship, takes the whole estate for life, or they may have a joint tenancy for their lives, with several inheritances. 2 Bl. Comm. 181, and Chitty's note; Litt. §§ 283, 285; Co. Litt. 188a; 4 Kent, Comm. 357. As to a joint tenancy in two persons for their lives, with remainders to their heirs, see 6 Harv, Law Rev. 321. cannot be joint tenants, since their interests do not arise at the same time. This requirement does not, however, apply in the case of limitations by way of use, or where the interests arise by devise,' and the same is no doubt true in the case of a statutory conveyance by way of grant. The doctrine of survivorship. As stated in the definition, the leading characteristic of a joint tenancy is the fact that, on the death of one joint tenant, the other joint tenant or tenants who may survive him, if it is an estate of inheritance, have the whole estate. Thus, if there be three joint tenants, on the death of one the two survivors have the whole, and, on the death of one of these survivors, the last survivor has the whole, and, on the death of this last survivor, the whole passes to his heirs, or to his personal representatives, if it be a leasehold estate. This doctrine is based on the fact, before referred to, that all the tenants together, as regards the feudal lord, were regarded as constituting but one tenant, and that this fictitious personality was considered as existent so long as any one of the tenants was alive. The right of the survivor to succeed to the interest of a deceased joint tenant takes precedence of any devise made by the latter, nor can it generally be affected by any charge placed by the latter on his interest, or by a grant by him of a right of use or profit.10 It may, however, be destroyed at the option • Co. Litt. 188a; 2 Bl. Comm. 181. 72 Cruise, Dig. tit. 18, c. 1, § 25; Williams, Real Prop. 135; 4 Kent, Comm. 358, note (d); Challis, Real Prop. 295. Consequently, if there is a limitation of a use in remainder to the children of the life tenant, they may be joint tenants, though they come into being at different times. 2 Jarman, Wills, 1118. 8 Litt. § 280; 2 Bl. Comm. 183; 4 Kent, Comm. 360. • Williams, Real Prop. 134. 10 Co. Litt. 185a; 4 Kent, Comm. 360; 2 Cruise, Dig. tit. 18, o. 1 8 53-56; Freeman, Cotenancy, § 14, |