Moultrie v. Hunt. and adds, "and who continue to be thus domiciled at the time the will takes effect by death." I fail to see that the case of De Bonneval v. De Bonneval (1 Curt. Eccl. R., 856), cited as authority for this proposition, maintains it. It appears to me that the precise point decided in that case was, that the deceased was originally domiciled in France, and that no change of domicil had taken place: and that although he died in England, yet the validity or invalidity of his will must be determined by the French tribunals, and not by the courts in England; and that it was for them to determine its validity and the succession to his personal estate. Nothing is said of the effect of a change of domicil, upon the validity of a will executed according to the form of a previous domicil. That the Chancellor regarded the rule to be as I have stated it, is I think to be drawn from the subsequent case of the will of Roberts' wife. (8 Paige, 519.) The issue directed by the Chancellor to be formed and tried was, "whether the decedent was domiciled in Cuba or in this State, at the time such will and codicil purported to have been executed," they not having been executed in the form prescribed by the Revised Statutes of this State. In this case the Chancellor says, that there is a difference of opinion among foreign jurists, whether a will of personal estate, or movable property as it is called by the civilians, in which the testator has complied with the forms and solemnities required by the lex loci actus, is a valid testamentary disposition of such property, although in the form of its execution, such will does not conform to the requirements of the law of the testator's domicil. (The domicil here referred to, must mean that of the testator's death.) He proceeds to say, that the better opinion however appears to be, that so far as regards the mere formal execution of the testament, it is sufficient if it conforms to the law of the country where the will is made, in accordance with the maxim, locus regit actum. These views of the Chancellor coincide with those of the Surrogate in the present case; and finding no authority in hostility to them, I think they should receive the sanction of this court, for the reasons already urged. It seems to be an authoritative deci Moultrie v. Hunt. sion, holding that a will of personal estate duly executed according to the law of the testator's domicil, at the time of its date, and valid there, is not revoked by a change of domicil to another state or country where different forms are required. In this connection the provisions of our statute, on the subject of the revocation of wills, are not without significance. They are, that no will-that is a legal and valid will, as it is deemed it has been conclusively shown this was, at the time of the change of domicil-shall be revoked, otherwise than by some other will in writing, or other writing of the testator, executed with the same formalities with which the will itself was required by law to be executed. We have seen what those formalities were, when the will was executed in this State, and when made out of it, by a citizen of this State, and by persons not citizens. The Statutes also provide for a revocation in other modes therein enumerated. (2 R. S., § 42, p. 64.) Now it is not declared by the legislature that a change of domicil shall work a revocation of a valid will; and the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius may be applied here with great force and propriety. If the legislature had intended such should be the law-it is reasonable to infer-while legislating on the subject of revoca tion of wills, it would have so declared. This will, at the time it was made, was required by law to be executed in the precise form in which it was in fact executed, and it was then a complete and valid will; and the inquiry presents itself, how has it been revoked, and by what process has it lost its completeness and legal force? - Certainly by no act of the testator himself, directly tending to that result, or indicating any such intention; nor by any of the processes pointed out by our Revised Statutes, to effectuate such a purpose. Such revocation is sought to be maintained from the sole circumstance of a change of domicil to a State where different forms are required for the valid execution of a will, but upon whose statute books it is declared that wills of personal estate, if executed out of this State according to the laws of the place where executed, shall be valid, and that the same shall not be deemed revoked Fellows v. Denniston. unless by an instrument in writing, executed with the same formalities. I am unable to see any reason upon principle or authority, why such a change of domicil should be held to be a revocation of a will. I think the legislature have in effect declared that it shall not, and that a will valid at the time of its execution, remains such, unless revoked in the manner and with the forms prescribed. The judgment of the Supreme Court should therefore be affirmed, with costs. SELDEN and MASON, Js., also dissented. Judgment of the Supreme Court and of Surrogate reversed. FELLOWS et al. v. DENNISTON, Comptroller, et al. Taxes authorized by a single act of the legislature (ch. 156, of 1841), for the construction of roads through three Indian reservations in the counties of Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua and Erie, are not general or State taxes in the sense of being extraordinary levies for peculiar or exceptional objects, as distinguished from the usual burdens imposed by general laws for town and county purposes; nor are they within the meaning of the compact of December 16, 1786, between this State and Massachusetts, prohibiting general and State taxes for a limited period The act authorizing the sale of the lands for the collection of unpaid taxes, but providing that such sale should not affect the Indian right of occupancy, is valid as against the objection that it conflicts with the treaties by which the United States guaranty the Indian tribes against being disturbed in the free use and enjoyment of their lands, or the acts of Congress regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes. It operates only as against the preemption rights of white purchasers. The act, however (ch. 254, of 1840), authorizing the taxation and sale of Indian lands, without any reservation of the rights of Indian occupants is unconstitutional and void. The lands of Indian tribes were not subject to assessment for taxes under the general provisions of the Revised Statutes. The policy of our laws, until changed by the statute of 1840, regarded the Indians within our Fellows v. Denniston. borders as distinct communities, not embraced within the administrative arrangement of towns and counties, though resident within their bounds But such lands were taxable when the Indian tribes, although actually occupying the Buffalo reservation, were so doing under a treaty which had extinguished their ownership, and provided for their removal beyond the Mississippi within the period at which the purchaser at a tax sale would be entitled to possession. Lands thus occupied were properly assessed as non-resident lands. The possession which, under the Revised Statutes, would justify their assessment to the occupant, where the owner resided in another town, must be the possession of persons themselves liable to taxation. The entire Buffalo reservation having been returned for the non-payment of taxes, and the several lots into which it was divided having been subsequently returned for the non-payment of other taxes, the Comptroller was authorized to apportion the taxes upon the whole tract, or portions of it which had been assessed in gross, among the several lots in proportion to their area, treating them as equally valuable in proportion to quantity; and his sale of the several lots for the taxes as thus apportioned was regular and valid. APPEAL from the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs claiming that certain lands in the Indian reservations within this State, to which they had become entitled, had been illegally assessed and sold for the non-payment of taxes, united with the Comptroller as representing the State, and with the assignee of the purchaser at the tax-sales, in a statement of facts which they submitted without action under section 372 of the Code of Procedure. The case thus made is sufficiently stated in the following opinion. The Supreme Court, at general term in the third district, denied any relief to the plaintiffs, and from that judgment they appealed to this court. John H. Reynolds, for the appellants. John K. Porter, for the respondents. DENIO, J. The present appeal is from the judgment of the Supreme Court, at general term, upon a case agreed upon by the parties, pursuant to the 372d section of the Code of Procedure. The controversy relates to the assessment of certain taxes upon lands comprised in Indian reservations in the counties of Erie and Cattaraugus, alleged to be illegal, and to sales Fellows v. Denniston. made by the Comptroller for the collection of these taxes. The assessments were made under special acts of the legisla ture, and, as to a portion of them, under the general laws of the State. By a statute passed in 1841, the Board of Supervisors of Erie county were authorized to appoint commissioners to lay out and construct roads across the Buffalo creek reservation, which lies wholly in that county, and across a portion of the Cattaraugus reservation, which is partly in that county and in part in Cattaraugus and Chautauqua. The Board of Supervisors of Cattaraugus county were in like manner authorized to appoint commissioners to lay out roads in the Allegany reservation, the whole of which is in the last mentioned county, and in that part of the Cattaraugus reservation which lies in the same county. The expense of making these roads and of the necessary bridges, and of repairing them, and of repairing other roads and bridges on the said Indian lands, was to be defrayed by taxes to be laid on the reservations, in the year 1841 and in the two following years. The Supervisors of Erie county were authorized during those years to assess an amount not exceeding $5,000 per annum, on the land in the Buffalo creek reservation, and not exceeding $4,000 per annum on that of the Cattaraugus reservation lying in that county; and the Supervisors of Cattaraugus were allowed to assess not exceed ing $4,000 per annum on the Allegany reservation, and not more than $1,000 per annum on the part of the Cattaraugus reservation lying in that county. Taxes were annually assessed in each of those years, to the maximum amount mentioned, in each county. (Laws, 1841, ch. 166.) It was also provided in the act that, if these taxes should remain unpaid for two years, the Comptroller should advertise and sell the lands in the manner provided by law; but it was added that no sale for the purpose of collecting them should in any manner affect the right of the Indians to occupy said lands. The general objection to this taxation arises out of the fact that it is laid, as alleged, upon lands belonging to the Seneca nation of Indians. There is no doubt that, prior to the year |