The Parker Mills v. The Commissioners of Taxes.

The present case does not come strictly within the terms of this exception. The word "products," as here used, means, as I suppose, the natural agricultural products of the country. But I can see no distinction in principle between the present case and the case excepted. In both, the commodity is produced and owned in other States, and is brought temporarily into this State for the mere purposes of a market. Every reason which would lead to exemption from taxation in one case, applies, as I conceive, equally to the other. The exception is to be considered rather as indicative of the scope intended to be given to the principal clause, than as founded upon any reasons specially applicable to the natural products of the country as distinct from other property. It is a case to which the maxim, expressio unius exclusio est alterius, does not apply. The exception was undoubtedly inserted, from abundant caution, to prevent a misconstruction of the previous clause, authorizing the taxation of trustees and agents for the property in their hands; and not because the legislature intended to discriminate between the products of agricultural and other kinds of labor. It shows that it was no part of the policy of the legislature, when that act was passed, to compel the citizens of other States to contribute to the support of our government simply because they send a portion of the products of their industry to this State to be sold. It is clear, therefore, that the property of the relators could not have been taxed to their agent under the law of 1851; and I see no reason to suppose that it was intended, by the law of 1855, to adopt a different policy in respect to property so situated. My conclusion, therefore, is, that the judgment of the Supreme Court should be reversed, and that the proceedings should be remitted, with instructions to cause the names of the relator to be erased from the assessment roll, and the corresponding tax to be canceled.

All the judges concurring,

Ordered accordingly.

The People v. Denniston.

THE PEOPLE, ex rel. DE FOREST, v. DENNISTON, Comptroller.

A State loan reimbursable at the pleasure of the State after twenty years, has no term of payment until the legislature has fixed it by law. Where such a loan was made under a law passed before the Constitution of 1846, for the benefit of the Long Island Railroad Company, which was bound to redeem the stock, an act giving to its holders the option of having it made payable in 1876, is not in violation of the constitutional prohibition of the loan of the State credit to corporations.

APPEAL from the judgment at a general term of the Supreme Court in the fourth district, affirming an order of the special term, granting a peremptory mandamus to compel the Comptroller of the State of New York to make an indorsement on certain bonds of the State, loaned to the Long Island Railroad Company.

It was enacted, by chapter 193 of the Laws of 1840, that whenever the Long Island Railroad Company should produce to the Comptroller the joint affidavits of five directors of said Company, that the sum of $400,000 of the moneys paid in on the capital stock of said company, had been actually expended by them in the construction of their road, he should issue and deliver to the treasurer of said company, special certificates of stock to the amount of $100,000, bearing an interest not exceeding six per cent, payable semi-annually. This amount was made a lien upon the road in favor of the State, and the money accruing from the sale of the certificates was to be applied to the construction of the road. The company was to pay punctually the interest in such manner as should exonerate the treasury of the State from any advance of money for that purpose; and, also, to pay, on the 1st day of January in each year, to the Comptroller, one per cent on the amount of said stock, to be by him invested as a sinking fund for the redemption of the stock. In case of default in payment of interest or contribution to the sinking fund, the Comptroller was required to sell the road and appurtenances, as therein provided.

The People v. Denniston.

The 7th section of the act was as follows: "§ 7. The said stock shall be reimbursable at the pleasure of the legislature, at any time after twenty years from the date of the respective issues thereof." The certificates issued were all dated July 27th, 1841, bearing interest from August 1st, 1841, reïmbursable at the pleasure of the State, at any time after the 1st day of August, 1861.

The interest and the contribution to the sinking fund was duly made as required by the act.

By the Laws of 1858, chapter 36, it is enacted as follows: "§ 1. The stock of the State of New York, issued to the Long Island Railroad Company, in pursuance of the provisions of chapter one hundred and ninety-three of the Laws of said State for the year eighteen hundred and forty, is hereby made payable on the first day of August, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, provided any party who may hold certificates of such stock, who may desire the same made payable on the said first day of August, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, shall, on or before the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, present such certificates to the Comptroller for indorsement, whereupon the Comptroller shall indorse on each of the said certificates the following words, namely, 'The principal of this bond is payable on the first day of August, eighteen hundred and seventy-six, and the rate of interest thereon is to be five per cent per annum, after the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, payable semi-annually, as heretofore,' attesting the same by his signature, and stating the date of the act of the legislature authorizing such indorse

ment.

"§ 2. Such certificates as shall not be so presented and indorsed shall be payable on the first day of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, from the funds to the credit of the railroad company then held by the Comptroller, or other additional funds if necessary, to be furnished by said company."

The 3d section provides, that the company shall pay the interest at five per cent on all the certificates so indorsed, and also pay to the Comptroller $2,000 per annum, to be invested

The People v. Denniston.

by him as a sinking fund for the redemption of the stock so indorsed in lieu of the $1,000 heretofore annually paid by said company as a sinking fund.

Section 4 provides, that this law shall not release the said railroad company from any liability imposed by the law of 1840, but the provisions and conditions thereof, not herein modified, shall remain in full force and effect.

On or about the 1st day of December, 1860, the Long Island Railroad Company filed with the Comptroller its consent that he should indorse such bonds as should be presented to him for that purpose, and requested the Comptroller to make the indorsement prescribed by the act of 1858.

On the same day the relator, being the owner and holder of one of said bonds, No. 16, presented the same to the defendant, and demanded that he should indorse it pursuant to the act of 1858, which the defendant refused to do on the ground that said act was a nullity.

The relator, upon affidavits, the several acts of the legis lature in relation thereto, and on notice of motion, applied to the Supreme Court, at special term, for a writ of mandamus to compel the Comptroller to indorse said stock; and after hearing the motion, the court awarded the peremptory writ, which was accordingly issued.

Charles G. Myers, Attorney-General, for the appellant.

Alonzo C. Paige, for the respondents.

JAMES, J. The ground upon which the Comptroller placed his refusal to do the act required, was, that the act of March, 1858, authorizing it, was in conflict with the 9th section of article VII of the Constitution of this State, and therefore void. That section of the Constitution declares that the credit of the State shall not, in any manner, be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation. The Constitution was adopted in 1846, and by the 17th section of article I, it was declared that such acts of the legislature of the State SMITH.-VOL. IX.

32

The People v. Denniston.

as were then in force, should be and continue the law of the State, subject to such alterations as the legislature should make concerning the same. The operation of the Constitution was therefore wholly prospective.

The Comptroller's refusal rests on the assumption that the act of 1858 was a loaning of the credit of the State to the Long Island Railroad Company, and unless that assumption be correct, he is without excuse.

To determine this question, it is necessary to ascertain the duration of the loan as authorized by the act of 1840. The argument of the Attorney-General is, that by the true construction of the statute, it falls due on the 1st day of August, 1861; that the words "at the pleasure of the legislature," contained in the act, are mere surplusage, and that such has been the uniform construction given to acts containing similar provisions by the State officers. I cannot concur in that construction. In construing a statute, it is the duty of the court, if possible, to give force and effect to every word used, if it can be done without a violation of the organic law. The words employed are to be understood according to their natural signification and import. When the words are plain and clear, and their sense distinct and perfect, there is generally no necessity to resort to any constructive means of interpretation. There is no room for construction. The words themselves declare the meaning of the instrument, and courts have no right to add to, or take away from, that meaning. (3 Seld., 97.) In this case, the words used are plain and clear; they embody a meaning precise and distinct, and that meaning cannot well be misunderstood. Taking the language of the act, and giving to every word its full force, according to its most common and popular signification, the intention of the legisla ture is plain and clear-it makes the stock reïmbursable at the pleasure of the legislature after twenty years from its issue. No other construction can be given to the act, unless a part of its words are omitted. To give it the construction contended for by the defendant, the words "at the pleasure of the legislature at any time after," would have to be erased. I cannot